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Victorian society witnessed a transformation in the understanding and treatment of psychological 
disorders. The expansion of nosologies or classifications of lunacy was one measure hailed by 
psychological physicians as indicative of their mastery over madness. Yet between the 1840s and 
the 1870s the introduction of moral insanity and monomania to established classificatory systems 
undercut the medical authority of physicians and challenged their desired cultural stature as 
benevolent and authoritative agents of cure. Far from consolidating medical authority, these 
`partial' forms of lunacy (which were detected in the emotions rather than the intellect) 
paradoxically heightened anxiety about the ease with which eccentric or sane individuals could be 
wrongfully incarcerated in lunatic asylums. This dissertation examines the themes, motifs and 
defining issues of wrongful incarceration as they were discussed in Parliament, national and 
regional newspapers, medical and literary journals, and novels and short stories. Discussing in 
detail several infamous `cases' of wrongful confinement, it traces the ways in which anxieties were 
formulated, expressed and negotiated. 
The public outcry over cultural representations of wrongful confinement generated heated reactions 
from physicians and lunacy law reformers. The most contentious discussions centred on the 
manner in which notions of humanity and benevolence, and tyranny and liberty, were marshalled 
to influence public opinion. These debates represented not solely a legal conflict centring the claim 
to treatment and authority over the alleged lunatic, but more dramatically a battle for the public's 
good opinion. As important as medico-legal trials and their consequent rulings was the contested 
appropriateness of sentiment; this was manifested in words and images utilised to exacerbate or 
contain anxiety. The wrongful confinement controversy constitutes an important (though largely 
overlooked) episode in the history of English nineteenth-century psychiatry; formatively altering 
perceptions of the profession of mental science in the Victorian period. . 
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The possibility that sane or merely eccentric individuals could at the `dictation of benevolence, and 
under the sanction of science' be ̀ seized, gagged, manacled, and placed beyond the pale of the 
constitution, within the walls of a [lunatic] asylum' and be subject there to a ̀ hideous captivity' 
was an enduring cultural anxiety of the Victorians. 
' Wrongful confinement generated widespread 
apprehension and was discussed not only in pamphlets, novels, journals and newspapers but also in 
medical and legal circles and in both Houses of Parliament. Specific attention was directed at the 
roles, rights and responsibilities of physicians specialising in the newly-emerging field of mental 
science. As this dissertation will demonstrate, these debates associated with cultural 
representations of wrongful incarceration focused on the dangers to civil liberties perceived in the 
newly-emerging theories of partial insanity: monomania and moral insanity, forms of partial 
insanity detected in the emotions, behaviours and morals rather than in the intellectual faculties. 
Physicians who made diagnoses of moral insanity and monomania were accused of assisting 
criminals in evading carceral punishment. 
2 However the most contentious and problematic 
discussions about wrongful incarceration centred on the potential threat that physicians and their 
theories of partial insanity posed to the `liberty of the self'. Paying particular attention to the way 
in which these discussions drew upon and complicated medico-legal and cultural conceptions of 
both individual liberty and the liberty afforded to physicians to diagnose lunacy, this study will 
examine the debates and controversies engendered by the fear of wrongful and illegal incarceration 
in private lunatic asylums in England from the early 1840s through to the late 1870s. 
The Victorians witnessed an unprecedented rise in the cultural prestige of psychological 
physicians. The development and consolidation of professional bodies and associations whose 
members specialised in the care and treatment of the insane strengthened their esteem and 
autonomy within the medical profession. 
3 Parliamentary legislation concerning the care and 
1 W. A. F. Browne, What Asylums Were, Are, and Ought to Be (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 
1837), p. 99; Henry Cockton, The Life and Adventures of Valentine Vox, the Ventriloquist (London: 
Willoughby, 1848), p. vi. First published in 1840; Sheridan Le Fanu, The Rose and the Key (Stroud, 
Gloucs.: Alan Sutton, 1994), p. 312. First published in 1871. 
2 The inclusion of theories of partial insanity into established psychiatric nosologies also heightened 
anxiety about their use in other situations. In the late 1860s the new wife of Sir Charles Mordaunt, 
Harriett Moncreiffe, admitted to him that she had been unfaithful. Shocked, Mordaunt instituted 
divorce proceedings. Hamilton argues that Harriett deliberately feigned insanity (on the order of her 
father) in order to prevent the divorce case coming to court. See Elizabeth Hamilton's account of the 
scandal in The Warwickshire Scandal (Norwich: Michael Russell, 1999). 
3 The Association of Medical Officers of Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane (AMOAHI) was 
established in 1841. In 1853 the Association began to publish its Asylum Journal of Mental Science 
(hereafter abbreviated as JMS) under the editorship of the medical superintendent of the Devon 
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treatment of lunatics was subject to a zealous Benthamite overhaul. Marking the codification of a 
comprehensive lunacy law, two lunacy Acts of 1845 were instrumental in establishing a nationwide 
system of care for the insane. 
4 Under the `Act for the Regulation of the Care and Treatment of 
Lunatics' (8 &9 Vict. c. 100), the Metropolitan Lunacy Commission (which had been established 
in 1828 and which was commonly perceived to be ineffectual) was replaced by the centralised Board 
of Commissioners in Lunacy. Chaired by Lord Shaftesbury, the inspectorates comprising the new 
Commission held specific statutory authority over the insane in England and Wales to license, 
oversee, inspect workhouses, county, borough and private asylums, and monitor admissions to 
ensure the prevention of wrongful confinement. The second Act, implemented to `amend the Laws 
for the Provision and Regulation of Lunatic Asylums for Counties and Boroughs, and for the 
Maintenance and Care of Pauper Lunatics' (8 &9 Vict. c. 126) made the provision of adequate care 
for lunatics in all counties and boroughs compulsory within three years and led to an intense 
period of asylum construction. 
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The establishment of the lunatic asylum as the officially-sanctioned site for care and 
treatment of the insane, and the development of an authoritative medical discourse (underpinned 
by the consolidation and professionalisation of the field of mental science) both contributed to a 
sense of therapeutic optimism. The provisions contained in the two Acts also contributed to the 
development of a new medical attitude towards the insane. From an inhuman brute without reason, 
the lunatic was now regarded as a diseased individual who was, for the first time, capable of being 
cured. Underpinning this transformation lay not only the replacement of brutal `physicking' and 
County Asylum, John Charles Bucknill (1817-1897). Though the journal represented one of the first 
efforts to construct a collective identity for psychological physicians distinct from other medical 
practitioners and bodies, the distinction of being the first English journal wholly devoted to the study 
of insanity fell in 1848 to Dr. Forbes Benignus Winslow's Journal of Psychological Medicine and 
Mental Pathology (hereafter abbreviated as JPMMP). As the proprietor of two private establishments 
for the insane, Winslow's journal was more geared to the needs and interests of physicians associated 
with private lunatic asylums. Collectively such developments reflect the increasing recognition that 
insanity was primarily a medical rather than moral problem. Andrew Scull, Charlotte MacKenzie and 
Nicholas Hervey, Masters of Bedlam: The Transformation of the Mad-Doctoring Trade, (Princeton, 
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 194. See also Andrew Scull, The Most Solitary of 
Afflictions: Madness and Society in Britain 1700-1900 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 
pp. 232-244. 
4 Michael Donnelly, Managing the Mind -A Study of Medical Psychology in Early Nineteenth-Century 
Britain (London: Tavistock, 1983), pp. 17,28. On the significance of this legislation, see also Leonard 
D. Smith, `Cure, Comfort and Safe Custody': Public Lunatic Asylums in Early Nineteenth-Century 
England (London: Leicester University Press, 1999), p. 275. 
5 On the problems attending the widespread construction of public asylums, see Peter McCandless, 
"`Build! Build! " The Controversy over the Care of the Chronically Insane in England, 1855-1870', 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 53 (1979), pp. 553-574. 
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mechanical restraints with a regime of psychological management, but the development of 
increasingly sophisticated nosologies or classifications of insanity. 
Though the extension of nosologies was hailed as a symbol of increasing diagnostic 
precision which was capable of transforming the effectiveness of clinical treatment, the 
incorporation of theories of moral insanity and monomania into established psychiatric nosologies 
paradoxically engendered public anxiety about the asylum and a fear of physicians specialising in 
mental diseases. Notwithstanding the safeguards contained in Parliamentary legislation purporting 
to prevent the possibility of anyone other than the insane being detained within a lunatic asylum, 
this dissertation will argue that moral insanity and monomania were formative in the 
construction, negotiation and deployment of anxieties about wrongful confinement throughout the 
nineteenth century. 
Supporters of the asylum perceived in representations of wrongful confinement (and the 
associated depiction of physicians as devious mad-doctors whose overriding interest in the lunatic 
was the pecuniary advantage to be gained from his or her detention) a challenge to physicians' 
recently achieved medical pre-eminence and their coveted cultural status as advocates of a liberal 
social order. As one physician wrote in 1859, 
Instead of giving confidence to those who undertake the ungrateful duty of passing a large 
proportion of their lives with [... ] examples of suffering humanity, every one falls on 
them; instead of sustaining and encouraging their efforts to improve the houses under 
their care, and to induce them to make further exertions, they are regarded with jealousy; 
every attack [... ] made on them by a violent patient or disconcerted friends [... ] is hailed 
as a case of misconduct, and until fairly shown to be untrue, and even after it had been so 
proved, they continue to be attacked by the public. 
6 
Charles Dickens expressed similar sentiments. Following his visit to Saint Luke's Asylum on 
Boxing Day in 1851, the novelist made an impassioned plea to the readers of Household Words to 
retain their faith in physicians, men who found their `sustainment and reward in the substitution 
of humanity for brutality, kindness for maltreatment, peace for raging fury; in the acquisition of 
love instead of hatred'.? While Dickens was specifically concerned to defend what many lauded as 
the vanguard of nineteenth-century humanitarianism, moral management, his comments similarly 
betray a concern that the public were suspicious of the authoritative declarations of medical skill 
6 Edward J. Seymour, A Letter to the Right Honourable, The Earl of Shaftesbury, on the laws which 
regulate private lunatic asylums with a comparative view of the process ̀De Lunatico Inquirendo' in 
England and the law of `Interdiction' in France (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & 
Roberts, 1859), p. 18. 
7 Charles Dickens, `A Curious Dance Round a Curious Tree', Charles Dickens - Selected Journalism, 
1850-1870, ed. by David Pascoe (London: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 318-326 (p. 326). First published 
in Household Words, 17 January, 1852. 
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and expertise espoused by physicians. Each of the following chapters, outlined below, explores a 
particular controversy, instance, or representation of wrongful confinement. A consideration of 
the debates, texts and theoretical arguments and positions with which this dissertation engages 
will be discussed prior to concluding the introduction with an overview of the historiography of 
psychiatry in the period. 
ii. Chapter outlines 
Chapter one examines the case of Daniel McNaughten, brought to trial in 1843 for the murder of 
Edward Drummond and acquitted on the ground of homicidal monomania. This chapter explores 
legal, medical and journalistic reactions to the successful use of the partial insanity defence. The 
contested relationship between individual responsibility and partial insanity was a troubling theme 
in the debate on the McNaughten verdict. In tracing these concerns as they extended from the 
courtroom into newspapers and journals, it becomes clear that the diagnosis of monomania was an 
object of concern in the 1840s. Its employment is here considered in relation to what I argue was 
an acute concern about the ability of words, images and associations, comprising a rhetoric of 
humanitarianism, to influence the reactions of the public to both McNaughten and his crime. 
In 1846 a middle-aged spinster, Louisa Nottidge, was abducted from a religious 
community by her family. Diagnosed as suffering from religious monomania, she was placed against 
her will in a private lunatic asylum. After her release in 1849, Nottidge filed a civil suit against 
family members for damages. Chapter two will examine this case, paying particular attention to the 
way in which the validity of monomania as a medical diagnosis and medico-legal conceptions of 
responsibility were challenged through her lawsuit. The judge presiding over the case directed the 
jury to find in favour of Nottidge, arguing that individuals posing no dangers to themselves or 
others should be entitled to liberty. Physicians and commissioners involved in the case were 
outraged by this decision. Arguing that societal chaos would follow if the judge's dicta were 
enshrined in law, they condemned both the `humanity-mongers' (those who supported her action 
for damages) and their deployment of a humane rhetoric of excessive sentimentality. The Nottidge 
case reveals the fragility of medical authority and the precarious social status of the profession of 
mental science. 
Chapter three shifts from an examination of medico-legal trials to a literary representation 
of monomania, an important field of inquiry for this study. In 1855 Wilkie Collins published a 
short story entitled `Mad Monkton' in Fraser's Magazine. It was originally intended for 
publication in Charles Dickens's Household Words but Dickens decided that Collins's treatment of 
hereditary monomania was problematic and he rejected his friend's story. Central to Dickens's 
concern was the influence that the story might have on its readers. This chapter will examine the 
role monomania played in extending the limits of narrative representation and in challenging the 
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boundary which separated socially-acceptable rhetorical strategies and narrative content from 
stories which sought deliberately to extend or reformulate the limits of narrative representation. 
Chapter four examines the ways in which J. S. Mill's doctrine of liberty informed and 
influenced debates about wrongful incarceration as they were formulated in a Parliamentary 
investigation of 1859-60. Mill's equivocal position on the role of public opinion in lunacy 
commissions complicated medico-legal debates about lunacy and liberty and framed a specific set of 
anxieties about wrongful confinement which were discussed in the hearings and in newspapers and 
journals. Using several cases of wrongful confinement, this chapter will consider the problematic 
relationship between eccentricity and partial insanity as it was understood in lay and medical 
circles. 
Chapter five uses the commission de lunatico inquirendo instituted against William 
Frederick Windham in 1861-62 to explore a contiguous set of concerns arising from the prospect of 
Windham's detention. Attention will here shift from partial insanity and eccentricity to partial 
insanity and moral perversity. In the Windham trial, the value of medical testimony came under 
close interrogation. This chapter will argue that moral insanity initiated and framed a series of 
important (but overlooked) debates which collectively acted to harm the professional credibility of 
physicians and entrench in the `public mind- a powerful fear of wrongful confinement. 
Chapter six will examine the efficacy of the predominant trope through which anxieties 
about wrongful confinement were constructed and disseminated, the Bastille. The words, images 
and metaphors associated with the Parisian prison became a graphic form of cultural currency and 
were employed (by individuals who experienced wrongful incarceration and also by novelists and 
journalists) to convey the arbitrary nature of the Victorian lunacy laws and to signal the horrors of 
wrongful detention. Acknowledging the rhetorical power of the images to influence readers, the 
medical community responded by condemning such associations as untruthful and dangerous. 
Chapter seven extends a consideration of the concern of physicians at the rhetorical power 
of words, images and associations by examining Charles Reade's fictional expose of wrongful 
confinement, Hard Cash (1863). Reade believed that fiction was an ideal vehicle to reveal the 
iniquities practiced under the auspices of psychological medicine. Critics of Hard Cash felt 
differently. Addressing several of the issues which chapter three also examines, this chapter will 
consider the concerns generated by Reade's ̀ matter-of-fact Romance', paying attention to Reade's 
deliberate conflation of fact and fiction and the angry responses to the novel from the medical 
community. 
Chapter eight examines the extent to which the ̀ idea' of insanity and wrongful 
confinement as understood by the lay-public complicated medico-legal debates about wrongful 
confinement, moral insanity and medical authority. Examining a select committee investigation 
into wrongful incarceration in lunatic asylums in 1877-78, this chapter will argue that through the 
course of the nineteenth century the parameters of the debates about wrongful confinement shifted. 
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In focusing on discussions about the relationship between medical, legal and familial responsibility 
and in considering debates about the relationship between moral insanity and confinement, this 
chapter demonstrates the extent to which the terms and ramifications of debates about 
confinement, and about partial insanity, had altered since the 1840s. 
iii. Interpretations 
Wrongful confinement in lunatic asylums has received attention from legal, medical and social 
historians, most notably by William Parry Jones in The Trade in Lunacy (1972), a study of 
private facilities for the care of the insane in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As Parry- 
Jones rightly claims, prior to his own contribution to the field few academics had looked closely at 
the functioning of private asylums for the insane. Those who had studied the `madhouse-business' 
tended to accept at face-value its infamous reputation as a lucrative and corrupt system based on 
profit. Parry Jones criticised scholars for accepting too readily the sensational cases of abuse and 
malpractice found in private establishments (and widely reported by contemporary observers). 
8 
In re-examining what was commonly known as the `trade in lunacy' Parry-Jones refocused 
critical attention on the previously overlooked contribution these derided institutions made in the 
care and cure of the insane, demonstrating in particular the valuable role that private licensed 
establishments played in the care and treatment of pauper lunatics during a period when public 
provision in county asylums was still in the process of developing. Parry Jones's study is also 
notable for the effort to interpret the alleged abuses and defects of the `trade in lunacy' in light of 
contemporary attitudes to insanity. Examining not only asylum case-books, parliamentary papers 
and reports, and special inquiries, but also law books, newspapers, novels and tracts written by 
alleged lunatics themselves, he convincingly argues that what today are considered to be abusive 
and debilitating treatment regimes were in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries 
common medical practice. In the context of this dissertation, Parry Jones's study is important for 
several reasons. In his analysis of the grounds on which abuses and defects of the system were 
feared, he notes the often unsuitable physical conditions of confinement, administrative 
irregularities and illegal practices of asylum superintendants and the inadequacy of magistrates in 
the context of their supervisory role. Yet despite the suggestiveness of the material he considers, in 
interpreting wrongful incarceration solely in light of the anxiety generated by the popular 
perception of a corrupt system based on financial profit Parry Jones neglects alternative 
explanations for the construction and dissemination of popular anxieties surrounding wrongful 
confinement and so overlooks other, equally compelling, factors which led to wrongful 
8 William Parry-Jones, The Trade in Lunacy: A Study of Private Madhouses in England in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 2. 
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confinement and which influenced the shape and outcome of the acrimonious debates both within 
and between the newspaper press and the professions of mental science and the law. 
It will become clear that in the mid-Victorian period, concern about illegal detention in 
lunatic asylums did not centre on specific motivations of profit and a popular perception of corrupt 
financial opportunity. Rather, the debates indicate a greater anxiety about the effects of conflicting 
medical, social and legal conceptions of accountability and ̀ civil responsibility', and an acute 
concern with the difficulty of diagnosis attendant upon contested definitions of insanity. 
9 
Turning on shifting and unstable conceptions of self-discipline, individual agency, social 
responsibility, the right to liberty of thought and action, and protection from tyranny and 
infringement of autonomy, the issues I consider collectively assign to the spectre of wrongful 
confinement a more influential role in Victorian society than has previously been acknowledged. 
The debates over wrongful incarceration both drew on and contributed to contemporaneous 
philosophical and political debates about the relationship between the rights of the individual and 
the authority of the state. 
In examining these issues, I am indebted to the work of Peter McCandless and others who 
have sought generally to relocate the rise of the asylum system in the nineteenth century as the 
outcome of a series of intricate transactions between a range of social agents (importantly 
including the family) rather than as the result of the absolute imposition of a medical hegemony. 
As McCandless has rightly pointed out in one of the very few articles devoted to wrongful 
confinement in the Victorian period, two factors were central to the threat illegal detention was 
seen to pose to individual liberty. Making clear the absence of decisive medical authority during 
this period (and highlighting in contrast the ignorance of many medical men on the subject of 
insanity), McCandless has argued that in the absence of an authoritative set of diagnostic tools, 
insanity was necessarily defined by physicians on the basis of value-laden subjectivity. 
Though physicians vehemently denied the possibility of wrongful confinement in lunatic 
asylums, such assertions were problematic. When relying upon symptomatic evidence (in the 
absence of pathological indicators of insanity), medical men themselves fundamentally disagreed, in 
the public arena of court-rooms, over what exactly constituted lunacy and at what point in time 
institutionalisation was necessary. Secondly, in a period characterised by the `strictness' of the 
Victorian moral code, it was easier than ever to confuse immorality with insanity, a fact 
compounded by the expansion of psychiatric nosologies to include moral insanity and monomania. 
The `greatest danger to civil liberty arose', McCandless concluded, `not from an unlikely collection 
of evildoers, but from ignorance, arrogance, and narrow-mindedness'. 
10 
9 Henry Monro, Articles on Reform in Private Asylums (London: John Churchill, 1852), pp. 64-65. 
10 Peter McCandless, `Liberty and Lunacy: The Victorians and Wrongful Confinement', in 
Madhouses, Mad-Doctors, and Madmen: The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era, ed. by 
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McCandless is right to stress the fact that anxiety about wrongful confinement was 
founded less on the perception of conspiratorial collusion and financial motives than on the 
complications arising from the developments taking place within Victorian society and, more 
specifically, the problems attendant on the development of the profession of mental science. 
However, by paying closer attention to the language of the debates - the metaphors, images and 
associations by which the lay-public, novelists and journalists expressed their fear of wrongful 
confinement -a different scenario will emerge which emphasises the extent to which the debates 
surrounding wrongful incarceration undercut the consolidatory programme of professionalisation 
of mental science in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Three interrelated anxieties in the often acrimonious encounters between the profession of 
mental science, the legal profession, the newspaper press and the lay-public over wrongful 
incarceration emerge in the following chapters: the reasons for and consequences of the expansion 
of psychiatric nosologies, the nature and outcome of the reform of the laws relating to lunacy, and 
the dangers contained within literary representations of wrongful incarceration. 
Firstly, the anxiety elicited by wrongful confinement contributed to a deterioration of 
confidence in physicians' abilities and even their right to claim the skills to care for, treat, and cure 
the lunatic. Central to the project of securing medical autonomy over the insane was the 
development of complex classifications of insanity. It was a fundamental belief, virtually without 
challenge, that improved theoretical knowledge of symptoms, attributes and signs of insanity 
enhanced effective treatment. The nineteenth century witnessed an explosion of ranks, levels, and 
classes, categories and sub-types of insanity, often appended with sub-categories of symptoms and 
associated conditions. Continental nosologies were incorporated within English systems of 
classification to produce what the medical community conceived of as an all-powerful tool for 
treating lunacy with authoritative precision and confidence. While Leonard Smith has examined 
diagnostic classification in light of the literal functioning of the asylum, Scull considers the 
widening of classificatory systems as one of the major factors underpinning the rise during the 
Victorian period of the number of people considered insane. 
11 Yet in an examination of cases of 
wrongful confinement resulting from incorrect diagnoses of lunacy, it becomes clear that the 
classificatory inclusion of moral insanity and monomania made it more difficult than ever to 
distinguish the lunatic from the merely deviant or eccentric. 
Andrew Scull (London: Athlone Press, 1981), pp. 339-362 (p. 347). First published in Journal of 
Social History, 11 (1978), pp. 366-386. 
11 Smith, "Cure, Comfort and Safe Custody, " pp. 192-194; Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions, 
pp. 344-352. On the use of classification in the asylum. See also Anne Digby, Madness, Morality and 
Medicine: A Study of the York Retreat, 1796-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
pp. 135-137. 
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I will argue that this lauded classificatory development paradoxically increased in the 
`public mind' the belief that it was easier than ever to be wrongfully confined in lunatic asylums. 
With moral insanity and monomania, the reassuring formulation of madness as it had become 
manifested in the popular imagination as ̀ Bedlamite' spectacle (in which one's reason was clearly 
dismantled by visible disease), was destabilised. The boundaries between madness and sanity that 
psychological physicians believed distinguished the superiority of Victorian mental science were 
increasingly precarious and monomania and moral insanity thus highlighted the fragility of their 
authority; not only over the lunatic, but over the public's confidence in their medical authority and 
social stature. 
Secondly, debates over wrongful confinement focused concern both on the inadequacy of 
the lunacy laws (and so the necessity for their reform), as well as the problematic relationship 
between legal and medical conceptions of insanity. The `opposing interests and conflicting 
opinions' of law and medicine as they related to insanity represented competing versions of 
authority. As Andrew Scull points out, because the cognitive and evaluative frameworks of the two 
professions were irreconcilable, conflict remained especially endemic over the criteria and 
procedures of certification and conceptions of criminal culpability (the insanity defence), two 
issues over which law and medicine openly clashed. 
12 What is most striking in these debates is the 
important role played by `public opinion'. 
13 Albeit reluctantly, both the professions of law and 
12 Scull, Madhouses, p. 24. 
13 In his 1901 analysis of the relationship between law and public opinion in the nineteenth century, 
A. V. Dicey defined `public opinion' as the `speculative views held by the mass of the people as to the 
alteration or improvement of their institutions. ' Yet he acknowledged that the term remained a mere 
`abstraction', a `power' without any independant existence'. See A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation 
Between Law & Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 
1901), pp. 3,412-413. Despite Dicey's recognition of the theoretical and empirical difficulties inherent 
in measuring the mechanisms by which ideas are formed and allegiances fostered, the concept of public 
opinion has remained fruitful because of the way that it denotes a form of power (or will) in social 
life not ultimately owed to material interests in society. It has been employed most often in scholarly 
accounts of the relationship between political and social institutions. Studies like Hannah Barker's 
Newspapers, Politics and Public Opinion in Late Eighteenth Century England (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998), and J. A. Downie's Robert Harley and the Press: Propaganda and Public Opinion in the 
Age of Swift and Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) explore the formation and 
effects of `public opinion' on `extra-parliamentary political culture[s] (Barker, p. 3) and consider the 
political ramifications of the `free' press on emergent democratic structures of government. This study 
is concerned with a different set of concerns; namely, the way that the term `public opinion' (or the 
`public mind' as it was often described at the time) was both conceived of as an `idea' and deployed 
strategically in relation to medico-legal debates about wrongful confinement in lunatic asylums. This 
study makes clear that the meaning, use and power accorded to the term altered dramatically depending 
on the groups or individuals employing it; the concept possessed multiple significations in the 
Victorian period. In the debates discussed in the following chapters, `public opinion' became a form of 
rhetoric, and indeed of propaganda: serving to persuade, impress and intimidate the Victorian reading 
public. The term was simultaneously employed by lunacy law reformers in defence of alleged lunatics, 
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mental science were forced to acknowledge that they were battling not only over the lunatic but 
also over the affections of the lay-public and against their popular conception of both the roles and 
responsibilities of lawyers and physicians. 
Numerous historians have acknowledged the important role that the lay-public, and public 
opinion, have played in relation to the nineteenth-century development of psychiatry. Studies of 
the profession in America have strongly emphasised the importance of public opinion. Writing on 
Thomas Kirkbride's philosophy of asylum treatment and management at the Pennsylvania Hospital 
for the Insane, Nancy Tomes takes issue with both David Rothman and Gerald Grob not only for 
their misconception of the status of the early psychiatrists but also for the way in which both 
authors neglect `the most immediate objects of their professional exertions: the families and friends 
of the insane'. As she correctly suggests, to `understand the establishment of psychiatric legitimacy 
in the early nineteenth century [... ] the emphasis on the asylum must be seen as a response to the 
public as well as professional competitors'. 
14 Similarly, the story of the conflict between 
neurologists and asylum superintendents in late-nineteenth-century America, as Bonnie Ellen 
Blustein has argued, indicates the extent to which `the limits of such a medical debate may be set by 
the interests and opinions of the lay-public'. The controversy she details was not simply a 
`jurisdictional dispute among professionals that happened to spill over into the popular press, but 
an example of the interrelations of lay and professional concerns in the establishment of a working 
definition of insanity'. 
15 
As these two examples suggest, we may also ask whether public opinion in Britain played a 
similar role in medico-legal disputes. The profession itself became increasingly alarmed at the 
intervention of public opinion upon topics about which they claimed professional expertise. Their 
concerns about the role of the lay-public were made all the more acute by the fact that the success of 
the asylum and the stature of its physicians - the psychiatric legitimacy of the profession of mental 
science - rested predominantly upon public responses to both cases of wrongful confinement and 
and by the medical community to denounce what they perceived as an ignorant and meddlesome 
`public'. In this respect, newspapers and journals (as well as novels) became the object of particular 
attention for advocates and critics of the lunacy laws because of their self-proclaimed duty to 
represent, and ability to influence, public sentiment. Those who used the term were attempting to add 
powerful support to their argument. Once that support had been summoned, the terms of the debate 
on wrongful confinement, incarceration and the autonomy of physicians changed, perhaps 
permanently. 
14 Nancy Tomes, `A Generous Confidence: Thomas Story Kirkbride's Philosophy of Asylum 
Construction and Management', in Scull, Madhouses, pp. 121-143 (p. 122). 
15 Bonnie Ellen Blustein, '"A Hollow Square of Psychological Science": American Neurologists and 
Psychiatrists in Conflict', in Scull, Madhouses, pp. 241-270 (p. 244). 
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the conflicts it exposed. 
16 This is a factor which has not received the attention it deserves in 
British scholarship. It will be addressed in the following chapters by paying specific attention to 
the power accorded to `public opinion' and by collectively considering the lay-pubic as powerful a 
regulatory agent as the asylum and its physicians or the courtroom and its lawyers. 17 
Thirdly, disquiet was expressed by both lawyers and physicians over the fictional 
representation of the Victorian lunatic asylum and its physicians. Especial criticism was directed at 
sensation novelists like Wilkie Collins, Charles Reade and Mary Elizabeth Braddon. Although 
madness and the motif of confinement were commonly used in nineteenth-century fiction as a 
device of sensation, a fact that has been examined by a number of commentators, what is most 
interesting in the context of this dissertation are the reactions produced by the fictional 
representation of wrongful incarceration. In contrast to Parry-Jones's and McCandless's 
treatment of Charles Reade's Hard Cash (1863), John Sutherland's chapter on Reade's indictment 
of Victorian mental science in Victorian Fiction: Writers, Publishers, Readers (1995) is astute in 
paying attention both to the novel itself as a work of fiction and to the responses it elicited in the 
medical community (and from Charles Dickens). Though those who have written on Hard Cash 
make clear Reade's polemical desire to educate a naive reading-public to the realities of asylum care 
and to encourage active participation in checking the authority of medicine and the law, what even 
Sutherland overlooks in his examination of the `delicately poised balance of forces between author, 
editor, publisher, and reading public' is the specific anxiety Reade's novel raised about the 
conflation of romance and realism in relation to the popular understanding of wrongful 
confinement. 
18 
Jenny Bourne Taylor and Pamela K. Gilbert's studies of sensation fiction indicate that the 
complex interface between scientific and medical rhetoric and its cultural and literary 
manifestations continue to remain a subject of critical investigation. 
19 Yet as Helen Small has 
pointed out, analysis of the relationship between the psychiatric text and the literary depiction of 
16 On the important and overlooked role that families and other non-institutional factors played in 
the committal of lunatics to asylums, see David Wright, `Getting out of the Asylum: Understanding 
the Confinement of the Insane in the Nineteenth Century', Social History of Medicine, 10 (April 
1997), pp. 137-155. 
17 The concept of a regulatory agency has more commonly been attributed to the site of the asylum. 
See Insanity, Institutions and Society, 1800-1914: A Social History of Madness in Comparative 
Perspective, ed. by Joseph Melling and Bill Forsythe (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 7. 
18 John Sutherland, Victorian Fiction: Writers, Publishers, Readers (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 
p. 61. 
19 See Jenny Bourne Taylor, In the Secret Theatre of Home: Wilkie Collins: Sensation Narrative, and 
Nineteenth-century Psychology (London: Routledge, 1988) and Pamela K. Gilbert, Disease, Desire, and 
the Body in Victorian Women's Popular Novels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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insanity has often been solely concerned to explore complementary or shared narratives, themes 
and images, and contiguous or coherent rhetorical discourses. In other words, `few literary critics 
have questioned the smoothness with which the traffic flows'. Such untroubled referencing, she 
argues, has limited our understanding of and appreciation for the complex interplay between 
medicine and literature. 
20 The chapters on Wilkie Collins's `Mad Monkton' and Reade's Hard 
Cash will address this concern by paying attention to the way in which the diverse cultural 
constructions of and responses to wrongful confinement mediated specific anxieties about the 
authoritative psychiatric construction of `stable' identity, the function of the asylum, the role of 
courts and the responsibilities of the doctors. Ironically, it was precisely the strenuous efforts made 
by physicians to castigate novelists and deride their fictions for their conflation of fact and fiction, 
or their `artistic errors', that exacerbated anxiety and further undermined the consolidating 
intentions of Victorian psychiatry. 
Throughout the dissertation, attention will be paid to the way in which the discourse of 
enlightened humanity and compassionate benevolence - through which the profession of mental 
science conveyed to the lay-public the successes of their reforms - was manipulated and undercut, a 
fact that highlights the problematic relationship between the evolution of `public sentiment' 
witnessed in the nineteenth century and the Victorian development of a system of care based on 
`compassionate consideration' and benign humanity. Revealing the extent to which the rise of an 
authoritative psychiatric discourse was contested in courts of law, in literature and in the `public 
mind', the controversies and anxieties briefly outlined here position wrongful confinement as 
historically more important and analytically more problematic than has previously been recognised. 
Considering that it was not just the fate of the alleged lunatic that was at stake but also the fate of 
the authority of psychiatric medicine and the cultural stature of its psychological physicians, it is 
surprising that the debates surrounding wrongful incarceration have not been utilised by social and 
medical historians in the larger examination of the Victorian world of lunacy. One key explanation 
for this striking absence of critical attention lies in the increasing recognition of a discordant 
relationship between the rhetoric of the psychological physician and the reality of the profession's 
goals and reforms. 
David Rothmans examination of the formation and effects of the lunatic asylum in the 
United States in the first half of the nineteenth century in The Discovery of the Asylum: Social 
Disorder and Disorder in the New Republic (1971), has been the subject of intense debate. Rothman 
argued that Jacksonian Americans experienced a crisis of confidence in the social organisation of 
the new Republic. The radically changing community, marked by an increase in poverty, crime and 
deviancy, was interpreted by contemporary observers as a harbinger of the dissolution of social ties 
20 Helen Small, `In the guise of science': Literature and the Rhetoric of 19th-century English 
Psychiatry', History of the Human Sciences, 7 (February 1994), pp. 27-55 (pp. 30-31). 
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and social cohesion. The solution lay in the asylum, an institution that would simultaneously 
rehabilitate its inmates and set an example to society at large. The asylum was both a cure and a 
preventative of social disorder. 
21 
Rothman's argument that the asylum's conscience-driven humanitarian ethos of cure was 
soon undermined by burgeoning insane populations, necessitating a shift from curative reform to 
custodial control, has been subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Peter Bartlett takes issue with 
Rothman's unproblematic interpretation of the role that the poor played in the downfall of curative 
institutions, pointing to the manner in which Rothman ignores the question of why the asylum in 
particular was the chosen site of care and treatment over other institutional or non-institutional 
solutions. 
22 Pointing to the arbitrary manner in which Rothman sees social control operating 
(with no acknowledgment of the specificity of class-based social locations from which ideas about 
incarceration emerged), Scull sees in Discovery of the Asylum no `serious and sustained or clearly 
articulated attempt to link ideas and changing social practices with underlying structures'. Both 
Bartlett and Scull also question Rothman's claim that the discovery of the uses of the asylum was a 
uniquely American phenomenon, emphasising the influence on the States of contemporaneous 
European movements and physicians. 
23 
Yet in the context of this study, what is most interesting about Scull's critique of 
Discovery of the Asylum is his condemnation of Rothman's reliance on the claims of reformers and 
so his inability to distinguish between the rhetoric of disorder, formulated by a particular social 
group for particular polemical purposes, and the reality of disorder. 
24 To Scull, an unqualified 
acceptance of the intentions of the reformers and the asylum as the outcome of `a triumphant and 
unproblematic expression of humanitarian concern' was ̀ hopelessly biased and inaccurate: one 
which relies on [... ] a systematic neglect and distortion of available evidence'. Rather than 
examining `the rhetoric of intentions', Scull claims that a far more fruitful investigation lies in 
examining what the `historical record reveals about the establishment and operation of the new 
apparatus for the social control of the mad-. 
25 Like Rothman, Scull's interest lies in how and to 
what effect psychiatry as a profession consolidated its control over lunacy in the nineteenth 
21 David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic, 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), p. xxx. First published in 1971. 
22 Peter Bartlett, The Poor Law of Lunacy: The Administration of Pauper Lunatics in mid-nineteenth 
century England (London: Leicester University Press, 1999), p. 15. 
23 Andrew Scull, Social Order/Mental Disorder: Anglo-American Psychiatry in Historical Perspective 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 97; Bartlett, The Poor Law, p. 14. 
24 Scull, Social Order, pp. 36-37. 
25 Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions, p. 3. 
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century. Though Rothman and Scull concur on the failure of the asylum to live up to its 
expectations, their explanations for the development of the asylum differ. 
Much more skeptical than Rothman of the reformer's humanitarian and disinterested 
claims of benevolence, Scull's interpretation of the rise of the asylum is heavily indebted, like Klaus 
Doerner's Madmen and the Bourgeoisie (1981), to Michel Foucault in perceiving the 
implementation of the asylum in light of the transformed economic requirements of a newly 
emerging capitalistic society and market economy. 
26 Yet at the same time, an underlying 
determination of Scull's treatment of this process lies in his concern to explore how actions were 
socially-defined and how people's responses to madness were mediated by and through `socially- 
constructed meaning[s]'. In this respect, he pays specific attention to the power invested in 
psychological physicians to `negotiate reality on behalf of the rest of society'. 
27 While I agree with 
Scull that Rothman's misinterpretation of propagandist rhetoric is problematic in relation to his 
use of it as evidence for the existence of social disorder, it remains the case that rhetoric played a 
powerful role in influencing the lay-public and in mobilising different groups of people around a 
particular set of rights. 
This is a factor that neither Rothman nor Scull adequately analyse. In dismissing the 
importance of rhetoric, Scull overlooks what is central to this dissertation: the way in which the 
polemical discourse of humanitarianism, the `rhetorical ornaments' through which psychological 
physicians expressed their authority, were in response to cases of wrongful incarceration 
reformulated and redeployed to critique and question the efficacy of the asylum and the authority of 
the profession of mental science. Though Rothman pays attention to the philanthropic claims of 
the reformers he does not trace their development over the course of the nineteenth century and 
pays scant attention to the distinct nature, and the specific social, cultural and political agendas of 
the multiple mediums of communication by which the philanthropic and altruistic discourse of 
benevolent responsibility and enlightened humanity was constructed, dispersed and understood. 
While the focus of concern regarding wrongful confinement shifted as the debates 
oscillated freely between the domains of literature, law and psychiatry, one constant and 
overarching anxiety centred on the role of rhetorical sentiment (words, images and associations) as 
it was manifested in legal, medical, literary and journalistic representations of the subjects and 
arbiters of medical confinement to construct or undermine specific sentiments and attitudes. In 
other words, by paying close attention to what Parry Jones dismisses as the ̀ hue and cry'28 
generated by the spectre of wrongful incarceration in lunatic asylums, it becomes apparent that 
26 On Foucault see below, pp. 26-27. 
27 Scull, Social Order, p. 123. 
28 Parry Jones, Trade in Lunacy, p. 290. 
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amidst the vying and entangled debates over responsibility and accountability lay an enduring and 
widespread concern with the use and abuse of sentimental language and the manipulation of 
representational strategies to contain, exacerbate and mediate popular anxieties. The complex role 
that rhetorical strategies have played in the construction and containment of anxieties about 
wrongful confinement has for the reasons outlined above, not been analysed. 
In seeking to shed light on the cultural, legal and medical significance of illegal or 
wrongful detention in the Victorian period, this the. ls is necessarily interdisciplinary in its reliance 
on a multitude of sources. To ascertain the shifting medical paradigms of insanity and its 
treatment in the lunatic asylum, I have turned to psychological tracts, treatises and journals. To 
explore the evolving relationship between the law and medicine (in reference to their conflicting 
interpretations of responsibility), I have employed legal journals, text-books, parliamentary papers 
and reports resulting from key investigations into psychiatry and civil liberties, and through them 
have explored the ways in which medico-legal precedents and principles were discursively framed 
and dispersed. In order to analyse the construction of anxieties surrounding wrongful 
incarceration, it has been necessary to focus also on the representation of the lunatic asylum and 
its physicians and patients in novels, short stories and poems as they engaged with specific medical 
theories and particular medico-legal debates. Similarly, the coverage of cases of wrongful 
confinement in both the editorial and correspondance pages within both regional and national 
newspapers has been a fruitful source through which to ascertain how the Victorian reading public 
conceived of such sensational cases and responded to them. 
29 
29 The rise of literacy rates, the development of societies and organisations devoted to learning, and 
the growth of the periodical and newspaper press (attendant on technological advances which 
contributed to mass market circulation) collectively ensured that reading became a near-universal 
ability in the possession of all classes in the Victorian period. My use of the terms Victorian `public' 
and `popular' or `lay' assumptions, attitudes and beliefs throughout the dissertation is underpinned by 
these developments and refers primarily to the Victorian reading public, a heavily-divided community 
but one no longer narrowly circumscribed by class affiliations. On the rise of literacy in the period, 
see Louis James, Fiction for the Working Man 1830-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963; 
repr. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 2-5; See also David F. Mitch, The Rise of Popular Literacy 
in Victorian England: The Influence of Private Choice and Public Policy (Philadelphia: University of 
Philadelphia Press, 1992). On the growth of societies devoted to the dissemination of knowledge, see 
in particular Scott Bennett, `Revolutions in thought: serial publication and the mass market for 
reading' in The Victorian Periodical Press: Samplings and Soundings, ed. by Joanne Shattock and 
Michael Wolff (Leicester, Buffalo and Toronto: Leicester University and University of Toronto Press, 
1982), pp. 225-257. On the development of the newspaper and periodical press, see Barbara Onslow, 
Women of the Press in Nineteenth-Century Britain (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 9-12; Richard 
D. Altick, The English Common Reader: A Social History of the Mass Reading Public, 1800-1900 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), Alan J. Lee, The Origins of the 
Popular Press in England 1855-1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1976), and Lucy Brown, Victorian News 
and Newspapers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). 
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The body of medical treatises, pamphlets and tracts, newspaper and journal articles, poems 
and short stories centring on or mentioning moral insanity and monomania collectively 
represents a means by which to explore and ultimately expose what I argue were entrenched yet 
problematic anxieties about the nature of madness and its relationship to morality and perversity. 
Similarly, they expose concerns over the medical and socio-cultural means employed to contain or 
cure insanity. What makes moral insanity so fascinating in this respect is the extent to which its 
contested nature provides us with a means to break down the complex dialectic between the often 
divided aims and methods of psychiatric practitioners and consequently the lay-public's 
contradictory and confused negotiation of morality, insanity, and liberty. In many ways, the 
profession of mental science as an authoritative arbiter of mental health flourished during the 
nineteenth century. Yet an examination of the application of the doctrines of monomania and 
moral insanity and the lay public's response to them rather serves to clarify what in fact 
constituted a damning indictment of the individuals and official bodies whose responsibility it was 
to take charge of madness. 
While with insanity in general one can naturally locate popular concerns and anxieties, 
what an examination of moral insanity and monomania reveals is the extent to which physicians 
themselves became the targets of anger and fear. Novels, periodicals, cartoons, and newspaper 
articles (documents that collectively enable us to locate assumptions, attitudes and fears) all 
address the increasing precariousness of the borderline between sanity and madness. Such fluidity, 
exacerbated by the debates within the psychiatric profession, was threatening because it became 
widely believed that the labelling of moral insanity meant that anyone could potentially be 
incarcerated as depraved and immoral. 
In recent years, monomania and moral insanity have both been the subject of critical 
investigation. Especial attention has been devoted to the role played by moral insanity in an 
acrimonious debate in 1860s America between two prominent physicians, Isaac Ray (the foremost 
proponent of moral insanity) and John Gray (a vociferous critic of the new disease entity). 
30 
Though not the subject of this study, the debates that were taking place in America over moral 
insanity were constructed around a similar set of issues and concerns to those facing English 
physicians (this will be briefly discussed in chapter five). One reason why English scholarship on 
moral insanity has not equaled that of American academics is because there was not an equivalent 
30 See S. P. Fullinwider, `Insanity as the Loss of Self: The Moral Insanity Controversy Revisited', 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 49 (1975), pp. 87-101; Robert J. Waldinger, `Sleep of Reason: John 
P. Gray and the Challenge of Moral Insanity', Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 
34 (1979), pp. 163-179; Gary Belkin, `Moral Insanity, science and religion in nineteenth-century 
America: the Gray-Ray debate', History of Psychiatry, 7 (December 1996), pp. 591-613. See also the 
debate over moral insanity during the trial of Charles Guiteau for shooting President James Garfield 
in 1881 in Charles E. Rosenberg, The Trial of the Assassin Guiteau: Psychiatry and Law in the Gilded 
Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). 
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Gray-Ray `controversy'. As this dissertation indicates, the concerns directed at the use of moral 
insanity and monomania were in relation to anxieties about wrongful confinement pervasive and 
wide-ranging. 
As with Gary Belkin, who argued that the Gray-Ray debates negotiated a specific concern 
about the status of scientific knowledge and authority in a society in the process of rapid 
secularisation, Hannah Franziska Augstein has used the concept of moral insanity (introduced to 
English medical circles by J. C. Prichard in 1835) to examine concern about the decline of religion 
in a materialist age. 
31 To Elaine Showalter, moral insanity joined moral management and moral 
architecture as one of the triple cornerstones of Victorian psychiatric theory and practice. Her 
conception of the disease entity is shaped by her belief that moral insanity was a diagnosis deployed 
by a male medical establishment to regulate and contain what were conceived of as aberrant female 
behaviors, emotions and actions. 
32 
Despite the pre-eminence she accords to the disease, Showalter overlooks the absence of 
consensus in the medical profession over its existence and does not examine the nexus of concerns 
it generated. 
33 Though Roger Smith has included in his examination of the `new topography of 
lunacy' a consideration of moral insanity, in focusing on the relationship of the disease to legal 
concepts of responsibility (and the relationship between crime and moral insanity), his work 
similarly overlooks the issues which this study considers. Few scholars have examined the role this 
disease played in debates about wrongful confinement in lunatic asylums. 
34 In a striking omission, 
Parry Jones makes no reference in The Trade in Lunacy to either moral insanity or monomania. 
Both Klaus Doerner and Jan Goldstein examine the role monomania played in the genesis 
of the French psychiatric profession in the nineteenth century. Drawing attention to the way in 
which it was deployed as a political tool and used to demarcate the emerging profession from other 
31 Hannah Franziska Augstein, JC Prichard's Concept of Moral Insanity -a Medical Theory of the 
Corruption of Human Nature', Medical History, 40 (1996), pp. 311-343. 
32 The incorrect belief that moral insanity was predominantly a female malady remains pervasive. In 
BBC Radio 4's Archive Hour (3/3/01) on the history of Severalls Mental Hospital in Essex, Diana 
Gittings (the author of a history of the hospital) described moral insanity as a disease label applied 
solely to women and young girls who were sexually active and who lacked control. 
33 Similarly, though G. E. Berrios argues in his introduction to the Classic Text series that moral 
insanity remains `an enduring legend', his concern with the origins of this legend precludes an 
examination of the larger socio-cultural framework in which it was deployed and debated. See G. E. 
Berrios, J. C. Prichard and the Concept of Moral Insanity', History of Psychiatry, 10 (March 1999), 
pp. 111-126 (p. 111). 
34 Peter McCandless is an exception, though his discussion of the disease entities in relation to 
wrongful confinement is brief. See McCandless, `Liberty and Lunacy', pp. 354-355. 
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scientific disciplines such as sociology, their important contributions cannot be underestimated. -ý5 
jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth have both examined moral insanity and monomania 
in relation to Victorian fiction. 
36 However, as with moral insanity, monomania's relative absence 
from or peripheral position in the majority of scholarly accounts of Victorian psychiatry remains 
surprising considering the centrality of the disease entity to debates about wrongful incarceration. 
iv. Historiography 
The Whig interpretation of history has been an influential model of historical analysis in the study 
of the history of psychiatry. The meliorative assumption of enlightened progress, and the 
advancement of a benign and uncomplicated story of progressive enlightenment, improvement and 
reform, has been widespread and long-standing. 
37 Yet as early as the 1940s, this model of analysis, 
and all that it advanced, was subject to rigorous scrutiny and criticism. 
38 
35 See Jan Goldstein, Console and Classify: The French Psychiatric Profession in the Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and Klaus Doerner, Madmen and the 
Bourgeoisie: A Social History of Insanity and Psychiatry, trans. by Joachim Neugroschel and Jean 
Steinberg (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 148-153. First published in 1969. See also J. Goldstein, 
`Professional Knowledge and Professional Self Interest: The Rise and Fall of Monomania in 19th- 
Century France', International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 21 (Fall 1998), pp. 385-396. 
36 Taylor, In the Secret Theatre of Home; Sally Shuttleworth, Charlotte Bronte and Victorian 
Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also Embodied Selves. An Anthology 
of Psychological Texts, 1830-1890, ed. by jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 251-284. Perhaps because of its regular appearance in Victorian fiction, 
monomania has been the object of examination in a number of recent articles. See, for example, 
Graeme Tytler, 'Heathcliffs Monomania: An Anachronism in Wuthering Heights', Bronte Society 
Transactions, 20 (June 1992), pp. 331-343; and Tytler, `Charles Dickens's `The Signalman': A Case of 
Partial Insanity', History of Psychiatry, 8 (1997), pp. 421-432. 
37 Studies of psychiatry grounded in this teleological tradition of history writing include Gregory 
Zilboorg, A History of Medical Psychology (New York: Norton, 1941), Norman Dain, Concepts of 
Insanity in the United States, 1789-1865 (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 
Kathleen Jones, Lunacy, Law and Conscience, 1744-1845, and Mental Health and Social Policy, 1845- 
1959; jointly abridged and republished as A History of the Mental Health Services (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1972). More recent accounts include Edward Shorter's A History of Psychiatry: From 
the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (New York: John Wiley, 1997). 
38 Compare, for example, Albert Deutsch's relatively benign The Mentally Ill in America: A History 
of their Care and Treatment from Colonial Times (1937) to his scathing condemnation of American 
psychiatric institutions in The Shame of the States (New York: Harcourt, 1948). The post-Foucault 
dismissal of this early scholarship is strikingly assessed by Scull, who regards these early accounts as 
representative of the naivete and narrowness of `deeply embedded' notions of progress which 
functioned as ̀ intellectual strait-jackets [rather] than as a means to insight and understanding'. 
Kathleen Jones's interpretation of Victorian psychological physicians as purveyors of scientific 
enlightenment, for example, is to Scull representative of her `naive Whiggish perspective'. See Scull, 
Social Order, pp. 34-35,143. 
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Calling into question implicit value-judgments and the absence of any sustained analysis 
of what actually constituted `progress' in such historical accounts, from the 1960s a new relativism 
emerged. Subjecting blatant assumptions to rigorous critique and historicising the terms of 
analysis, the terms of the debate were fundamentally repositioned. In the midst of a climate of 
disillusionment resulting in a range of challenges to authority witnessed from the 1960s (including 
from the early 1970s prison riots and exposes of horrific conditions in state hospitals for the 
insane), the structural mechanisms by which deviance was institutionally contained and controlled 
by the state garnered especial attention. The social legitimacy of prisons and asylums for the 
mentally ill was in decline. 
39 
After conducting research at St Elizabeth's Psychiatric Hospital in Washington, D. C., 
Erving Goffman published his highly influential Asylums in 1968. Goffman argued that the asylum, 
hospital, prison, monastery and boarding school displayed strikingly similar characteristics. They 
all represented closed communities, separating their inmates from the world outside. Wholly 
reliant on the regimes of discipline enforced by staff members the inmates were unprepared for life 
after institutionalisation. The mental hospital, in particular, was to Goffman an institution which 
while purporting to be a therapeutic organisation with rational aims and officially approved 
curative ends, was in fact a site which heightened and even promoted disturbance. As Scull again 
makes clear, the power of Goffman's Asylums lay not in its (weak) evidentiary basis but rather in 
the way in which he promoted the idea of carceral institutions as repressive mechanisms of social 
control. 
40 
Since the 1960s, the concept of `total institutions' has been an enormously influential 
ideological construct for historians, sociologists, and heath-care professionals (and social policy) 
alike and has led to a sustained interrogation of formal institutions of control and the relationship 
they articulated between social classes and the distribution of power. Yet it was not just the 
institution that came under attack. With R. D. Laing's The Divided Self (1960) and Thomas S. 
Szasz's The Manufacture of Madness (1970), attention shifted from the site of incarceration to the 
medical diagnosis by which an individual was incarcerated in the asylum. Both Laing and Szasz 
argued that madness was itself a creation of the therapeutic state, produced by the very regimens 
that were scientifically and medically constructed to study and treat it. As the foremost 
proponents of the `antipsychiatry' movement, the disillusioned psychiatrists condemned the 
paternalistic authority of medicine by arguing that psychiatric hospitalisation, instituted by agents 
of the state in the guise of physicians, sought to fulfil the pernicious goals of social conformity and 
social order. 
39 Rothman, Discovery, p. xvi. 
40 Scull, Social Order, pp. 308-309. 
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The sociologist E. A. Ross defined `social control' in 1901 in response to the question of 
how humans are influenced by the society in which they live and what factors, other than legally 
imposed rules, make an individual act in certain ways. For Durkheim and Weber the concept of 
social control was a fruitful model for explaining why industrial societies avoided descending into 
selfish individualism. The benign neutrality of this model dissipated as it was increasingly used to 
explain the success of the bourgeoisie in transmitting their values to the rest of society, in 
manipulating and regulating the actions and behaviors of the working classes in order to serve 
their interests. With Szasz and Laing, too, social control became a pejorative term, used to 
challenge the dominant conception of psychosis as illness and asylums as therapeutic 
institutions. 41 
To Szasz, it was the involuntary and non-contractual relationship between the physician 
and the patient that marked out psychiatry's dangerously subtle yet coercive function within 
society. Medical procedures such as lobotomies and sterilisation, and the employment of 
debilitating drugs, were sinister and draconian regulatory interventions; the diagnosis of insanity, 
employed to `explain away problems in personal and social relationships', was a socially-ascribed 
label no different from the way witchcraft was theologically used in the Middle Ages to deny moral, 
personal, political and social controversies. 
42 As Porter interpreted Szasz's analogy, `modern 
psychiatry conducts its own witchhunts'. 
43 The indictment of psychiatry's motives by the 
`antipsychiatry' school have been marked by productive though occasionally acrimonious 
controversy, making clear the fallacy of a unified `revisionist' position. 
Any student of mental illness and its institutions is equally indebted to the 
groundbreaking writings of the late French Professor of history of Systems of Thought, Michel 
Foucault (1926-1984). Influenced by a number of intellectual movements in France, including 
Althusser's Marxism and the Annales school's long-term focus on temporal patterns of change, 
Foucault's Histoire de la Folie (1965), abridged and republished in 1971 as Madness and 
Civilization, represents a powerful challenge to the triumphalist histories of science and medicine 
of the 1940s and 1950s. Foucault's seminal text has led to a powerful historiography and a 
profusion of articles, reviews and books. There is no need here to rehearse the well-established 
41 For an explanation of shifting meaning and application of the term `social control' see Rothman, 
Discovery, p. xxxvi. For a more general overview see Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain, ed. 
by A. P. Donajgrodzki (London: Groom Helm, 1977) and F. M. L. Thompson, `Social Control in 
Victorian Britain', Economic History Review, 34 (May 1981), pp. 189-208. 
42 Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (St. 
Albans, Herts.: Paladin, 1972), p. 189. First published in 1962. 
43 Roy Porter, A Social History of Madness: The World Through the Eyes of the Insane (New York: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p. 113. 
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debates about Foucault's interpretation of the structures and applications of power as they related 
to psychiatry. 
44 
According to Foucault, between the middle of the seventeenth century and the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, silence came to replace what had previously represented a dialogue 
between reason and unreason. It was the institution of the lunatic asylum (the compelling 
`personality' of the physician and the introduction of `moral management') which bound madness 
to reason, invisibility and ultimately, domesticated monotony. Madness and Civilization concludes 
with the emergence of the asylum and its repressive regimes. In contrast, this study commences 
long after the `birth' of the asylum and does not seek to examine the `experience' of madness. 
Rather, it explores the perceptions, attitudes and beliefs which were constructed in response to 
(and influenced by) the `mythical values' transmitted by Pinel and Tuke's acts of `liberation'. This 
dissertation traces the reactions to, and consequences of, cultural representations of wrongful 
confinement as they were shaped by the `voice' of public opinion, a frame of reference which 
necessarily complicates Foucault's analysis. 
In focusing on the manner in which the lay-public transformed medico-legal discourse, it 
is explicitly concerned with the `language' of psychiatry rather than the study of silence. This 
development, I argue, functions as an energetic constraint to the early Foucauldian notion of 
totalizing institutions, characterised by repressive power structures manifested solely in the 
physician-patient relationship. It offers an alternative interpretation of the nineteenth-century 
history of psychiatry; one which registers a much more complex view of the interaction and 
struggle of multiple discourses, and one which draws attention to the intricate relationship between 
specific structures of power and representations of powerlessness. 
The shift to a more nuanced and more interrogative analysis, or the movement away from the 
concept of `total institutions' to the specific analysis of institutions, practices and philosophies of 
mental illness (within specifically national contexts) has been marked in recent studies of Victorian 
mental science (and in Foucault's later, more nuanced, consideration of the productive nature of power 
and its structural mechanisms). Detailed archival studies of the institution of the lunatic asylum and 
its critics and defenders have drawn attention to the cultural complexity underlying the rise of 
psychiatry as a scientific discipline. The asylum is now understood as a complicated cultural 
phenomenon rather than as a site (like the prison) symbolising a bourgeois conspiracy (discussed by 
Foucault and others in relation to class-specific strategies of power and control). As many recent 
studies indicate, the displacement of revisionist interpretations of the insane and the asylum does not 
represent a retreat to the Whig position but rather an acknowledgment that the profession overseeing 
the care and treatment of the insane must be understood in relation to the society in which it 
44 See, for example, Rewriting the History of Madness: Studies in Foucault's Histoire de la Folie, ed. by 
Arthur Still and Irving Velody (London: Routledge, 1992); and Reassessing Foucault: Power, Medicine 
and the Body, ed. by Colin Jones and Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1994). 
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operated. 
45 Having considered historically the ways in which the field of psychiatry has been analysed 
and interpreted, chapter one will return to the nineteenth century, using the case of Daniel 
McNaughten to explore the hostilities and anxieties his acquittal generated. 
45 Indicating the power of the anti-psychiatry movement, a wider questioning of the efficacy of 
asylums led to the closing of institutions. Yet far from representing a triumph of emancipation, the 
policy of deinstitutionalization was not attended by the revelation of `truths' and did not solve the 
`problems' of institutionalization. Instead, it resulted in heightened anxieties over the tragic 
consequences (for example, homelessness and drug-addiction) of liberating patients from institutions, 
in many cases without adequate provision for `care in the community'. See Gerald Grob, The Mad 
Among Us: A History of the Care of America's Mentally Ill (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), p. 2. For an overview of recent developments in the social history of psychiatry, see 
Joseph Melling's introductory chapter in Insanity, Institutions and Society. 
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Chapter One 
The Case of Daniel McNaughten 
The trial of Daniel McNaughten in 1843 provides us with a moment in time when popular 
conceptions of rightful confinement were formulated in lengthy debate both in the courtroom and 
in the papers. The murder of Edward Drummond and the subsequent trial of his assassin, 
McNaughten, is important for two reasons. Firstly, it garnered an unusual degree of attention and 
commentary. Secondly, the verdict, not guilty by reason of insanity, led to the formulation of the 
McNaughten `rules', rules that were to guide the relationship between insanity and responsibility 
throughout the nineteenth century. Despite the fact that it was a criminal trial and brought into 
the public arena not by the actions of family members but by the crown, the case represents the 
important benchmark by which to consider what medical, cultural and social factors were essential, 
in the popular mind, rightfully to demand confinement in a lunatic asylum. The `most intense 
sensation" of the McNaughten case provides in this sense a socio-cultural framework through 
which to assess the extent and shape of anxieties over wrongful confinement which were exhibited 
in the no less sensational but legally less important civil cases of Louisa Nottidge in 1849 and 
William Frederick Windham in 1861-62. 
In employing the trial of McNaughten as a lens through which to examine the dominant 
nineteenth-century legal and social construction of rightful confinement, one major factor 
immediately presents itself. The McNaughten trial was not the first to consign automatically an 
insane offender to a lunatic asylum: this had occurred in 1800 with the trial of James Hadfield. On 
15 May 1800, George III and his wife and daughters attended a play at the Theatre Royal in Drury 
Lane. During the performance, a shot was fired in the direction of the King. Hadfield was 
immediately restrained and taken to the music room beneath the stage, where he was interviewed 
by the Duke of York (the King's brother), who had also been in attendance. Hadfield was brought 
to trial on a charge of high treason which commenced on 26 June, 1800. The major problem that 
faced Thomas Erskine, Hadfield's defence counsel, was that in many respects Hadfield seemed in 
absolute possession of his reason. In representing the prosecution the Attourney-General, Sir John 
Mitford, brought to the stand the Duke of York, who testified that in his interview with Hadfield 
he appeared to be completely rational. Because the defendant appeared to realise what he had done, 
had understood the nature and quality of his act, and had fully comprehended that the murder 
attempt was treasonable, it was clear to Erskine that Hadfield did not conform to the `wild beast' 
standard which had been formulated by judge Tracy in the case of Rex v. Arnold in 1723 and which 
1 Weekly Chronicle, 22 January, 1843, p. 5. 
3Od 
had been the sole existing means of acquittal on the grounds of insanity. 
2 In the case heard before 
the King's Bench at Westminister Hall, Erskine instead employed `masterly rhetoric' to redefine 
the meaning of insanity. He framed his argument around Hadfield's delusions, highlighting his 
client's belief that because the Second Coming was imminent and George III's `sunken state' 
would entail disaster, his mission was ̀ to rid the world of said Monarch so that a more wholesome 
climate might greet the redeemer'. 
3 
Erskine put forth the novel idea that `reason is not driven from her seat, but distraction 
sits down upon it along with her, holds her, trembling upon it, and frightens her from propriety'. 
4 
In replacing the idea of madness as total baseness with the idea that delusions and irresistible 
impulses resulted from a diseased brain, and as such could not be prevented, Erskine was successful. 
Ignoring instructions both from judge Kenyon and the prosecution to find Hadfield guilty, the 
jury entered the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The verdict was met with 
apprehension. Many were frightened by the idea that a man who they perceived as a murderer 
rather than a lunatic could be released into the community (Judge Kenyon feared for the safety of 
`every man of every station, from the King upon the throne to the beggar at the gate's). It was the 
prospect of Hadfield's liberty which led to the passage of the Insane Offenders Bill. Under the Bill 
which led to the Act of the same name (and which had been specifically passed using retrospective 
language in order to confine Hadfield in Bethlem until `His Majesty's Pleasure be Known'), all 
who were acquitted on the grounds of insanity were to be taken into strict custody. Removing 
from juries the authority to acquit offenders whom they believed were insane at the time they 
committed the criminal act ensured that criminal lunatics were no longer legally entitled to 
release. 
6 
2 The `wild beast' test formulated by judge Tracy in the trial of `Mad Ned' Arnold (who had shot and 
Killed Lord Onslow) deemed that an individual who is `totally deprived of his understanding and 
memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast, [... ] 
is not the object of punishment'. In order for an individual to be held exempt from justice and the 
punishment of the law, under the test he or she must be wholly deprived of his or her reason, 
understanding and memory. Because it was successfully argued that Arnold had purchased the gun and 
gunpowder in a lucid interval, he was found guilty of murder. Tracy quoted in Norman J. Finkel, 
Insanity on Trial (New York: Plenum Press, 1988), p. 13. 
3 Quoted in Finkel, Insanity on Trial, pp. 14-15. 
4 Erskine quoted in Nigel Walker, Crime and Insanity in England, 2 vols (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1968), I, The Historical Perspective, p. 77. 
5 Walker, Crime and Insanity, I, p. 78. 
6 Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal. Culture, Law, and Policy in England, 1830-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 84. The generally agreed importance of the case 
lay in the way that Erskine `had circumvented the normal test of ability to distinguish right and 
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Though it was the Insane Offenders Act that had set the legal groundwork for automatic 
incarceration, it remained with the McNaughten case to set a precedent by which to determine the 
responsibility attached to partial forms of insanity, and thus to undermine, finally, the wild beast 
standard. The case of McNaughten is important in this respect because despite the precedent set by 
the Insane Offenders Act, a legal stricture which would ensure McNaughten's confinement even if 
he was found not guilty by reason of insanity, the case still elicited anxious debate about the nature 
of rightful confinement and the threat posed by such individuals both to themselves and to society 
at large. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section explores initial responses to 
the assassination attempt (the victim, Drummond, lived for five days prior to his death on 25 
January, 1843) and considers the way in which the case has been interpreted by historians. The 
second section examines newspaper responses to the murder. Though the motive, victim and crime 
were naturally the focus of attention, of most interest in the coverage of the assassination attempt 
was the consideration of McNaughten's mental state and the proper retribution he should receive. 
This section will focus upon the rhetorical strategies by which newspapers sought to influence their 
readers either sympathetically to view McNaughten as mad (for whom the lunatic asylum was the 
proper place of detention), or to unsympathetically view him as a cold-blooded murderer (who 
should be subject to carceral punishment). The third section will focus upon the trial itself, 
considering the legal strategies of both prosecution and defence counsel. The concluding section 
will examine the role played by physicians in the trial and consider the contested role played by 
theories of partial insanity. Though Alexander Cockburn's use of monomania was legally 
successful, its reception, like the verdict itself, was less triumphant. This last section will conclude 
by considering the `rules' which the case of McNaughten established. 
i. `a cold-blooded murderer'? 
On 20 January, 1843 Sir Robert Peel, the Tory prime minister since 1841, had the `painful duty' of 
writing to Prince Albert with the news that his private secretary, Edward Drummond, had been 
shot at point blank range upon exiting from his uncle's bank in Charing Cross, London. Peel 
wrote with confidence that although the ball from the pistol had entered through Drummond's back 
and had passed around his ribs, `[n] o vital part appears to have been injured, and there is no 
wrong by arguing solely from the premise of Hadfield's clearly established delusion'. John Hostettler, 
Thomas Erskine and Trial by jury (Chichester: Barry Rose Law Publishers, 1996), p. 159. 
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unfavourable symptom whatever'. 
7 However five days later, on 25 January 1843, Drummond died. 8 
Initially, all that was known about the assassin was his name. On the day Drummond died, Peel 
wrote to the Queen, using the traditional third-person form of address, to express his concern that 
far from a random killing by a violent lunatic, it may well have been an organised assassination. 
The Evidence of his [McNaughten] mental delusion is strong, but it must be borne in 
mind that he was exactly the instrument which others would employ. Sir Robert Peel has 
no reason for surmising this to be the case, but the possibility of it ought not and shall 
not be overlooked. 
9 
Though Queen Victoria's response to Peel's letter is not recorded, Peel's reply of the same day 
indicates that she was specifically interested in McNaughten's mental state. 
10 Peel agreed with the 
Queen that if the `Law does not attach its severest penalty to a crime so premeditated 
[McNaughten had also purchased the gun prior to the assassination attempt] and so deliberately 
and savagely perpetrated' it would be `most unfortunate indeed'. 
11 Peel confirmed to the Queen 
that `every effort will be made to bring him to condign punishment'. However he acknowledged 
that McNaughten's defence counsel would probably `endeavour [to establish] his insanity'. At this 
stage Peel remained confident that McNaughten would nevertheless be found guilty of murder. It 
7 Peel to Prince Albert, 20 January, 1843, The Letters of Queen Victoria -A Selection from Her 
Majesty's Correspondance Between the Years 1837 and 1861, ed. by Arthur Christopher Benson, 3 vols 
(London: John Murray, 1907), I, p. 570. 
8 Edward Drummond had had a distinguished career as Private Secretary to Canning, Ripon, and 
Wellington before taking up office with Peel. He was popular with those who knew him until his 
violent death, at the age of 51, in 1843. 
9 Peel to Victoria, 25 January, 1843. Benson, Letters of Queen Victoria, I, p. 572. 
10 On 10 June, 1840, the Queen was herself the object of an attack by a young man, Edward Oxford, 
who brandished a pistol while the Queen was in her carriage. In his trial, the prosecution argued that 
papers found in Oxford's lodging (suggesting links with Young England) implied an organized 
assault. Oxford's defence counsel brought to the stand several medical witnesses, including John 
Conolly (1794-1866), who all testified that the assault was committed under the influence of 
hereditary moral insanity. The Solicitor-General ridiculed the doctrine of moral insanity. However, 
because the pistol only contained blank shots, the jury found Oxford not guilty on the grounds of 
insanity. Under the Insane Offenders Act of 1800, he was removed to Bethlem. For an account of the 
trial, see J. F. Clarke, Autobiographical Recollections of the Medical Profession (London: J. & A. 
Churchill, 1874) and Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 86. On Oxford and moral insanity see 
Samuel Wilks, `An Account of Some Papers of the Late Dr. Hodgkin', Guy's Hospital Reports, 3rd 
series 23 (1878), pp. 87-91; and Amalie M. Kass and Edward H. Kass, Perfecting the World: The Life 
and Times of Dr. Thomas Hodgkin, 1798-1866 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 
pp. 324-28. 
11 Peel to Victoria, 25 January, 1843, Benson, Letters of Queen Victoria, I, p. 573. 
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was inconceivable to the prime minister that McNaughten could be acquitted on the grounds of 
insanity when, even at this early stage, ̀ [n]othing can be more collected and intelligent in many 
respects than his conduct in prison'. 
12 
Lord Melbourne also wrote to the Queen declaring the assassination ̀indeed a most 
horrible event' and `a dreadful thing'. Though the Home Secretary, Sir James Graham, was soon 
aware of McNaughten's Chartist sympathies and of the `violent part' he had taken in politics, 
Melbourne failed to see ̀any clear, distinct, and certain evidence of what were the real motives and 
object of the man-'. 
13 In contrast to Melbourne's ignorance or speculative reservations, the 
London-based daily and weekly newspapers lost no time in despatching reporters to Scotland to 
discover information that might reveal more about the assassin and point to a motive for the 
murder. Only a week after the assassination, the Weekly Chronicle suggested, rather 
disingenuously, that the `public has nearly exhausted itself in speculating upon the motive [... ] The 
belief that the shot was intended for the prime minister seems to be gaining ground daily'. 
14 
McNaughten's Chartist sympathies and the part they played in the assassination have been 
subject to interrogation by the American sociologist Richard Moran and academic, Daniel M. 
Robinson. In Knowing Right from Wrong (1981), Moran argues that the political significance of 
the McNaughten case has been sidelined in favour of viewing the assassination and subsequent 
`rules' which emerged from the case in the legal context of debates about criminal responsibility 
and issues surrounding the insanity defence. 
15 Tracing the political climate of the period, notably 
the rise of the Anti-Corn-Law League and Chartist agitation in McNaughten's home town of 
Glasgow, he argues that the assassination was politically motivated. In the depositions taken prior 
to the trial, McNaughten stated that he believed he was being persecuted by a Robert Lamond. 
Lamond, as Moran points out, was one of many Tory spies despatched across the country to report 
on the activities of the newly established Anti-Corn-Law League. Arguing that McNaughten was 
paid nearly £750 to murder Peel, Moran concludes that McNaughten's attack on Drummond was 
12 The Weekly Chronicle noted that upon his removal from Bow Street police station to Tothill 
Field's Bridewell to await sentencing, McNaughten `appeared quite at ease; not, indeed, like a man 
charged with the dreadful crime of assassination'. Weekly Chronicle, 22 January, 1843, p. 5. 
13 Melbourne to Victoria, 2 February, 1843, Benson, Letters of Queen Victoria, I, p. 576. 
14 Weekly Chronicle, 28 January, 1843, p. 2. 
15 Much analysis has been given to the rules established on McNaughten's acquittal. See, for example, 
Richard Moran (special editor), The Insanity Defense, The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 477 (January 1985). 
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in fact aimed at Peel and that far from a random attack, it was a well-organised Chartist plot. 
16 
Robinson concurs in this assessment. 
17 
Despite their important interpretation of the case, neither Moran and Robinson, nor legal 
historians, go far enough in the examination of the socio-cultural climate surrounding the murder 
of Drummond, especially the popular understanding of rightful confinement. 
18 Even a superficial 
perusal of the national and regional newspaper coverage of the McNaughten case indicates that the 
anxieties elicited by the murder extended far beyond political concerns. Many believed that the 
murder had cast a ̀ stigma' on the `national character'. 
19 The Times, for example, felt angered by 
the `dreadful imputation' that England was fast becoming as violent as continental countries in the 
conduct of public life. 
20 Yet equally, it could not escape the facts as they were presented by the 
murder: 
Formerly it was our boast that the weapon of the assassin - exercised for ready gain in all 
Europe besides - was unknown [... ] in England [... ] But events that have occurred within 
the present century has disabused us of this cherished and exalted faith. The belief in the 
honour and manly courage of Englishmen is become as one of those ancient superstitions, 
the memory of which provokes a painful comparison between the past and present times. 
21 
16 Richard Moran, Knowing Right From Wrong: The Insanity Defence of Daniel McNaughtan (New 
York: The Free Press, 1981), p. 45. A deposit receipt from the Glasgow and Shipping Bank for 1745 
was found on McNaughten when he was arrested. His defense counsel found it difficult to explain the 
sum, given that McNaughten was only a wood-turner by trade. 
17 Daniel M. Robinson, Wild Beasts & Idle Humours: The Insanity Defense from Antiquity to the 
Present (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 163-171. 
18 A chapter entitled `What we thought about it all' by Alexander Walk in Daniel McNaughton: His 
Trial and the Aftermath is a compilation of various journal and newspaper responses to the crime and 
the debates it engendered. However, Walk does not analyze the excerpts, despite their important 
reflection of responses to debates over criminal insanity. See Daniel McNaughton: His Trial and the 
Aftermath, ed. by Donald J. West and Alexander Walk (Ashford: Gaskell Books, 1977), pp. 113-128. 
19 Weekly Chronicle, 28 January, 1843, p. 4. 
20 The Times lost no time in condemning the foreign influence from which the assassination was seen 
to emanate: ̀ We are yet, as a people, novices in copying the melodramatic massacres of Young France, 
and the LYNCH-lawlessness of Republican America. There is still enough shame and courage left - at 
least, we hope so - to arrest this mania of foreign growth, before it becomes too fierce and powerful to 
cope withal. Heaven grant that the masculine courage and honest sense of our countrymen may not be 
slack to redeem the tarnished reputation of our common land, laws, and faith! ' The Times, 26 January, 
1843, p. 4. For an agonized account of the degradation of the English character, see also the Illustrated 
London News (January-June 1843), p. 49. 
21 The Times, 23 January, 1843, p. 4. 
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Such a ̀ painful comparison' was not limited to national character. The two-day trial for the wilful 
murder of Drummond that followed in the first week of March, overseen by Sir Nicholas 
Conyngham Tindal, the chief justice of the commons pleas, was terminated by the judge. The jury 
found McNaughten not guilty on the ground of insanity. 
22 Commenting on the case in 1855 in 
Miscellanies: Critical, Imaginative, and judicial, Samuel Warren noted that the perceived ̀ escape of 
the cold-blooded murderer, M'Naughten [... ] horrified and disgusted the public'. 
23 
The angry reaction to the verdict is suggestive of the way in which lunatic asylums were 
popularly perceived in the mid-nineteenth century. Many felt that far from insane, McNaughten 
was a violent criminal who had used a plea of insanity to escape from the due retribution of the law. 
Unlike carceral punishment in a prison, the asylum was not perceived as a rehabilitative institution 
but rather as a site where McNaughten could simply pass his days in relative luxury. 
24 The verdict 
was thus seen to provide law-breakers with an ideal model for evading punishment. The reactions 
elicited by the murder of Drummond and the trial and acquittal of McNaughten allow us to 
register popular perceptions of both the value and purpose of prisons and lunatic asylums. One of 
the primary issues centred on determining who should be protected, how, and from what exactly. 
Physicians argued that lunatics, like McNaughten, needed to be protected from themselves and 
others. The best place to treat and effect cure was the lunatic asylum. 
Yet as Samuel Warren and others in the legal system (as well as many lay-public observers) 
argued, McNaughten had never denied murdering Drummond. There were witnesses to the 
assassination. Maintaining that McNaughten had feigned insanity, they argued that a miscarriage 
of justice had been witnessed. That he should escape ̀ condign punishment' was seen by the public 
as an example of perverse and unwarranted leniency. As Moran makes clear, there was general 
apprehension that the verdict might establish a new legal precedent. 
25 The fact that the judicial 
22 On 13 March, 1843, McNaughten was removed from Newgate to Bethlehem Hospital at St. 
George's Field under an order from Sir James Graham. He was transferred to the newly constructed 
Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum on March 26,1864, where he died of poor health on 3 May, 
1865, aged 52. 
23 Samuel Warren, Miscellanies: Critical, Imaginative, and Judicial, 2 vols (London: William 
Blackwood, 1855), II, p. 117. After studying medicine in Edinburgh, Samuel Warren (1807-18 77) was 
called to the bar in 1837. Throughout his life, his ambitions were literary rather than legal. Between 
1830 and 1837, his `Passages from the Diary of a Late Physician' appeared in Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Magazine and in 1841, Ten Thousand a Year was published in three volumes. He was appointed 
Master of Lunacy in 1859. See DNB, 59, pp. 424-25. 
24 Commentators on the McNaughten case pointed to the comfortable living conditions of Edward 
Oxford, who was also confined in Bethlehem after his attempted assassination of Queen Victoria in 
1840. See, for example, ̀ The Conduct of Edward Oxford in Bethlem', Glasgow Saturday Post, 4 
March, 1843, p. 1. 
25 Moran, Knowing Right from Wrong, p. 2. 
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system was seen to have failed to protect the public and society at large was almost 
incomprehensible to those who had regarded the English legal system as fair and just. 
The question of whether the legal system had degenerated from its humane and enlightened 
past drew intense debate. Warren, in particular, believed that the court's decision had failed the 
public. While acknowledging that the subject was one `environed with immense practical 
difficulties, which are often unexpectedly visible in applying clear and correct principles to simple 
combinations of facts', 
26 he remained clear as to where fault lay for the shocking verdict: the 
introduction to the court of medical men and their theory of `uncontrollable impulse'. As the 
following section will demonstrate, McNaughten's defence counsel argued that his client 
committed the murder under the influence of homicidal monomania. To Warren, this was no more 
than a 
sickly and spurious theory, which would place the innocent and virtuous entirely at the 
mercy of the most base and ruffianly impulses of our fallen nature. It would relax all the 
bonds of self-restraint, and afford a premium on the indulgence of ungovernable 
27 
passions. 
The 1840s was^decade which witnessed dramatic legislative overhaul in the care and treatment of 
the insane. As with Philippe Pinel in France, the English profession of mental science had begun 
to strike the metaphorical and literal chains off the lunatic and replace them with moral kindness 
and fortitude. The lunatic was no longer seen as bestial but as a person who was ill and in need of 
treatment. For this development, physicians were beginning to be regarded with some degree of 
respect, and their profession was gaining the degree of authority over the insane they had long been 
fighting for (against both other professional bodies as well as apothecaries and charlatans). 
Although an authoritative medical interpretation of McNaughten's mental instability was 
successful within the courtroom, the public reaction to the verdict challenged the suggestion that 
the medical profession was best-qualified to interpret McNaughten's actions. 
The popular belief in the advancement of mental science eroded very publicly. Their 
theories of insanity were ̀ dangerous and monstrous'. 
28 With the murder itself, and the perceived 
failings of both the legal system and the profession of mental science, the upright and humane 
nature of the ̀ national character' was fast becoming an issue of real debate and consternation. No 
longer were the public confident in those who made the law and those who positioned themselves as 
protectors of society. It was for this reason that the common law judges were requested to attend a 
26 Warren, Miscellanies, II, p. 115. 
27 Warren, Miscellanies, II, p. 159. 
28 Warren, Miscellanies, II, p. 117. 
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hearing at the House of Lords soon after the acquittal verdict to establish a set of new and 
hopefully more effective set of rules governing criminal responsibility. Unlike the medico-legal 
cases of Louisa Nottidge and William Frederick Windham later in the century, both of whom were 
threatened or confronted with incarceration in a lunatic asylum (like McNaughten, Nottidge was 
examined by physicians and declared to be suffering from delusions resulting from religious 
monomania), McNaughten's trial was a criminal rather than civil case, brought by the state rather 
than family members. Nevertheless, the case represents a formative point in time for both the 
status of the legal profession and for the profession of mental science in regard to popular 
perceptions of their roles and responsibilities. Importantly, it extended an awareness of the 
existence of, and confusions surrounding, partial forms of lunacy like monomania. Perhaps most 
importantly, in discussing the construction of anxieties over issues relating to wrongful 
confinement, the McNaughten trial provides a framework through which to examine the contested 
nature of rightful confinement. 
ii. `[L]et us have no maudlin humanity or hysterical tenderness'29 
Though Drummond was a well-respected man, faithful in the office of private secretary to a number 
of political luminaries, the sensational quality of the assassination and the immediate suggestion 
that Peel was the real target of McNaughten's bullet soon displaced sentimental regret at the loss 
of life of a civil servant. Far from being the preserve of nostalgic remembrance, ̀ maudlin humanity' 
and ̀ hysterical tenderness' were phrases employed by the Standard to warn their readers against 
holding too much sympathy for a man they believed to be no more than a ̀ savage murderer in 
intention'. It was an antagonistic position for the paper to take, especially as no-one knew at this 
early stage whether McNaughten was in fact a lunatic who had attempted to murder Drummond 
under the influence of irresistible impulses, or whether he was merely a violent criminal. In 
instructing its readers to be wary of adopting a merciful position, the paper explicitly encouraged 
an hysterical anger (despite declaring that McNaughten was as entitled as any accused person to 
have the full benefit of the law). Commenting after news of Drummond's death, The Times also 
hoped that 
no undue exertion will be made by the soft-hearted to twist and torture unimportant 
incidents into symptoms of insanity - that no over-refined humanity will endeavour to 
argue back the crime itself into a proof of madness [... ] that no maudlin sensitiveness will 
lift up its plaintive voice to rescue the convicted felon from the doom which a justice 
higher than man's has pronounced against him by whom man's blood has been shed. 
30 
29 Standard, 23 January, 1843, p. 2. 
30 The Times, 26 January, 1843, p. 4. 
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Yet not all papers sardonically advised their readers to renounce compassion for 
McNaughten. Far from a ̀ savage murderer', the Illustrated London News desired that its readers 
sympathetically view McNaughten as a ̀ wretched man'. Sentimentally pleading for mercy not 
vengeance, the tone and language (of maudlin humanity and hysterical tenderness) that the leader 
used was in striking opposition to that of the Standard: 
If he be really mad - if reason is shut out from his brain - if his heart is blind - his mind 
sadly and hopelessly incoherent, irresponsible, and void of all thought - his soul darkened 
and prostrate under an Almighty affliction - it is not for man to dole forth retribution 
unto such as him. Pity, more than punishment, may be laid at his door. 
31 
The antithetical positions on McNaughten encapsulate the fundamental question which preoccupied 
everyone: was McNaughten mad or bad? Despite the `over-refined humanity' expressed by the 
Illustrated London News (directed precisely to the `soft-hearted' reading-public), many believed that 
McNaughten had deliberately feigned insanity in order to escape punishment. 
32 Even the 
Illustrated London News had to acknowledge that this was a possibility: 
But if he prove a gloomy-hearted criminal, and has done this murder as a foul and black 
assassin [... ] [s]hall we get up the false cry of insanity to stay the arm of justice - the 
sword of God? [... ] We do not wish to throw the colour of wild approval over the fearful 
punishment of death - God Forbid! - but we do earnestly wish to check the false mercy of 
misconstruction which writes mad instead of bad, and is content to call that criminal a 
maniac who is nothing better than a fiend. 
33 
To save the `reproach of having nurtured such an atrocious villain', a writer in the Glasgow 
Herald hoped that McNaughten had committed the murder under the influence of insanity. 
34 The 
Glasgow Saturday Post agreed: ̀ To us it seems immaterial whether insanity be self-engendered or 
otherwise. It is enough to justify acquittal of a crime that the party be, beyond all doubt, 
31 Illustrated London News (January-June 1843), p. 49. 
32 Responding to recent publicity about an open day `fancy fair' at the Middlesex County Lunatic 
Asylum, Hanwell, one observer believed that the murder was linked to McNaughten's desire to attend 
the institution's `balls and entertainments'. Standard, 25 January, 1843, p. 3. In 1839, nine years 
after it was established, John Conolly was appointed Hanwell's resident physician superintendent. He 
immediately replaced mechanical restraints with a humane system of moral management. Conolly was 
the object of acclaim for his role in transforming the care and treatment of the lunatic. See chapter on 
Conolly in Masters of Bedlam, pp. 48-83. On moral management see Scull, Social Order, pp. 80-94. 
33 Illustrated London News (January June 1843), p. 49. 
34 Glasgow Herald, 27 January, 1843, p. 2. 
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unaccountable for his actions'. 
35 However like the Standard, the Weekly Chronicle was suspicious 
of McNaughten's apparent insanity. `From close personal observation with the prisoner', the paper 
recorded, it was not misleading in `stating that he is most undoubtedly in a sound state of mind'. 
Though `his cheeks were sunken and his eye was wild and restless; beyond this he exhibited no 
symptoms that could be construed even into incipient insanity'. 
36 He in fact held the innocent 
appearance of a ̀ decent mechanic'. Even if it was found that the assassin was of unsound mind, 
`still the danger is not the less to the sane'. 
37 
Underpinning such comments lay an anxiety about deterrence and punishment. The 
Standard believed that criminal impulses could and should be repressed, be it in criminals or 
lunatics. No-one, the paper suggested, was `so utterly devoid of moral and reasoning faculties as to 
be impervious to the efficacy of proper punishment'. This argument was reiterated by `Protection', 
writing to The Times on 30 January: 
Are all persons in high stations to walk about in peril of their lives, because our laws 
think a mad-man's life of more value than theirs? If a sane man can be restrained from 
crime by fear, why are we to suppose that fear [of punishment] will have no influence in 
restraining those who are only half-cracked? 
38 
In a succinctly written leader in the Morning Chronicle on the same day that `Protection' wrote to 
The Times, these issues were discussed. Prior to the campaigns of Sir Samuel Romilly in the first 
decade of the nineteenth century to reform the criminal code and specifically to abolish the death 
penalty for the crime of picking pockets (of goods to the value of twelve pence) 
39, 
and the `changes 
in the public mind' that they effected, the `sanguinary character of our penal law had its natural 
influence on the character of the people'. 
40 Now though, the paper suggested, ̀a morbid humanity 
. has taken the most atrocious crimes under its protection '41 
35 Glasgow Saturday Post, 18 March, 1843, p. 1. 
36 Weekly Chronicle, 22 January, 1843, p. 5. 
37 Standard, 26 January, 1843, p. 1. 
38 The Times, 30 January, 1843, p. 5. 
39 Romilly (1757-1818) also persuaded the House of Commons to accept transportation for life rather 
than hanging as the punishment for pick-pockets. See Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The 
Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850 (London: Penguin Books, 1989). 
40 Morning Chronicle, 30 January, 1843, p. 2. 
41 On the dismantling of a reformative penal system and its replacement in the early 1860s with a 
punitive model of convict treatment, see Jennifer Davis, `The London Garotting Panic of 1862: A 
Moral Panic and the Creation of a Criminal Class in mid-Victorian England', in Crime and the Law: 
4 
`By pushing humanity too far, we may in reality be encouraging inhumanity', the Morning 
Chronicle reminded its readers, noting that the sole object of the McNaughten trial was to 
establish secure penal parameters to adequately protect society. The fear expressed by the Standard, 
`Protection', and by the Morning Chronicle was that the diminishment of severe verdicts (resulting 
from the public horror of capital punishment) might be taken too far. By affording `encouragement 
to bloodshed'42 the issue was one of vital importance to society as a whole. The prosecuting 
Solicitor-General, Sir William Webb-Follet, agreed with such sentiments and argued in court that 
McNaughten should be subject to punishment - both to deter imitators and to protect the public 
from further potentially murderous outbursts. He argued that too much time and thought had gone 
into the assassination attempt for McNaughten to be suffering from an uncontrollable impulse. 
Yet this was exactly the position taken by McNaughten's defence counsel, the barrister Alexander 
Cockburn. He argued that his client could not be found guilty of the crime because he was partially 
insane. Because he had suffered from criminal monomania, deterrence was not an issue. To Webb- 
Follet, McNaughten was ̀ bad'; to Cockburn, he was ̀ mad'. Yet as the Morning Chronicle also 
pointed out: 
From monomania up to the wildest frenzy there are an infinity of gradations: and it not 
only becomes of importance to consider how far the individual committing a criminal act 
is conscious of wrong, but also how the punishment may affect those who may labour 
under different kinds of insanity. 
43 
iii. The trial 
On Friday 3 March, 1843, the Central Criminal Court at the Old Bailey was packed. The number 
of people seeking admission was ̀ enormous', and having been anticipated, the `precautions taken by 
the sheriffs were proportionally strict, and the difficulty of getting even to the outer doors was 
unprecedentedly great'. The display of wigs and gowns, the paper continued, was unequaled since 
the trial of Daniel Good. 
44 When the barristers took their seats and the jury was sworn in, there 
was a ̀ Babel-like scene of confusion' as the public tried to crowd in to the court. After Chief 
Justice Tindal entered the courtroom, the prisoner was brought to the bar to hear the indictment 
The Social History of Crime in Western Europe since 1500, ed. by V. A. C. Gatrell, Bruce Lenman and 
Geoffrey Parker (London: Europa Publications, 1980), pp. 190-213. 
42 Morning Chronicle, 30 January, 1843, p. 2. 
43 Morning Chronicle, 30 January, 1843, p. 2. 
44 Morning Chronicle, 4 March, 1843, p. 7. Daniel Good was a London coachman who was found 
guilty of brutally murdering his mistress. He was executed in 1842. See Thomas Boyle, Black Swine in 
the Sewers of Hampstead. - beneath the surface of Victorian sensationalism (London: Viking, 1989), 
pp. 55-58. 
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read for the wilful murder of Edward Drummond. `[G] ently and clearly' he entered a plea of not 
guilty. 
Webb-Follett, counsel for the prosecution, began his case against McNaughten by 
establishing that Drummond had been shot near the Salopian Coffee House, near Charing Cross, 
on 20 January. In his opening statement, Webb-Follet emphasised to the jury that public safety 
was the object of all law. To counter what he presumed would be the key defence strategy of 
Cockburn (that McNaughten was insane to the degree that he was not a responsible agent and so 
not answerable to the laws of his country), Webb-Follett suggested that in disavowing the 
importance of public safety, Cockburn's argument `should not be too readily listened to'. 
45 
Because insanity `assumes such different forms and such various shapes, and acts in such opposite 
ways, that you cannot define it' (p. 4), Webb-Follett indicated that it was not sufficient to excuse 
McNaughten on the grounds of partial insanity. 
One of his central tactics was to employ the definition of insanity made by Sir Matthew 
Hale, Lord Chief Justice of England, in History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736). Hale added to 
Sir Edward Coke's definition of insanity the possibility that the criminal might be lucid at the 
time of the trial but that the onus was on him to show that the crime had not been committed 
during a lucid period (thus accepting that partial insanity existed). Webb-Follett employed Hale's 
distinction between partial and total insanity in order to show that because McNaughten was 
partially sane, he could distinguish between right and wrong and so should be found guilty of 
murder. The Solicitor-General also employed Erskine's formative construction of delusion and 
`motives irresistible' (which he successfully used in the case of Hadfield in 1800) to show that his 
definition of delusion in regard to criminal responsibility was simultaneously too broad and too 
small. Even though a ̀ party may have that state of mind which would render him wholly 
unconscious of right and wrong [... ] [and though] he may have that state of mind which makes him 
not aware that he is committing a crime [... ] the crime may not be the offspring of any delusion he 
labours under'. (p. 7) Webb-Follett relied heavily upon Lord Chief Justice Mansfield's guilty verdict 
in the trial of John Bellingham in 1812.46 The similarities between the Perceval and Drummond 
murders were striking and could not have failed to produce an impression on the jury. 
45 Richard M. Bousfield and Richard Merret, Report of the Trial of Daniel M'Naughton at the Central 
Criminal Court, Old Bailey, (London: Henry Renshaw, 1843), p. 3. Further page references are 
contained within the text. 
46 In 1812 John Bellingham shot and killed Spencer Perceval, the Prime Minister (and previously 
Chancellor of the Exchequer) in the lobby of the House of Commons. Against Bellingham's wishes, 
his defence counsel argued that he committed the murder while suffering from temporary insanity. 
Bellingham was found guilty. The Times reflected in 1843 that it had been adequately proven that 
Bellingham had come up to London by himself, had never been under restraint, had never been 
attended by a medical man and `was perfectly regular in all his habits'. There was ̀ not one proof 
adduced to show that his understanding was so deranged as not to enable him to know that murder 
42 
Webb-Follett then moved away from legal precedents to establish details of the defendant's 
life. He highlighted the fact that McNaughten appeared to have been of sober habits and had saved a 
considerable sum of money while living in Glasgow and plying his trade as a wood-turner. He had 
even attended lectures on natural philosophy and anatomy at the Mechanics' Institute. The purpose 
of drawing the jury's attention to such details was to reinforce the idea that McNaughten was sane 
and that the crime was premeditated. Policemen and soldiers testifying for the prosecution 
explained that they had seen McNaughten loitering both at Whitehall and at Downing Street 
(suggesting premeditation), and the curator of the Mechanics' Institute testified to McNaughten's 
industrious nature. By the end of the first day of the trial, the jury were left with a formidable 
picture of McNaughten's rationality, sanity, and thus guilt. 
The second and final day of the trial commenced with Cockburn's opening speech on behalf 
of McNaughten. Cockburn began by acknowledging what a sensation the crime had produced, even 
within `the remotest confines of this extensive empire'(p. 22). 
47 Yet in focusing on the nature of 
the crime itself and the stature of the victim, such attention was dangerous for it gave rise to a 
desire for vengeance in the form of `a wild and merciless cry for blood'(p. 22). Cockburn desired 
that attention should be refocused on his client, a man who had shot Drummond under the 
influence of a monomaniacal instinct which had been led on by `fierce and fearful delusion'(p. 24). 
He explained to the jury that he would prove that McNaughten was partially insane. For this 
reason, his client could not be held morally or legally responsible for his crime. Yet to argue that 
partial insanity fell under legal directives for the existence of insanity and to convince the jury 
that this fact negated criminal intention and thus a guilty verdict, was simply too risky a strategy 
for the defence counsel. 
48 
In light of Webb-Follett's focus upon McNaughten's sanity, Cockburn focused his defence 
on the corruption of his client's moral affections. His client's uncontrollable delusions had 
temporarily deprived him of `moral liberty'(p. 59). Cockburn was acutely conscious of Webb- 
Follet's continued emphasis on the necessity of protecting society and the `public safety'. With 
this in mind, he did not dispute the fact that the `very nature of this disease necessitates the 
seclusion of those who are its victims from the rest of the world'(p. 24). Rather, Cockburn 
deliberately positioned McNaughten as himself a victim of his insanity, `cut off from the rest of 
mankind like the lepers of old'(p. 25). Central to his strategy was the employment of expert 
was a crime'. The Times, 28 January, 1843, p. 5. Bellingham was convicted of murder and executed. 
Significantly, despite the claim of his counsel, no medical evidence was given in Bellingham's defence. 
See Robinson, Wild Beasts, pp. 152-154. 
47 The news (albeit incorrect news) of the murder soon reached Australia. The New South Wales 
Magazine reported that a man named ̀ Nugent' had shot at Drummond in a deranged fit. New South 
Wales Magazine, (July 1843), p. 363. 
48 Walker, Crime and Insanity in England, I, p. 92. 
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medical witnesses. In order to challenge the public perception of McNaughten as a ̀ cold-blooded' 
murderer, Cockburn first offered to the jury a vision of the advances that the profession of mental 
science had made in regard to lunacy. 
In much the same way as the Illustrated London News had done before the outset of the 
trial, Cockburn employed overtly sentimental language to establish in the minds of the jury the 
skill, expertise and enlightened humanity of the psychological physician: 
Thank God, at last - though but at last - humanity and wisdom have penetrated, hand in 
hand, into the dreary abodes of these miserable beings, and whilst the one has poured the 
balm of consolation into the bosoms of the afflicted, the other has held the light of science 
over our hitherto imperfect knowledge of this disease, has ascertained its varying character, 
and marked its shadowy boundaries, and taught us how, in gentleness and mercy, best to 
minister to the relief and restoration of the sufferer! (p. 25) 
To reinforce the suggestion that many of the ancient legal arguments and definitions of insanity 
simply did not hold true in relation to the advances that mental science had made, particularly in 
conceiving insanity as a defect of will and emotion as well as in intellect, Cockburn employed the 
arguments of a young American physician, Isaac Ray (1807-1881), set out in his Treatise on 
Medical Jurisprudence (1838). Ray believed wholeheartedly in the necessity for expert diagnosis in 
order to distinguish crime from insanity. He also believed that courts should establish a simple rule 
that no act perpetrated by an insane person should be punished as a crime. Here Cockburn was 
directly challenging the `wild beast' standard of criminal responsibility, formulated by judge Tracy 
in the case of Rex v. Arnold in 1723. 
Though `mad Ned' Arnold was found guilty of shooting and wounding Lord Onslow, the 
case enabled the courts to absolve a person of legal responsibility for his actions only if he could be 
shown to be totally deranged and without the use of his reason. Quoting the further case of a man 
named Bowler, who had been tried for shooting a Mr. Burrows in 1812 and who had been found 
guilty (despite being found insane during a commission of lunacy inquiry), Cockburn entreated 
the jury `to let the error in that case [... ] operate as a warning to you not to be carried away 
headlong by antiquated maxims or delusive doctrines'(p. 27). Though Webb-Follett turned to 
Erskine in order to point out the fallacy of his argument, Cockburn saw him as ̀ great light' (p. 38) 
for his understanding of delusion as the true test of insanity. Like Erskine, Cockburn attempted to 
demonstrate that McNaughten had committed the wilful murder of Drummond while suffering 
under delusions in which, like Bellingham, he believed he was being persecuted by group of 
politicians, policemen and catholic priests. Willful' he deliberately made clear to the jury, 
suggested the `necessary moral sense that guides and directs the volition, acting on it through the 
medium of reason' (p. 36) . 
Cockburn thus argued that a man might on many points be sane, but nevertheless be 
rendered wholly incompetent to resist ̀ some impulse so irresistibly strong so as to annihilate all 
44 
possibility of self-dominion or resistance'(p. 45). Having established the problems inherent upon 
relying on ancient laws and rulings, the skill of present-day physicians and the absolute necessity 
for their expert intervention, as well as the possibility that a delusion can exist in a person who in 
many other respects is sane, he traced McNaughten's personal history. Unlike his counterpart, who 
stated the case for the prosecution in `that calm and colourless manner [... ] free from all rhetorical 
ornaments [... ] distinct, simple, forcible', 
49 Cockburn appealed directly to the mercy of the jury 
by sentimentally positioning his client as sensitive and kind, a humble but honest working-class 
man. 
As a young adult, for example, McNaughten had become increasingly gloomy and reserved, 
yet continued to give crumbs to birds and watch children play; acts that did not accord with the 
ferocity of an assassin. As several witnesses for the prosecution had testified, McNaughten had 
trouble sleeping in the months leading up to the murder. To Webb-Follet such pacing in his room 
at night was indicative of his obsession with murdering Drummond (or Peel). To Cockburn, it 
was indicative of his insane delusion; McNaughten had been denied `sweet sleep', a privilege that 
was the `birthright and inheritance of the working man - the reward of the humbler portion of 
society - the blessing which nature gives them to counterbalance the disadvantages of their 
condition'(p. 46). In countering the suggestion that the murder was politically motivated, 
Cockburn simply asked the jury whether McNaughten was ̀ shown to have taken a strong and 
active part in political matters? Did he attend political meetings? Is he shown to be a man of ill- 
guided, strong, and enthusiastic political sentiments? There is not a tittle of evidence on that 
subject'(p. 54). 
iv. `The jargon of the shop! ' 
At this stage in the proceedings, Cockburn turned to his medical witnesses, ̀ men of intelligence, 
experience, skill, and undoubted probity'(p. 24) who would declare McNaughten the `creature of a 
delusion, and the victim of ungovernable impulses, which wholly take away from him the character 
of a reasonable and responsible being'(p. 24). He believed that their evidence would force the jury to 
conclude that McNaughten's perverted moral affections had rendered him incapable of resisting the 
impulse to murder and so find in favour of acquittal. Prior to their evidence, Cockburn made a 
point of reminding the jury that though they could not punish the prisoner for an offence 
committed at a time when he was unconscious of wrong, they did have the power (provided by the 
`mercy of the law') to request that McNaughten be placed in a lunatic asylum, where `he will be 
protected from the consequences of his own delusions, and society will be secured from the danger 
49 William C. Townsend, Modern State Trials, Revised and Illustrated, 2 vols (London: Longman, 
Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1850), I, p. 326. 
45 
of his acts'(p. 60). Without this legal stricture, he knew that his client would be found guilty of 
wilful murder. 
The first medical witness was Dr E. J. Monro, a physician who had interviewed 
McNaughten on 18 February while he was held at Newgate Prison. Monro testified that 
McNaughten's moral sense had been perverted. He was, the physician believed, so absorbed by the 
contemplation of a fancied wrong that his mind was unable to distinguish between right and 
wrong. The monomaniacal delusions were `real' and 
the act with which he was charged, coupled with the history of his past life, left not the 
remotest doubt [... ] [of] the presence of insanity sufficient to deprive the prisoner of all 
self-control. (p. 68) 
Sir Alexander Morison, the author of Physiognomy of Mental Diseases (1838) and founder in 1842 
of the Society for Improving the Condition of the Insane50, and the third medical witness, Mr 
McClure, a surgeon living in Harley Street were equally convinced that McNaughten's moral 
perceptions were impaired. Five further medical witnesses were called including a surgeon at Guy's 
Hospital, Mr Aston Key, and Dr Forbes Benignus Winslow, editor of the journal of Psychological 
Medicine and Mental Pathology and author of Plea of Insanity in Criminal Cases (1843). Though 
the testimony of McClure and Winslow was based on observation during the trial itself rather 
than on a formal examination of the defendant (their evidence was disputed by the prosecution), 
Winslow expressed the opinion of all of the medical witnesses in arguing that McNaughten was 
insane because he had `committed the offence in question whilst afflicted with a delusion'(p. 73). 
Judge Tindal then asked Webb-Follet whether he had medical witnesses that could testify 
to the defendant's sanity. On replying that he didn't, Tindal concluded that `the evidence, 
especially of the last two medical gentlemen who have been examined, and who are strangers to 
both sides, and only observers of the case, to be very strong, and sufficient to induce my learned 
brother to stop the case'(p. 73). After further stating that there was ̀ no part of it which leaves 
doubt on my mind'(p. 74), the jury brought back a special verdict, `NOT GUILTY on the grounds 
of insanity'. 
51 After the abrupt end of the case, three interrelated anxieties over the verdict became 
all-pervasive in journals and in the press. Firstly, the emergence of monomania as a medical 
condition and the use of it in criminal trials was perceived to enable criminals to escape 
50 See chapter on Morison in Masters of Bedlam, pp. 123-160. 
51 The trial generated intense interest, especially from phrenologists. In an address to Lord 
Brougham, J. Q. Rumball argued that McNaughten should be found not guilty because of the 
phrenological proofs of his disease. J. Q. Rumball, M'Naughten. A Letter to the Lord Chancellor, upon 
Insanity, 2nd edn (London: J. Churchill, 1843). See also James George Davey, Medicolegal Reflections 
on the Trial of Daniel M'Naughten (London: Balliere, 1843) and the review of Davey's Reflections in 
Zoist: A Journal of Cerebral Physiology and Mesmerism, I (March 1843 - January 1844), pp. 397-99. 
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punishment. Secondly, the emergence of psychological physicians in courts of law and the esteem 
with which they were accorded, evidence of the growing authority of science to exculpate guilt, was 
seen as a development which threatened the judicial system by undermining its legal sanctions. 
52 
Thirdly, dangers were read into the sentimentally excessive rhetoric employed by Cockburn, 
contributing to a growing conviction that society was ironically threatened by its own humanity 
and seemingly enlightened sensibility. 
In his essay entitled `Manie Homicide' in the Dictionaire des sciences medicales (1818), 
J. E. D. Esquirol (1773-1840), a young French physician, expressed mistrust of a form of insanity in 
which the intellect was unimpaired: `But does there really exist a mania', he asked, ̀ in which 
patients who labour under it preserve their reason intact, whilst they abandon themselves to the 
most condemnable actions? Is there a pathological state in which man is irresistibly impelled to 
commit an act which his conscience condemns? I do not believe it'. 53 Yet in Des maladies mentales 
(1838), he recanted such a denial in favour of what clinical observations proved was the existence of 
such a malady. 54 
Monomania, Esquirol's contribution to medical nomenclature, was a condition which 
encompassed ̀all the mysterious anomalies of sensibility, all the phenomena of the human 
understanding, all the consequences of the perversion of our natural inclinations, and all the errors 
of our passions'. 
55 It was characterised by a partial lesion of the understanding. It was a form of 
delirium which was limited to a single or a small number of objects in which the sufferer would 
`seize upon a false principle, which they [would] [... ] pursue without deviating from logical 
reasonings, and from which they deduce legitimate consequences'(p. 320). Importantly, 
monomaniacs were not deprived of the use of their reason, but their moral affections and 
dispositions were fundamentally perverted. Attentive `to the role of a pristine and specialized 
vocabulary in establishing scientific authority', 
56 Esquirol hoped that the enhanced specificity of 
52 Weiner, Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 87. 
53 D. Hack Tuke, Prichard and Symonds in Especial Relation to Mental Science with chapters on Moral 
Insanity (London: J. & A. Churchill, 1891), pp. 16-17. 
54 At the turn of the century, Esquirol was one of Pinel's students on the clinical instruction course 
at the Salpetriere. Though from different socio-economic backgrounds, they developed a close 
friendship. Whereas Pinel's patronal role was characterized by unused opportunity, Esquirol was 
forceful in formulating and achieving his aims. As such, he played a formative role in the 
institutionalization of French psychiatry and in the professionalisation of physicians. See Goldstein, 
Console, pp. 128-132. 
55 J. E. D. Esquirol, Mental Maladies, A Treatise on Insanity, trans. by E. K. Hunt (Philadelphia: Lea 
& Blanchard, 1845), p. 200. Further page references are contained within the text. 
56 Goldstein, Console, p. 156. 
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linguistic classification to include his three subdivisions of monomania (intellectual, affective, and 
instinctive) would lead to a clearer understanding of madness and in turn, greater effectiveness in 
its treatment and prevention. Yet Esquirol's inclusion of monomania into the traditional 
nosological framework was both challenging and threatening to the profession's established 
categorization of mental derangement. The apparent breach of the distinction between moral 
depravity and mental incapacity, demanded by the extension of classificatory systems to include 
monomania, affected the medical profession in several ways and as the following chapters will 
demonstrate, were central to debates about wrongful confinement in England throughout the 
nineteenth century. 
A deepening confusion over what exactly constituted insanity and how it should be treated 
was at the centre of the clash between the profession of mental science and the public over the 
newly emerging theory of monomania in England in the 1840s. Commenting on the McNaughten 
case several years later, the Journal of Psychological Medicine and Mental Pathology reprinted an 
extract from Sir George Stephen's Juryman's Guide' in order to illustrate `the opinion of an 
intelligent jurist on the plea of monomania in criminal cases'57. 
we cannot attribute all the fuss that has been made about monomania [... ] to any new 
lights that have been thrown on the nature of structure of the mind. We are far more 
inclined to ascribe it to that sickly humanity for which our juries have latterly become 
proverbial, and which generally has crept more into fashion than quite becomes the sturdy 
manliness for which our countrymen have long been celebrated. 
58 
The emergence of monomania represented no more than the `latitude of definition which medical 
men were apt to attribute to the notion of insanity'. 
59 Unsurprisingly, the Standard was not 
hesitant to voice apprehension. The fault, the paper believed, lay in `permitting the "mad doctors" 
to dictate the law, and in allowing too much weight to their crude, and, we must say, absurd 
opinions in their own department of knowledge. (If they really know anything)'"60 
Despite previously expressing generosity towards the `wretched man', the Illustrated 
London News was one of many journals to now express dissatisfaction with the fact that insanity 
was so readily admitted and 
with so little qualification [... ] and that a verdict to that effect should invest the criminal 
with a protection which the community at large regard as being fraught with danger to its 
57JPMMP, 1 (1848), p. 485. 
58 JPMMP, 1 (1848), p. 485. 
59 Walker, Crime and Insanity, I, p. 97. 
60 Standard, 7 March, 1843, p. 5. See also The Times, 9 March, 1843, p. 6. 
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own personal security [... ] The cry, upon the recent acquittal of M'Naughten, is, almost 
everywhere, who after this is safe? "61 
A common sentiment was that the public were now at the mercy of either unscrupulous criminals 
feigning insanity or lunatics whom the court had set loose upon society. A Mr. T. Campbell 
expressed the tenor of the public's outraged response to the acquittal of McNaughten in an 
amusing poem which was reprinted in several national journals: 
CONGRATULATIONS ON A LATE ACQUITTAL 
Ye people of England! exult and be glad, 
For ye're now at the will of the merciless mad. 
Why say ye that but three authorities reign - 
Crown, Commons, and Lords? - You omit the insane! 
They're a privileg'd class, whom no statute controls, 
And their murderous charter exists in their souls. 
Do they wish to spill blood - they have only to play 
A few pranks - get asylum'd a month and a day - 
Then Neigh! to escape from the mad-doctor's keys, 
and to pistol or stab whomsoever they please. 
Now the dog has a human-like wit - in creation 
He resembles most nearly our own generation: 
Then if madmen for murder escape with impunity, 
why deny a poor dog the same noble immunity? 
So, if dog or man bite you, beware being nettled, 
For crime is no crime - when the mind is unsettled. 
62 
Campbell was one of many to denigrate this new form of `partial' madness. One observer at 
McNaughten's trial took up the discussion over whether the notion of impunity was an incentive 
to crime in the insane. ̀ W. B. G. ' offered the following solution to the problem raised by impunity: 
`I think that the safest and best course the legislature could adopt would be to punish the insane as 
well as the sane, then there will be no occasion to legislate for confining persons for life who are 
subject to these morbid delusions. Make an example of the next case, and we shall not hear of 
monomaniasm again'. 
63 
61 Illustrated London News (JanuaryJune, 1843), p. 163. 
62 The Times, 8 March, 1843, p. 5. 
63 Morning Chronicle, 11 March, 1843, p. 6. 
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It was hoped by one anonymous poet, `Dry Nurse', that the `Monomania epidemic'64 
would be subdued by his rhymes. Published in 1843, ̀ Monomania' captured the public concern with 
partial insanity by making the point that physicians who argued for the existence of monomania 
were making it implausibly easy for murderers to declare insanity and so suffer no true retribution 
for their crimes. It was madness, ̀ Dry Nurse' thought, to `set up human laws ̀ gainst laws divine': 
This legal murder. -I would simply ask, 
And let the doctors answer, if they dare; 
Let them cast off the poor and paltry mask - 
The jargon of the shop! - to make men stare: 
Tell me, ye judges of our mortal sins, 
Where madness ends, and sanity begins? (p. 10) 
Believing monomania a `fashion', anger was most forcefully directed at two fictitious `learned 
doctors, Dunderhead and Fool'(p. 40), men to whom `[l]awyers and judges, the supreme concoctors 
/ In legal knowledge, knuckle[d]'(p. 2). While the poem amusingly makes reference to the absurdity 
of mesmeric passes and to the decline of worldly wisdom, its anxiety about the `novel 
passion'(p. 40) of monomania and particularly the part played by the physicians who authorised it, 
remains forcefully articulated. Such physicians, the author reflects, were in the past `not subpoe'd, 
to shield and knave/From common justice, righteous retribution -/ By flimsy, barefaced artifice, to 
save/ A brutal murderer from execution -/ To prove him mad, who'd ne'er been heard to 
rave'(p. 54). But in these `degenerate times'(p. 13), `Dry Nurse' conjectured, any `fool may 
slaughter me or you'(p. 2). In presenting an image to his readers of `pseudo maniacs infesting the 
earth'(p. 20), `Dry Nurse' (like Campbell) played artfully on public concerns about insanity and 
the manipulation of '[flaws of England! `pillars of the state! '/ Framed to protect the innocent and 
the good'(p. 2). Using the poet's right to inculcate a serious truth in the tone of a pleasantry, the 
verses of Campbell and `Dry Nurse' contributed to the public feeling that legislative changes were 
of vital necessity. Such changes were important to all for they involved `on the one hand the 
liberty of the subject, on the other the security of the community'. 
65 
One particular problem facing physicians within the field of mental science was that the 
public not only reviled their authority to diagnose insanity, but believed lunatic asylums to be far 
from institutions with specific and serious medical and disciplinary directives. Rather, they were 
seen merely as safe havens from the retribution that the law should rightly have dispensed. Bethlem 
Asylum for the Criminally Insane, in particular, was mentioned in several letters to The Times on 
64 `Dry Nurse', Monomania (London: Saunders and Otley, 1843), p. v. Further page references are 
contained within the text. 




7 March. `Killing no Murder' sardonically wrote of a ̀ pet project' involving `some degree of 
violence' but stated that he would `retain beforehand some of the most eminent medical men of the 
66 day as witnesses in proof of my monomaniacal possession'. He continued: 
I hope, through the assistance of your journal, to ascertain when the public [... ] are 
sufficiently tranquilized to render it safe and expedient for a British court of justice and a 
British jury to reward my perseverance with a comfortable and permanent abode in 
Bethlehem Hospital at the expense of the nation. 
67 
`Laicus Londinensis' was equally disparaging. Bethlem was an asylum in which 
McNaughten would be `better kept and treated than his situation in life ever permitted before, and 
there [would] be visited, and have his picture taken, and his autograph solicited by foolish people 
who have nothing else to do'. 
68 While the General Report of the Royal Hospitals of Bridewell and 
Bethlem for the year ending 31 December 1843 makes no mention of visits, there was no doubt 
that by the mid-1840s, treatment underpinned by faith in moral management had been fully 
implemented at the Hospital. The Report detailed the success of various trades (carpentry, 
gardening, masonry) and amusements (library facilities, chess, draughts, cards and backgammon). 
Even the department for criminals into which McNaughten had been removed was in the process of 
constructing workshops and a reading room. 
69 
Despite the Standard's entreaty to its readers in January 1843 not to be influenced by 
`maudlin humanity' and `hysterical tenderness', the jury were influenced by Cockburn's 
convincing argument and the `sickly humanity' of the `soft-hearted' prevailed. This anxiety - the 
erosion of the country's `sturdy manliness' in the face of excessive and humane sentiment - was 
conceived of in terms not dissimilar to the earlier concern about the murder itself engendering the 
erosion of the `national character'. The general public were alarmed at the apparent ease with which 
a dangerous assassin could be found innocent. The law lords were equally concerned by what they 
perceived to be a crucial defect in English criminal law, brought to light not least by the 
employment of such difficult terms as partial insanity and homicidal monomania, and the immense 
difficulties that such diagnoses presented in drawing a line between sanity and insanity. As the 
66 The Times, 7 March, 1843, p. 5. 
67 The Times, 7 March, 1843, p. 5. 
68 The Times, 7 March, 1843, p. 5. 
69 General Report of the Royal Hospitals of Bridewell and Bethlem, and of the House of Occupations 
for the year ending 31st December, 1843 (London: A. Spottiswoode, 1843), p. 58. 
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Glasgow Saturday Post simply put it, `[w] e only want to know, for the benefit of simple folks, 
what in future is to be considered sanity? ' 
70 
The public believed that the test for criminal responsibility, the jury's decision, and the 
medical profession had each failed them; almost everyone expressed the `common conviction that 
the law cannot be suffered to remain as M'Naughten's acquittal has left it'. 
71 A debate ensued in 
the House of Commons regarding the problems presented by the McNaughten case in regard to the 
proper judicial relationship between insanity and criminal responsibility. One Irish Baronet, Sir 
Valentine Blake, moved for leave to bring in a bill to abolish the plea of insanity in cases of murder 
except where it could be proved that the defendant was ̀ publicly known and reputed to be a maniac, 
and not afflicted with partial insanity only'. 
72 Despite his best efforts (asking the House to 
suspend the standing orders in order to accelerate the process of the bill), he received no seconder. 
The law lords were similarly unsettled. While it was clearly difficult to convict persons who were 
not in a state of mind to be responsible for their actions, Lord Campbell expressed the opinion of 
many when he argued that it remained ̀ monstrous to think that society should be exposed to the 
dreadful dangers to which it is at present liable, from persons in that state of mind going at 
large '73 . 
On the suggestion of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Lyndhurst, it was agreed that the judges 
of the Queen's Bench should be called upon to declare the true state of the criminal law on this 
matter. For this purpose, they framed a series of questions answers for which were to set 
contentious medico-legal precedents throughout the middle of the nineteenth century. 
74 Five 
questions were put to the judges: What was the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons 
with insane delusions? What were the proper questions to be put to the jury when insanity was 
employed as a defence? What terms should be left to the jury regarding the defendant's state of 
mind when the act was committed? Should the defendant be excused if he or she was acting under 
an insane delusion? And should a physician be asked his opinion even if he had never seen the 
defendant prior to the trial? This last question was asked in response to the public outrage that had 
ensued upon Winslow being called to the stand to testify to McNaughten's mental state despite 
not officially having examined him. As a leader in The Times makes clear, such a move had 
70 Glasgow Saturday Post, 18 March, 1843, p. 1. 
71 Standard, 7 March, 1843, p. 2. 
72 A Dictionary of Psychological Medicine, ed. by D. Hack Tuke, 2 vols (London: J. & A. Churchill, 
1892), I, p. 309. 
73 Lord Campbell quoted in Warren, Miscellanies, II, p. 118. 
74 For an extensive account of the parliamentary debate see Hack Tuke, A Dictionary of Psychological 
Medicine, I, pp. 308-320. 
52 
weakened the distinctions between the rights of the jury as contradistinguished from the 
responsibilities of witnesses. 
75 
The Lords' response to this last question was that physicians could not strictly be asked 
their opinions because it was the responsibility of the jury to determine the facts of the case. 
Though in established issues of science their authority might be called upon, it did not remain a 
matter of right. In concluding, notwithstanding the instruction to juries that in all cases the 
accused was to be considered sane, the defendant may be considered insane only if it could be 
clearly proven that at the time of the act he or she was labouring under such a defect of reason so as 
not to be able to distinguish between right and wrong. While Lord Brougham led the camp arguing 
for a miscarriage of justice, believing that McNaughten should have been found guilty, Lords 
Cottenham, Lyndhurst, and Campbell maintained that the verdict was correct. From both moral 
and legal standpoints they argued that men like McNaughten could not be held accountable for 
their actions. 
In 1843 insanity was legally established as solely a physical impairment, importantly 
subject not to medical directives but to legal tests of responsibility defined by knowledge of right 
and wrong. Necessarily, such tests disavowed emotional, behavioral and environmental factors in 
legally defining mental disorder. Medical considerations centring on the origin of moral 
distinctions, the nature of conscience and the freedom of the will, were far from being at the heart 
of judicial decision-making. This was to become the subject of heated discussions within medical 
circles. Judicial decisions on insanity, physicians pointed out, remained under the `Rules' bound to 
old authorities which had not advanced at the rate of medical science. As Hack Tuke wrote of the 
`Rules' as late as 1892: 
If we consider the circumstances under which the answers were rung from the judges in 
1843, if we remember how agitated the public mind was at that time in consequence of the 
tragic death of Mr. Drummond, it might well be conceded that rules so given to the world 
were scarcely likely to be of a character to be binding to all posterity. 
76 
While the McNaughten trial served to bring public attention to various forms of insanity and 
their relationship to moral perversity and criminal responsibility, the consequent rulings 
attempted, in retrospect rather unsuccessfully, to break down such complex nosological 
distinctions and place them within a legal framework. At the heart of the rules was whether or not 
the accused was legally punishable and in McNaughten's case it was agreed that he was not. 
After McNaughten was sent to Bethlem, many felt that the `public excitement' died down. 
As Townsend put it, the 
75 The Times, 14 March, 1843, p. 4. 
76 Hack Tuke, A Dictionary of Psychological Medicine, I, p. 318. 
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calm good sense of the nation has tardily, but at length with general assent, recognised the 
propriety of M'Naughten's acquittal. It is far more just and merciful to take care alike of 
the accused and of society by confining in secure custody the doubtfully conscious shedder 
of blood, than to incur the fearful hazard of putting to death an irresponsible agent. 
77 
With the `Rules' formulated following the acquittal of McNaughten simultaneously acknowledging 
insanity and serving to seal the `criminal floodgates'78 that many feared his case would open, the 
McNaughten case set up the parameters by which rightful confinement was legally interpreted well 
into the twentieth century. 
79 Yet as the following chapters will seek to demonstrate, the significance 
of the McNaughten case, and the legal tests of responsibility it gave rise to, lay in opening up a new 
floodgate through which the responsibility of the law, medicine, society and the individual in cases of 
wrongful confinement were contested. The spectre of wrongful incarceration in lunatic asylums was a 
powerful cultural anxiety in the nineteenth century. Its rhetorical formulation was encoded and 
underpinned by the McNaughten case. It centred on contested notions of humanity (`Morbid', 
`sickly', and `maudlin', for example), mercy and sentiment, and used a language which paradoxically 
bolstered and threatened the advances that the profession of psychological physicians were making in 
consolidating their grip both on insanity and the Victorian cultural imagination. 
77 Townsend, Modern State Trials, I, p. 325. 
78 Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 90. 
79 Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, p. 88. 
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Chapter Two 
`safe liberty' or `odious incarceration'? 
The case of Louisa Nottidge 
This chapter will examine the case of Louisa Nottidge, a middle-aged spinster who in November 
1846 was forcibly removed from the Agapemone, a secretive millenarian religious community based 
in Somerset, by her two brothers and brother-in-law. After the necessary medical certification, she 
was placed in a lunatic asylum near London. Her behavior, action and beliefs, including 
estrangement from her family, attempts to commit suicide, and no apparent abatement of her 
devotion to Henry James Prince, the leader of the sect, suggested to the psychological physicians 
that she was suffering under a form of fanatical derangement, religious monomania. Nottidge was 
to remain confined in the asylum (despite trying to escape) until May 1848 when she was released 
by the Commissioners of Lunacy on the grounds of ill-health. She immediately returned to the 
Abode of Love, as the sect was also known, and as originally intended, turned over her inheritance 
of nearly £6000 to Prince, known to Nottidge as the `Beloved'. Once re-established with her 
friends and her three sisters, who had all married into the `family', she brought an action for 
damages against her brothers and brother-in-law which was heard in front of the Lord Chief Baron, 
Frederick Pollock, in the Court of Exchequer in late June, 1849.1 
Like the chapter on McNaughten, this chapter will explore the problems posed by the 
concept of monomania as it was debated both in and out of the courtroom. The case highlighted 
several issues which dramatically positioned the medical profession rather than Nottidge's relatives, 
as the key defendant in the dangerously influential and potentially damaging court of public 
opinion. To many observers of the case, her behavior and beliefs amounted to no more than 
harmless eccentricities. To the profession of mental science, they were representative of a disorder 
which necessitated treatment in a lunatic asylum. She was seen by the medical establishment as 
dangerous both to herself and to society. Irreconcilable, these two positions initiated and framed a 
debate which (despite the differing dimensions of the case) in many respects drew upon concepts of 
social, medical and legal responsibility witnessed both during and after the trial of McNaughten. 
When Esquirol's new disease entity of monomania began to be used in the French 
courtroom in the first half of the nineteenth century, the debates it generated were often framed in 
the context of humanitarian rhetoric. It was commonly felt, especially by right-wing magistrates 
and legal advocates, that monomania represented no more than misguided philanthropy and a 
1 On Pollock see Edward Foss, A Biographical Dictionary of the Judges of England, 1066-1870 
(London: John Murray, 1870), pp. 523-25. See also Lord Hanworth, Lord Chief Baron Pollock: A 
Memoir (London: John Murray, 1929). 
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`system' of mercy which encouraged nothing less than ̀ false pity'. 
2 As we have seen, similar 
rhetoric ('maudlin humanity', `sickly humanity', `soft-hearted') was pervasive in discussion elicited 
by the McNaughten trial. The case of Nottidge is important because of the way that it highlights a 
transformation in the construction, application and effectiveness of a compassionate rhetoric of 
enlightened benevolence and humanity; a transformation which was to have profound consequences 
for physicians seeking to assert autonomous medical control over the lunatic and to secure public 
respect for their profession. The prosecutor in the McNaughten trial, Webb-Follet, sought to 
emphasise to the jury the brutal nature of the murder and position the prison as the rightful site of 
retributive punishment. In contrast, McNaughten's advocate attempted to show that the defendant 
committed the murder while suffering under a monomaniacal delusion. To this end he relied heavily 
on medical witnesses and on a rhetoric of humanity. As chapter &At' demonstrated, even before 
McNaughten was found not guilty by reason of insanity, the case attracted public attention. 
Though ostensibly the newspaper and journals debated whether McNaughten was insane or an 
`atrocious villain', it was equally a conflict which pitted the lay-public's `hysterical tenderness' 
against a position of mercy which indirectly acknowledged the existence of monomania. The 
question of whether the physician's diagnosis in conjunction with Cockburn's defensive strategy 
reflected an `overly-refined' humanity which was itself dangerous to society, was also central to the 
case of Nottidge. 
Those who believed that Nottidge's rights to freedom of speech and action had been 
obstructed by physicians used identical rhetorical strategies (of humanity, mercy and benevolence) 
to support her action for damages and denounce the unwarranted intervention of the medical 
community. Acknowledging the threat such opinions posed, physicians (and the commissioners in 
lunacy) mounted a vociferous defence of their actions. Highlighting the excessive sentimentality of 
`humanity-mongers' they argued that the generosity of the press to Nottidge's eccentricity posed 
very real dangers to the safety both of the lunatic and society as a whole. While this chapter will 
explore the way such rhetoric was used and to what effect, drawing on Goldstein's analysis of the 
French psychiatric profession, it will also pay attention to the way that the manipulation of the 
rhetoric of humanitarianism disclosed a preoccupation, in the field of mental science, with social 
status and medical expertise. 
3 
Ever since Esquirol had envisioned the role of the medecin des alienes as auxiliary figures 
important both to the successful running of the state and as moral statisticians, many physicians 
had gained professional recognition and admiration. 
4 However, though Esquirol believed that the 
2 Goldstein, Console, p. 181. 
3 Goldstein, Console, p. 168. 
4 Goldstein, Console, p. 158. 
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enhanced specificity of linguistic categorisation to include monomania and its multiple sub- 
divisions would result in a clearer understanding of insanity, the better treatment of lunatics, and 
clearer guidelines for committal to lunatic asylums, it remained a concept which challenged 
psychiatrist's understanding of mental derangement. Physicians who were used to diagnosing 
madness based on the defective state of one's intelligence were now forced to observe behaviour and 
to judge between sane and insane emotions. 
5 The difficulty of distinguishing monomania from 
eccentricity formatively contributed to an anxiety about wrongful confinement. Partially 
explaining why the McNaughten rules of 1843 failed in their attempt to regularise the law, the 
problems monomania presented to English medical and legal circles in the 1830s and 1840s were 
dramatically encapsulated in the case of Louisa Nottidge. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Offering a brief biography of HenryJames Prince 
and examining the events that led to the establishment of the Abode of Love, the first section will 
consider the reasons underlying the popular perception of its followers as victims of religious 
madness. The second section will examine contemporary medical opinion on religious aberration. 
The third section traces Nottidge's involvement in the Abode, her abduction, and the trial itself, 
focusing on the contested doctrine of monomania. The fourth and fifth sections turn to the 
coverage of the trial in the press and journals, many of which were critical of the part played by the 
medical establishment. Physicians responded to this criticism and the fifth section will focus on 
their reaction to the verdict and their interpretation of the dangerous role sentimental rhetoric 
played in the Nottidge case. The concluding section provides a brief overview of the case and the 
important role monomania played in exposing and entrenching in the public mind competing 
versions of authority. 
i. The Abode of Love 
In late May, 1849 a resident of the village of Spaxton in the county of Somerset, Isaac Thomas, 
brought charges for damages in the Bridgewater County Court in Taunton against three men, 
Thomas Starky, Lewis Price and Thomas Williams. As Thomas's counsel explained in court, his 
client had ̀ innocently' been watching a game of field hockey when `about twenty men rushed out 
with their hockey sticks' and `beat him unmercifully'. Thomas was ̀ felled to the ground by a blow 
in the head'. The defendants' counsel, Mr Rouse, argued conversely that Thomas had initiated the 
debacle by throwing a stone which had been provocatively aimed at their friend, Henry James 
Prince. Rouse declared that his clients had no wish to break the laws or disturb the peace of the 
country and had only retaliated under extreme provocation. The judge was not convinced and gave 
judgment in favour of Thomas, awarding compensation totaling £11 11s. 
6 
5 Hack Tuke, Prichard and Symonds, p. 20. My italics. 
6 Exeter Flying Post, 28 June, 1849, p. 3. 
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Commenting on the debacle after the conclusion of the case, the sympathies of the local 
paper, the Bridgewater Times, clearly lay with the plaintiff. The paper acknowledged that field 
hockey was a ̀ rather a roughish game, even for boys', 
7 
and accepted that it was sufficiently novel to 
`excite the gaping wonderment of [... ] simple rustics'(p. 3). However, like Thomas, the paper 
maintained that guilt rightly lay with the defendants: `If they commit such acts as provoke and 
excite others to assemble in crowds to watch their extraordinary manoeuvres [... ] they are morally 
guilty of the result of such assemblies if a breach of the peace be committed'(p. 3). While itself 
bizarre, the action for damages was made all the more unusual by the fact that the three defendants 
were members of a ̀ mysterious community'8 known as the Abode of Love. 
The friend whom Starky, Price and Williams had been defending, Henry James Prince, was 
the revered founder of the Abode, a millenarian religious sect. 
9 At the heart of Prince's doctrine 
was the belief that all true religion began and ended with prayer and that it was the first duty and 
the highest profit of those who sought to do the will of God on earth. 
10 As one `family' member, 
Louis Price, later explained, 
we pray by offering up praises to God, by a life of goodness to God, and by outward 
manifestation, such as singing, and by healthy exercises, and `hockey' is one. I consider 
that all we do is to the `glory of God. ' That is the commandment of God. I consider that 
we are glorifying God when we eat and drink. Every one does as he pleases on the Sunday. 
We make no difference between that day or any other day. 
11 
Initial suspicion at the sect's strange `hockey worship'12 and abhorrence for their seemingly 
heretical beliefs soon eroded in the face of curiosity. Prince's services became increasingly popular. 
Ever conscious of the danger of his doctrines being undermined by partial believers, he stated that 
7 Bridgewater Times, 21 June, 1849, p. 3. Further page references are contained within in the text. 
8 Exeter Flying Post, 28 June, 1849, p. 3. Illustrating the national attention that the incident and so 
the Abode received, Punchs amusing cartoon draws attention to both the bizarre sport and the 
curiosity it aroused in the local community. See Figure 1 (on p. 81) from Punch, 1 (January - June 
1850), p. 231. 
9 On Prince and the origins of the Abode, see William Hepworth Dixon, Spiritual Wives, 2 vols 
(London: Hurst and Blackett, 1868), I, pp. 261-264, and Charles Mander, The Reverend Prince and his 
Abode of Love (Wakefield: E. P. Publishing, 1976). 
10 Dixon, Spiritual Wives, I, p. 256. In the 1830s Prince had experienced a spiritual conversion. He 
believed that the Holy Spirit had penetrated his earthly body, causing it to die, and himself to become 
the embodiment of a new creation of the Lord. 
11 Morning Chronicle, 25 June, 1849, p. 7. 
12 Express, 30 June, 1849, p. 3. 
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only those holding a true belief should be entitled to attend. As William Hepworth Dixon 
described it, `[b] roils arose [... ] boys and girls quarreled with their parents, servants with their 
masters; while the ungodly rabble took advantage of this uproar to hoot and curse'. 
13 
Such `broils' brought to the parish the critical attention of the Reverend George Henry 
Law, the Bishop of Bath and Wells. On 4 May, 1842 Law revoked Prince's licence to preach within 
the diocese of Bath and Wells. 
14 Immediately relieved of his post, it was inevitable that Prince and 
his devoted followers would officially leave the Church of England, but not before they had 
established a course of action. While Prince would set up a congregation in Brighton, Starky would 
do the same in Weymouth. After the site at Weymouth soon became too small to accommodate the 
swelling members of Prince's `family', a decision was made in 1846 to reunite and relocate to 
Spaxton. With what was believed by the locals to be a mysterious and contraband financial source, 
it was here that resources were pooled to construct a lavish stone chapel, overseen by the watchful 
eyes of two `princites', G. V. Thomas and Thomas Cobbe. 
15 
Here the whole family, numbering around sixty, sought to live in secluded harmony. Yet 
as the field hockey sensation indicated, this was an impossible project. As a writer for The Times 
noted, the `distinguishing peculiarity' of the `mystical jargon' espoused by the Abode was its 
`enforcement of mirth and recreation as religious duties'. Such ̀ diversions' he concluded, were of 
the `most harmless, if not the most ridiculous character'. 
16 Though the Express newspaper 
commented that the residents of the Abode remained ̀ super-saturated with folly', because they `did 
not insist on other people being fools' and did not even ̀ obtrude their practices on public notices', 
they were relatively harmless in their pursuit of peace and tranquillity- 
17 
Yet the innocent and `harmless' practices and beliefs of the Agapemone were hotly 
contested. A short pamphlet entitled Mr. Prince and the Agapemone (1858) sought to delineate the 
heresy underlying Prince's doctrines and to explain how his `dogma was physically, morally, 
intellectually, and spiritually opposed to the Word of God'. 
18 By contrasting Prince's doctrines 
with passages from the Bible the pamphlet sought to reclaim `those who have been led away [... ] and 
13 Dixon, Spiritual Wives, I, pp. 280-81. 
14 Mander, The Reverend Prince, p. 68. 
15 Thomas Cobbe, the brother of Frances Power Cobbe, was a civil engineer employed on the Bristol 
and Exeter Railway line. After leaving the railway he was one of the Agapemone's more wealthy 
residents. See Mander, The Reverend Prince, p. 70. 
16 The Times, 30 June, 1849, p. 7. 
17 Express, 30 June, 1849, p. 3. See also the Illustrated London News (January June 1851), pp. 253-254. 
18 Mr. Prince and the Agapemone - The Doctrines of Mr. Prince tested by the word of God (Taunton: 
W. A. Woodley, 1858), p. 16. 
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[act as] a convincing comfort to those who have left, and have had inducements held out to them to 
return, and are therefore wavering in their decision'. 
19 The claim Prince made to be a prophet 
attracted the scornful rebukes of his critics. `The most favourable view', the All England Law 
Report recorded in a case for damages against Prince in 1860, ̀ would be that under the influence of 
a disordered imagination, he really fancied himself to be such a supernatural being as he made these 
ladies believe-. 20 The pamphlet of 1858 was far from convinced of his transcendental authority. The 
first nine verses of Book III of Timothy, the reader was pointedly reminded, `contains many sins 
at which he [Prince] has been aiming and doing'. 
21 The author of Mr. Prince and the Agapemone 
concurred. Prince was ̀ of that class of God has descibed [sic] in His Word as outside, where there 
are "Sorcerers, and Whoremongers, and Murderers, and Idolators, and whosoever loveth and 
maketh a Lie"'. 
22 
Though Rouse (himself an Agapemone resident) had argued in court that the community 
desired neither to intrude upon nor cause offense to the locals, their doctrines and secretive 
practices could not but arouse intense curiosity and encourage pernicious speculation. The `strange 
and extraordinary' lifestyle of the `mysterious community', or `very singular sect' affronted the 
upright sensibility of the local community, who were shocked on `moral, social, and religious 
grounds' at their mode of living and their lack of traditional religious tenets: 
With every luxury money can procure, beautiful equipages, splendid horses, and other 
adjuncts of wealth [... ] the Princites, with their splendid horses and dogs, sweep through 
our villages as if going to the hunt, or the race field, and this while the village bells may be 
solemnly inviting them to prayer. 
23 
19 Mr. Prince and the Agapemone, p. 1. 
20 The All England Law Reports Reprint, 1843-60, ed. by G. F. L. Bridgman (London: Butterworth 
& Co. Ltd, 1965), p. 768. 
21 Mr. Prince and the Agapemone, P. 15. The pamphlet was referring to an eventually substantiated 
rumour that in the Spring of 1856 Prince had `deflowered' one of the young residents or `soul brides' 
in front of the entire congregation. The young girl had become pregnant and the child was believed by 
Prince to be the son of the Devil. The event had become known as the `Great Manifestation'. See 
Mander, The Reverend Prince, p. 7. See also Some Account of the Agapemone (London: J. Snow & Co., 
1887), p. 2; and Prince's own account in The Little Book of the Testimony of Br. Prince (London: 
C. A. Bartlett, 1856). 
22 Mr. Prince and the Agapemone, p. 16. 
23 Exeter Flying Post, 28 June, 1849, p. 3. For artist's image of the community in 1850, see Figure 2 
(on p. 82), from Mander, The Reverend Prince, p. 110. 
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While some were curious to know where the money came from, others were gripped by rumours of 
the `Princite's' deviant sexual practices. 
24 Whatever their particular curiosities, it was agreed that 
the action brought in 1849 against three of its residents, or `the exposure given to their doings 
[... ] will open the eyes of the public to the true character of this set of Princites'. The editorial in 
the Bridgewater Times published after the county court proceedings concluded with a question: 
`how he [Prince] could have so duped others to have joined him in this extraordinary work, has 
been, and ever will remain, a mystery' (p. 3) . 
ii. Subtle Schemings 
Much of the fervent curiosity and speculation about the Agapemone community focused on the 
question of how members of the public could become so seduced by such a dangerous and bizarre 
sect. Though claims made by the Agapemone were initially contested as a form of heresy, to be 
answered by Scripture, the debate shifted quickly from theology to medicine. The issue became not 
whether they were liturgically wrong, but whether in fact the `family' members were mentally 
deranged. The local press believed that the whole Agapemone community showed signs of `religious 
madness or most subtle scheming'. 
25 The actions of their spiritual leader, Prince, they thought, 
had been ̀ from first to last the proceedings of a madman', 
26 
and their ready converts were thought 
to be unsound and weak-willed men `and far more witless women'27 who had been ̀ duped' or were 
`deluded'. Armed with confident scientific explanations of religious aberration, medicine provided 
28 
an interpretation of the Agapemone's devoted followers which proved immensely persuasive. 
As late as 1898, L. Forbes Winslow (the son of Forbes Benignus Winslow) claimed that 
religious madness constituted one of the more formidable species of insanity. Like his predecessors, 
he believed it to be a dangerous form of monomania in which the 
mind fixes upon a well-known truth, and exaggerates its importance to the exclusion of 
everything else. The idea enlarges, and at length becomes gigantic; it grows and increases; 
24 Express, 29 June, 1849, p. 3. 
25 Exeter Flying Post, 28 June, 1849, p. 3. 
26 Bridgewater Times, 21 June, 1849, p. 3. 
27 Express, 29 June, 1849, p. 3. 
28 Medical rather than theological interpretations of `eccentric' religious behaviours and doctrines 
represented a powerful tool enabling the public to make sense of such apparently deviant beliefs and 
modes of living. See Andrew T. Scull, Museums of Madness: The Social Organization of Insanity in 
Nineteenth-Century England (London: Allen Lane, 1979), pp. 42-43. See also Scull, The Most Solitary 
of Af flictions, p. 178; Roy Porter, Mind-Forg'd Manacles: A History of Madness in England from the 
Restoration to the Regency (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 78-79. 
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it has no context, and admits of no relationship with any other truth; it stands alone [... ] 
The person so possessed is a dangerous lunatic. 
29 
James Cowles Prichard, writing nearly sixty years earlier, was less extravagant in his delineation of 
religious mania. Though it could not be doubted that `in persons predisposed to insanity [... ] 
anxieties connected with a future state of existence have been the exciting causes of mental 
derangement', his caution was explicit: 
The circumstance that the mind of a lunatic is occupied during the period of his disease 
with ideas and feelings connected with an invisible world, is no proof whatever that the 
derangement of his understanding was produced in the first instance by impressions 
related to the same subject. 
30 
Though Prichard continued this train of thought with an examination of the distinguishing 
religious manias of Catholics and Protestants, he concluded that the foundations of religious 
insanity were not limited to particular nations and periods but to `the condition and 
circumstances of human nature'. 
31 Here Winslow agreed: 
Religious sentiment or instinct enters so materially, as well as so intimately, into every 
motive and every action, and tinges so deeply and indelibly every thought, implicit or 
explicit, that it may be said that no event happens in the world which is not a scene of one 
of the acts of a vast religious drama (p. 140). 
The theoretical sophistication and classificatory expansion of nosological systems of 
insanity to include monomania and its multiple sub-divisions increased the confusion between 
religious mania and religious eccentricity. 
32 The `inveteracy of its character', Winslow argued, 
demanded that it be understood as ̀ not a mere mental act', nor a ̀ violent effort of volition' but 
rather an `excitement upon the abstract truths of religion, originating from, or closely connected 
29 L. Forbes Winslow, Mad Humanity - Its Forms, Apparent and Obscure (London: C. A. Pearson, 
Ltd., 1898), p. 120. Further page references are contained within the text. 
30 James Cowles Prichard, A Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind (London: 
Sherwood, Gilbert, and Piper, 1835), p. 187. 
31 Prichard, A Treatise on Insanity, p. 190. 
32 For comprehensive list of monomania sub-types, see D. Hack Tuke, A Dictionary of Psychological 
Medicine, I, p. 812. Religious madness was not a new phenomenon in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Since at least the sixteenth century, writers had believed that witchcraft and other forms of 
possession were indicative of mental derangement rather than demoniacal mastery. However, it was 
not until the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that religious forms of insanity entered 
established nosological systems. For overview, see Winslow, Mad Humanity, p. 119. 
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with, actual organic changes of structure'(p. 136). As a disease of the brain, only physicians 
conversant in mania could authoritatively diagnose and treat it. Physical changes were manifested 
in the behaviour of the religious maniac in precise ways. As John Conolly described them in 1849, 
fanatical lunatics were at once 
gloomy and presumptuous, they are easily induced to believe that God speaks to them more 
directly than to others; they soon learn to despise their parents; they denounce their 
relatives and friends, write foolish or abusive letters to persons in their neighbourhood; 
interfere in every family; and put their whole trust only in the vilest flatterers of their 
folly, to whom their property is willingly confided. 
33 
To Conolly, there was ̀ no single cause of insanity more frequent than fanaticism'. 
34 Mental 
derangement caused by religion was to Winslow `remarkable for its destructive propensities, and 
depraved state of morality'(p. 134). It was a dangerous disease and, to be sure of administering the 
proper treatment, all `patients suffering from religious insanity must be regarded as 
suicidal'(p. 132). It was for this reason that confinement in asylums was seen as the most 
appropriate means to contain the `formidable pertinacity' of religious mania. 
iii. The Law and Louisa Nottidge 
The `sensational' trial of Nottidge v. Ripley has often been referred to in histories of nineteenth- 
century psychiatry and related social, cultural and legal histories. It has been employed as one of 
many examples of illegal confinement to examine the predominance of insanity in women, and to 
indicate the complexities faced by physicians in defining madness. 
35 However, because it has been 
used predominantly as an illustrative tool, the intricacies of the trial, and particularly the 
retaliation of the medical profession in response to the public denigration of their intervention, 
have not been given the attention they deserve. From a wider perspective, the trial and the 
unprecedented responses it elicited magnified the difficulties faced by the psychiatric profession in 
their desire to gain autonomy and professional credibility. Such difficulties came not only in the 
form of a lay-public, whom physicians could argue were ignorant and unworthy of responding to, 
but from the legal profession in the form of the laws they had enacted to guard against the ill- 
33 John Conolly, A Remonstrance with the Lord Chief Baron Touching the Case Nottidge versus 
Ripley, 3rd edn (London: John Churchill, 1849), p. 15. 
34 Conolly, Remonstrance, p. 15. 
35 See, for example, Parry Jones, Trade in Lunacy, p. 236; Scull, Social Order, pp. 282-85; Alex Owen, 
Women, Power and Spiritualism in Late Victorian England (London: Virago Press, 1989), pp. 152-4. 
On the significance of religion to the case, see Joshua John Schwieso, "`Religious Fanaticism" and 
Wrongful Confinement in Victorian England: The Affair of Louisa Nottidge', Social History of 
Medicine, 9 (August 1996), pp. 159-174. 
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treatment of lunatics. More specifically, by crystallizing the confrontation between medical and 
libertarian principles the case foregrounded the problems psychiatrists would encounter throughout 
the century in defending sophisticated nosologies and the necessity of asylum care itself, 
particularly in light of its increasingly poor curative value. 
It was while living comfortably with their parents in the village of Rose-hill in Suffolk, 
that Nottidge's three spinster sisters, Harriet, Clara and Agnes first heard Prince preach in 
Brighton. 36 They were intoxicated by Prince's doctrines. In May 1844 their father died after a 
long illness. Harriet, Agnes and Clara attended the funeral, explaining to their mother that they 
only did so because it was the `will of God'. 
37 Though a horrified Mrs Nottidge declared that she 
would never `receive' Prince into her home, and though Nottidge stated that she ̀ did not want to 
join them [her sisters] in their devotion', mother and daughter eventually left Rose-hill to join the 
sisters in Sussex. From her later testimony, it is clear that Mrs Nottidge was extremely unhappy 
both when Clara, Agnes and Harriet suddenly married three of the members of the Agapemone and 
when Nottidge herself became the newest recruit to the Abode. 
38 Fearing for her daughter's safety, 
in December 1845 Mrs Nottidge left Brighton, with Nottidge, to return to Rose-hill. 
Nottidge was unhappy with their departure and when she received a visit from two of the 
Abode's `family' members, Mr Turner and Mr Starky, she suddenly left with them (to live in the 
community in Charlinch). Mrs Nottidge searched for her missing daughter for nearly two months. 
Despite offering a reward for information, all she was able to discover was that Nottidge was living 
`in the greatest sin and iniquity'. Fearful for her daughter's safety, she requested the assistance of 
her son-in-law, Ripley, and her two own sons, Edward and John Pepys. Providing them with all 
the information she had gleaned from friends and from many letters, they were successful in 
bringing Nottidge to Ripley's home in London. 
To her family, the abduction of Nottidge from a rear exit of the local inn (where she had 
been staying) without `her bonnet, or shawl, or shoes'39 was appropriate though too late to have 
saved her from the influence of Prince. Asking her daughter about Prince, Nottidge replied that she 
knew of no such person: 
36 The fifth sister, Cornelia, had by this time married Mr Ripley, one of the two defendants in the 
Nottidge trial. 
37 The Times, 26 June, 1849, p. 7. For family history see also 27 and 29 June, 1849. 
38 It was pointed out in court that Mr Cobbe, Mr Thomas and Mr Price were much younger than 
their wives and were essentially penniless while their wives each brought with them inheritances of 
£6000. It was also pointedly remarked that common-place Victorian prenuptial settlements were not 
signed by any of the couples. Though the Married Women's Property Bill had become law in certain 
states in the United States in 1857, it was not until 1882, renamed The Married Women's Property 
Act, that it became law in England. 
39 Express, 25 June, 1849, p. 4. 
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God now dwells only at Charlinch in the flesh of Him I once knew as Mr. Prince. God 
who made me, and all the world, is now manifest in him whom I once called Mr. Prince. 
He has entered his tabernacle of flesh among men, and I have seen God face to face. He 
will deliver me wherever I am taken. 
40 
After Nottidge declared that she would never die, her shocked mother requested the expert 
assistance of physicians. 
41 Though she had originally wanted her daughter to remain at home `with 
a keeper, if necessary', because Nottidge continually insisted on returning to Charlinch, on the 11 
November 1846 certificates declaring her to be of unsound mind were signed by the local surgeon 
and physician, Mr Thomas Morton and Dr Rowland. She was committed to Dr Stillwell's private 
establishment, Moorcroft Asylum in Hillingdon. 
In their testimony the two medical men gave differing explanations for their diagnosis of 
religious mania. Morton turned to Nottidge's delusions, explaining that she had ̀ estranged herself 
from her mother's house [... ] to follow a person of the name of Prince, whom she believed to be 
Almighty, and herself immortal'. `ý2 Rowland noted her objectionable nature (she refused to answer 
his questions) and stated that she had later admitted to him that she had tried to escape from the 
asylum. He `was perfectly satisfied at the time of her unsoundness of mind'. Both doctors 
emphasised that they held the necessary expertise to diagnose such a condition. 
43 Though the 
testimony of Rowland and Morton was important, the defendants' case centred on Dr Stillwell's 
testimony regarding Nottidge's mental state. Once officially under his care, her `mania' continued 
unabated. As he explained to the jury, his patient said that Prince 
had rendered her immortal - that she should not die - that she should not be buried in a 
coffin as other persons were; and that she should be taken up to heaven in the twinkling of 
an eye [... ] she sang as she_ walked about the room but never used any intelligible words 
40 The Times, 26 June, 1849, p. 7. 
41 At this point in the proceedings the Lord Chief Baron asked Mrs Nottidge why she didn't 
immediately call for a commission of lunacy. Her counsel replied on her behalf that there was a strong 
desire for as little publicity as possible, a recurrent concern of friends and relatives of alleged lunatics. 
42 The Times, 26 June, 1849, p. 7. 
43 Unsoundness of mind, as set out in English law, included all `who by reasons of morbid conditions 
of intellect are incapable of managing themselves and their affairs as an idiot or a lunatic, or a person 
of merely weak mind [... ] Great general eccentricity assists materially on the proof of [... ] 
unsoundness of mind and furnishes strong ground for suspicion of predisposition to madness'. See 
Charles Palmer Phillips, The Law concerning Idiots, Lunatics, & Persons of Unsound Mind (London: 
James Wildy, 1858), pp. 2-6. 
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[... ] The plaintiff had no other delusions but those in reference to Mr. Prince, and he had, 
in my opinion, such an influence over her that she would have done anything. 
44 
Highlighting to the jury his trustworthiness, the asylum proprietor explained that because 
Nottidge objected to her confinement, he requested a visit from the Commissioners in Lunacy in 
December 1846. Lord Shaftesbury himself, and another commissioner, Mr Turner, interviewed 
Nottidge. They substantiated Stillwell's diagnosis of religious madness. As Turner explained in 
his testimony, they `had no doubt whatever of her unsoundness of mind' and so refused to support 
her release. On 6 January 1848 she attempted to escape. On the pretence of visiting with 
Stillwell's wife, she reached Farringdon Road Station where she was met by Cobbe (with Starky 
and other residents, Cobbe had been scouring the south of England looking for her ever since her 
sudden departure from Charlinch). Yet Nottidge had been followed by an asylum attendant who 
escorted her back to the asylum on 8 January. Cobbe followed them back to Moorcroft Asylum. 
Though he was refused permission to speak with her, after his return to the Abode of Love he wrote 
to the Commissioners in Lunacy and after implementing an inquiry, Louisa Nottidge was released 
from Moorcroft asylum on the grounds of ill health on 15 May 1848. In Turner's testimony, he 
stated that at the time of her release there had been ̀ no abatement of the unsoundness of mind [... ] 
nor of her extraordinary delusions on the subject of religion'. Despite no indication of recovery, he 
confirmed that all of the Commissioners except himself thought her capable of managing her own 
affairs. He himself `objected to her being set at liberty'. 
The `extraordinary trial' was resumed the next morning when Mr Mylne, another 
Commissioner in Lunacy, took the stand. It was his testimony that was to decide, in the minds of 
the jury, that an `outrage' had been committed upon Louisa Nottidge. Mylne had seen her twice 
while she was at Moorcroft and explained to the jury that much discussion had taken place 
concerning her case. Concurring with a colleague, Mr Prichard (unrelated to James Cowles 
Prichard), he stated that he was satisfied that she was of unsound mind and so ̀ a very fit object for 
confinement in the asylum'. The Lord Chief Baron asked Mylne whether he thought that Nottidge 
was in such a state of mind to be dangerous to herself or to others. Mylne replied that in his 
opinion she was not dangerous. When asked by Pollock why he then saw fit to support her 
continued confinement (for seventeen months) he replied that it was `no part of my duty to keep 
her there. I was only to liberate her if I saw good and sufficient reason for adopting that course'. 
The Lord Chief Baron's response to Mylne was quoted in all of the subsequent letters, 
remonstrances, and editorials concerning the case: 
44 The Times, 26 June, 1849, p. 7. The Times has been invaluable in acquiring details of the case and 
the trial. All information here is taken from coverage of the case on 26 June, 1849, p. 7 and 27 June, 
1849, p. 7. 
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It is my opinion that you ought to liberate every person who is not dangerous to himself 
or to others. If the notion has got abroad that any person may be confined in a lunatic 
asylum or a mad house who has any absurd or even mad opinion upon any religious 
subject, and is safe and harmless upon every other topic, I altogether and entirely differ 
with such an opinion; and I desire to impress that opinion with as much force as I can in 
the hearing of one of the commissioners. 
45 
After several other physicians connected to the case took the stand (including a Mr Proctor who 
stated affirmatively that she was a monomaniac suffering under religious delusions), the case for the 
defendants concluded with Sir Thesiger's summation of the case on behalf of Nottidge's brothers 
and brother-in-law. 
In `a most eloquent and energetic speech', Thesiger's closing address was specific and 
damning. The Abode of Love, he argued, was `dangerous'. The doctrines they espoused crept, via 
their agents, almost unknowingly into families and there `spread dismay and desolation'. Such an 
association could not but be `degrading' and `disgusting'. The implication was that no one of their 
own free will would join the Agapemone. Rather, individuals like Louisa Nottidge were 
`irresistibly' coerced, certainly unaware of the base and mercenary motives underlying the quasi- 
religious doctrines of their new `family'. Thesiger's `very powerful appeal' was directed at the jury's 
assumed sympathy for Nottidge's family, a family which he attempted to show had been painfully 
divided by the Agapemone. He concluded that it was her family's `moral duty to make every effort 
to pluck this lady from the position of danger into which she had been drawn'. His summing up 
elicited considerable applause. 
In `one of the most eloquent speeches that has been heard in Westminister-hall for many 
years', Cockburn's opening remarks on behalf of Nottidge drew upon a libertarian discourse which 
emphasised the freedom of religious belief. In attempting to draw out the jury's assumed 
sympathetic attitude towards the abundance of conflicting religious beliefs, Cockburn situated her 
faith in the doctrines of the Agapemone in a larger framework. By acknowledging from the outset 
that the explosion of religious sects and the multitude of doctrines they espoused engendered 
familial hazards, he was able to offset the defence's suggestion that her estrangement from her 
family was indicative of the presence of insanity. Instead, a ̀ severe wrong had been committed 
upon this lady'. Removing her from the Abode of Love had infringed her religious freedoms and her 
civil liberties had been endangered by the unjust and `odious incarceration' she had experienced at 
the hands of the medical establishment. Cockburn concluded by suggesting that if God was capable 
of forgiveness, then the jury should not hasten to condemn her `error' of judgment but rather 
should exonerate her by awarding substantial damages. Cockburn proceeded to bring to the stand a 
45 The Times, 27 June, 1849, p. 7. 
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number of witnesses who testified to Nottidge's sanity. These included Nottidge's mother and 
several members of the Abode. 
It was immediately evident in his summing up of the case that though legally impartial, the 
Lord Chief Baron favoured Cockburn's argument. While he believed that the jury must find in 
favour of the plaintiff because the defendants had not tried to deny their role in the abduction, he 
also believed that despite the lengthy testimony of medical witnesses, no evidence had been 
provided to suggest that she was insane. He concluded by stating his own `idea of toleration': 
all those who entertained with sincerity any peculiar doctrine, however absurd that 
doctrine might appear to others to be, ought to be allowed to enjoy that opinion without 
interference, so long as the principles and the acts they adopted were not forced 
offensively, or contrary to law, upon the public notice, or against public morals. If persons 
sincerely entertained these doctrines, then they were, in his opinion, as much entitled to 
be treated with respect as any other religious sect. 
46 
After retiring for an hour, the jury returned to give their verdict. The `high moral duty' of her 
family, they decided, was not a justifiable reason for removing Nottidge from the Abode and they 
awarded her damages of £50. 
47 
iv. Humanity-Mongers? 
Recalling the county court case of the three Abode residents only weeks before the Nottidge trial, 
The Times suggested that the `question of the illegal incarceration of persons in madhouses under a 
trumped up accusation of insanity' was `of far greater public concernment than the equipages or 
hockey-sticks, or any mad freaks of the Agapemone, or any other crack-brained sect'. 
48 Though the 
action had been brought against Nottidge's relations, it was clear that in the court of public 
opinion it was the psychiatric profession that was on trial. As a result of the ruling they had been 
publicly criticised and professionally over-ruled. They were harshly -criticised not, as was often the 
case, for incarceration procedures (which in this case had been in order) but for their decision to 
commit Louisa Nottidge to an asylum because of her religious beliefs. 
As chapter one demonstrated, the enlarging of classificatory designations of insanity to 
include monomania was a source of public and legal discontent. The Times argued that it was vital 
not to equate a ̀ harmless' eccentricity with monomania. `We must not', the paper declared, ̀ call a 
46 The Times, 27 June, 1849, p. 7. 
47 The low figure decided by the jury resulted from their belief that the abduction committed by 
Nottidge's relatives was not actuated by mercenary or unworthy motives. 
48 The Times, 30 June, 1849, p. 7. 
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man mad because he differs from ourselves in matters of opinion'. 
49 The Express concurred: `In the 
wide doctrine of tolerance there are few points that require to be more strenuously and reiteratedly 
[sic] inculcated than the right men have to be as absurd as they please. There is nothing criminal in 
being a fool so long as a man's folly does no harm'. 
50 Both papers were outraged at the particular 
role played in the case by the Commissioners in Lunacy. Their conduct was ̀ unaccountable and 
indefensible' and their suggestion that `there was some hidden monomania lurking in the recesses 
of her mind, [... ] was a gratuitous and unwarrantable assumption'. 
51 
Though the Commission was in many respects instrumental in establishing a national 
system of care for the insane, its commissioners were criticised both for their lack of experience in 
asylum superintendance and their failure to enforce legislative guidelines for committal to and 
removal from lunatic asylums. As a bemused writer in The Times noted, the Commission seemed 
unsure even of its own legislative authority, deciding at one moment that "Miss NOTTIDGE 
should be retained in confinement, at another they order her release'. 
52 This was a cause for 
concern. `If one mistake has come to light, how many others must there have been of which we are 
ignorant - and where a mistake means the incarceration in a madhouse of a person not of insane 
mind, how awful is the possibility of its occurrence! '. 
53 Further compounding concern was the 
revelation that one of the `confidential medical men' involved in the case was a relative of Stillwell 
54 (the asylum proprietor). For this reason, it was felt that the Board of the Commissioners in 
49 The Times, 30 June, 1849, p. 7. 
50 Express, 30 June, 1849, p. 3. 
51 Express, 30 June, 1849, p. 3. The Commission of Lunacy had been established by the legislation of 
1845 to replace the Metropolitan Lunacy Commission (founded in 1828). As a centralized body (still 
chaired by Lord Shaftesbury) it consisted of six full-time professionals. Three of these had legal 
responsibilities and three medical. In conjunction with the Home Office they supervised the 
construction and management of the new county asylums and were given the statutory authority to 
visit, unannounced, private and public asylums, as well as workhouses and hospitals. They were 
empowered to alter the regimes of private asylums as they saw fit, as well as institute inquiries upon 
the request of lunatics and their families and friends (as witnessed in the Nottidge case). For the first 
time, one body was given authority to `monitor practices and establish standards relating to medical 
certification, asylum management, and the care of patients on a nationwide basis'. Nicholas Hervey, 
`A Slavish Bowing Down: the Lunacy Commission and the Psychiatric Profession 1845-60' in The 
Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry, ed. by W. F. Bynum, Roy Porter and 
Michael Shepherd, 3 vols (London and New York: Tavistock, 1985), II: Institutions and Society, 
pp. 98-131 (p. 104). 
52 The Times, 30 June, 1849, p. 7. 
53 The Times, 29 August, 1849, p. 4. 
54 Express, 30 June, p. 4. The new commission had been established in part to suppress public concern 
at the existence of unethical personal and professional links between the Metropolitan commissioners 
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Lunacy were not acting in the interests of public security and their involvement in the case of 
Nottidge v. Ripley amounted, The Times thought, to a ̀ foul outrage to law and humanity'. 
55 The 
Commissioners, the Express concluded, `acted most unwarrantably in allowing a lady to remain 
under coercion a single day, simply because her religious notions appeared to them extravagant'. 
56 
The arguments put forth by the Commissioners in Lunacy in defence of their role, the 
Express suggested, were no better than `the gossip of village publics, always indignant when they 
see people act differently from themselves, and but too prone to give vent to their righteous wrath, 
by retailing all their black conjectures and surmises as positive facts'. The paper sarcastically 
commented that if `everyone whose creed does not square exactly with the notions entertained by 
the Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons and at Apothecaries' Hall is to be shut up in a mad-house, 
we shall have a rare time of it. Anger was similarly expressed at the unwarrantable authority of 
physicians to incarcerate Nottidge on the grounds that unsoundness of mind was detected in her 
decision to hand over her inheritance to a man whom she believed to be God. Arguing that `there 
does not appear to be a shadow of a symptom of lunacy about Miss NOTTIDGE', the Express 
desired to record `an emphatical protest against any encroachment on the liberties of such harmless 
fools; against the irregular incarceration of any one of them on the untenable plea of madness'. The 
guidelines by which doctors could incarcerate ̀ all whose religious tenets appear to them absurd', 
was as ̀ monstrous' and as ̀ susceptible of being perverted to the most selfish and dishonest 
oppression' as the `power of priests and inquisitors to incarcerate and seclude for heresy'. 
v. Not for punishment, but for safety 
Since the late-eighteenth century, the consolidation of the profession of psychological medicine had 
necessitated an overhaul in the system of asylum care, the implementation of national legislation, 
the publication of journals, and the expansion of professional associations. However any self- 
conscious belief that the profession had attained public admiration and their physicians a 
heightened professional status for securing lunacy under their autonomous legal and medical 
control was directly challenged by the Lord Chief Baron's dicta. As a result of the ruling and 
widespread public discontent, the physicians who had signed orders for Nottidge's committal to 
Moorcroft asylum and the Commissioners who were involved in the case rallied to defend their 
credibility and integrity against what they perceived as unwarranted accusations. 
and the proprietors of the asylums that they were inspecting and licensing. The apparent collusion 
witnessed in the Nottidge case contributed to a climate of suspicion which was to mark the 
relationship between the press and the profession of mental science throughout the nineteenth 
century. Donnelly, Managing the Mind, p. 19. See also Parry-Jones, Trade in Lunacy, pp. 9-10. 
55 The Times, 30 June, 1849, p. 7. 
56 Express, 30 June, 1849, p. 3. 
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In the Journal of Psychological Medicine and Mental Pathology's ̀ call to arms', one writer 
expressed concern that the praiseworthy accomplishments of the profession of mental science had 
been overlooked. Though pointing `triumphantly to the splendid works on insanity [... ] to the 
diminished mortality among the insane, and to the vastly-increased proportion of cures which have 
been effected', the journal was forced to acknowledge that the psychiatric profession had been 
treated `as though it deserved punishment rather than gratitude [... ] Every opportunity of blame, 
deserved or undeserved, is eagerly seized upon by the organs of public opinion'. 
57 The medical 
profession, the Lancet was similarly aggravated to note, was ̀ looked upon as having an 
overweening desire to prove all the world mad'. 
58 If such sentiments ̀were allowed to dominate 
unreproved, the humanity-mongers would soon degrade the treatment of insanity into a branch of 
quackery, for none would be held fit to treat the insane but those willing to bow to the prejudices 
of ignorance and jealousy. 
59 
The origin of such an `over-excitement of the public mind on this topic' of insanity was 
grounded in what the journal saw as ̀ an excess of the benevolent sentiments for those afflicted 
with insanity'. Combined with `a natural sensitiveness on the question of the liberty of the 
subject, an invasion of which, by medical men, is held in great professed horror', it was ̀ a 
humiliating fact' that the psychiatric profession was denigrated to such an extent and with 
apparent disregard for their evident successes. ̀The public mind seems drunk, if we may so express 
it, with humanity upon this matter'. 
b° Ironically, and as physicians themselves noted, the `morbid 
excess of that humane feeling' was directly linked to `the present benevolent mode of managing 
insane persons'. 
61 Nevertheless, the mistrust, suspicion, and apprehension that had attended 
newspaper coverage of physicians' involvement in medico-legal trials, commissions of lunacy `and 
in every other instance in which medicine comes before the public in connexion [sic] with 
insanity'62 suggested that the greater fault still lay with the `prevailing and injurious jealousy of 
57JPMMP, 2 (1849), p. 566. 
58 Lancet, (1849) ii, p. 127. The Lancet had been established in 1823 by the reformer Thomas Wakley 
(1795-1862). 
59 JPMMP, 2 (1849), p. 567. Widespread concern in the 1860s that the law was excessively lenient in 
its treatment of criminals led the Manchester Guardian to suggest that under `the influence of our 
humanity mongers, we have nursed and fostered a race of hardened villains'. The phrase ̀ humanity 
mongers' is revealing in exposing the larger framework within which enlightened sensibility was held 
accountable not only for the release into the community of what physicians perceived as dangerous 
lunatics but also for the rise of a criminal class. See Davis, `The London Garotting Panic', p. 200. 
60 JPMMP, 2 (1849), pp. 566-67. 
61 Lancet, (1849) ü, p. 127. 
62 JPMMP, 2 (1849), p. 566. 
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the public towards the profession [of mental science]'63 and with the increasing presence of 
`pseudo-philanthropy on the subject of lunacy'. To `curb these excesses of humanity' was 
admittedly a `disagreeable necessity' but it was one to which all medical men involved in insanity 
must submit. 
64 
The Lancet adopted the same attitude. Setting out in detail the `jealous regard for the 
liberty of the subject inherent in the present law of lunacy' the journal argued that `these plain 
facts are alone sufficient to refute the notion that medical men bear any despotic power over the 
liberties of their fellow subjects'. 
65 At the heart of the profession's discontent was what they 
perceived to be ̀ a tendency which has obtained in late years to appeal to the public, and make the 
public judges in matters medical'. From the `benevolent fanatic LUKE JAMES HANSARD, and 
poor Mr. PERCEVAL, downwards, there is hardly one officious dabbler in popular physic who does 
66 not think himself as good a judge of insanity as a PRICHARD or CONOLLY'. 
Interestingly, the `special jury' were subject to criticism from all quarters except the 
medical journals. Both The Times and the Express objected to their decision to award such a low 
figure for damages. 67 Fraser's Magazine believed that the `sapient jury' were wholly unqualified to 
make such a decision. `Loose and general assertions about the hazard we are all placed in from the 
ineffective safeguards of the law of lunacy', the journal suggested, 
63 JPMMP, 2 (1849), p. 567. 
64JPMMP, 2 (1849), p. 567. 
65 Lancet, (1849) ü, p. 127. 
66 Lancet, (1849) ii, p. 21. Luke Graves Hansard was the son of the printer of the `House of 
Commons' Journals; John Thomas Perceval was the 5th son of the assassinated Prime Minister 
Spencer Perceval. In 1845 with Richard Paternoster he established the Alleged Lunatics' Friend 
Society [ALFS]. He had been incarcerated in both Brislington Lodge and Ticehurst Asylum and was a 
vociferous campaigner for lunacy reform. See Richard A. Hunter and Ida Macalpine, `John Thomas 
Perceval (1803-1876): Patient and Reformer', Medical History, 6 (1962), pp. 391-95. Though it does 
not appear that the ALFS intervened in any official capacity in the Nottidge case, Perceval 
immediately and angrily responded to the accusation of being an `officious dabbler'. A letter published 
in the Lancet on 4 August 1849 made clear his support of the Lord Chief Baron's dicta. Believing it 
his `right' and `duty' to keep the claims of authority made by physicians `within due bounds', his 
concern lay with the `protection of the civil and religious liberties of my fellow-subjects; the 
restoration to society of many amiable and talented, though nervous and eccentric, individuals; the 
prevention of any person being subjected, unjustly or mistakenly, to a most cruel confinement [... ] 
and the extension of the consolidation and protection of the spiritual authorities to the deluded and 
the insane'. Lancet, (1849) ii, p. 134. 
67 The Times, 30 June, 1849, p. 7; Express, 30 June, 1849, p. 3. 
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are usually sustained by reference to cases such as that of Miss Nottidge, in which a 
miscellaneous jury reverse the judgment of scientific men. The actual value of such verdicts 
is not worth the cost of the slip of paper on which they are written. 
68 
If physicians, the journal continued, who `dedicated their lives to the study of mental phenomenon' 
found it necessary to `exercise great vigilance in forming their opinions, is it likely that a jury, 
composed of individuals who have never had the opportunity of acquiring any exact knowledge or 
experience in the mysterious pathology of the human mind, can arrive at sounder conclusions [... ] 
without even having had the advantage of testing for themselves the sanity or insanity of the 
plaintiff? '. 
69 The answer, the journal thought, was self-evident. 
Some members of the jury felt compelled to justify their verdict. On 2 July, a letter from a 
`Juryman' appeared in The Times. The author wanted to express his support for the paper's 
contention that the award represented a trifling sum `for the most unwarrantable and unjustifiable 
assault that was ever committed upon an innocent and unoffending lady'. 
70 He pointed out that 
the jury were far from unanimous in their decision. 
71 Another was so outraged at being criticised 
by his `brother juryman' that he also wrote to The Times to express his opinion that the 
`defendants were actuated by the kindest motives towards their relative, the plaintiff'. 
72 The 
problem, as Fraser's Magazine saw it, was that the defendants' argument had been ̀ highly coloured 
with that sort of popular sentiment which is known to have an electric effect upon the sympathies 
of juries, but which has as much connexion [sic] with the real question at issue as Tenterden 
steeple with the Goodwin Sands'. It was on a verdict procured in this way `that the opinions of 
responsible medical men are consigned to derision and odium'. 
73 
The threat to their authority from this `rampant' and `vicious system' demanded an 
immediate response, not only from individual physicians by writing letters to medical journals, 
but also from the profession as a whole. Because the case of Nottidge v. Ripley questioned the 
fundamental institutional framework of lunacy legislation, the Commissioners in Lunacy 
themselves felt obligated not only to delineate the law as they saw it, but also to remind the public 
that they owed a ̀ debt of gratitude for their [the Commissioners] earnest and emphatic appeal to 
68 `The Lord Chief Baron's Law of Lunacy', Fraser's Magazine, 40 (1849), pp. 363-373 (p. 366). 
69 Fraser's Magazine, 40 (1849), p. 367. 
70 The Times, 2 July, 1849, p. 8. 
71 The Times, 2 July, 1849, p. 8. 
72 The Times, 5 July, 1849, p. 5. 
73 Fraser's Magazine, 40 (1849), p. 367. 
,; 
the law and to common sense against what every one must now see was a very hasty and ill- 
considered perversion of justice'. 
74 
The Lancet agreed: 
A lunacy seems to have seized the judges. We do not hesitate to declare that, during the 
last two or three years, decisions have been pronounced from the bench respecting insanity 
which must make our jurisprudence upon this subject the laughing stock of the civilized 
world. 
75 
When rumours soon circulated that the case might be tried over again, it was suggested in the 
journal that such an opportunity would `be afforded to judicial wisdom of rectifying the errors 
formerly committed'. 
76 As it became clear that such an opportunity was not to be afforded, the 
medical establishment stepped up its defence of what they now perceived to be their precarious 
authority. The `humanity-mongers' had hailed the Lord Chief Baron's dicta as the dawn of a 
humane and libertarian attitude to those on the borderlands of madness, to those who seemed 
eccentric, or to those who held anti-establishment or irreligious views and opinions. Yet 
physicians expressed horror at the probable consequences of such a decision. A spectre of 
uncontrollable chaos and disruption was proffered by a writer in the Lancet: 
the number of persons threatened with mental disease, instead of being subjected to proper 
treatment and control, will go on to hopeless and incurable insanity [... ] medical men will 
be chary of giving certificates even in undoubted cases; the commissioners will have their 
authority overturned, and the whole question of sanity or insanity will be launched out 
into uncertainty. Under a pretended deference for the liberty of the subject, or an affected 
horror for practices in lunatic asylums which have not existed in many years, thousands of 
helpless creatures will be consigned to sharpers and swindlers, and the peace of families in 
which there are persons of unsound mind harassed to an extent which can scarcely be 
conceived. 
77 
Lord Shaftesbury was so shocked by the verdict and the widespread public denigration of 
his colleagues that he wrote a letter of protest to the Lord Chancellor. He felt that the law 
74 Lancet, (1849) ii, p. 211. 
75 Lancet, 2 (1849), p. 211. Though the Lancet was envisaged by Wakley as an entirely new forum in 
which quackery and charlatanism, and corruption at the heart of medical establishment could be 
exposed, the journal gave crucial support to the physicians involved in the case. Much space was given 
to a condemnation of the charges that were threatening the autonomous status of physicians in the 
field of lunacy. 
76 Lancet, (1849) ii, p. 211. 
77 Lancet, (1849) ii, p. 42. 
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regulating the care and treatment of lunatics had been misinterpreted, if applied at all, in the 
Nottidge case. The consequences would be catastrophic, not only for Louisa Nottidge, but for the 
health of society as a whole: `Certain dicta and opinions which have recently been attributed to the 
Lord Chief Baron', he wrote, and `appear to us so seriously to affect the interpretation and 
application of the law by which we are governed, that we feel called upon by a sense of duty to 
point out in this letter [... ] the great evils to society which would ensue from their acceptance and 
adoption as a practical rule'. 
78 The 1845 Act for the Care and Treatment of Lunatics, he argued, 
was not limited to any particular class of lunatic. The word `lunatic' in fact was defined in the Act 
(as well as in the County Asylums Act of 1828) as every insane person being an idiot or lunatic, 
or of unsound mind. Lord Shaftesbury wanted to make it explicitly clear that the object of the Act 
in question was not to arbitrarily confine lunatics, but to restore to them a healthy state of mind, 
as well as ̀ to afford comfort and protection to the rest'. 
79 
The point he wished to make on behalf of his commissioners was that those lunatics 
considered dangerous to themselves or others were relatively few in number. The more 
predominant classes of lunatic presently held within asylums were those who were incapable of self- 
government and so required supervision and control, and those who were incapable of taking care 
of themselves and so were likely to sustain serious injury if unprotected. `It may be reasonably 
asked', he wrote, `what would become of all these large classes of the insane if set at large, in 
conformity with the Lord Chief Baron's opinion? '. 
80 Fraser's Magazine had already penned an 
answer: 
If this opinion of his lordship's were to be carried into effect, the result would probably be 
the liberation of nine-tenths of the insane persons who are at this moment detained in 
lunatic asylums, because, being under treatment, they undeniably do not come within the 
description of persons who are dangerous to themselves or others. But in recommending 
the commissioners to throw open the doors of the asylums and let out this crowd of 
detenus, his lordship overlooked one important consideration, namely, that in a few weeks 
after their liberation the majority of these unfortunate persons would be tolerably sure to 
qualify themselves for re-admission, by becoming as dangerous to themselves and others as 
even his lordship could desire. 
81 
The Lancet was only slightly more sardonic'. 
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If the Commissioners of Lunacy are to act upon this opinion, and monomaniacs not 
dangerous to themselves or others are to be treated as sane, why it just comes to this [... ] 
There should at once be a general asylum-delivery throughout the kingdom. Hanwell 
should give up its kings and queens, its emperors and popes, for none of them could be 
pronounced insane [... ] Certainly, the whole medical profession should at once set about 
reforming its notions of what constitutes insanity. We can fancy PINEL or ESQUIROL, 
aghast at such a revolution. 
82 
It was the `most lamentable' consequences of such an `asylum-delivery' that most 
concerned Lord Shaftesbury. While the Commissioners might promote the liberty of the patient if 
he or she had a caring family and comfortable home to return to, if this was not the case there was 
absolutely no justifiable reason for removing the patient from the `shelter' of an asylum and 
abandoning him or her, unprepared, to the outside world. Even if there was a home to return to, 
such an environment represented ̀ every disadvantage to [lunatics who would] [... ] be the cause of 
great and unnecessary expense, and of inexpressible annoyance to their families '83 . Lord 
Shaftesbury's letter highlighted the often overlooked fact that mental derangement was not situated 
solely in the domain of the patient-physician relationship. Families and sometimes larger 
communities, it becomes clear, were influential factors in the decision made by doctors to consign 
lunatics to asylums. Because ̀the habits and general conduct of patients under the influence of 
mental disease', 
are frequently so violent, and at times so offensive, that it would be to the last degree 
cruel and unjust to expose the other members of the family to them; more especially when 
there are children, whose minds might receive a shock, and perhaps be incurably injured, by 
continually witnessing the paroxysms or [... ] extravagances of a lunatic. 
84 
John Conolly was in absolute agreement. The judge's ruling, he respectfully argued in his 
Remonstrance with the Lord Chief Baron (1849), was `far too limited for the welfare of society, for 
the comfort of private families, and for the protection of many harmless insane persons'. 
85 His 
lordship's opinion, Conolly believed, was ̀mistaken' and ̀ extensively mischievous'. It was not the 
`dangerous lunatic alone who requires to be placed in an asylum. A rule for safe general guidance 
must have a wider extent'. 
86 The `tranquillity of his [the lunatic's] family, or his neighbours, or 
82 Lancet, (1849) ii, p. 21. 
83 JPMMP, 2 (1849), p. 612. 
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society' were factors as important as his own protection in the consideration of whether or not to 
send him to an asylum, even if it was the case that he suffered from only excessive ccentricity or 
extreme feebleness of mind. 
87 People of this kind, Conolly argued, 
may not endanger their lives, or those of others, but their being at large is inconsistent 
with the comforts of society [... ] and it is imperatively necessary that they should be kept 
and watched [... ] If the Commissioners, acting according to your Lordship's advice, were 
to liberate all such people, they would, indeed, "let Bedlam loose, " bring affliction on a 
thousand families, and even throw society into confusion. 
88 
Though reflecting contemporaneous psychiatric opinion, seen in the context of his earliest 
writings, Conolly's comments represent a striking change of opinion. In Indications of Insanity 
(1830) Conolly had dissented from the traditional orthodoxy by suggesting that lunatics were 
committed to asylums indiscriminately, that certificates were heedlessly signed and that asylums 
were thus silting up with harmless and eccentric patients. The isolation of the lunatic was, he had 
written, `repugnant to every idea of rational freedom which all ought to enjoy, that a man should 
not do as he chooses with his time, or his property, so long as he does not inflict direct injury on 
others'. 
89 As Helen Small has suggested, his change in philosophy resulted from acquiring the 
status, but not the wealth, he had hoped for in the course of his professional career. As a result, he 
had been forced to turn not only to testifying as an expert witness in lunacy commissions and in 
medico-legal trials, but to the private `trade in lunacy', establishing his own asylum, Lawn 
House. 90 Considering the striking abnegation of his early libertarianism, it was perhaps 
surprising that the press did not make more of his Remonstrance, especially considering his remark 
that the `comments of the newspapers on the conduct of the Commissioners [... ] have been equally 
injudicious, as well as unjust'. 
91 
The writer in Fraser's Magazine thought that the `great truth in reference to insanity 
which the public had yet to comprehend' was that `benevolence' to the suffering individual and 
`justice' to society, far from being equated with the Lordship's dicta, was to be found in the 
implementation of methods for restoring the health of the mind. Yet ironically, there was no legal 
87 Conolly, Remonstrance, p. 7. 
88 Conolly, Remonstrance, p. 9. 
89 John Conolly, An Inquiry Concerning the Indications of Insanity with Suggestions for the better 
Protecting and Care of the Insane (London: John Taylor, 1830), p. 139. 
90 Helen Small, Love's Madness: Medicine, the Novel, and Female Insanity, 1800-1865 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 54. 
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basis underpinning the medical profession's argument that the main and primary object of 
confinement was the treatment of mental disease. As John Charles Bucknill, a contemporary of 
Henry Maudsley (Conolly's father-in-law), pointed out, the `sole purpose of the law is to provide 
for the safety of the public and the individual'. 
92 Devoting a chapter of The Care of the Insane 
(1880) to the Nottidge case, he explained how the law was written and why in cases when there 
was no danger, confinement was actually illegal. Though the actions of the Commissioners (in 
confining Louisa Nottidge in an asylum) were `thoughtful and humane', they were illegal purely 
because of the `shortcomings of the statute'. 
93 
Bucknill concluded that the law was ̀ smothered in its own absurdity' because it `expressed 
the lawyer's view of interference with the insane, founded upon the facts of life when society was 
young and simple, in opposition to the doctor's view of what must be done to prevent mischief 
among the tender and complex interests of modern life'. 
94 In order to smooth out the `knotted 
intricacies and confusions', the term `dangerous' needed to be codified. As it stood, `dangerous' 
was interpreted by the law to mean liable to inflict physical rather than moral danger. Similarly, 
the term `harmless' was not the exact opposite of `dangerous'. It was ̀ impossible', Bucknill 
concluded, `that this vast gap, this casus omissus - should be allowed to continue, throwing more 
than doubt upon the legality of detaining [... ] any insane person who is either not dangerous or 
found lunatic by inquisition'. 95 
What the Lord Chief Baron's dicta ignored, and a fact overlooked by Bucknill, was the 
medical belief that physicians should intervene prior to an alleged lunatic becoming `dangerous'. As 
Fraser's Magazine asked, if the `asylum is to be maintained merely as an hospital for violent or 
suicidal lunatics, what curative means does his Lordship propose to establish for the treatment of 
lunatics in the earlier stages of the disease? '.
96 Without attention, `many of these cases go on to 
absolute insanity' and by `early care this terrible end is generally averted', 
97 While families and 
friends of lunatics thought that they were acting with the greatest benevolence by regarding the 
lunatic's strange actions as merely harmless eccentricities (and thus keeping him or her at home), 
92 John Charles Bucknill, The Care of the Insane and their Legal Control (London: Macmillan, 1880), 
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they were in fact abandoning ̀unfortunates' to their fate. 
98 As Conolly put it, the lunatic would 
be `condemned to a domestic imprisonment, more secret, and in every respect more objectionable 
than confinement in a lunatic asylum'. 
99 The most effective means of preventative treatment 
demanded ̀ a change of scene, variety, amusement, and occupation', 
' 00 
and the detachment of the 
lunatic from `scenes and associations in the midst of which his disorder has arisen'. 
101 Physicians 
felt that these necessities could be achieved only in the site of the lunatic asylum. 
The circumstances of Louisa Nottidge's case, Conolly felt, were `strikingly illustrative of 
the peculiar danger of leaving imbecile, visionary, and fanatical women at large, particularly if 
possessed of property'. He was firm in his belief that she needed protection `not because she 
cherished delusions, but because those delusions were inconsistent with the safety of her person and 
the security of her property'. 
102 By being committed to as asylum ('the proprietors of which are 
known to be distinguished for liberality and kindness'), 
the delusions might have died away, and a sense of duty have returned: her habits would at 
least have been regulated, all excess avoided, all painful exposure prevented; the patient 
would have been screened from all possible harm, and her property from pillage. 
103 
This paternalistic authority was to mark the medical profession's defence of their actions. It also 
positioned them in direct opposition to the public's entrenched belief in the liberty of the subject, 
and to the law concerning the confinement of the insane. Though physicians argued that the 
lunatic asylum represented a form of `safe liberty' from what was perceived to be a world full of 
`fanatics and swindlers' and `sanctimonious knaves', the vivid evocation of the dangers that lay 
beyond the walls of a lunatic asylum did not encourage a more generous public feeling towards 
psychological physicians and towards the Commissioners in Lunacy. 
Conolly thought that all `the dishonourable and blasphemous parts of these strange 
transactions' had been overlooked. This was all the more shocking because it had taken place ̀ in a 
country where an appearance of honesty and general morality is at least generally respected! '. 
104 
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The lunatic asylum, as the only place where her property would be adequately secure against the 
possibility of `legalised robbery, and her person from the possibility of legalized prostitution' had, 
Conolly remonstrated, been ̀ censured with all the dignity of the bench' and with `all the fervour of 
the press [... ] as an outrage not to be tolerated'. 
105 They rejoined, to the vociferous accusations of 
despotism, and to what they regarded as ̀ absurd charges constantly made in the public press, and in 
society, not to mention the judicial bench', 
106 
that it was their duty `to step forward in 
opposition to prejudices which, although associated with kind and liberal feelings, are full of 
mischief and danger'. 
107 It was for this reason that they confined Louisa Nottidge, against her 
will, in Moorcroft Asylum, and responded so ferociously to public condemnation. 
108 
In an unusual conclusion to the case, after Nottidge's death on August 21,1858 her 
brother, Ralph Clarke Nottidge, acting as her legal representative, sued Prince in the Vice 
Chancellor's Court in order to recover the inheritance that she had given him in 1849. Such a gift, 
made under the influence of a delusion or deception, was deemed by the court to be invalid. It was 
judged immaterial whether the delusions related to matters spiritual or temporal. Finding for the 
plaintiff and excluding the accrued interest, Prince was ordered to pay the sum of £5,728 7s 7d. 
109 
vi. Overview 
In the McNaughten case of 1843, with the support of the court the theories of psychological 
physicians ultimately prevailed over public opinion. In the Nottidge case of 1849, the authority of 
mental science was ultimately over-ruled in both the courtroom and in the court of public opinion, 
despite vigorous efforts to contain anxiety and to redirect blame at the `humanity-mongers'. 
Though different in many respects, both cases foreground two issues which were central to 
controversies over wrongful confinement throughout the course of the nineteenth century. Firstly, 
they both highlighted the conflict between civil liberties and safety attendant upon the 
sophistication of psychiatric nosologies and the introduction of partial forms of insanity such as 
monomania to the legal arena. Secondly, the case of Nottidge drew on and developed anxieties 
105 Conolly, Remonstrance, p. 18. 
106 Lancet, (1849) ü, p. 127. 
107 Conolly, Remonstrance, p. 20. 
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community. In 1958 the Chapel was sold and renovated as a retirement home. In the early 1990s it 
was sold as a private residence. It has never been a tourist attraction and was put on the market with 
no reference to its coloured past. This information has been kindly provided by the Taunton Board of 
Tourism. 
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raised both during and after the McNaughten trial about the potential dangers implicit in the use 
of a sentimental rhetoric of humanitarianism. Yet as this chapter has also demonstrated, 
monomania and the rhetoric employed both inside and outside the courtroom to construct and 
debate issues associated with wrongful confinement were not the only areas of contentious dispute. 
Central to all debates was the question of protection. No-one was free from scrutiny on 
this point. Physicians and the commissioners in lunacy defended themselves and the lunacy laws by 
arguing that the lunatic asylum was a form of `safe liberty' which was necessary in order to protect 
her (and her property) from the harmful influences of Prince and his followers. To their critics, the 
so-called ̀ safe liberty' argument offered by the medical profession presented a more dangerous 
threat than that posed by Prince. In particular, the rights and responsibilities of lay-persons 
involved in the case, most notably the family and friends of Nottidge and the jury, were integral 
to medico-legal discussions. The question of whether the Victorian household represented a form of 
`domestic imprisonment' more harmful to Nottidge (and to the comfort and protection of its 
inhabitants) than the asylum was as controversial as the perceived effect that the `electric' power of 
popular sentiment held on the jury. In illuminating competing versions of authority, newspapers 
and journals commenting on the trial reinforced popular anxiety through the use of specific 
representational strategies appropriated from the courtroom. The power of sentiment to divert 
attention from what the profession of mental science perceived as the facts of the case was a cause 
for concern. As the following chapter will argue, the anxieties engendered by the McNaughten and 
Nottidge cases, particularly in regard to the relationship between representation and 
identification, extended to the contemporaneous treatment of monomania in fiction. 
81 
Figure 1. 
`Ye Agapemone. With a Prospecte of Ye Brother and Sisters. A Playinge at Hockey. ' 
Punch (1850) 
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Figure 2. 
Artist's impression of the Agapemone in 1850. 
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Chapter Three 
Wilkie Collins and Charles Dickens: 
The Dangers of `Mad Monkton' 
When Daniel McNaughten murdered Edward Drummond in 1843 it was a sensation worthy of 
extensive editorial comment in both the regional and national press. As the contrasting positions 
of the London Illustrated News and the Standard suggest, McNaughten's crime and personality 
were immediately constructed in relation to ideas of feeling. Both newspapers deployed particular 
rhetorical strategies, or `ornaments' in order to contest the appropriateness of sentimentality and 
sensationalism in understanding the nature of the horrific and initially inexplicable murder. 
Intimacies, associations and identifications were strategically manipulated in order to control the 
reader's response to the crime and criminal. Yet as the conflicting responses to the Drummond 
murder make clear, the employment of rhetorical strategies to manipulate emotions was itself 
contested. The Standard, for example, was angered by the merciful depiction of McNaughten as 
himself a victim of ungovernable passions. Such a representation was bound, the paper thought, to 
exacerbate in the reading public `maudlin humanity' and `hysterical tenderness', emotions which 
seemingly exceeded the boundaries of acceptable identification. As the conflicting reactions to Lord 
Chief Baron's dicta in the Nottidge case also demonstrate, pity, sympathy and benevolence vied 
with horror, anger and fear. The coverage of both trials in the newspaper and journal press express 
not only a concern for the fate of the two individuals but for the dangers implicit in what was 
perceived to be the influence of an over-refined humanity. 
As the public profile of the profession of mental science heightened through its 
proponents' steadfast attempts to professionalise, the encounters between the world of mental 
science and the reading public multiplied. Besides novels and short stories exploring psychological 
theories, practices and personages, sensational exposes of wrongful confinement in lunatic asylums 
(like Nottidge's) and medico-legal and criminal trials (such as McNaughten's) all contributed to 
an increasingly problematic relationship between the profession of mental science and their critics 
which was played out most dramatically in print. In terms of legal rulings determining control of 
the lunatic, courtrooms and the Houses of Parliament were the sites of verbal contestation in 
which competing forensic arguments sought to influence judges and juries. Yet outside the confines 
of the courtroom, no such legal strictures could control the flurry of correspondence and editorial 
comment. It became not solely a medico-legal conflict centring on the claim to treatment of and 
authority over the lunatic, but more dramatically a battle between journals and papers for the 
public's good opinion and for their emotions. It was a battle, no less formative than medico-legal 
trials and their consequent rulings themselves, of words, associations and images. 
Whether fictional or factual, narratives relied on the rhetorical play of words and images as 
well as the production of historically and culturally-grounded associations to construct a range of 
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representational strategies which sought to guide the reader through particular issues, ideas and 
beliefs which were troublesome, difficult or contentious. The representational boundaries that texts 
constructed naturalised the differentiation between socially and culturally acceptable behaviors, 
values and beliefs and those which were deemed unacceptable, immoral or excessively affective. Yet 
as Ludmilla Jordanova makes clear, this process of mediation could never be a passive process 
because such discourses, she argues, were `never simple descriptions or reflections of an actual state 
of affairs-. 
' From production to consumption, the meaning of texts - their ideas and assumptions - 
encountered obstacles that effected their transformation. Their meaning could never be fixed or 
static because, as Jordanova puts it, both the production and reception of texts `are themselves 
practices deeply embedded in the social, economic, and political orders [... ] ideas and the means by 
which the are expressed, act as mediations on the social conditions in which they exist'. 
2 
During a period when the `appetite for printed paper [was] morbid and universal', the 
3 
increasing availability and accessibility of both novels and newspapers necessitated an acute 
interest in (and anxiety about) the authority to control identification with, and reception of, the 
written word. The complex relationship between writing and representation and reading and 
identification in the nineteenth century is particularly interesting in regard to the fraught 
reception of the theories and practices employed by psychological science to demarcate and so 
control the spectre of lunacy. In Criminal Conversations (1998), Laura Hanft Korobkin examines 
courtroom story-telling in nineteenth-century America and explores the way in which the legal 
process, traditionally characterised by objectivity, logic, and masculine rationality, was in fact 
permeated by rhetorical strategies of sentimentality. Providing judges with a set of ostensibly 
literary narratives which engaged jurors' deepest emotions, Korobkin argues that framing legal 
arguments through sentimental stories enabled lawyers in adultery cases to establish new legal 
definitions of spousal obligation which encouraged female empowerment. 
4 
Korobkin's argument is relevant to the larger argument of this dissertation. The rhetorical 
strategies of sentimentality, used by lawyers to teach jurors to `read' cases, exhibit many 
similarities to the ways in which fiction writers used specific narrative strategies in their attempts 
to control the interpretation and reception of their novels and short stories. She suggests that 
1 Ludmilla Jordanova, Sexual Visions: Images of Gender and Science in Medicine between the Eighteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), p. 5. 
2 Ludmilla Jordanova, Nature Displayed., Gender, Science and Medicine 1760-1820 (London: 
Longman, 1999), p. 3. 
3 `Publishers Circulars and Literary Advertisements for 1854', British Quarterly Review, 21 (January 
1855), pp. 158-181 (p. 158). 
4 Laura Hanft Korobkin, Criminal Conversations: Sentimentality and Nineteenth-Century Legal Stories 
of Adultery (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 12-16. 
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while jurors undoubtedly drew on personal experiences, their interaction with literary experiences 
was a process actively encouraged by lawyers because of-the way in which a literary mode like 
sentimentality provided a shared (and thus powerful) interpretive system. Paying attention to 
some of the concerns and interests of Korobkin, particularly the problems of credibility attendant 
on the necessary conflation of fact and fiction in the construction of rhetorical strategies, this 
chapter will examine `Mad Monkton', a short story published in 1855 by Wilkie Collins. Through 
a narrative which traces irrational obsessions, reasonable investigations, superstitious prophecies 
and partial insanity, the reader gradually descends, guided by the fragile rationality of the narrator, 
into a gothic world of spectres and `supernatural warrant [s]'. 
5 
This chapter will argue that monomania, as a partial form of insanity, plays a central and 
complex role in illuminating the cultural anxieties arising from the contested boundaries 
separating socially-acceptable rhetorical strategies and narrative content from stories and strategies 
which attempted to extend or reformulate the limits of narrative representation. Though certainly 
reflective of anxieties about the consequences of monomania on the body and mind of the sufferer, 
as well as the social world which the monomaniac inhabits, the story represents more than just a 
reflection of the concern that monomania engendered in the cultural imagination of nineteenth- 
century society. Both the story itself and the circumstances of its publication offer a fascinating 
insight into the way in which Collins problematised the relationship between representation, 
identification, and emotional reception demanded by the nature of shared interpretive systems, 
systems that were vitally important to Collins's friend and mentor, Charles Dickens. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section details the story itself, paying 
particular attention to the role of the narrator in collapsing the distinction between the 
recognisable and the unrecognisable fictional worlds that Collins constructs. The second section 
will examine the reasons underlying Dickens's concern with the effect that Collins's story might 
have on the readers of Household Words. The gradual repeal of `taxes on knowledge' or the 
democracy of print (advertisement duty in 1853, stamp tax in 1855, and paper duty in 18616), the 
advances taking place in paper and printing technologies, the increase in literacy and the rise of 
library circulation throughout the nineteenth century all positioned novel-reading as a leisure 
activity accessible and attractive to a large number of Victorians. As Collins and Dickens both 
knew, the very attractiveness of fiction was its ability to foster in readers intense and dangerous 
emotional impulses. 
5 Wilkie Collins, `Mad Monkton', in Wilkie Collins - Mad Monkton and Other Stories, ed. 
by 
Norman Page (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 68. Further page references are contained 
within the text. 
6 Altick, The English Common Reader, p. 341. 
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Though novels, as cultural artifacts designed for popular consumption (whether read for 
pleasure, elevation, instruction or escape) enabled Victorians to acquire a greater understanding of 
the world around them, they simultaneously opened imaginary worlds for their readers which did 
not necessarily follow the way the `real' world actually worked. When Eleanor Vane in Mary 
Elizabeth Braddon's Eleanor's Victory (1863) passionately declares vengeance for her father's 
mysterious death, she is warned against the folly of blurring reality and fiction: `Life is not a 
three-volume novel or a five act play, you know, Nelly. The sudden meetings and strange 
coincidences common in novels are not very general in our everyday existence'.? Such imaginary 
worlds apparently held the power to inculcate deviant values, influence behaviors and to produce 
unhealthy introspection and excitable tendencies. As this example make clear, and as ̀ Mad 
Monkton' will demonstrate, reading - the affective power of words - was perceived as both thrilling 
and dangerous. Contrasting `Mad Monkton' to Dickens's response to several other short stories, 
it becomes clear that he turned down Collins's story because it violated shared systems of 
representation and emotional identification. His decision reflected his concern for the influence 
that Collins's fictional treatment of monomania would have on readers. 
The `popular craving for excitement' was reinforced not only in fictions but in factual 
narratives published in periodicals and newspapers. Though fundamentally divergent in intention, 
relying on and relaying distinctive versions of narrative structure and authority (which were 
defined by the particular though not mutually exclusive demands of entertainment, information 
and instruction), both fictional and factual narratives relied upon verbal and visual devices to 
excite particular emotions, sentiments and affective identifications. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, the concerns expressed in the newspaper coverage of the McNaughten and Nottidge 
cases about the dangers of excessive identification were identical to those of Dickens. 
The third and final section of this chapter examines both the role played by monomania in 
complicating the way in which each writer conceived of their responsibility to their readers and 
considers more generally the problems posed by fictionalising contemporaneous medical diagnoses. 
i. `Mad Monkton' 
As he indicates early on in his account of the Monktons of Wincot Abbey, the family whose story 
the narrator recounts `bore a sad character of want of sociability'(p. 39) in their neighbourhood. It 
was ̀ enough to say' that their lack of sociability derived from the `horrible affliction of hereditary 
insanity' (p. 39) . 
The `illness, as it was significantly called'(p. 40) was believed by most to have been 
Eleanor's Mary Elizabeth Braddon, Eleanor's Victory (Stroud, Gloucs.: Alan Sutton, 1996), p. 95. eanor's 
suspicions were fostered after reading a novel by Paul Feval: `There were villains and rascals 
paramount throughout this delightful romance; and there was mystery and murder enough for half a 
dozen novels [... ] the trouble in the book seemed to become a part of the trouble in her own mind, 
adding its dismal weight to her anxieties'. Braddon, Eleanor's Victory, p. 46. 
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in decline for many years due to its `careful treatment'. Yet the narrator's father, one of the 
Monkton family's few friends, was not deceived. When rumours circulate that the future heir to the 
country estate, Alfred Monkton, was to become engaged to his `delicate, gentle, lovable'(p. 40) 
ward, Miss Elmsie, `he viewed with horror the bare possibility' of the lurking `hereditary taint [... ] 
reappearing one day in the children of his friend's only daughter'(pp. 40-41). After he refuses his 
consent to the marriage friendly intercourse between the families ceases. However, following his 
death, the engagement is again ratified. `Polite hints'(p. 42) once more circulate about the 
suitability of the match, `hints' that friends `were unwilling to specify distinctly'(p. 42) yet which 
she responded to as ̀ infamous calumnies' against the `best, the kindest, the sanest of human- 
beings'(p. 42). When Miss Elmsie left for the continent to recover from an illness, the rumours did 
not cease. Rather, they shifted to Monkton, `living as suspiciously strange and solitary a life as his 
father had lived before him'(p. 43): 
Civil visitors called resolutely at the Abbey, and were resolutely bowed away [... ] Under 
this combination of sinister and aggravating circumstances, people in all directions took 
to shaking their heads mysteriously when the name of Mr Alfred Monkton was 
mentioned, hinting at the family calamity, and wondering peevishly or sadly, as their 
tempers inclined them, what he could possibly do to occupy himself month after month in 
the lonely old house (p. 43). 
Monkton's mysterious actions, including standing on the `perilous summit of one of the 
crumbling turrets'(p. 44) and forcing open closed windows, lead to the widespread belief that he was 
`sinking rapidly, if he had not already succumbed, under the hereditary curse of his family'(p. 44). 
At this point, the narrator travels to the continent in order to instruct and amuse 
himself. While in Naples, he hears that Monkton had suddenly and without explanation broken the 
marriage engagement to Miss Elmsie, and was in Naples on what an acquaintance described as an 
`insane purpose-(p. 46): to seek out the remains of his dissolute uncle, Stephen Monkton, who had 
died in an illegal duel `somewhere outside' the Neapolitan States. The narrator learns that 
Monkton was considered to be mad. He had ̀ squandered his money, pestered the police, exposed 
himself to the ridicule of the men and the indignation of the women'(p. 46), becoming in what was 
a ̀ dull opera season'(p. 46) the `principal excitement'(p. 46). Though struck by Monkton's `dark, 
eager eyes, the colourless cheeks, [and his] strangely vigilant, anxious expression' (p. 45), the 
narrator pays little attention to the `hearsay' generated by Monkton's `precious errand'. (p. 47) 
Though warned that if he touched `the subject of his vagabond of an uncle, [... ] the Monkton 
madness comes out directly'(p. 47), he became increasingly intrigued by the discrepancy between an 
acquaintance's description of Monkton as mad and his acknowledgment that Monkton `talks like a 
sensible, well-educated man [and appears] [... ] the gentlest and most temperate of human 
beings' (p. 47) . 
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Although `astonished' by Monkton's `earnestness and agitation'(p. 48) the narrator could 
not ignore the fact that Monkton's talk held `no trace of anything the least like insanity about 
it'(p. 48). His manner, the narrator concludes, `was in itself a standing protest against such a 
nickname as "Mad Monkton". He was so shy, so quiet, so composed and gentle in all his actions 
that at times I should have been almost inclined to call him effeminate'(p. 48). Their developing 
`intimacy' is marred, however, by Monkton's two `eccentricities'(p. 49): the `odd expression in his 
eyes' and the fact that he never referred to his fiancee, Miss Elmsie, or his life at Wincot Abbey. 
An explanation is provided when Monkton suddenly takes the narrator into his confidence. 
Entreating him to `try to pass over for the present whatever may seem extraordinary and 
incomprehensible'(p. 53), Monkton explains to the narrator that in the attic of the Abbey he had 
discovered papers relating to an ancient family prophecy which predicted the extinction of the 
Monkton family unless all family members are buried in the vault under the Abbey's chapel. 
Monkton explains that he has traveled to Naples under a ̀ supernatural warrant' in order to 
prevent the fatal outcome of the curse by finding his uncle's body and returning it to the vault. 
To the narrator, Monkton's interpretation of the prophecy as ̀ the warning of his own 
doom'(p. 67) looks increasingly `like insanity-(p. 58), a belief that is confirmed when Monkton 
describes to him the constant presence of a strange apparition who he believes is the ghost of his 
uncle. Though he sought to give the narrator `some reasonable explanation' of his conduct, the 
opposite effect is produced: `All the suspicions I had ever heard whispered against his sanity flashed 
over my mind in an instant'(p. 52) The narrator starts thinking about `the extent of his madness, 
or, to speak more mildly and more correctly, of his delusion'(p. 71): 
Sane he certainly was on ordinary subjects; nay, in all the narrative parts of what he had 
said to me [... ] he had spoken clearly and connectedly [... ] It was plain that the real 
hallucination [... ] lay in Monkton's conviction of the truth of the old prophecy, and in his 
idea that the fancied apparition was a supernatural warning to him to evade its 
denunciations. And it was equally clear that both delusions had been produced, in the first 
instance, by the lonely life he had led, acting on a naturally excitable temperament, which 
was rendered further liable to moral disease by an hereditary taint of insanity [... ] I firmly 
believed, as a derider of all ghost stories, that Alfred was deceiving himself [... ] and I was 
on this account therefore uninfluenced by my unhappy friend's delusions (pp. 71-72). 
Though he refers often to his `astonishment'(pp. 48,57), to his fear of Monkton's appearance, which 
looked `so much like madness [... ] that I felt afraid to ask him about it, and always pretended not 
to observe him' (p. 49), to his `dread' (p. 62) and to his `loss of possession' (p. 63), the narrator is 
unable to resist `aiding him to execute his extraordinary purpose'(p. 71). Pity overrides prudence 
and he accepts Monkton's plea for assistance. To the `near universal suspicion that [he] must be as 
mad in [his] way as Monkton himself'(p. 72) they venture outside the Neapolitan states in search 
of the body. To save time, they separate. Following clues provided by a newspaper report of the 
duel, the narrator eventually finds Stephen Monkton's body at a `dark, low, sinister-looking' 
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convent. Though willing to assist Monkton, `humouring his delusions to the last'(p. 69), it 
becomes apparent that he himself `struggles' to deny the reality of the `strange discoveries' and the 
`wild fancies'(p. 64) initiated by the discovery of the prophecy in the attic of Monkton Abbey. 
Upon the discovery of the unburied body, the narrator's cool rationality collapses. Yet it 
`was something more than the hideous spectacle unexpectedly offered to my eyes which had shaken 
my nerves'. The forced questioning of his practical point of view is overwhelming: `I began to 
almost doubt the evidence of my own senses, when I reflected upon the apparently impracticable 
object with which we had left Naples'(p. 87). He fears Monkton's response to his discovery, yet 
equally his own 'self-possession-(p. 88). Though the body is safely transferred to the leaden coffin, 
calamity strikes when the coffin and body are lost during a storm on the return journey to 
England. This precipitates further disaster as Monkton succumbs to `brain fever'. Though they 
safely return to England, his illness `exercised the strangest influence over his faculties of 
memory'(p. 102) and he never again recognises the narrator nor recalls the obsessions, passions and 
terrors experienced by both of them during their quest. The story concludes with Monkton's death, 
the tragic fulfillment of the ancient family prophecy. 
ii. Dickens and `Mad Monkton' 
`The Monktons of Wincot Abbey' as it was initially entitled was written in 1853 for Dickens's 
Household Words. It is striking for its engagement with notions of manliness and masculinity 
through its powerful evocation of illicit obsession, fear and desire. 
8 Yet of equal significance is the 
way in which Collins boldly conflates two seemingly incompatible discourses and frames of 
reference: gothic romance and contemporary psychiatric theories of partial insanity. Dickens, who 
had established Household Words in 1850 to compete with Blackwood's, was clear about the social 
and moral purpose of the weekly periodical. 
9 In the first volume he declared to his readers that they 
would discover nothing in his new journal that would render them `less ardently persevering in 
ourselves, less tolerant of one another, less faithful in the progress of mankind, less thankful for 
8I am referring here to the text's references to effeminacy, suggestive as a euphemism for 
homosexuality. See Norman J. Vance, The Sinews of the Spirit: The Ideal of Christian Manliness in 
Victorian Literature and Religious Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 38, 
112. 
9 Dickens to Rev. James White, 5 February, 1850. The Letters of Charles Dickens, ed. by Graham 
Storey, Kathleen Tillotson and Nina Burgis, 11 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 6 (1850-52), 
p. 30. 
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the privilege of living in the summer-dawn of time'. 
10 On receiving Collins's story, however, 
Dickens was hesitant about its place within Household Words. 
Dickens was in thrall to what he perceived as the sensitive natures and values of his 
middle-class audience. The editorial staff of Household Words welcomed stories and articles that 
were instructive, educative, amusing, or sentimental. Stories and articles which held even the 
potential to unnecessarily offend, depress, anger or over-excite readers were rejected outright or 
returned to their authors for re-writing. In early 1855, for example, the offices of the journal 
received a short story written by Louisa Lucy Juliana King (the daughter of Joseph Charles King, 
the headmaster of Dickens's sons' school). Dickens's doubts about the suitability of the story for 
Household Words arose partly from `the nature of the interest' which he believed required its 
publication in a single volume, and partly from her manner of relating the tale itself. One of the 
young character's language, for example, was `a little too "slangy"': 
I know the kind of boyish slang which belongs to such a character in these times; but, 
considering his part in the story, I regard it as the author's function to elevate such a 
characteristic, and soften it into something more expressive of the ardour and flush of 
youth, and its romance. 
" 
Dickens's detailed comments betray his characteristic desire to seduce or `soften' the reader 
through the elevation of `fancy' and `romance'. Though their correspondence continued, Miss 
King's story never appeared in Household Words. Such injunctions did, however, occasionally lead 
to an agreeable compromise, as the correspondence between Dickens and Emily jolly demonstrates. 
Jolly had submitted `A Wife's Story' to the journal only a few months before Collins submitted 
`Mad Monkton'. The gentle admonition reserved for King was replaced by enthusiastic praise. 
Dickens believed that the story held `great merit and unusual promise' particularly because it 
displayed ̀ so much power and knowledge of the human heart'. 
12 Yet he still entreated jolly to 
rethink the scene of the familial `catastrophe'. In this central scene the `spiritually dark'13 wife 
(who believes that she is intellectually superior to her faith-driven husband) is told of the deaths of 
10 [Charles Dickens], `A Preliminary Word', Household Words, 30 (March 1850), p. 1, reprinted in 
Dickens' Journalism, ed. by Michael Slater, 4 vols (London: J. M. Dent, 1996), II, The Amusements of 
the People and Other Papers: Reports, Essays and Reviews, 1834-51, p. 177. 
11 Dickens to King, 9 February, 1855. The Letters of Charles Dickens, ed. by Graham Storey, 
Kathleen Tillotson and Angus Easson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 7 (1853-55), p. 529. 
12 Dickens to Miss Emily jolly, 17 July, 1855. The Letters of Charles Dickens, 7, p. 677. 
13 [Emily Jolly], A Wife's Story and Other Tales, 3 vols (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1875), I, p. 70. 
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her husband and children. Her subsequent grief is viewed as punishment for her arrogance. Dickens 
thought such a conclusion was ̀unnecessary painful' and believed that it would 
throw off numbers of persons who would otherwise read it, and who (as it stands) will be 
deterred by hearsay from doing, and is so tremendous a piece of severity, that it will defeat 
your purpose. All my knowledge and experience, such as they are, lead me straight to the 
recommendation that you will do well to spare the life of the husband, and of the children 
[... ] So will you soften the reader whom you now as it were harden, and so you will bring 
tears from many eyes, which can only have their spring in affectionately and gently 
touched hearts. I am perfectly certain that with this change, all the previous part of this 
tale will tell for twenty times as much as it can in its present condition. 
14 
Jolly acquiesced to Dickens's request for alterations, conforming to the central tenet of his 
meliorative social philosophy: the `raising up those that are down, and the general improvement of 
our social condition'. 
15 `A Wife's Story' was published in Household Words in September 1855 
and though the story was far from `cheery and pleasant', qualities that Dickens usually demanded in 
his effort to effect `some solid good', 
16 it was heart-rending, sentimental and morally instructive. 
In the published version both the frail daughter and the disillusioned and spurned husband survive 
illness and accident to be reunited with the repentant wife. Though grieving for the death of her 
son, she displays a renewed desire to `reverence' her husband and so find `rest on earth'. 
1 7 
The success of sentimental narratives such as ̀ A Wife's Story' should be gauged, Dickens 
believed, in part by the intensity of the reader's response. In just the way that familial harmony is 
reinstated within the narrative through the shedding of tears and the conjoining of pity and 
forgiveness with guilt-ridden repentance (unsurprisingly gendered), so too does sentimentality 
work outside the confines of the text, strategically forging a specific bond of feeling between the 
reader and author. Yet as Dickens well knew, the relationship between reader and author was a 
fragile one. Notoriously fickle, the reading-public remained all-powerful in determining the 
popularity of a work and the success of the journal in which it was published. Dickens's advice to 
Jolly was disingenuous. He feared that in its original version `A Wife's Story' would `throw off 
numbers of readers' whose derogatory comments about the `severity' of the wife's punishment 
would deter potential readers through the circulation of mere `hearsay'. Fewer readers would not 
only defeat Dolly's didactic purpose, but his own as well. He wanted Household Words and in turn 
14 Dickens to Miss Emily jolly, 17 July, 1855. The Letters of Charles Dickens, 7, p. 677. 
15 Dickens to Mrs Elizabeth Gaskell, 31 January, 1850. The Letters of Charles Dickens, 6, pp. 21-22 
(p. 22). 
16 Dickens to Rev. James White, 5 February, 1850. The Letters of Charles Dickens, 6, p. 30. 
17 [Jolly], A Wife's Story, I, p. 173. 
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his own reputation to flourish in the fiercely contested world of periodical journalism and story- 
telling. 
Dickens's correspondance with his contributors makes clear his conception of his readers: 
they were a potent revenue-generating market, which he desired not unnaturally to keep loyal to 
Household Words. There was no question, however, that Dickens also conceived of his audience as 
familial community. He presumed a shared cultural identity (constructed through the generation of 
a common stock of allusions and references which were framed by gentle guidance and 
instruction18) which was described by Thackeray as a communion, or `something continual, 
confidential, something like personal affection'. 
19 Through such a ̀ communion' the morally- 
upright, generous and compassionate dispositions of his domestic readership could be nurtured and 
`better acquaintance and a kinder understanding' between individuals, groups and classes be 
achieved. 
20 
Dickens's treatment of his readers can be seen to be similar to the ways in which lunatics 
in asylums were managed using moral treatment. To him, the reader (like the lunatic to the 
physician), was foremost a malleable subject whose emotions could be manipulated and so 
`managed' through the rhetorical strategy of sentimentality and the forging of emotional bonds 
between readers and characters in fiction. Dickens always wanted to `soften the reader' from his or 
her natural hardness. Such a gentle yet effective strategy was all the more necessary in the middle of 
the nineteenth century because of the way in which, to Dickens, the social processes of 
utilitarianism had induced an `iron binding of the mind to grim realities'. 
21 The deaths of the 
wife's family in Dolly's story reinforces this point. All it would have achieved was an ossifying of 
the reader's response which would in turn deny the reader both the instructive moral lesson that 
the story contained as well as the pleasure to be gained through its sentimentality and heart- 
rending emotionality. 
In contrast to Jolly's story, Dickens believed that the depiction of Alfred Monkton's 
monomaniacal obsession in Collins's short story posed problems for its publication in Household 
Words. Importantly, it was not solely the nature of the insanity itself, monomania, that was 
problematic, but the fact that it was presented as hereditary. This alarmed Dickens in several ways, 
not least because the hereditary nature of Monkton's insanity held the potential to produce 
18 Taylor, Secret Theatre, p. 25. 
19 William Thackeray, `A Box of Novels', Fraser's Magazine, 29 (February 1844), p. 167. Quoted in 
Sue Lonoff, Wilkie Collins and his Victorian Readers: A Study in the Rhetoric of Authorship (New 
York: AMS Press, 1982), p. 5. 
20 [Charles Dickens], `A Preliminary Word', p. 177. 
21 [Charles Dickens], `A Preliminary Word', p. 177. 
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identifications and associations in readers so intense (and alarming) that future readership for 
Household Words would be threatened. Perhaps more significantly, the hereditary nature of 
Monkton's monomania positioned it as literally untreatable and so culturally inaccessible to the 
sentimental ideals and demands of Dickens's reformist agenda. Hereditary monomania removed 
from the reader any chance, within the narrative itself, to achieve moral reconciliation. This is 
reinforced by that fact that though Alfred Monkton's monomania both initiates and underpins the 
narrative it remains, ironically, a ̀ hidden representation'; 
22 it is never named. 
Diluting the full horror of Monkton's affliction through his own mediation of the events, 
the narrator seemingly protects the reader. Yet his own descent from practicality and rationality 
into Monkton's world of obsessions foregrounds not only the instability of the representational 
boundary separating madness from sanity but also `strengthen [s] in the popular mind' (p. 44) the 
story's simultaneous horror and attractiveness by forcing the reader to construct in his or her own 
mind the full implications of the affliction. It was the spectre of dangerous emotional excess, the 
arousal of uncontrollable feelings in his readers, that Dickens feared. He objected to Collins's 
depiction of monomania because it challenged, I argue, Dickens's overwhelming belief in the power 
of words to foster self-discipline, optimism, and strengthen belief in the power of social harmony. 
Alfred Monkton's inability to escape from his condition, and the hopeless prospects it engendered 
(importantly not only for himself but for those around him), undermined Dickens's belief in `the 
progress of mankind'. Such a representation did not hold true to his promise that Household Words 
would contain nothing that would make its readers ̀ less thankful for the privilege of living in the 
summer-dawn of time'. 
Dickens knew the power he held to control boundaries of emotional reception; as he wrote 
of periodical publications in general, whether `quarterly, monthly, or daily [... ] [they] teach the 
multitude of men what to think and what to say'. 
23 With the materials that he authorised and 
accepted for publication, he was as secure as he could be in the knowledge that the effect produced 
would go some way to reinforce and reaffirm the purpose for which the story or article had been 
written. 
Dickens was convinced that Collins's story would engender anxiety and criticism. Far 
from educating the reader about insanity or enabling the adoption of sentimental sympathy for the 
social consequences of such an affliction, Collins's portrayal of `Mad' Monkton's hereditary 
monomania was to him neither instructive nor amusing. He instructed Wills to write to Collins 
and convey to him his primary objection to the story, that the subject of hereditary insanity 
22 Barbara Leckie, Culture and Adultery: The Novel, the Newspaper and the Law, 1857-1914 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 16. 
23 Quoted in Peter Ackroyd, Dickens (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1990), p. 596. 
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potentially posed distress to `those numerous families in which there is such a taint'. Dickens was 
careful not to alienate his young friend: 
I think there are many things, both in the inventive and descriptive way, that he could do 
for us [... ] And I particularly wish him to understand this, and to have every possible 
assurance conveyed to him that I think so, and that I should particularly like to have his 
aid. 
24 
In a sense, ̀Mad Monkton' conformed to Dickens's `Conductorial Injunction' to keep 
Household Words ̀ IMAGINATIVE'25 for it was a story in which Collins played on the reader's 
imaginative fancy and romantic impulses through the use of gothic motifs: dark and ancient 
haunted abodes, family curses and prophecies, mysterious, moldy documents, locked chests and 
leaden coffins. Many of his short stories playing with gothic horror attest to Collins's enjoyment 
of the fantastical genre. ̀ A Terribly Strange Bed', for example, was published in Household Words 
in April 1852.26 Unlike the much darker `Mad Monkton', `A Terribly Strange Bed' was welcomed 
for its entertainment value, its ability to excite the reader and to enable him or her wholly to enter 
a thrilling imaginary world. It was the short story which confirmed to Dickens the literary 
potential of his protege. 
Embracing `all the mysterious anomalies of sensibility, all the phenomena of the human 
understanding, all the consequences of the perversion of our natural sentiments, and all the errors 
of our passions', 
27 
monomania embodied emotions and sentiments which characterised both 
romance and gothic fictions. However, Collins's portrayal of the condition was indebted less to 
gothicism than to the medical topicality of the condition. Henry James believed that Mary 
Elizabeth Braddon followed in the footsteps of Wilkie Collins when she explored in her fiction 
`those most mysterious of mysteries, the mysteries which are at our own front doors'. 
28 There was 
no doubt, James believed, that such mysteries `were infinitely the more terrible' than those in, for 
example, gothic fiction. By its very nature, the affliction of monomania and the social and 
psychological world which the monomaniac inhabited, was as familiar and terrifying as the 
24 Dickens to W. H. Wills, 8 February, 1853. The Letters of Charles Dickens, 7, p. 23. In its place 
Collins wrote `Gabriel's Marriage', a story set in Brittany about attempted murder and penitence. 
His original story was submitted to Fraser's Magazine where it was published between November and 
December 1855. It was republished in 1859 in Queen of Hearts as ̀ Brother Griffith's Story of Mad 
Monkton'. 
25 Dickens to W. H. Wills, 17 November, 1853. The Letters of Charles Dickens, 7, p. 200. 
26 See also `A Dead Hand' published in Queen of Hearts in 1859. 
27 Esquirol, Mental Maladies, p. 200. 
28 Henry James, ̀ Mary Elizabeth Braddon', Nation, I (November 1865), pp. 593-4 (p. 593). 
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sensation novel's combination of the beautiful country house and the revelation of its occupants' 
`terrible' secrets. It was just this combination, of the recognisable and the unrecognisable, the real 
and the unthinkable, that reinforced monomania's alluring literary potential to Collins and other 
writers. 
29 
The world he witnessed around him was a preoccupation of Collins and one which he had 
investigated with his second novel, Basil: A Story of Modern Life (1852). In the novel's `Letter of 
Dedication' addressed to Charles James Ward, Collins wrote that in the archives and legends of 
ancient history he had been unable to find another story that held the `romance' so powerfully as 
Antonina (1850). Abandoning a story residing on a 'classical foundation' he described how the 
temptation overtook him to write a story of his own time which would instantly address the 
`readiest sympathies' of the `largest number of readers'. In an often-quoted passage, Collins set 
forth his vision of what the `light of Reality' might achieve: 
My idea was that the more of the Actual I could garner up as a text to speak from, the 
more certain I might feel of the genuineness and value of the Ideal which was sure to 
spring out of it. Fancy and Imagination, Grace and Beauty, all those qualities which are to 
the work of Art what scent and colour are to the flower, can only grow towards Heaven 
by taking root in earth. After all, is not the noblest poetry of prose fiction the poetry of 
every-day truth? 
30 
Such a project, as Collins was aware, demanded the violation of `some of the conventionalities of 
sentimental fiction'. 
31 When he sought to `excite the suspense or pity of the reader' it was not to 
the exotic, romantic, or uncanny that he turned, but rather to the `most ordinary' street sounds 
and events such as riding on the tram. He believed that such additions to `truth' reinforced the 
tragic power of Basil `as no artifices of mere writing possibly could [... ] let them be ever so 
32 
cunningly introduced, by ever so crafty a hand'. 
Unlike Antonina, Bäsil was a project in which he sought to `exhibit human life' and the 
`truth of Nature'. To this end he defended its scenes of misery and crime. When they were `turned 
to plainly and purely moral purpose'33 they could be neither `useless' nor `immoral' in their effect 
on the reader. To readers who 
29 On Charlotte Bronte's employment of monomania, for example, see Shuttleworth, Charlotte 
Bronte, pp. 49-56. 
30 Wilkie Collins, Basil: A Story of Modern Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. xxxv- 
xxxvi. 
31 Collins, Basil, p. xxxvi. 
32 Collins, Basil, p. xxxvi. 
33 Collins, Basil, p. xxxviii. 
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denied that it is the novelist's vocation to do more than merely amuse them; who shrink 
from all honest and serious reference [... ] who see covert implications where nothing is 
implied, and improper allusions where nothing improper is alluded to [... ] to those 
persons I should consider it loss of time, and worse, to offer any further explanation of my 
motives. 
34 
An immediate question arises when Collins's comments are interpreted in the context of `Mad 
Monkton'. Why did Collins chose to conflate the gothic genre, which one might consider to be an 
effective `artifice' of writing, with the realistic `truth' represented by the theory of monomania, 
especially when the `fancy' and imaginative work demanded by the reader from gothicism was 
undercut by the threatening and very real nature of partial insanity? One explanation might he in 
the increasing secularisation, from the early nineteenth century, of the gothic genre. Gothic 
fictions began to rely less and less on the evocation of horror through depravity and satanic forces 
and more on the increasing effectiveness of evil created through `a defect of character, misapplied 
intelligence, a temporary lapse of will, a negative environment, or simply an inappropriate social 
or political context'. 
35 
Coming to express a psychological rather than a spiritual state of horror, the `artifice' of 
gothicism and the world of the supernatural in many ways complimented monomania in the 
exploration of the sinister terrors lurking in the mind of Alfred Monkton. They collectively serve 
in their precipitation of `narrative dis-equilibrium'36 to signify a departure from the rational world 
of reason and calculation. Yet the end to which Collins's conflates the two frames of reference 
produced both unexpected and unsettling effects and it was against these effects that Dickens 
desired to protect his readers. 
iii. Fragile boundaries 
In Victorian Renovations of the Novel (1998), Suzanne Keen examines the significance in 
nineteenth-century novels of what she terms narrative annexes. Such annexes, entered through the 
crossing of a boundary, are border regions in which the narrative suddenly shifts from the expected 
to the unexpected, from the probable to the improbable, through a change of genre and an altered 
setting. The events contained within narrative annexes formatively change the direction that the 
34 Collins, Basil, pp. xxxvii-xxxix. 
35 Marilyn Gaull, English Romanticism: The Human Context (New York and London: Norton, 
1988), p. 247. 
36 Tammis Elise Thomas, `Masquerade Liberties and Female Power in Le Fanu's Carrnilla', in The 
Haunted Mind. - The Supernatural in Victorian Literature, ed. by Elton E. Smith and Robert Haas 
(London: The Scarecrow Press, 1999), pp. 39-65 (p. 40). 
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plot takes. Keen argues that annexes were sites in which novelists could challenge conventional 
cultural and literary norms and extend the representational range and generic flexibility of 
narrative fiction. 
37 Narrative annexes were used not only to break the norms and conventions of 
carefully-wrought fictional worlds but also to address cultural anxieties, particularly those 
preoccupations kept out of the novel by the limits of generic convention, the prohibitions of 
contemporary critics or by shared ideas about the boundaries of representation. 
38 
Though Keen focuses on the relationship between narrative annexes and gender, sexuality 
and social class, the way in which they represent a response to the limits placed on fictional 
representation offers an important way of thinking about Collins's short story, and especially his 
construction of a complicated relationship between reason and irrationality. `Mad Monkton' is 
informed by two genres, gothicism and sensationalised realism. Action takes place in two central 
settings (the world of Neapolitan society and the `annex' represented by the distant states outside 
Naples). A boundary is literally crossed and the narrator's experiences at the dark and dangerous 
convent dramatically change the direction that the plot takes. Yet the importance here lies less in 
the way in which the story conforms in most senses to the features of Keen's `narrative annex', 
and more in the way in which the story can be read as a radical critique of exactly those boundaries 
of reception and representation that Dickens so rigorously policed. 
The alarm that Dickens was so anxious to prevent was exactly what Collins desired to 
effect in exposing the fragile boundary between sanity and insanity in his treatment of 
monomania. Most curious and most interesting, though, is the way in which Collins consciously 
subverts the opposition, maintained by Keen and other theorists of nineteenth-century fiction, 
between realism as representative of conventionality, order and control and alternative realities 
(reflected within narrative annexes) as representative of excess, disorder and the unconventional. 
The creative play of energies and tensions that Collins constructs between the genre of gothic and 
the realism attendant upon psychiatric theories of insanity are effective and powerful in keeping the 
reader in a state of nervous anticipation. Yet ironically, it is his realistic treatment of monomania, 
his subverting of psychological borderlines, through which Collins deliberately violates the 
boundaries of fictional representation and challenges the range and generic flexibility of narrative 
fiction as a whole. The `alternative realm' of the `narrative annex' is here manifested not, as one 
might expect, in gothic conventions but in partial insanity, in the mind; and its power is 
reinforced by the way in which the narrator, and the reader, slowly succumb to the obsessions 
Alfred Monkton's monomania generates. 
37 Suzanne Keen, Victorian Renovations of the Novel. - Narrative Annexes and the Boundaries of 
Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 1-4. 
38 Keen, Victorian Renovations, p. 9. 
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Both Dickens and Collins repeatedly made reference to the power that fictional narratives 
held to produce in their readers strong emotional effects such as anger, fear, disbelief, sorrow, pity 
and sympathy. Dickens believed wholeheartedly in the true power of sentimentality to effect change 
or promote reform. As his letters to King and jolly suggest, Dickens was not hesitant about 
specifying the types of narrative welcomed by Household Words. As Ackroyd writes, both as a 
writer and an editor Dickens `always knew precisely the demands and expectations of the public 
and at no stage in his career did he deliberately or knowingly thwart them'. 
39 In contrast, Collins 
lost no time in discarding sentimentality (in his eyes an `artifice of mere writing') in the aid of 
reality and truth. Collins offered in the Dedication in Basil a strident defence of his position as a 
writer of truths about the human condition whatever effect they might incur. 
Though they each felt themselves and their particular brand of art and instruction to be 
answerable to the claims of their reading public, what is most revealing in regard to `Mad 
Monkton' and Dickens's response to it are the opposing ways in which they each conceived of their 
`responsibility' to the reading public. One might conjecture that Dickens found Collins's 
depiction of hereditary insanity simply irresponsible. Instead of using gothic conventions to 
represent, albeit imaginatively and creatively, disorder, it was the reality of the dangers posed by 
monomania that allowed readers the freedom to make associations between fiction and fact that 
were potentially dangerous, not only to themselves in terms of exacerbating anxiety or 
dangerously reinforcing ignorance, but to the pecuniary demands of the journals in which such 
storylines were published. While the maintenance of shared interpretive systems and the 
reinforcing of the boundaries of emotional reception were all important to Dickens, it was such 
boundaries and strictures that Collins so powerfully and deliberately disrupted with his treatment 
of monomania. 
The fact that monomania was a form of partial insanity, existing on the borderline 
between madness and sanity, was important to Collins. From Dickens's expressions of concern, it 
is apparent that in his appropriation of monomania the conductor of Household Words felt that 
Collins was upsetting what he perceived of as a vital relationship between writer and reader. 
Apprehension about the violation of boundaries of emotional reception was not limited to fictional 
representations of monomania and the way the disease entity was employed to negotiate the 
problematic relationship between representation and emotionally-grounded identification. As 
chapters one and two have demonstrated, the use and abuse of monomania in medico-legal trials 
similarly elicited anxious concern in the newspaper press. The papers covering the trials of 
Nottidge and McNaughten were equally attuned to the power of words, images and associations to 
influence readers and consciously sought to challenge, manipulate or reinforce the public's attitude 
39 Ackroyd, Dickens, p. 215. See also Fred Kaplan, Sacred Tears: Sentimentality in Victorian Literature 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 39-40. 
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not only to Nottidge and McNaughten but also to the disease entity of monomania. As the 
following chapter will demonstrate, monomania was not alone in provoking public anxiety and in 
centring unwanted attention upon the profession of mental science. Addressing some of the 
concerns explored here, the focus of chapter four will shift from a consideration of the problems 
raised by the introduction of monomania to established nosologies of mental disorder to a 
consideration of the problems attendant on moral insanity. Like monomania, moral insanity was a 
`new' disease. It was formative in the renovation of accepted psychiatric nosologies but its 
legitimacy was hotly contested. Far from entrenching the status and authority of the psychological 
physician in the care and treatment of the lunatic, it was a condition which was perceived, like 
monomania, to protect the guilty from due retribution and incarcerate in lunatic asylums innocent 
though eccentric individuals. 
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Chapter Four 
The Gordian Knot: Entanglements in nineteenth-century lunacy reform 
A writer in The Times in 1858 described the new county and borough asylums constructed under 
the 1845 Act as sites in which `brutality and violence are unknown' and in which `everything is 
done to cheer and comfort the unfortunate inmates [... ] by every little stratagem which the most 
thoughtful humanity can devise'. 
1 And a visitor to the Sussex County Lunatic Asylum (opened in 
July 1859) observed that the replacement of loopholes and gratings with glazed windows was an 
innovation worthy of particular praise. While the country views the asylum's windows commanded 
were aesthetically-pleasing, of more significance was the way that windows had been constructed so 
that `the safety of the inmate is secured without the idea of confinement being conveyed'. 
2 Though 
reserving criticism for the overcrowding that he witnessed in Bethlem, Colney Hatch and Hanwell 
asylums, Andrew Wynter's comments on the ameliorative transformation that had taken place in 
the site of the asylum and in the care and treatment of the lunatic were impressive: 
Not only have the old methods of treatment been abandoned, but many changes have been 
made to render the houses for the insane less repulsive to the eye. Thousands of pounds 
have been spent in replacing the dungeon-like apertures [... ] with light-framed windows, 
undarkened by dismal bars [... ] with the improved appearance of the building, the harsh 
title of keeper has given place to that of attendant, and the madhouse has become the 
asylum. 
3 
Yet despite the abolition of whips, chains, and manacles and the replacement of `dungeon- 
like apertures' with glazed windows, the popular perception of the lunatic asylum as a site of 
brutality, secrecy and danger was difficult to dispel. Similarly, though Wynter applauded the 
pivotal role that the medical man had played in replacing mechanical and physical restraint with a 
humane system of moral management by comparing him to a `ministering angel carrying out the 
all powerful law of love', 
4 
the psychological physician remained an object of deep apprehension. To 
the dismay of the lunatic asylums' advocates, in the summer of 1858 these perceptions were 
1 The Times, 28 July, 1858, p. 9. 
2 `Sussex Lunatic Asylum', JPMMP, 12 (1859), p. 463. 
3 Andrew Wynter, Curiosities of Civilization (London: Robert Hardwicke, 1861), p. 151. First 
published as `Lunatic Asylums' in the Quarterly Review, 101 (April 1857), pp. 353-93. 
4 Wynter, Curiosities, pp. 157-158. When he visited Hanwell asylum in 1848, the Rev. Charles Davies 
was pleasantly surprised by its `bright wards', `buxom attendants' and `frequent jinks', all factors 
which contributed to the physical and moral amelioration of the `sad condition' of lunatics. See 
Charles Maurice Davies, Mystic London; or, Phases of Occult Life in the British Metropolis (New York: 
Lovell, Adam, Wesson, [1875]), pp. 40-41. 
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dramatically validated when newspapers reported several cases of wrongful confinement in lunatic 
asylums. Fostered by newspaper editorials condemning the laxity of the lunacy laws and 
questioning the authority which had been accorded to the physician, widespread panic ensued. In 
order to allay the public's anxiety and address the concerns of an increasingly vocal lay-lunacy law 
reform movement, in February 1859 a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed 
to examine the Operation of the Acts and Regulations for the Care and Treatment of Lunatics and 
their Property. 
Chaired by the Home Secretary, Spencer Walpole, the committee examined a range of 
witnesses over the course of three parliamentary sessions. They were questioned on the medical 
treatment of lunatics (chancery, private and pauper), the physical environment of asylums (private, 
county and borough asylums and single houses and workhouses), the conduct and qualifications of 
attendants, visitation guidelines, certification procedures and legal safeguards. In their final Report 
published in July 1860, Walpole stated that though their inquiry had been comprehensive, they had 
found no evidence to substantiate claims that wrongful confinement in private lunatic asylums was 
widespread. 
5 
The 1859-60 Select Committee inquiry has not been the subject of sustained critical 
attention. 
6 An explanation for this lies perhaps in the committee's conclusions that the anxieties 
of the public about the prospect of wrongful incarceration in lunatic asylums were unfounded. Yet 
in exploring the construction, dissemination and response to such fears, the debates engendered by 
the inquiry take on a significance hitherto overlooked. This chapter will examine three specific 
concerns debated in the hearings and discussed at length in newspapers and journals: the ease with 
which eccentricity could be confused with moral insanity, the threat to the liberty of the subject 
posed by medical intervention, and the role played by `public opinion' and `popular notions' of the 
lunatic, the asylum, and the psychological physician. It will become apparent that these issues 
played a formative role in exacerbating the popular perception of medical impropriety and 
entrenching the `idea' of the asylum as a site of illegal detention. The anxieties and debates about 
wrongful confinement in 1858-59-60 were in many respects similar to those that attended the 
Nottidge trial of 1849. There was, however, one difference. Amidst the flurry of articles, essays 
5 Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Lunatics; Together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendix; PP 1860 (495) XXII, 349, p. viii. 
The final Report, published in July, coincided with the serialization of Wilkie Collins's The Woman 
in White, no doubt to his gratification. 
6 ParryJones, for example, ignores the importance of the debates about liberty and scientific 
authority that the inquiry set in motion. Though Scull notes the concern with pauper lunatics, his 
treatment of the inquiry is equally insufficient. See Parry-Jones, The Trade in Lunacy, p. 26, Scull, 
The Most Solitary of Afflictions, p. 307, and Scull, Museums of Madness, p. 212. 
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and editorials on the inquiry in the medical and popular press, J. S. Mill published On Liberty 
(1859). 
This chapter will demonstrate the extent to which Mill's doctrine of liberty informed the 
controversy over the existence of wrongful confinement by examining both testimony from the 
select committee hearings and a range of texts commenting on the hearings and discussing moral 
insanity and eccentricity. Seeking to make sense of the fragile relationship between authority, 
individuality and society, Mill embraced a constructive paradigm: the `only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant [... ] 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign'.? Advocating the 
individual's right to liberty of thought, feeling and action, and expressing a mistrust of authority, 
the principles Mill espoused in On Liberty bolstered the arguments of those seeking to condemn 
the `overweening' and coercive threat that physicians posed to the rich diversity of individualism. 
In focusing attention on the question of who held the legitimate right to speak authoritatively on 
behalf of the individual, and how such a right should be defined, his treatise formatively contributed 
to concerns about the profession of mental science in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Yet at the same time, Mill's denunciation of `public opinion' and his criticism of the 
credulity of the public was couched in a language strikingly similar to the medical condemnation of 
the role public opinion played in exacerbating suspicion of the lunatic asylum and fear of its 
arbiters. Because no specific mention is made of lunatics in On Liberty, and because Mill asserted 
that the liberty of children, barbarians and those incapable of looking after themselves should be 
subject to interference, it remains unclear whether he believed that the psychological physicians 
posed a threat to the liberties of the lunatic. 
8 While it is true that Mill never wholly denounces or 
sanctions medical interference (a striking omission in light of his contribution to medico-legal 
debates about wrongful confinement in the summer of 1858), of greater significance is the way in 
which his conspicuous ambivalence about medical interference acted to complicate rather than 
7 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. by J. M. Robson, 33 
vols (Buffalo and Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 18, pp. 223-224. First published by 
John Parker in 1859. Further page references are contained within the text. Mill's denunciation of the 
social conformism displayed by judges, jurors and witnesses in civil lunacy inquisitions was used by 
Thomas Szasz to declare Mill one of the earliest critics of psychiatric paternalism and psychiatry as a 
dangerous form of social control. See Michael J. Clark, `Law, Liberty and Psychiatry in Victorian 
Britain: an Historical Survey and Commentary, c. 1840-c. 1890', in Proceedings of the Ist European 
Congress on the History of Psychiatry and Mental Health Care, ed. by Leonie de Goei and Joost 
Vijselaar (Rotterdam: Erasmus Publishing, 1993), pp. 187-193 (p. 187). 
8 Clark attributes Mill's `puzzling omissions and equivocations' on the issue of liberty and 
involuntary hospitalization to a ̀ conflict in his own mind' between a mistrust of physicians' abuse of 
individual liberty and a tacit recognition that not everyone was capable of looking after themselves 
and enjoying the benefits of individual liberty. Clark, `Law, liberty and psychiatry', pp. 191-192. 
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clarify the legislative boundaries between medical intervention and the civil liberties of individuals 
as they were debated in the hearings and in the press. The way in which Mill's equivocal position 
informed the wider debate, especially in regard to eccentricity and `quasi-insanity', is an issue that 
has not been sufficiently interrogated. Yet in the context of the courtroom, where it lay with juries 
to ultimately determine the contested boundary between partial forms of insanity and eccentricity 
and thus consign an alleged lunatic to the asylum or secure his or her liberty, this is an important 
factor which was to remain of concern throughout the nineteenth century. 
There are four sections in this chapter. The first section details the cases of wrongful 
confinement sensationally reported in the press in the summer of 1858. The concerns raised by the 
cases, all of which centred attention on partial insanity, led to the select committee investigation 
of 1859-60. The second section turns to the problematic relationship between moral insanity and 
eccentricity and explores what constituted a preoccupation of all concerned: individuals suffering 
from `quasi' forms of insanity. This section will focus on the acrimonious medico-legal debates 
surrounding moral insanity and will trace the arguments employed to denigrate both the disease 
and its defenders. The third section will examine the medical response to public condemnation and 
will focus on how public opinion itself became an object of controversy. In seeking to deflect 
unwanted attention from their own profession, physicians were quick to condemn the role played 
by journals and newspapers in heightening anxiety about wrongful confinement. The last section 
turns to Mill's On Liberty and examines the importance he accords to eccentricity. By situating 
Mill's concerns about liberty and authority in the framework of contemporaneous debates about 
partial insanity, this chapter will argue that quasi or partial forms of insanity formatively 
complicated and undermined the legal, medical and social borderlines separating sanity from 
insanity. Furthermore, it will seek to identify the ways that debates about moral insanity, like 
monomania, entrenched a concern not only with the threats posed by the physician to the alleged 
lunatic, but with representations and definitions of authority, liberty, protection and safety. 
i. 1858 
Physicians believed that individuals who exhibited `no positive hallucination of any kind' were 
paradoxically far more dangerous to society than maniacally deranged lunatics because of the ease 
with which their `exalted state of the passions and sentiments' and their inability to fulfil their 
`duties towards themselves or society' were interpreted by families and friends as evidence of a 
harmless eccentricity rather than of insanity. For this reason, they were not automatically the 
object of medical scrutiny. Yet to physicians it was precisely these individuals who required 
treatment in lunatic asylums. As a writer for the British Medical Journal put it in 1859: 
We believe that hundreds of insane persons of the most mischievous character, most 
mischievous, because their unsoundness of mind runs on sound tracks, and is therefore less 
likely to be guarded against - will, in consequence of the known tendencies of juries in 
104 
such cases to "cast the mad-doctors, " be allowed to run their lamentable course, and to 
spread misery and anguish around them. 
9 
It was this scenario which led to the confinement of Rosina Bulwer-Lytton, the wife of the 
Colonial Secretary and novelist in Inverness Lodge, a private asylum in Brentford run by John 
Conolly's brother-in-law, Robert Gardiner-Hill. Since 1836 Rosina had been separated from her 
husband. While he was amassing both wealth and prestige, she was forced to live on what she 
considered a meagre monthly allowance of £400. In retaliation she regularly published novels in 
which Bulwer-Lytton was the `instantly recognizable villain'. 
10 By the late 1850s, she was 
convinced that her husband had employed men to observe her actions and so discover a reason to 
challenge the payment of her allowance. In private and in public, she took all opportunities to 
embarrass him, verbally berating him and sending him letters adorned with obscenities. 
In the summer of 1858 a general election was called. To secure his nomination as a Tory 
member, Bulwer-Lytton was to attend a public meeting in Hertford. Seeing in the meeting an 
ideal opportunity to condemn her husband's conduct, she arrived with posters and made a long 
speech on the hustings. Bulwer-Lytton saw in her complaints and accusations, and in the `misery 
and anguish' she was spreading, the seeds of mental disorder. He called in six physicians (including 
John Conolly) to examine her. Diagnosed as insane, she was removed against her will on 22 June 
to Inverness Lodge. Released on grounds of ill health on 17 July, she took every opportunity to 
affirm her sanity and accuse her husband and the doctors of unparalleled vindictiveness. The 
description of her three-week stay at Inverness Lodge in her autobiography, A Blighted Life 
(composed in 1866 but not published until 1880), was filled with indignation and contempt. She 
compared her husband to `CAESAR BORGIA', 
11 
condemned Inverness Lodge as a ̀ living 
tomb', 
12 
and described Conolly as a ̀ vile old' man who would `sell his own mother [... ] for 
money'. 
13 Considering the political stature of her husband, it was unsurprising that the 
`ignominious family war' attracted lurid publicity. On one point, a writer in The Times felt that 
9 British Medical Journal, (1859), p. 568. Hereafter abbreviated as BMJ. 
10 Richard D. Altick, The Presence of the Present - Topics of the Day in the Victorian Novel 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1991), p. 546. 
11 Rosina Lytton, A Blighted Life (London: The London Publishing Office, 1880), p. 45. 
12 Lytton, Blighted Life, p. 42. 
13 Lytton, Blighted Life, p. 39. 
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the public were in agreement: ̀ The power at present exercised under the lunacy law is dangerous to 
social liberty'. 
14 
Proving no less attractive to critics of private asylums, the second expose of illegal 
confinement reported in 1858 was that of a Mrs Mary Jane Turner, the wife of Charles Turner, the 
Official Assignee in the Liverpool Court of Bankruptcy. Turner believed that her husband had been 
unfaithful. In a manner similar to Rosina Bulwer-Lytton's verbal denunciations of her husband, 
she had taken every opportunity to embarrass him, charging him with `undue familiarity with other 
women'. 
15 As The Times sympathetically acknowledged, when she was ̀ kept apart from her 
husband', she seemed to `have conducted herself without any marked impropriety'. Yet on the 
advice of physicians, who observed a ̀ want of collectedness'16 in her actions, she was committed to 
Acomb House, a private lunatic asylum near York run by Dr J. W. Metcalfe. Subjected to brutal 
treatment by her `keepers' and prevented from communicating with the `outer world', Turner made 
several unsuccessful attempts to escape. It was only after the intervention of her solicitor and the 
subsequent initiation of an inquisition that she was found to be of sound mind by the jury and 
released from the asylum. The case was notoriously known as the-Acomb House scandal. While 
exhibiting relief at the successful outcome of the case, The Times remained cautious: 
We cannot but entertain a fearful suspicion that the administration of Private Lunatic 
Asylums is carelessly conducted, and that many a sad tragedy which is never spoken of in 
the outer world occurs in these dismal abodes. 
17 
The third scandal of 1858, again involving John Conolly, was that of a Mr. Lawrence 
Ruck. After drunkenly threatening his wife, Conolly signed a certificate committing Ruck to 
Moorcroft House, the institution where Nottidge had been wrongfully incarcerated in 1846. Soon 
sobering up, Ruck secured an inquisition in lunacy after which, like that of Turner, a jury found 
him sane. In the trial for damages Ruck instituted against Conolly upon his release from the 
private asylum, heard in the Court of the Queen's Bench in late June, 1859, the proprietor of the 
asylum, Dr Stillwell, admitted that he had fabricated the asylum casebook. This was not the worst 
of the misdemeanours sensationally reported in the press. When Conolly examined Ruck it was in 
14 The Times, 15 July, 1858, p. 4. 
15 The Times, 28 July, 1858, p. 9. 
16 ̀ Commission of Lunacy on Mrs. Turner', JMS, 5 (1858-59), p. 118. 
17 The Times, 28 July, 1858, p. 9. As a witness in the Select Committee inquiry, Lord Shaftesbury 
pointed out that Turner had never filed an official complaint to the visiting commissioners in lunacy. 
He believed that the press had exacerbated the proportions of the case. See Report of the Select 
Committee of the House of Commons on Lunatics; Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, 
Minutes of Evidence and Appendix; PP 1859 1st sess. (204) III, 75, p. 17. 
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the presence of a second physician, Dr Richard Barnett. This was illegal. Visiting physician to 
Moorcroft House since 1853, a position which gave him a salary and a percentage of the patient's 
fees, Conolly had also received a commission from Ruck's committal. Both charges were serious and 
despite his attempt to defend himself from the damning admissions, judgment was given in favour 
of Ruck. Conolly was forced to pay £500 damages. 
18 
The cases of Rosina Bulwer-Lytton, Mary Jane Turner and Lawrence Ruck were given 
extensive coverage in the press. Almost daily, in leaders and letters to the editor, the abuse of 
physicians' privileged authority (such as Stillwell's falsifying of the asylum's records and the 
`disgraceful conduct' of Metcalfe), the brutality of the asylum keepers, the ineffectual safeguard 
represented by the visits conducted by Commissioners in Lunacy, and the laxity of lunacy laws 
were subjected to minute analysis and debate. 
19 Despite strenuous denials of impropriety and a 
rigorous defence of their actions and intentions, the proprietors of private lunatic asylums like 
Gardiner-Hill, Metcalfe, and Stillwell, and physicians (like Conolly) who signed detainment 
certificates, were fighting a losing battle against public opinion and the widespread. belief that the 
reformed system of asylum care did not prevent the illegal detainment in private lunatic asylums of 
sane but eccentric or socially-inept individuals. Journalists and `lay-lunacy law reformers' remained 
convinced that physicians held too great a power to `put any man who is a little original into an 
asylum'. 
20 
ii. moral insanity and eccentricity 
Though the Select Committee hearings of 1859-60 were concerned with a multitude of issues 
regarding the care and treatment of the lunatic, lay-lunacy law reformers, newspapers and medical 
journals commenting on the hearings were clearly preoccupied by the particular problems presented 
by the `vast body' of men and women who suffered from a state of `quasi-insanity'. Without 
medical intervention, physicians argued, such individuals were liable to contract `foolish and 
improvident marriages', `recklessly [squander] their property' and be singled out for pecuniary gain 
by `designing domestics and unprincipled knaves'. 
21 While the medical community were keen to 
argue that this scenario was far more ruinous and embarrassing than the diagnosis of insanity 
(especially to families who already suffered from `social disadvantages'), civil libertarians argued in 
18 Masters of Bedlam, p. 76. See also The Times, 24 August, 1858. Conolly explained in his testimony 
before the Select Committee that he did not know that Barnett was a medical man. 
19 See, for example, The Times, 4,19,20,21,23, August, 1858. 
20 `The Parliamentary Inquiry into Popular Notions concerning the Treatment of Lunatics', 
JPMMP, 13 (1860), p. 50. 
21 JMS, 5 (1858-59), p. 66. These images hold a striking resemblance to those of Conolly in his 
defense of the incarceration of Nottidge. 
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contrast that such individuals were merely harmless eccentrics whose civil liberties were being 
undermined by the diagnosis of quasi-insanity. 
Sensing the depth of public outrage and anxiety at the cases of wrongful confinement 
sensationally reported in the summer of 1858 (especially Lytton's case), Walpole instituted the 
inquiry both to secure the `proper protection' of the lunatic and to secure the `interests of the 
public' by giving voice to `popular opinions'. 
22 In equating the `public' with `ignorant' lay-lunacy 
law reformers, and in equating `popular opinions' with a concern for the alleged lunatic's civil 
liberties, physicians and asylum proprietors were angered by this second motive. They believed that 
the `perverse, single-eyed attention to the civil rights of lunatics, as contradistinguished from, and 
to the neglect of their medical rights detracted valuable time and attention from what should have 
been the sole concern of the inquiry: the medical treatment of the lunatic. 
23 Though Walpole 
recognised that in order to secure the patient's right to protective treatment it was first necessary 
to assure the public of the medical authority of physicians and to convince them that the lunatic 
asylum was the most appropriate site of care, physicians felt that in exacerbating fear of the asylum 
and suspicion of the physician, lunacy-law reformers were acting irresponsibly. 
The medical community's concern at the effectiveness with which lay-reformers were 
rousing public opinion against the asylum and its physicians was compounded by the increasingly 
wide-spread claim that moral treatment could be performed `equally by an unprofessional as by a 
professional man'. 
24 Because physicians were therefore seen by some as ̀ ornamental [rather] than 
essential members of an asylum staff'25 it was not surprising that `the importance of a medical 
attendant is little appreciated, and that the value of medical treatment is little heeded'. 
26 Another 
factor which heightened disillusionment with the asylum was the perception that an increasing 
number of lunatics were not responding to the curative measures of moral treatment. County 
asylums in particular were increasingly understood as being merely `reservoirs for the reception of 
our surplus lunacy! `. 
27 Though Andrew Scull has argued that there was in fact no overall increase 
22 `The New Lunacy Bills', Lancet, (1859) i, p. 420. 
23 `Proposed Legislation in Lunacy', JPMMP, 12 (1859), p. 412. Many physicians believed that the 
Inquiry was, in reality, `not required'. See ̀The Parliamentary Inquiry and Popular Notions 
concerning the Treatment of Lunatics', JPMMP, 13 (1860), p. 46. 
24 John T. Arlidge, On the State of Lunacy and the Legal Provision for the Insane (London: John 
Churchill, 1859), p. 103. Arlidge had been a student of Conolly's and was a former Superintendant of 
St. Luke's Hospital for Lunatics. Scull, The Most Solitary of Afflictions, p. 318. 
25 Arlidge, p. 104. 
26 Arlidge, p. 104. 
27JPMMP, 13 (1860), p. 450. 
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in the pauper insane population, contemporary observers believed that the asylum population was 
increasing. According to the Select Committee Report of 1860, the explanation lay in the 
expansion and improvement of public asylums, the inclusion of previously unsupervised chronic 
cases, an increase in longevity, and a decrease in annual mortality rates. 
28 Yet an equally plausible 
explanation for what was perceived to be an increase in asylum populations can be found not only 
in the increasing desire to `nip lunacy in the bud' through early commitment to asylums (which it 
was hoped would protect both the patient and society from the possible dire consequences of their 
illness29), but in the nosological expansion of categories of lunacy to include quasi-forms of 
insanity. 
As John Charles Bucknill put it, since the mid-1840s `medical science has discovered whole 
realms of lunacy, and the nicer touch of a finikin civilization has shrunk from the contact of 
imperfect fellow-creatures, and thus the manifold receptacles of lunacy are filled to overflow with a 
population more nearly resembling that which is still at large'. 
30 While insanity itself was not a 
focus of concern in the Select Committee hearings, the introduction to medico-legal circles of 
moral insanity played a significant though unspoken role in the debates that the inquiry initiated. 
Particular concern was expressed at the way in which the eccentricities of Lytton and Turner had 
been interpreted as insanity. To civil libertarians, the expansion of psychiatric nosologies and the 
consequent ease with which anti-social behaviors, beliefs and actions could be interpreted as signs 
of insanity was a dangerous development threatening the liberty of the subject. Held directly 
accountable for violating the alleged lunatic's right to civil liberty, the profession of mental science 
was subject to intense scrutiny. The reactions to public mistrust of their authority revealed deep 
fissures within the medical establishment. Not all psychological physicians accepted moral insanity 
as a new disease entity. Contesting its medico-legal efficacy, the debates within the profession 
about quasi-forms of the insanity served to further entrench concern with the profession of mental 
science. 
Born into a family of physicians and a into a rationalist world of psychiatric medicine 
which viewed insanity as incurable, Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) emerged as a pioneer of therapeutic 
techniques. Widely popularised as the physician who dared to strike off the fetters that restrained 
patients in the Bicetre and the Salpetriere, sensationally depicted in Tony Robert-Fleury's 
painting of 1887, ̀ Pinel Freeing the Insane', Pinel's belief in the recuperative power of moral 
management, a treatment regime directed principally at the mind rather than the body, introduced 
the ground-breaking idea that rather than being sinful, criminal or depraved, the lunatic was sick 
28 PP 1860 (495) XXII, 349, p. iii. On slipshod and faulty measures for gathering statistics, see Scull, 
Museums of Madness, p. 226. 
29 McCandless, `"Build! Build! "', p. 554. 
30 Bucknill, Care of the Insane, p. 4. 
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and so might be cured. 
31 Pinel gained much of his early knowledge of insanity in the years leading 
up to the French Revolution while he worked at one of the most famous private sanatoria in Paris, 
the Maison de Sante. As Jan Goldstein has argued, the imminent collapse of the Ancien Regime led 
to the demand for an overhaul of the French medical establishment. The Paris Faculty of Medicine 
were forced to give up the power of decision-making to younger physicians (many of whom were 
friends of Pinel) who were often affiliated with the Royal Society of Medicine. As a result of this 
development, in 1793 Pinel was offered the position of physician -in-chief at the newly-medicalised 
section for the insane at the Bicetre. Two years later he also accepted a position at the Salpetriere. 
Gradually, Pinel's philosophical interests heightened his fascination with the non- 
intellectual motivations of human behavior (the affective and passional aberrations in mental 
disorder) and he was thus part of a ̀ broader movement in which art, psychology, philosophy and 
medicine came increasingly to express the non-rational aspects of human activity'. 
32 However, 
acclaim at the success of his treatment was marred by suspicion about the methods he employed to 
diagnose insanity. Central to the criticisms directed at Pinel, especially by the Paris Faculty of 
Medicine, was his use of observation to detect the nature and trace the development of lunacy. To 
his critics, Pinel's advocacy of observation as a scientific tool affiliated him with a group derided by 
elitist pre-revolutionary medical bodies: charlatans and lay concierges of lunatic asylums. Yet Pinel 
was explicit about the knowledge to be gained from his unaccredited counterparts. In contrast to 
many established physicians (who seldom had so varied a knowledge and so treated all patients with 
the same techniques), their sound judgment based on daily observation provided them with an 
unsurpassed breadth of knowledge. 
33 
Observation was to play a formative role in Pinel's recognition that insanity was not 
solely grounded in the derangement of reason and thus was not, as universally believed, an 
intellectual disorder. Though he found himself `not a little surprized [sic] to find many maniacs 
who at no period gave evidence of any lesion of the understanding', 
34 he was conclusive about the 
31 Goldstein, Console, p. 65. On Pinel see Casmir Pinel, `Pinel: A Biographical Study', JPMMP, 13 
(1860), pp. 184-205. See also Sir Aubrey Lewis, The State of Psychiatry: Essays and Addresses (New 
York: Science House, Inc., 1967), pp. 9-17, and Dora B. Weiner, `Le geste de Pinel': The History of a 
Psychiatric Myth', in Discovering the History of Psychiatry, ed. by Mark S. Micale and Roy Porter 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 232-247. 
32 Eric T. Carlson and Norman Dain, `The Meaning of Moral Insanity', Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine, 36 (1962), pp. 130-140 (p. 132). 
33 Goldstein, Console, p. 74. 
34 Philippe Pinel, A Treatise on Insanity in which are contained the Principles of a New and More 
Practical Nosology of Maniacal Disorders, trans. by D. D. Davis (Sheffield: W. Todd, 1806), p. 150. 
First published in 1801 (with the article as the first chapter) as Traite medico philosophie sur 
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existence of a `nervous malady' in which there existed no alteration in active faculties or in the 
understanding but rather a mania without delirium which was ̀ excited by intense or vehement 
passions; by exalted and furious enthusiasm, or by whatever strong emotions that may originate in 
fanaticism or chimerical delusions' (p. 156) . Because of its striking singularity, the condition he 
titled manie sans delire constituted for Pinel a category of insanity which deserved to be 
interpreted as clinically distinct from melancholia, dementia, idiotism, and mania with delirium. 
Like his student Esquirol, Pinel felt that there existed, he argued, ̀ a want of proper terms, 
to express certain facts, and to describe, with a suitable degree of minuteness, the various lesions of 
the intellectual and active faculties'(p. 135). He was dissatisfied with the predominance of `general 
expressions [like `mental derangement'] [... ] however suitable and comprehensive' because in most 
instances, ̀ they are far from being the result of accurate observations and experiences. (p. 134) He 
believed that the established classificatory system was both limiting and inaccurate and had thus 
become wholly inadequate to cope with the recognition of new forms of insanity. As evidenced by 
the observations of Pinel, the rational, intellectualist understanding of mental illness had become 
so far removed from the recognition of emotional and behavioral impairment that it had become, 
relatively speaking, extraneous. Pinel's belief that mental derangement could exist without any 
evidence of a lesion of the understanding was as radical as his introduction of a therapeutic regime 
of moral management and contributed to a fundamentally new way of thinking about mental 
illness and its appropriate treatment. 
35 
When Pinel's manie sans delire was introduced to England by the English ethnologist and 
psychiatrist, James Cowles Prichard (1786-1848) in his Treatise on Insanity (1835), the condition 
which he termed `moral insanity' similarly produced `a profound sensation in the legal and 
psychological world'. 
36 Just as Pinel's recognition of a form of insanity grounded in emotional 
rather than intellectual aberrations was met with scepticism by the French psychiatric profession, 
so too was moral insanity received by English physicians with suspicion. As with manie sans delire 
in France, moral insanity initiated a series of debates which developed into a battle of authority 
between the advocates of emotionally-grounded mental aberration (grounded on observation) and 
the defenders of insanity as a theoretically-grounded intellectual impairment. 
Judging from his laudatory dedication to Esquirol in his 1835 Treatise, Prichard admired 
the theoretical minutiae of his French contemporary's concept of monomania. Prichard was 
particularly indebted to Esquirol's division of monomania into three sub-divisions: intellectual 
l'alienation mentale, ou la manie, with an expanded edition appearing in 1809. Further page references 
are contained within the text. 
35 George Frederick Drinka, The Birth of Neurosis - Myth, Malady, and the Victorians (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 41. 
36 D. Hack Tuke, Prichard and Symonds, p. 1. 
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insanity (based on illusions, hallucinations and delusions), affective insanity or manie raisonnante 
(in which the affections were perverted and the character of the individual altered), and instinctive 
insanity (a lesion of the will marked by destructive impulses which drew a patient away from his or 
her accustomed course of actions to the commission of acts which his or her conscience rebuked). 
Simultaneously defined against Esquirol's `intellectual' monomania and allied to Esquirol's second 
and third sub-divisions of monomania, `affective' and `instinctive' insanity, moral insanity was a 
`morbid perversion of the feelings, affections, and active powers, without any illusion or erroneous 
conviction impressed on the understanding'. 
37 Displayed solely in the state of one's feelings, 
affections, temper, and in the habits and conduct of the individual, moral insanity was a mental 
disorder in which the understanding, or reason, remained intact and the `intellectual faculties [... ] 
sustained little or no damage'(p. 4). 
Unlike mania (in which the understanding was indisputably deranged), and unlike 
monomania (in which a delusive or erroneous belief was impressed upon the mind leading to a false 
conviction on a sole topic), moral insanity was an instinctive disorder marked by the depravity or 
perversion of the `moral and active principles of the mind' and by the impairment of `the power of 
self-government'. Many cases of moral insanity, Prichard argued, featured an ̀ eccentricity of 
conduct, singular and absurd habits, [and] a propensity to perform the common actions of life in a 
different way from that usually practised-(p. 23). Though often incapable of conducting himself 
`with decency and propriety in the business of life'(p. 4), the morally insane individual often 
displayed ingenuity in justifying their `singular, wayward, and eccentric' actions'(p. 12). Yet 
despite their cunning, it remained possible for skilled physicians to detect the presence of moral 
insanity by observing the precise nature of their `decay of social affections', their `unusual 
expression of strong feelings' and their `thoughtless and extravagant conduct'(p. 19). 
Like monomania, which could degenerate into its theoretical opposite, mania, it was 
difficult to define moral insanity because a considerable proportion of morally insane individuals 
had tendencies not only towards gloom and sorrow but also to `an opposite condition of prenatural 
excitement [... ] [in which the patient is] always in high spirits, active and boisterous, full of 
projects and enterprises'(p. 19). While potentially symptomatic of moral insanity, such attributes 
could equally indicate merely an individualistic and eccentric personality. Because ̀the varieties of 
moral insanity are perhaps as numerous as the modifications of feeling or passion in the human 
mind'(p. 17), the dangers of mistaking socially-deviant and socially-inept behaviors, including 
criminality and eccentricity, was more than apparent to Prichard. Though he acknowledged in his 
tract on insanity and jurisprudence published in 1842 that it was often difficult to `pronounce, 
with certainty, as to the presence or absence of moral insanity, or to determine whether the 
appearances which are supposed to indicate its existence do proceed from natural peculiarity or 
37 Prichard, A Treatise on Insanity, p. 12. Further page references are contained within the text. 
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eccentricity of character', 
38 he maintained that while it was impossible to determine the line which 
marks a transition from predisposition to disease (and argued that a degree of predisposition did 
constitute madness), neither tendency (be it gloomy or excited) destroyed the understanding. 
While Prichard acknowledged that both tendencies were natural to many, in those instances which 
form cases of moral insanity, it was ̀ beyond the limit that belongs to a natural variety of 
character'(p. 19). 
The difficulty of accurately determining the existence of moral insanity positioned it 
almost immediately as the object of acrimonious medico-legal debate. In the Croonian Lecture of 
1853, delivered by Thomas Mayo before the Royal College of Physicians, foremost among the 
eminent physician's objections to moral insanity was the manner in which it was increasingly used 
in the courtroom as a ̀ refuge' plea to abjure criminal culpability on the grounds of irresponsibility. 
Objecting in particular to the `vagueness' with which it was legally understood and applied, he 
argued that the `loosening of the definite sense of words' which the term moral insanity suggested 
was damaging because of the way that it had acted to discredit the value of medical intervention. 
Because of the `formidable' moral and judicial consequences its employment had led to, he argued 
that he was conducting `no mere war of words' on moral insanity. 
39 Observing the manner in 
which the new disease had acted ̀ dangerously in our courts of justice, paralyzing her arm, and 
securing impunity to those who have indulged their "homicidal orgasm, " as it is the fashion to call 
a propensity to murder', 
40 
a writer in Fraser's Magazine concurred with Mayo's objections. 
Promoted by the `Moral Insanitists' or `kindred followers' of Prichard, moral insanity was a 
41 `notion subversive of the safety of society'. Though for different reasons, Mayo was not alone in 
objecting to the inclusion of quasi-forms of insanity into established medical nosologies. 
The journalist and one-time Baptist minister Thomas Mulock was one of many who 
perceived in the nosological expansion of categories of lunacy an increased potential for wrongful 
confinement in lunatic asylums. 
42 In British Asylums: Public and Private (1858) Mulock argued 
that it was too easy under the existing lunacy legislation to diagnose sane but eccentric individuals 
38 James Cowles Prichard, On the Different Forms of Insanity, in Relation to Jurisprudence (London: 
Hippolyte Balliere, 1842), p. 31. 
39 Thomas Mayo, Medical Testimony in Cases of Lunacy; being the Croonian Lectures (London: John 
Parker, 1854), p. 64. 
40 ̀ Moral Insanity. - Dr. Mayo's Croonian Lectures', Fraser's Magazine, 51 (March 1855), pp. 245-259 
(p. 246). 
41 `Moral Insanity', Fraser's Magazine, pp. 51,254,251. 
42 On Mulock see Peter McCandless, "Insanity and Society: A Study of the English Lunacy Reform 
Movement, 1815-1870" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 168- 
69. 
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as lunatics who were suffering from unrecognised brain disease. Writing in the capacity of a self- 
declared ̀ Attourney-General of Her Majesty's Madmen', Mulock argued that physicians, or as he 
preferred to describe them, `medical imposters' or `accredited quacks', 
43 had been given far too wide 
a margin in the diagnosis of insanity. Seeking in his essay to cast a new light on the `favourite 
theme with the boastful extollers of national progress in philanthropic arts and appliances'(p. 3) - 
the improved treatment of the insane - Mulock sarcastically condemned one of the most significant 
of the `brilliant novelties' of the `present auspicious days': the immoderate power of physicians to 
`hunt out eccentricities which abound in the infinite varieties of human character, and which are 
additionally generated by the amazing wealth and proneness to habits of singularity so constantly 
exhibited in English society'(p. 6). 
The lunacy legislation had inflicted a ̀ deadly injury upon society'(p. 6) by affording to 
physicians (whom Mulock argued were no more qualified to diagnose mental illness than the 
general public), the ability to distinguish madness from sanity. The absolute power to incarcerate 
eccentric individuals given to `abstruse metaphysicians' like John Conolly and L. Forbes Winslow 
represented to Mulock the underbelly (the `new black art') of the `golden times of enlightened 
progress'(p. 4). The ability of `oracular mad-doctors'(p. 4) to `demonstrate the insanity of 
anyone'(p. 4) represented nothing less than a direct and dangerous threat to every `man or woman 
[who] has some peculiarities of thought and action'(p. 6). Mulock was a close friend of John Thomas 
Perceval (1803-1876), the fifth son of the assassinated Prime Minister, Spencer Perceval and the 
object of medical journals' disapprobation during the Nottidge trial. In the early 1830s Perceval 
had been a patient at two private asylums, Brislington Lodge and Ticehurst Asylum. Upon his 
release, he wrote extensively, in letters to psychological journals and in his Narrative (1840-41), of 
the degradation and hardship he had suffered while confined, being denied privacy and subject to 
abuse. 
With Admiral Richard Saumarez (1791-1866), in 1845 he established the Alleged Lunatics' 
Friend Society (ALFS), an apolitical and non-sectarian organisation who campaigned for the 
reform of the lunacy laws, took up cases of alleged wrongful incarceration, agitated for Chancery 
reform and for an improvement in the condition of asylums. 
44 Regularly lobbying parliament, it 
secured a victory when one of the organisation's supporters, Mr Tite M. P., delivered a petition to 
43 Thomas Mulock, British Lunatic Asylums: Public and Private (London: Hill and Halden, 1858), 
pp. 7,8. Further page references are contained within the text. 
44 With the assistance of a surprisingly wide range of supporters including M. P. s and attorneys, the 
organisation regularly lobbied parliament and submitted Bills concerning the legal and civil rights of 
alleged lunatics. Despite their best efforts at focusing attention on the inadequacies of the laws, by the 
late 1850s the ALFS was on the verge of collapse. Fortuitously, the lunacy panic of that summer 
presented an unequaled opportunity to rally supporters and attention. On the ALFS see Nicholas 
Hervey, `Advocacy or Folly: The Alleged Lunatics' Friend Society, 1845-63, Medical History, 30 
(1986), pp. 245-275. 
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the House of Commons which secured the appointment of the 1859-60 Select Committee 
inquiry. 45 Perceval, Saumarez, and Gilbert Bolden, a lawyer and honorary secretary of the ALFS 
were invited to give testimony. Though expressing many objections to what they perceived as the 
laxity of the lunacy laws, they all drew especial attention the fact that lunacy legislation stipulated 
no barriers to prevent the confinement in lunatic asylums of persons ̀ possessed of great 
imagination and invention, of deep reflection, and of an enthusiastic temperament'. 
46 To Perceval, 
it was these eccentric individuals that `changed the destiny of nations and the destinies of the 
world'. 
47 Men and women of `original minds' needed to be applauded for their eccentricity and 
safeguarded from the scrutiny of the psychological physician. This could only be achieved, he 
concluded, by repositioning the entire focus of the inquiry away from the `constant routine and 
reference to the medical man', and towards the `spiritual and moral part of the subject'. 
48 It was 
only in this way, he felt, that improper detention could be abolished and `many amiable and 
talented, though nervous and eccentric, individuals'49 be restored to society. 
The same year, 1859, the Reverend James Kendall published a short book entitled 
Eccentricity; Ora Check to Censoriousness. Kendall was critical of `pharisees and fanatics' who 
believed they held a right to hunt down men `noted, or only said to be noted for mental 
eccentricity'. 
50 Eccentricity was `a very interesting subject' to Kendall and though he felt he would 
be `deemed heretical' for doing so, he argued that eccentricity was far more beneficial to the 
individual than it was dangerous to society. Eccentricities restored health to the body and 
furnished `rational and improving entertainment to the mind'(p. 33). Despite the benefits 
furnished by eccentricity, Kendall observed that it remained the object of `undefinable suspicion'. 
Those holding the strongest prejudices against it were to be found amongst people of `little, low 
and vulgar minds [... ] [who] are so wonderfully obtuse, as to be utterly destitute of all perception 
of its usefulness [and individuals] [... ] so wanting in good taste, as to have no relish for its 
raciness, point and brilliancy'(p. 189). Though Kendall's comments concerned the persecution of 
ministers, his contempt for those whose ignorance blinded them to the usefulness of eccentricity 
was remarkably similar to Perceval and Mulock's scathing descriptions of psychological physicians. 
45 Hervey, `Advocacy or Folly', p. 259. 
46 Lancet, (1859) ü, p. 127. 
47 PP 1859 2nd sess. (156) VII, 501, p. 16. 
48 PP 1859 2nd sess. (156) VII, 501, p. 46. 
49 Lancet, (1859) ii, p. 134. 
50 Reverend James Kendall, Eccentricity; Or, a Check to Censoriousness (London: Simpkin, Marshall, 
1859), p. 32. Further page references are contained within the text. 
115 
As with Kendall's ̀ pharisees', medical men had similarly `made themselves objects, not of esteem 
and veneration, but of dread, terror and disgust'(p. 33). 
iii. The medical response 
As `a very useful' society and one `worthy of the serious attention of the psychologist and the 
philanthropist', the Lancet supported the direction that Perceval, Bolden and Saumarez were 
forcing the hearings to take. 
51 The journal agreed with the ALFS members that the jealousy with 
which the medical profession asserted their jurisdiction over the insane represented the 
`pretensions of the alienists, par excellence', and reflected `the self-esteem that is apt to be 
engendered by a narrow circle of pursuits, and exaggerated by the interchange of ideas amongst 
themselves'. 
52 In contrast, the journal of Psychological Medicine lost no time in condemning the 
manner in which the ALFS members elevated the `so-called civil rights of the lunatic above his 
rights as a sick man'. 
53 In commenting on the testimony of Perceval, Bolden and Saumarez, the 
journal was unable to wholly leave their evidence to the `contempt' of its readers because of the 
importance that the opinions of the ALFS had been accorded by the inquiry and the general public. 
Because it appeared that the opinions of the ALFS were founded on `a careful consideration of 
facts', it was necessary to convince the public that their arguments were the products of `too-active 
imagination'. 
Though suspicious of the pretensions of physicians, the Lancet acknowledged their 
authority as a collective body. Yet as the comments of a writer in the British Medical Journal make 
clear, physicians themselves were acutely conscious of their precarious reputation: `It really would 
seem as though the government looked upon the proprietors of private lunatic asylums in much the 
same light as the public look upon the swell mob, as a class of people banded together to prey upon 
their fellow men'. 
54 Because of the actions of a `few incompetent men' who signed certificates 
`without sufficient ground or reason [... ] serious odium is brought upon all persons associated with 
asylums for the treatment of the insane'. 
55 What most riled the Journal of Mental Science and 
51 Lancet, (1859) i, p. 125. Wakley, M. P., was one of the organization's key supporters. See Hervey, 
`Advocacy or Folly', p. 252. 
52 Lancet, (1859) i, p. 420. John Conolly was one of several witnesses who reflected this opinion, 
stating that the weakening of their jurisdiction over the insane would lead inevitably to lunatics 
falling into `lower hands'. PP 1859 1st sess. (204) III, 75, p. 179. 
53JPMMP, 12 (1859), p. 67. 
54 ̀ Lunacy Law', BMJ, (1859), p. 193. 
55 JMS, 5 (1858-59), p. 60. 
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Mental Pathology was the way in which the proprietors of private asylums had been singled out for 
criticism. 
56 As one clearly partisan individual noted in a letter to The Times in August 1858: 
It seems to be forgotten that all the eminent physicians who have especially devoted 
themselves to the study and treatment of mental disease - surely no ignoble department of 
a noble art - the very men to whom we owe that system of mercy whose good effects have 
taught us to abhor the everyday cruelties of a time not long past, have been, and are, with 
scarcely one exception, the proprietors of private asylums. 
57 
To John Charles Bucknill (himself one of the witnesses), an explanation for why the 
proprietors of private asylums and their medical attendants had become the specific object of 
opprobrium lay in their `association with capitalists and speculators' and in their `character of 
custodians' whose business was to detain the `inmates of these institutions against their will'. 
58 
The chairman of the Lunacy Commission, Lord Shaftesbury conceded in his testimony at the 
inquiry that private asylums were operated solely for profit. His acknowledgment that private 
asylums were `strictly speaking, commercial speculations'59 riled many specialists in lunacy 
belonging to the Association of Medical Officers of Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane. Feeling 
`directly injured and deeply degraded'60 by the suggestion of their impropriety (and with it the 
ravaging of their respectability), they lost no time in condemning the nature of the inquiry. `The 
design appears to be', wrote one observer, 
to drive men of character, respectability, and honour out of the specialty, by rendering 
their position so odious, offensive, and repulsive, that no gentleman who had any respect 
for himself would think of occupying it. For the misdeeds of one or two delinquents, the 
whole body of men connected with asylums are made to suffer! The order of the day is, 
hunt the "mad-doctors" down! extend to them no mercy, give them no quarter! Treat 
them and legislate for them as a suspected class! 
61 
A number of suggestions for reform of the lunacy laws were considered by the committee 
including the proposal that private establishments for the insane should be overseen by a new body 
56 JPMMP, 12 (1859), p. 410. 
57 Letter to The Times, 23 August, 1858, p. 9. 
58 Bucknill, Care of the Insane, p. vii. 
59 The Times, 19 August, 1858, p. 8. 
60 Lancet, (1859) i, p. 420. 
61 ̀ Proposed Legislation in Lunacy', JPMMP, 12 (1859), pp. 408-409. 
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of `independant medical examiners'. Just the idea of medical examiners ̀ chafed the feeling'62 of 
those involved in a medical capacity in the care and treatment of the insane. While asylum 
proprietors pointed out that medical examiners could have no practical knowledge of insanity, 
Commissioners in Lunacy were aghast at the possibility of another body scrutinising their own 
actions. 
63 Recognising the threat that another body would pose to their autonomy, Shaftesbury 
argued that the Select Committee should instead support an increase in the number of 
commissioners and a extension of their responsibilities. As the widespread coverage of the Lytton 
and Turner cases indicated, the safeguard requiring the provision of two physicians' signatures on 
the certificate of lunacy had become ineffectual. One solution lay in the additional signature of a 
magistrate. This proposal was also contested. Again, Shaftesbury questioned the right of law to 
provide a solution (though the intervention of a magistrate) by arguing that such a measure would 
delay the detention of the lunatic and so harm the potentially successful outcome of early asylum- 
based treatment, a cardinal medical rule. 
Though both proposals were acrimoniously debated, Lord Shaftesbury's opinions were 
influential. 64 The committee concluded in their Report that the necessity for an alteration in the 
law to demand the inclusion of a magistrate's signature was ̀ more imaginary than real' and 
furthermore, posed its own dangers in the form of `unnecessary publicity'. 
65 The Report 
continued: 
Insanity under any shape is so fearful a malady, that the desire to withdraw it from the 
observation of the world is both natural and commendable. The reverse of this would in all 
instances be painful, and in many it would be cruel [resulting in ] injurious comments 
[... ] unnecessary exposure [... ] the stigma or prejudice which might permanently attach to 
[the lunatic]. 66 
The Committee's consideration of the additional safeguard of a magistrate's signature and the 
implementation of a new body of medical examiners both posed a serious threat to physicians' 
medical autonomy and authority. Yet of equal concern to the profession of mental science was the 
62 ̀ The New Lunacy Bills', Lancet, (1859) i, p. 420. 
63 To one writer in the BMJ, the medical examiners were no more than `spies and censors of their 
brethren who have been bred to the specialty'. BMJ, (1859), p. 193. 
64 Though the formation of a body of medical examiners was approved, Shaftesbury's opposition to a 
magistrate's signature was upheld. See Georgina Battiscombe, Shaftesbury: The Great Reformer, 1801- 
1885 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), p. 258. 
65 PP 1860 (495) XXII, 349, p. viii. 
66 PP 1860 (495) XXII, 349, p. ix. 
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role played by the press and publicity in heightening the public's fear of the asylum and its 
proponents. Their success in countering pul$ic opinion was in many respects dependant on 
ensuring that the public `rest content for a short time to regard medical practitioners in lunacy as 
curative agents, and not as avaricious ogres'. 
67 
Though the assumption that wrongful confinement was widespread was a ̀ vulgar idea', the 
Lancet was one journal not surprised by the depth of anxiety it engendered: ̀ The crazy people at 
large form so large a proportion of society, and fear is so contagious, that [... ] one ought not to be 
surprised at it; the less so when we consider the ignorance of the public, and of the newspaper 
leaders of the public, in all matters relating to lunacy'. 
68 Reflecting contemporaneous medical 
opinion, John Charles Bucknill believed that the success in treating cases of insanity was 
dependant on securing early treatment in a lunatic asylum. However he felt that such a ̀ hope was 
to remain distant while the newspapers continued to open `their sweet melodious voices upon the 
poor mad doctor'. 
69 Bucknill was one of the major spokesmen defending the medical establishment 
before the Select Committee and was scathing in his attack on the role that newspapers had played 
in manipulating public opinion against psychological physicians and denigrating their right to 
speak authoritatively on behalf of the lunatic. While it was a ̀ wonderful thing this newspaper press 
of ours [... ] the palladium of liberty, the great engine of education [... ] we must add in all that is 
wrong, the fountain of the pure waters of truth, but alas, sometimes also the sewer of calumnious 
falsehood'. 70 
`The sane people confined in lunatic asylums under the easy facilities of the act', Bucknill 
wrote, `are ghosts of newspaper writing. They cannot be brought to the bar as tangible realities'. 
Though he believed that the defects in the lunacy laws had been attributed unjustly to those acting 
under it, amendments in lunacy legislation were necessary ̀ if for no other purpose than to take the 
wind out of the sails of these panic-mongers, and effectually to reassure the too credulous public'. 
71 
Though the newspaper press was perceived by the medical establishment to be unfairly opposed to 
the existing legislation and persons connected with lunacy, periodically leading `senseless' 
, they campaigns, because they formed `a current clinical record for the psychological physician '72 
67JPMMP, 12 (1859), p. 412. 
68 `The Lunacy Laws', Lancet, (1859) i, p. 221. 
69 [John Charles Bucknill], `The Newspaper Attack on Private Lunatic Asylums', JMS, 6 (1859-60), 
p. 146. 
70 JMS, 6 (1859-60), p. 146. 
71 JMS, 6 (1859-60), p. 152. 
72 JPMMP, 13 (1860), p. lxiii. 
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ironically offered evidence of the necessity of medical intervention. To the Journal of Psychological 
Medicine and Mental Science, the case of Oliver Cromwell, for example, represented a ̀ singular 
illustration of popular information concerning lunacy'. 
73 Cromwell was a young man who lived in 
rented accommodation in the borough of Westminster in London. Though free to come and go as 
he pleased, he remained ostensibly under his landlord's surveillance. Cromwell held `war-like 
propensities' and arming himself with `sundry murderous steel weapons' attacked his landlord. In 
illustrating an `exceedingly narrow escape from another horrible butchery by a homicidal maniac at 
large', the criminal case was important because of the way that it could `teach the press, who are too 
apt to cavill [sic] with the alienist who is desirous of placing lunatics of this species under durance 
or strict watch, that it is only by sequestration or constant surveillance that the public can be 
protected from their dangerous tendencies'. 
74 Because Cromwell's insanity was ̀ neglected or 
unrecognised', it played `immense mischief in society' and thus highlighted the need not only for 
expert medical intervention but also for early treatment in asylums. 
iv. Mill and eccentricity 
Perceval believed that in order to prevent individuals being improperly deprived of their liberty, it 
was imperative to break down what he termed the `jealousy' of the medical profession over the 
alleged lunatic and replace it with a `system of clerical protection'. 
75 By offering the alleged lunatic 
as much protection and publicity as possible, Perceval's advocacy of a system in which the sanction 
of a magistrate or a clergyman was needed prior to the alleged lunatic being sent to an asylum 
reflected Mulock's belief in the necessity for `public vigilance and enquiry in all cases of alleged 
lunacy'(p. 49). In contrast to the Committee's Report which saw in `unnecessary exposure' a 
danger to the lunatic and his or her family, both lay-reformers advocated the productive power of 
public opinion in `fixing', as Mulock put it, `the public attention on the momentous 
matters'(p. 37) confronting the legislators of lunacy law. 
On 31 July 1858, J. S. Mill wrote a lengthy letter to the Daily News expressing his outrage 
at the `frightful facility with which any persons [... ] may be consigned without trial to a fate more 
cruel and hopeless than the most rigorous imprisonment'. 
76 Mill's impassioned diatribe also 
attacked the ineptitude of the lunacy legislation. Mill's comments, like those of others, roused and 
reinforced public alarm at the apparent ease with which sane individuals could be subjected to illegal 
73JPMMP, 13 (1860), p. xxxix. 
74JPMMP, 13 (1860), p. xxxix. 
75 PP 1859 2nd sess. (156) VII, 501, p. 43. 
76 U. S. Mill], `The Law of Lunacy', Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 25, pp. 1 198-1199 (p. 1 198). 
First published in the Daily News, 31 July, 1858, p. 4. 
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incarceration. In contrast to criminals, whose incarceration was always the result of a public 
investigation and determined on the verdict of a jury, Mill believed that 
a perfectly innocent person can be carried off to a madhouse on the assertion of any two 
so-called medical men, who may have scarcely seen the victim whom they dismiss to a 
condition far worse than the penalty which the law inflicts for proved crime [... ] [To 
these] unfortunates the ordinary use of speech is virtually denied; their sober statements of 
fact, still more their impassioned protests against injustice, are held to be [... ] instances of 
insane delusion. And this state any two medical men may secretly inflict. 
77 
Along with Mulock and Perceval, Mill was forthright in his condemnation of the secrecy 
that characterised the lunacy laws. Like the ALFS, he recommended the institution of a jury to 
decide the fate of an alleged lunatic. 
78 Ensuring publicity at a preliminary stage in the proceedings, 
a jury inquiry would fix 'attention on any unavowed motive which may actuate the promoters of 
the proceeding' and thus act as an effective safeguard to prevent illegal or unlawful incarceration. 
Yet despite Mill's `earnest' desire to promote `the exertions of intelligent reformers' and support 
their continued efforts `at rousing public opinion on a matter so vital to the freedom and security 
of the subject', 
79 Mill retained reservations about the use of a jury because he felt that too often 
the public were `foolish and credulous' and `only too willing to treat any conduct as madness which 
80 is ever so little out of the common way'. 
In On Liberty, Mill sought to examine theoretical constructs underpinning the 
dichotomous relationship between authority and liberty and to explore the `nature and limits of the 
power which can be legitimately exercised over the individual-'(p. 217). Mill believed in the liberty 
of thought and feeling and in the `absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, 
practical or speculative, scientific or moral, or theological'. Equally important was the `liberty of 
tastes and pursuits, of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like 
[... ] without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, 
even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong'(p. 226). While in the early 
stages of society strong impulses `overwhelmed social principle', by the mid-nineteenth century 
77 [Mill], `Law', Collected Works, 25, p. 1198. Mill was especially concerned at the `knaves' who 
certified for the sake of the fee, and `weak creatures' who were ready to certify insanity on the grounds 
of `anything affirmed by a gentleman and a man of position'. Such remarks appear directed at Edward 
Bulwer-Lytton. 
78 In preventing collusion between physicians and relatives of the alleged lunatic, a jury trial before 
admission was supported by the ALFS. See Hervey, `Advocacy or Folly', p. 246. 
79 Mill, `Law', p. 1198. 
80 Mill, `Law', p. 1198. 
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society had overwhelmed the individual. Nothing, he believed, could be desired strongly without 
moral disapprobation or medical intervention. That `so few now dare to be eccentric' was to Mill 
the ̀ chief danger of the time'(p. 269). 
In all classes of society, he believed, ̀everyone lives as under the eye of a hostile and 
dreaded censorship'(p. 264) resulting in a ̀ withering of strong wishes and native pleasures'(p. 265). 
Though in his letter to the Daily News Mill expressed reservations about juries, he remained 
adamant that publicity, and the rousing of public opinion, was an important strategy in the 
prevention of wrongful confinement. In contrast, in On Liberty Mill expresses greater hesitations 
about the destruction of liberty posed by the `moral coercion of public opinion'(p. 223). Far `more 
formidable than many kinds of political oppression'(p. 220), he argued, was the operation of `social 
tyranny'. Though individuals were still controlled by political functionaries acting in the capacity 
of public authorities, more dangerous to individual liberty was the domination of `prevailing 
opinion and feeling [... ] to impose, by means other than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices 
as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them [... ] [and] to fetter the development and [... ] 
prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways'(p. 220). 
Conformity, Mill argued, maimed `like a Chinese lady's foot, every part of human nature 
which stands out prominently and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to 
commonplace humanity'(pp. 271-272). Most threatened in such an austere and repressive society 
were those with eccentricities of conduct and peculiarities of taste. Instead of defining eccentricity 
as a reproach to society and a form of `moral delinquency', Mill, like Perceval, believed that it 
should be consciously fostered. Mill equated eccentricity with strength of character and saw such 
`strong impulses'(p. 263) as vital to the healthy development of society. The danger to Mill lay not 
in the excess but in the resultant deficiency of `personal impulses and preferences'(p. 264). Yet he 
remained fully aware of the potential consequences of doing `what nobody does': a commission de 
lunatico inquirendo. Mill's concept of liberty involved a correspondent debasement of authority. 
He believed that whatever `crush[ed]'(p. 266) individuality was despotic. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in the court rooms of medico-legal trials and commissions of lunacy, contested arenas 
in which the lay-public juries, the judicial authorities and physicians (employed as expert witnesses) 
met to decide the fate of individuals retaliating against accusations of alleged insanity. 
In a conspicuous departure from theoretical speculations, Mill set forth a vision of the 
commission that made clear his distaste for such proceedings. The evidence that was presented in 
judicial commissions was both `contemptible and frightful': 
All the minute details of his daily life are pried into, and what ever is found which, seen 
through the [... ] faculties of the lowest of the low, bears an appearance unlike absolute 
commonplace, is laid before the jury as evidence of insanity, and often with success; the 
jurors being little, if at all, less vulgar and ignorant than the witnesses, while the judges, 
with that extraordinary want of knowledge of human nature and life which continually 
astonishes us in English lawyers, often helps to mislead them. (p. 271) 
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For Mill, the significance of such trials was that they spoke `volumes as to the state of feeling and 
opinion among the vulgar with regard to human liberty'(p. 271). Far from setting any value on 
individuality, neither judges nor juries were able to conceive `that a person in a state of sanity can 
desire such freedom'(p. 271). Mirroring Mill's feelings, Mulock despaired, '[w] hat on earth have 
doctors to do with the endless eccentricities of the human mind which lead to no violations of the 
law of the land! ' (p. 12) . 
Underlying Mill's condemnation of the commission de lunatico inquirendo was his distaste 
for the social codes and unwritten moral laws governing society; codes of behavior that discouraged 
excess and promoted the improvement of morals and the regularity of conduct. So effective was the 
strength of public opinion in reinforcing the dictates of society that such `encroachment' was `not 
one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and 
more formidable'(p. 227). In just the way that Michelet wrote of the despotic power of the Bastille 
before its fall in 1789 (discussed in chapter six), Mill saw the conformity of public opinion as 
almost inescapable, capable of `penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving 
the soul itself'(p. 220). Yet it was precisely the cultivation of such idiosyncrasies that needed not 
only to be protected but fostered for human beings, and in turn human life, to become a `noble and 
beautiful object of contemplation'(p. 266). Without such `salt of the earth' individuals, `human life 
would become a stagnant pool'(p. 267). In a little-disguised critique of Jeremy Bentham's 
utilitarianism, Mill maintained that human nature was `not a machine to be rebuilt after a model 
[... ] but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of 
the inward forces which make it a living thing'(p. 263). Artfully adapting the metaphor of the tree, 
it was necessary to `preserve the soil in which persons of genius grow [... ] [for they] can only 
breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom'(p. 267). 
Although in agreement with Mulock and Perceval on many issues, Mill differed in 
recognising the theoretical legitimacy of particular kinds of interference. His doctrine sought to 
apply such principles only to those in the full maturity of their faculties and he believed that 
children, young persons, barbarians, and those who `are still in a state to require being taken care 
of by others' must be protected `against their own actions as well as against external 
injury'(p. 224). The rights Mill was concerned to safeguard in law were not applicable to such 
groups, a point which bore directly on the contemporaneous debates taking place in the field of 
mental science concerning eccentricity and liberty. 
The introduction of monomania and moral insanity into the legal arena dramatically 
shifted existing paradigms about lunacy and sanity. The vigorous debates that ensued made it clear 
that the previous definitions of `insanity' and `insane' which had made these states recognisable 
and thus legitimate, had begun to be challenged. The debates were compounded by Mill's advocacy 
of eccentricity and the way that it problematized medico-legal arguments about lunacy and liberty. 
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Because it rested so precariously on socially-constructed boundaries and contested manifestations 
of legitimate forms of authority (as defined by and against law), the binary opposition between 
sanity and lunacy became, with `quasi' forms of madness, an issue of deep concern. The apparent 
impossibility of agreeing on a definition of `lunatic' that would satisfy, equally, the different 
legitimate needs of medicine, society and the law proved to be highly threatening: it exposed to full 
public gaze the arbitrary nature of the debate. As John Charles Bucknill remarked in 1859, 
In nature we find no such sharply defined classification: even the exact boundary of the 
animal and vegetable kingdoms is not ascertained; and in the kingdom of the mind, mind 
itself is scarcely able to conceive the gradations of power and knowledge. But nature herself 
must bend to the laws of man! 
81 
In an open letter to Lord Shaftesbury on the lunacy law regulating private asylums, 
Edward Seymour stated that he saw no greater obstacle in the `amelioration of the unhappy state of 
lunatics' than that found in the `prejudices and feelings of society'. 
82 Yet whether society was 
`injured' or protected by the lunacy legislation and the actions of physicians was hotly contested 
and ultimately unresolvable - evidenced by Mill's ambivalence - for lunacy specialists and the public 
at large were confronted with an impossible task: 
Omniscience alone can estimate accurately the degree of irresponsibility produced by 
cerebral disease, the degree of moral freedom and of responsibility left by the same. It is a 
Gordian knot which no human power can perfectly unravel, and which the most acute 
forensic intellects have in vain attempted to cut by the sharp line of a legal definition. 
83 
Critics of the lunacy legislation argued that everyone had a right to personal liberty and the right 
to be eccentric without the fear of being incarcerated in a lunatic asylum. To the medical 
community, the lunatic had a right to be treated and their job was to ensure that the insane were 
protected from themselves. Physicians responded with defensive declarations of superior skill and 
knowledge gained through years of proximity to the insane. Mirroring the feelings of many 
physicians, one writer thought it `most unwise, injudicious and impolitic to throw any very 
84 
stringent or vexatious impediments or obstructions in the way of confining the insane'. 
81 John Charles Bucknill, Unsoundness of Mind in relation to Criminal Acts (London: Longman, 
Brown, Green, Longmans & Robert, 1859), p. 115. 
82 Seymour, A Letter, p. 6. 
83 Bucknill, Unsoundness of Mind, p. 17. 
84 JMS, 5 (1858-59), p. 61. 
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The Select Committee hearings of 1859-60 encompassed multiple aspects of the care of the 
lunatic and revealed the extent to which the lunacy laws were encumbered by an ̀ entanglement of 
authorities'. 
85 Crucially, the swirling debates which it elicited illustrated the precarious nature of 
established legislative and medical boundaries distinguishing legal intervention from medical 
prerogative. As the comments of physicians, lay lunacy reformers, and Mill indicate, it was next to 
impossible to assert social, medical or legal authority over the lunatic because of the extent to 
which the legitimacy of insanity itself was in doubt. The lunacy panic of 1858 and the Select 
Committee inquiry of 1859-60 thus provide an important register of contemporary tensions and 
provide a fruitful insight into the refiguring of conceptions of power and authority in the domain 
of lunacy legislation. While ostensibly manifested as a debate over the rights of or claims over the 
lunatic, it became more powerfully a grid-locked battle over who had the right to authenticate and 
so enforce, the boundaries delimiting that which constituted the autonomous individual from 
definitions of lunacy and processes of `confinement'. 
The following chapter will examine many of the concerns expressed by Mill, the ALFS and 
by psychological physicians (such as the relationship between liberty and authority and eccentricity 
and public opinion) as they were discussed in relation to one of the more sensational lunacy 
commissions of the nineteenth century, that of William Frederick Windham in 1861-62. Several 
issues make the Windham story particularly fascinating in this respect. Unlike the case of 
McNaughten, no one was trying to argue that Windham had committed a crime. It was never to be 
a case that revealed tensions between medical diagnoses and civil and criminal culpability. Rather, 
it exposed fundamental tensions within the ranks of mental science over the acceptability of moral 
insanity as a valid diagnosis. Never before had so many and such celebrated physicians clashed so 
openly in the courtroom, and, after the verdict was given, in medical journals. The conspicuous 
absence of medical consensus on the state of Windham's mind contributed to a perception that the 
lay public were as qualified as skilled medical practitioners in determining the existence of insanity. 
With the case of Windham, medical testimony itself was brought into doubt and with it the 
authority and status long sought for by psychological physicians. 
85 Bucknill, The Care of the Insane, p. xxvii. 
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Chapter Five 
Moral insanity and the case of William Frederick Windham 
As the debates within the medioI establishment and between physicians and lay-lunacy law 
reformers and civil libertarians indicate, diagnoses of moral insanity and monomania were both 
either perceived to assist criminals in eluding proper retribution or to threaten the civil liberties of 
eccentric or socially deviant individuals. The controversies that the previous chapters have explored 
were not confined to England. In the late 1850s and early 1860s in the United States, two 
prominent physicians, John Gray and Isaac Ray, became embroiled in a controversy over moral 
insanity. John Gray (1825-86), president of the Association of Medical Superintendents of 
American Institutions for the Insane and (from 1854) the editor of the American Journal of 
Insanity, felt that the `general tendency of the doctrine of moral insanity is bad, whatever show or 
real feeling of humanity there may be in it'. 
1 For Gray, the ambiguity surrounding the disease 
(resulting from the multiple clinical symptoms) held dangerous ramifications. Its contested use in 
courtrooms exposed the fragile authority of physicians, disorganised and ultimately nullified the 
code of criminal law, and so acted to hasten the onset of social anarchy. 
While from a religious perspective moral insanity encouraged individuals to `indulge in 
their strongest passions', in legal terms it protected them from punishment. It tended, Gray 
continued, 
to give to bad education, loose habits, vicious indulgence, neglected parental control, and 
disobedience to God, an immunity from the prescribed penalties of crime, that is not 
warranted by the Scriptures, the law of reason, or any codes of human law that assume to 
be founded on the law of reason or the law of God. (AJI, 14, p. 321) 
Arguing that immoral passions were not representative of a new form of mental illness 
but were rather representative of perverse viciousness, 
2 Gray vehemently concluded that moral 
insanity was ̀ simply and only human depravity'(AJI, 14, p. 320). He took issue with the term 
`moral' because it was ̀ too shadowy, fluctuating, indefinable, and disputable, to be firmly grasped 
by the law'(AJI, 14, p. 319). As Ruth Caplan puts it, Gray felt that in 
teaching that criminality and bad habits were innate and hence beyond the control of the 
individual [... ] [moral insanity] implied that one prone to destructive and self-indulgent 
1 John Gray, `Moral Insanity', American Journal of Insanity, 14 (1857-1858), pp-311-322 (p. 321). 
Hereafter abbreviated as AJI. Further page references are contained within the text. 
2 Fullinwider, `Insanity', p. 93. 
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acts could cease to struggle for self control [... ] because in effect, society had sanctioned its 
deviance. 3 
In the face of Gray's virulent onslaught on moral insanity, in 1861 Isaac Ray (the first 
Superintendent of the Butler Hospital) published an impassioned defence of the disease. In 1838 
Ray had published A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity in which he argued that the 
legal tests available to determine criminal responsibility, to distinguish right from wrong and 
reason from unreason, were too narrow. ̀
I What distinguished Ray from many of his 
contemporaries, as well as from the English judicial system, was that he accepted moral causes in 
the diagnosis of lunacy. Implicit in Ray's acknowledgment of moral insanity was his belief that the 
traditional rationalistic theory of mental disorder as an intellectual lesion was insufficient. 
While Gray argued that the unpredictability of moral insanity supplied grounds for 
excising it from established medical nosologies, Ray saw in the disease's unpredictability a 
challenge to physicians to rethink the ways in which mental disorder was theoretically interpreted. 
Because its symptoms were often too random to be easily diagnostically categorised, Ray, like 
Pinel, argued for more emphasis to be placed on the history of the individual rather than on the 
visible symptoms. It was only in this necessarily empathetic way that the subjective life of the 
individual could be penetrated and a precise diagnosis made. 
Though he agreed with Gray that diversity of medical opinion had mischievously acted to 
degrade the dignity of the `professional character'5 of physicians, he took issue with Gray's denial 
of the existence 
moral 
insanity, arguing that Gray's objections to moral insanity were grounded in 
n 
insubstantial metaphysical arguments that sought to loosely associate moral obliquity with vice or 
unbridled passions (a strategy which served to startle the public with the spectre of social chaos). 
Ray argued that the objections to moral insanity he was at pains to refute were grounded in the 
taint of charlantry that accompanied the disorder (it was grounded in theories of phrenology) and 
the ignorance surrounding the disease. 
While mistaken inaccuracies regarding diagnosis of moral insanity were not themselves 
dangerous, when they were expressed in the courtroom they became hazardous. While the 
courtroom was a stage in which the identity and knowledge base of the emerging psychiatric 
3 Ruth B. Caplan, Psychiatry and the Community in Nineteenth-Century America: The Recurring 
Concern with the Environment in the Prevention and Treatment of Mental Illness (New York: Basic 
Books, 1969), p. 123. 
4 Recall, during the trial of McNaughten, Cockburn's employment of Ray's work on medical 
jurisprudence to undermine the idea that madness could only be detected if accompanied by explicitly 
insane actions. 
5 Isaac Ray, `An Examination of the Objections to the Doctrine of Moral Insanity', AJI, 18 (1861- 
62), pp. 1 12-138 (p. 1 13). Further page references are contained within the text. 
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profession was developed (and presented to the lay public), it was equally a stage of dissent. 
6 Ray 
was dissatisfied with the hesitation of the courts to yield to what he understood to be scientific 
truth. The judicial system, he believed, simply had not progressed at the rate of science. This was 
all the more distressing because of the ignorance that was consequently disseminated through 
newspaper coverage of medico-legal trials. The `objections which seem too puerile for serious 
refutation are urged upon courts, paraded in newspapers, and patronised by amateur writers on the 
legal relations of the insane. In this way', he believed, `they get a sort of factitious authority which 
deceives the ignorant or unwary and therefore procures for them a degree of attention they would 
never obtain by their intrinsic merits alone'(AJI, 18, pp. 137-38). 
The debates which were taking place in England over moral insanity were inflected with a 
set of concerns which were identical to those expressed by both Ray and Gray in the United States. 
In both the chapters on Louisa Nottidge and the 1859-60 Select Committee inquiry, we saw that 
the anger expressed by agitators for a reform of the lunacy laws was directed at the authority of 
physicians to locate in eccentricity the seeds of lunacy. The focus of this chapter, however, will 
shift from examining the anxieties produced by the perceived conflation of quasi-forms of insanity 
with eccentricity to consider a set of different concerns centring on the relationship between moral 
insanity and moral depravity. This chapter will examine moral insanity as it was represented 
within English medical and legal circles in the mid-nineteenth century through the lens of the 
commission de lunatico inquirendo instituted against William Frederick Windham in 1861. 
Central to Ray's defence of moral insanity was the need to draw medical and legal 
distinctions between moral insanity and moral depravity. Yet as the case of Windham makes clear, 
it was impossible to achieve these distinctions when even eminent psychological physicians like 
Forbes Benignus Winslow reinforced the confused medical understanding of the disease entity by 
suggesting that the morally insane were `guilty of acts of private and public indecency, dishonesty, 
debauchery, and beastly intemperance'. 
This chapter will first examine the medical controversy over the contested relationship 
between moral insanity and medical, legal and individual responsibility, paying particular 
attention to the perceived relationship between moral depravity and the onset of modernity. The 
second section considers the actions, events and anxieties which led to the implementation of the 
commission de lunatico inquirendo, sensational not only because of the stature of the instigators of 
the commission and the detailed treatment of Windham's actions, but also because it pitted against 
one another several of the most distinguished psychological physicians of the period. While the 
third section will examine the role played by physicians in the inquiry, the fourth section will look 
6 Belkin, `Moral Insanity', p. 592. 
7 Forbes Benignus Winslow, On Obscure Diseases of the Brain and Disorders of the Mind, 2nd edn 
(London: John W. Davies, 1861), p. 280. 
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at the coverage of the commission in the press, considering in particular how physicians were 
popularly conceived. The concluding section will reflect generally upon the way in which moral 
insanity framed a series of important but overlooked medico-legal debates which, I argue, 
paradoxically harmed the professional credibility of the profession of mental science by bringing 
into question the value of medical testimony itself. 
i. Morally insane or morally depraved? 
With partial insanity still fresh in the minds of the public from the McNaughten case, how to 
reconcile the raving actions of a madman with the apparently rational and coherent processes of 
reading, writing and thinking was the question which Arthur Ladbroke Wigan set himself the task 
of answering in his 1844 tract on insanity, The Duality of the Mind. To Wigan the explanation for 
the apparent paradox lay in the individual's `possession of two complete and perfect organs of 
thought with opposing volitions'. 
8 Famous for positing the idea of the dualistic nature of the 
brain, Wigan argued that mental instability arose from the inability of the `conscious' half of the 
brain to stem a disordered train of thoughts in the other half of the brain. In producing 
unprecedented and dangerous levels of excitement, printing, steam power, and railroads had 
deranged all known mental `combinations' and made it increasingly difficult to check false 
impressions, feelings and actions. He believed firmly in the connection between mental 
derangement and the many forms of indulgence generated by modern life. 
9 
For this study, the most interesting sections of Wigan's tract are those that consider the 
`horrible doctrine' of moral insanity. Turning to a case described by Prichard in On the Different 
Forms of Insanity in Relation to Jurisprudence (1842)10 Wigan, like Gray, was aghast at the way in 
which the excuse of insanity was endorsed in cases that for him were clearly examples of perverted 
moral conduct. The case which Prichard argued represented a classic case of moral insanity was to 
Wigan solely representative of the `common, regular process of depravity, and shews [sic] no other 
sign of insanity than is inherent in all vicious conduct'(p. 250). Rather than illustrating the 
collapse of one's moral rectitude and so evidencing moral insanity, it was a case ̀of what common 
people call ̀ madness spelt with a b' - badness'(p. 252). Wigan believed that the individual exhibited 
the `grossest criminality' and such a form of depravity should not, he stated, be afforded the 
`shelter of irresponsibility'(p. 254). Wigan thought that the idea that moral depravity was a cause of 
8 A. L. Wigan, A New View of Insanity - The Duality of Mind (London: Longman, Brown, Green 
and Longman, 1844), p. 56. Further page references are contained within the text. 
9 To gain a sense of the breadth of `popular delusions' see Charles Mackay, Memoirs of Extraordinary 
Popular Delusions, 2 vols (London: Richard Bentley, 1841). 
10 Prichard, On the Different Forms of Insanity, p. 31. Further page references are contained within the 
text. 
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madness was a ̀ dangerous doctrine to promulgate-, holding the potential to `dislocate the whole 
frame of society'(p. 254). Deriding its adherents as ̀ crazy enthusiasts', his comments indicate the 
anger elicited by the doctrine of moral insanity. 
In 1861, Sir James Crichton-Browne (1835-1938) was elected Senior President of the 
Royal Medical Society, Edinburgh. In his Inaugural Address to the members of the Society he 
addressed the perceived relationship between insanity and the onset of industrialisation. He argued 
like Wigan that in an age of railways, gas, electricity, and of `velocity in thought and action', all 
minds were stretched to limits previously unknown: 
We live in a vortex of excitement; every impression is intoxicating, every idea stirring. 
Whilst of old they tended their herds and tilled the land, and lived in a place of placid 
monotony in a limited sphere, we now run round the world, and experience every 
vicissitude of life. 
" 
In the `doubtful system of competition' (p. 27) which now prevailed in all professions and 
employments, there were many who failed to lay claim to `membership of the mental aristocracy' 
because of improper marriages, excessive exertion of body, impure air, sedentary habits, unhealthy 
occupations, intemperance, and immorality. Imbued in contemporary scientific theory, particularly 
Spencer's concept of the survival of the fittest and Darwin's theory of natural selection, Crichton- 
Browne concluded that as ̀ certainly as the powerful mind will rise and conquer in this struggle 
[... ] the weak or less powerful mind will be disordered or overcome' (p. 27). Those who were left by 
the wayside in the struggle for position and excellence and who thus represented a potential danger 
to society, included those `congregations' of dangerous classes consisting of men with `dwarfed 
intellects, low morals, violent passions, and degrading vices'(p. 27). Foreshadowing the therapeutic 
pessimism which was to characterise late-Victorian psychological theory and practice, Crichton- 
Browne's cynical view hinged on its inevitability and reinforces the extent to which the two 
writers were divided by fundamentally distinct theoretical interpretations of insanity. 
Yet despite conflicting interpretations of what constituted the effective treatment of 
insanity, if this was indeed at all possible, Wigan and Crichton-Browne were linked by their 
acknowledgment of a complicated relationship between modern life, depravity and insanity. 
Implicit in their comments lay a concern with the unstable boundary between moral depravity and 
mental illness; whether socially-deviant behaviors, actions and beliefs constituted insanity or 
whether they were merely symptomatic of the ̀ grossest criminality' for the which the individual 
should be held accountable. The following section will examine these issues as they were manifested 
in the commission de lunatico inquirendo instituted against William Frederick Windham in 1861. 
11 J. Crichton-Browne, `The History and Progress of Psychological Medicine', JMS, 7 (1861-62), 
p. 27. Further page references are contained within the text. On Crichton Browne see Taylor, 
Embodied Selves, p. 395. 
13: 
As we have seen, a central aspect of the debates and discussions about insanity was the 
inadequacy of existing terminology to accurately define mental disorder. Just as Esquirol's 
homicidal monomania, or partial insanity, was too loose a term to be employed in McNaughten's 
defence, moral insanity was too problematic to be employed by physicians in the Windham inquiry. 
As Gray pointed out, moral insanity had from its inception been susceptible to misinterpretation 
because of the multiple meanings of `moral'. When moral insanity was first introduced in the 
1830s, the term `moral' was interpreted under the auspices of psychology and held no ethical 
connotations. By the 1860s this was no longer the case. Whereas with Conolly the term `moral' 
signified psychological therapy, in the framework of moral insanity the term referred primarily to a 
lack of conformity to social norms. 
12 The difficulty arising out of what was perceived to be 
confusing linguistic terminology led to the petitioners' counsel in the Windham trial using the 
term unsoundness of mind instead of moral insanity, yet for legal purposes the two terms were 
essentially indicative of the same disorder. 
13 
ii. Windham: mad or bad? 
Since its construction by the Norfolk branch of the Windham family in the late-sixteenth century, 
Felbrigg Hall near Cromer had undergone successive alterations and renovations. It was in the 
nineteenth century, though, that the estate experienced unprecedented expansion. After the death 
of Admiral Windham in 1833 his son, William Howe Windham, inherited Felbrigg. Though 
educated in Norwich and at Eton, William Howe `never much cared for books', and was 
`essentially a man of the open air all his life'. 
14 Seizing every opportunity of enlarging its 
holdings, Felbrigg benefited from the `rough, unlettered'1S squire's lack of worldly concerns. For 
£65,000 in 1845 he purchased the Hanworth estate, 1500 acres of land lying to the south of 
Felbrigg Hall. 
On 9 August 1840 William Howe's wife, Lady Sophia Windham (nee Hervey), the 
youngest daughter of the first Marquess of Bristol, gave birth to their only son, William Frederick 
Windham. After being educated by a series of private tutors, Windham was sent to Eton. However 
when his father died in 1857 he returned to Felbrigg. Under the will, Windham Howe's brother, 
Major-General Charles Ashe Windham (famed for leading an assault on the Redan in 1855) and 
Lady Sophia were appointed his guardians. In the event of Windham's death, the General's sons 
12 Caplan, Psychiatry and the Community, p. 119. 
13 See Phillips, The Law concerning Idiots, p. 1-2. 
14 Robert Windham Ketton-Cremer, Felbrigg - The Story of a House (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 
1962), p. 235. 
15 The diarist Charles Greville quoted in Ketton-Cremer, Felbrigg, p. 246. 
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would succeed to the estate. When the General was sent again to India in 1857, Windham was 
made a Ward of Chancery and his two other uncles, Lord Alfred Hervey and Captain Henry 
Windham were appointed additional guardians. In 1858, Lady Sophia met and fell in love with a 
young Italian opera singer, Signor Giubilei. Windham grew up in what many agreed was an 
eccentric household. 
On 9 August, 1861, at the age of twenty-one, Windham would cease to be a ward of court 
and would inherit Felbrigg Hall and receive its annual income of £3000. Two months prior to 
attaining his majority, Windham met a young prostitute, Agnes Willoughby, at Ascot. Three 
weeks after his legal and financial independence, he married her and settled on his new wife £800 a 
year. As concerning to his relatives as the sudden marriage was the circulation of a rumour that 
Windham had decided to sell the estate's timber (at a reduced price) to an acquaintance of 
Willoughby's, `Mahogany Roberts'. Fearful that the vast Felbrigg estate would be destroyed by 
such a business transaction, between October and December 1861 the General wrote to family and 
friends requesting their support in securing a judicial inquiry, or a commission de lunatico 
inquirendo, into the state of his nephew's mind. 
Though the letters no longer exist, the responses indicate the strength of the General's 
anxieties. `My Dear Charles', Mary Chase wrote on 20 December, `I lose not a moment in 
answering your letter. Most heartily do we join in the prayer of the petition [... ] Oh how we hope 
you will succeed & wish that Felbrigg were yours. It makes me quite sick to think of all the fine old 
trees being cut down'. 
16 The vicar of Wadhurst in Sussex, John Foley, wrote that though he had 
not seen Windham since he was a little boy, `I say that no sane person could act as he has done & 
if you ask my opinion I don't hesitate to say that I think it is your duty [... ] to lose no time in 
taking means to put him under some restraint'. 
17 Another respondent, Robert Hook, replied that 
the course you propose taking is the only one that can save our unfortunate nephew [... ] 
from absolute ruin, and is thus as humane as it is wise. Should you succeed in getting a 
committee of management of his property [... ] I only hope it will [... ] thus annul and 
cancel the acts he has already done, which proved he is not and was not in a state of mind 
to have charge of his own affairs. 
' 8 
16 NNRO: MC 580 (MS33514). The letters and various anonymous newspaper cuttings are pasted 
into a volume (with no page numbers) owned by Peter Hansell, the Norwich-based solicitor who had 
acted for the petitioners. It is held at the Norwich and Norfolk Record Office in the Hansell Family 
Papers Collection. 
17 NNRO: MC 580 (MS33514). 
18 NNRO: MC 580 (MS33514). 
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Secure in the knowledge of support, fifteen members of Windham's family, led by the 
General, brought a petition to the Court of Chancery in November 1861. Making out a prima 
facie case on the ground that Windham was morally insane, an inquisition was ordered. Opposing 
the petition, Windham (now officially an `alleged lunatic') maintained the right to request that the 
case be heard before a special jury. Should the jury find Windham a lunatic, there were two options 
available to the petitioners. One was to make an application for the appointment of a committee of 
the person. While many witnesses were brought to London by the prosecutors to testify to 
Windham's inability to manage himself, it was clearly a desire of the petitioners (on a successful 
outcome of the commission) to bring a formal application for the appointment of a committee of 
the estate. Should this in turn be successful, Windham would be considered incapable of managing 
his property and Felbrigg Hall would revert to the control of Windham's guardians including the 
General himself. 
On 16 December 1861 in the Court of Exchequer in Westminster, and presided over by 
the Master of Lunacy, Samuel Warren, the inquiry began. The petitioners' counsel, Mr Chambers, 
sought to prove that Windham was mad by presenting a personal history that would convince the 
jury of his inability to look after his property. While his piece de resistance would be the expert 
testimony of several of the most acclaimed physicians of the day, he began by producing a string of 
witnesses who would attest to Windham's antecedent history of strange and immoral behavior; 
behavior which resulted, he argued, from moral insanity. Windham's defence counsel, Mr Hugh 
Cairns, argued that although his client may have been eccentric and morally depraved, he was 
certainly not mad. Cairns also requested the testimony of many witnesses, including other 
eminent physicians, who testified to his sanity. 
Much attention was given over to detailing Windham's eccentric upbringing. Recognising 
the importance of Windham's early years in making a case for his unsoundness of mind, Chambers 
opened for the petitioners by setting out a picture of Windham as a rowdy and strange boy, unlike 
other children. Chambers pointedly drew the attention of the jury to Windham's fondness for `low 
company and low pursuits'. 
19 One striking aspect of Windham's behavior was his predilection, 
continued into adulthood, for dressing up and play acting. As Chambers derisively noted, 
Windham's wish to wait at the dining room table and to wash dishes was encouraged by his father, 
who `actually purchased for him the livery of a footman that he might act as the menial he desired 
to be'(p. 4). Hoping that removal to boarding school would stem his propensity to mingle with 
servants, Windham was sent to Eton. It was there, according to the testimony of a prosecution 
witness, that he gained the epithet `Mad Windham'. He was removed from Eton in 1857. 
19 An Inquiry into the State of Mind of W. F. Windham of Felbrigg Hall, Norfolk (London: W. 
Oliver, 1861), p. 4. Further page references are contained within the text. 
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Windham's conduct was so extraordinary and according to Chambers ̀so inconsistent 
with the power of taking reasonable care of himself'(p. 4), that responsibility for his education was 
transferred to private tutors, including a Mr Cheale. Giving evidence for the petitioners, Cheale 
stated that he had discovered in his pupil an extraordinary deficiency of mental power. Windham 
was unable, Cheale thought, to distinguish between truth and falsehood and more dangerously was 
unconscious of the real character of the lies he often told. Windham's regular use of foul and 
profane language made him an unwelcome guest among ladies. On one occasion in Torquay 
Windham broke out into a violent passion at a party and without provocation seized an unknown 
gentleman and flung him against a wall. Remonstrating with him, Mr Cheale stated to the jury 
that his pupil's response was to utter a ̀ loud unmeaning laugh, which showed at once that he was 
not responsible for his acts'(p. 5). To the fascinated delight of the public during the trial, it was 
revealed that while at Felbrigg Windham was in the habit of gorging himself, devouring his food 
more like a brute than a ̀ rational being'(p. 5). He often vomited at the dining table, abused and 
insulted the staff in the kitchen, acted like a buffoon, and screeched and howled regardless of the 
company he was keeping. 
Windham displayed an acute fascination for the railways, an interest that was also used by 
Chambers to construct a case for his unsoundness of mind. While still under the care of Mr 
Cheale, Windham purchased a railway whistle and took to using it in his room, `shutting the door 
as if it were the door of a railway carriage, and acting as if he were a railway guard'(p. 9). 
Requesting the purchase of a guard's uniform, this `unfortunate propensity'(p. 6) made him a 
fixture at the local railway station, where he volunteered to assist passengers with their luggage and 
blow the whistle to start the Great Eastern train. Windham's predilection for trains drew 
particular attention from the press. As Punch mockingly noted with relief, `what an escape some of 
the public have had, and what an escape that fast young men have had; either from getting 
themselves, together with the passengers, smashed, or getting sentenced to penal servitude for 
manslaughter'. 
20 Dressing up as a railway guard was only one of the many disguises Windham 
delighted in. Possibly because of his uncle's profession, he was also interested in the military and 
demanded that everyone, including the local Norwich police, call him Captain Windham. Similarly 
he demanded that the local police converse with him as if he were a detective. 
Upon the General's return to England in 1861, he took the unusual step of overseeing 
Windham's removal to London three months before he was to come of age. Believing that his 
nephew might respond favourably to independence, Windham was installed in a boarding house in 
Duke Street owned by the Llewellens with instructions to behave like a gentleman. The couple 
described to the jury the disorderly behavior and bizarre eating habits (consuming seventeen eggs 
for breakfast) of their boarder. Despite his uncle's injunction to act like a gentleman, Windham 
20 `Amateur Engine-Drivers', Punch, 11 January, 1862, p. 13. 
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began to visit the Haymarket, an area frequented by prostitutes. Dressing up as a police constable, 
he delighted in rounding up women as they left saloons. This fact might well have heightened 
public fascination with one of the prosecution's key arguments for Windham's unsoundness of 
mind: his marriage to Ann Agnes Willoughby. 
Willoughby, the `blond horsewoman'21 had come to London from Hampshire and made an 
immediate impact in circles frequenting the Queen's Hunt. Prior to her marriage, she had been 
looked after by several men including a James Garton. Though he had allegedly installed her in a 
villa in St Johns Wood, she had been lured away by the attentions of the Vicar-General of 
Canterbury. During this period, though, she was also seen in the company of James ̀ Mahogany' 
Roberts, a proprietor of a smart gambling house and, importantly, a sometime timber merchant. 
22 
As it was stated in court by a Mr Martin, who had lately been the Bailiff at Felbrigg, early in 1861 
Windham had found a series of Times articles and letters on `pretty horsebreakers' `capital' reading. 
Furthermore, he had allegedly admitted to the bailiff that he would prefer to marry a ̀ pretty- 
horsebreaker' than a lady. This is precisely what he did, soon after meeting Willoughby during 
Ascot week in 1861. Though her marriage to Windham was used to illustrate his mental imbecility, 
it also acted to draw attention to the apparently scheming nature of both prostitutes and their 
protectors. The tabloid and broadsheet press coverage of the trial both relished in presenting her as 
a designing woman. Though admittedly she was a ̀ pretty Horsebreaker' she was equally a 
`worthless woman', a ̀ strumpet', and a ̀ notorious woman'. 
23 
In turning from Windham's upbringing to his relationship, Chambers argued Windham's 
marriage to a woman so far removed from his own station reflected both his unsoundness of mind 
and a serious financial threat to the security of the estate. In the affidavits presented to the Lord 
Justices prior to the petition being heard, it was evident that Windham's wife's desire for an 
opulent lifestyle was seen to represent severe financial constraints for Windham. Representing 
Lady Sophia, Mr Cole explained to the court that selling the timber was the only means that 
Windham saw to allow his wife to live in the luxury that she desired. The designs of `Mahogany' 
Roberts on the estate were at the heart of the Petitioners' concerns and central to Chambers' legal 
strategy. 
To make a sufficient case, Chambers, on behalf of the petitioners, needed to prove that 
Windham suffered from unsoundness of mind and had done so since childhood. To this end, much 
of the month-long trial was taken up with evidence from many people who had known Windham as 
21 Hampstead Express and North London Advertiser, 4 December, 1861, p. 2. 
22 Donald MacAndrew, `Mr and Mrs Windham', The Saturday Book, ed. by Leonard Russell (New 
York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 194. 
23 Morning Post, 6 December, 1861, p. 4; Daily Telegraph, 27 December, 1861, p. 5; Daily News, 31 
January, 1862, p. 4. 
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a child and as a young man. Witnesses included railway inspectors, housemaids, gardeners, 
landlords, and policemen. While it was hoped by the petitioners that these witnesses would 
persuade the jury that Windham was insane, it fell to expert medical witnesses to illustrate the 
relationship between Windham's bizarre behavior as a child and as a young man and his madness. 
Their testimony was crucial to the outcome of the trial and crucial in entrenching in the popular 
mind a fear of the profession of mental science. 
iii. Psychological physicians 
In order to prove that Windham was insane, Chambers brought to the witness stand three 
eminent physicians, Forbes Benignus Winslow, Thomas Mayo, and Dr. Southey. While the details 
of Windham's private life (his venereal disease and his acceptance of an intimate relationship 
between his wife and Roberts) were salacious enough to heighten the public interest in the case, of 
more importance here is the manner in which the physicians interpreted Windham's erratic 
behavior. Winslow had examined Windham in mid-December upon the request of the Lord Justices. 
In highlighting Windham's apparent insensibility to shame and impassive reaction to his wife's 
indecent conduct, Winslow concluded that Windham was not `in a state of mind to realize his 
moral obligation [and to realize that his reaction to his wife's behavior] [... ] was contrary to the 
usage of society-. 
24 Such behavior indicated a striking `absence of moral sense-25 on Windham's 
behalf. To the amusement of the public, Winslow attributed it to amentia, an intermediate 
condition between idiocy (signified by an absence of development in the mental and moral powers) 
and lunacy. 
26 A synonym for congenital imbecility (signified by an incomplete development of the 
mental and moral powers), Winslow explained that such a condition did not necessarily require 
confinement. However, concluding that the young squire was ̀ a person of unsound mind, 
incapable of managing himself or his affairs'(p. 68) he recommended that Windham be subject to 
supervisory control and in this way `be able to conduct himself with propriety'(p. 71). 
The second medical witness was Thomas Mayo. As we have seen, Mayo believed that 
insanity was always, however subtly, accompanied by a lesion of the intellect. He thus objected to 
the doctrine of moral insanity because it conferred irresponsibility and because it collapsed the 
boundary between vice and insanity. Like Gray, Mayo was a proponent of a `punishing legal 
24 NNRO: WCK 4/29/17, p. 12. Transcripts of proceedings, 1-15 January, 1862. The trial 
transcripts and proceedings, as well as associated miscellaneous papers, are held at the Norwich and 
Norfolk Record Office in the Hansell Family Papers Collection. 
25 NNRO: WCK 4/29/17, p. 28. 
26 A derisive letter from `Pneumatics' employed Cicero to undermine the `nice distinction now 
drawn by certain eminent psychological physicians' between amentia and dementia. Evening Standard, 
6 January, 1862, p. 2. 
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system'. 
27 Viewing the insane as fit objects for punishment, Mayo was particularly alarmed by the 
problems posed by the earliest stage of insanity, when the intellect was not yet impaired and when 
the disease was perceptible only in motives and actions. In an article republished in the American 
Journal of Insanity only months before the Windham trial, he argued that an individual in this 
stage of the disease 
may destroy the comforts of his family and ruin their fortunes and his own; he may have 
become a bad father, a savage husband, a profligate and licentious member of society, and a 
total change of character may have occurred [... ] but no false perceptions, no amount of 
delirium or incoherency may have given evidence that he is mad [... ] here is a difficulty 
which must not be overlooked. 
28 
For the protection of society, a patient who exhibited these moral symptoms of insanity should be 
subject to coercion and surveillance. It was such sentiments which positioned Mayo as a vital 
witness for Chambers in his attempt to prove that Windham was unfit to manage both himself and 
his affairs. 
Mayo explained to the jury that when he examined Windham, he ̀ could see in him a very 
weak intellect and a very impure mind'. 
29 Along with Winslow, the physician's attention was 
most attracted to WinýýoM 's description of his relations with his wife. Explaining that he did not 
differ from Winslow's judgment of the case, Mayo concluded that Windham was unfit to manage 
himself or his affairs as a result of severe unsoundness of mind. While in other cases all that was 
needed to secure safety to the patient and his relations was gentle restraint from friends and 
relatives, ̀ when the disease has reached the point developed in Mr. Windham it becomes 
uncontrollable and defies the obligations of decency and society'(p. 73). Like Winslow, Mayo did 
not advise placing Windham in a lunatic asylum. Rather, he should be placed in the hands ̀ of a 
person who would prevent him meddling with affairs'(p. 73). When cross-examined by Karslake, 
Mayo was forced to admit that unsoundness of mind was a fitter subject for description than for 
definition although he firmly restated that moral obliquity, supposing it to mean perversion, was 
one element in the proof of unsoundness of mind. On what was hoped by the prosecution would be 
a triumphant authoritative note, Chambers closed their case. As he hoped to have demonstrated 
through the testimony of numerous witnesses, Windham's appetites, affections, and propensities 
indicated that he was of unsound mind and wholly incapable of managing his affairs. 
27 Roger Smith, Trial by Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1981), p-56- 
28 ̀ Dr. Thomas Mayo on the Moral Phenomena of Insanity and Eccentricity', AJI, 18 (1861-1862), 
pp-81-89 (p. 81). 
29 NNRO: WCK 4/29/26, p. 32. 
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In his opening speech for the defendant, Hugh Cairns turned to his client's obvious 
eccentricities. ̀It was natural for any only child', he declared, 
with no brothers and sisters, with no companions of his own age, with no companions 
whatever except tutors whom he disliked, eagerly to embrace the opportunity of 
frequenting the society of those who were to be found about the house and stables [... ] He 
had a great power of imitating the Norfolk dialect, and representations and pantomimes 
seen on the stage. He had a great power of imitating the acts and conduct of other people, 
and he used it in a way which very likely was pleasant to himself, but sometimes not to 
those who were associated with him. (p. 80) 
Seeking to challenge the relationship between mental imbecility and eccentricity which Chambers 
had so carefully constructed, Cairns forced Cheale to admit that many young men were fond of the 
railway and it did not necessarily indicate a deficiency of mental power. By far the most powerful 
testimony had come from the three physician's descriptions of Windham's behavior. To counter 
Winslow's and Mayo's declarations of Windham's mental incapacity, the defence also brought to 
the bar a number of physicians including John Conolly, Dr Harrington Tuke (Conolly's son-in- 
law), Edward Seymour, for eight years one of the metropolitan commissioners in lunacy, and Dr 
William Charles Hood, the Superintendent of Bethlem Hospital. 
Harrington Tuke, the first medical witness, declared that he knew `all the characteristics of 
idiocy'. Windham, he concluded, was `certainly not an idiot, nor could it ever enter my mind that 
he is an imbecile when I consider his powers of observation, the manner in which he instructed his 
solicitor, and his delicacy in conversation'. (p. 102) Countering the defence's suggestion that 
Windham's propensity to he was a sign of madness, Seymour did `not accept falsehoods as proofs of 
insanity'. Arguing that Windham had `mind enough to take care of himself and his property', he 
suggested that as Windham's strange conduct was contracted merely through `vulgar and bad 
habits' his behavior would naturally improve if he mixed in `good society'(p. 107). Seymour did not 
accept moral insanity. `No amount of what-is called eccentricity would', he continued, `amount to 
insanity. If a young nobleman were to choose to act as a sweep [... ) I should not therefore consider 
him of unsound mind'(p. 108). 
Like Seymour, Hood had examined Windham and concluded that his responses to the 
physician's questions were `coherent, consequent, and rational throughout'(p. 155). Adamant that 
Windham was not suffering from amentia, Hood directly undercut the medical validity of 
Winslow-'s testimony by declaring amentia an `exploded' term which had become obsolete and no 
longer recognised. Windham was of `sound mind'(p. 155). Sutherland's testimony similarly 
challenged Winslow's diagnosis of mental imbecility. Though he felt that Windham was ̀ rather 
below the average in point of intellect, [... ] he does not at all approach the line where imbecility 
begins' and was `of sound mind'(p. 171). John Conolly similarly indicated to the jury that when he 
examined Windham in order to ascertain the state of his mind, he found `not the slightest 
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peculiarity' in his demeanour. `Cheerful, frank, and gentlemanly', Windham was according to 
Conolly `assuredly not in an imbecile state'(p. 172). Rather, his `misfortune has been since 
childhood to have been surrounded by improper persons. He has the capacity to manage his 
affairs'(p. 173). Conolly made clear his opinion that Windham's was ̀ a most instructive case, as 
showing the ill effects of improper treatment and neglect in youth'(p. 173). All of the physicians 
called to testify for the defence concurred in the belief that Windham was of sound mind. 
Though as we have seen Mayo objected to the doctrine of moral insanity, this did not 
prevent Cairns from describing him as the `standard-bearer and champion of the theory of moral 
insanity -a theory always repudiated by the Bench by the law of England'(p. 94). Considering the 
importance of the medical testimony to both sides, it would be surprising if Cairns did not know 
that Mayo was one of the most virulent critics of moral insanity. The attention Cairns thus paid 
to what he described as Mayo's `curious and unfair reasoning'(p. 94) was in all likelihood a 
deliberate strategy which sought to play on the fears of the jury. It indicates, furthermore, that 
moral insanity was presumed by Cairns to be familiar to the lay-jury. In his summation of the case 
for the defence, Karslake returned to moral insanity: 
I trust the jury will give no countenance to the theory of moral insanity, which, though 
dear to Dr. Mayo and the petitioners, has always been scouted and repudiated by the law 
and the bench of England. Mr. Windham has committed many bad actions, but he is not 
therefore insane. (p. 182) 
According to Karslake, the doctrine of the petitioners was monstrous. He questioned where the 
line was to be drawn between profligacy, vice and insanity. If eccentricities of behavior were 
indicative of madness, he argued that `the Divorce court ought to be abolished, and lunatic asylums 
to be built for adulterers and adulteresses'(p. 182). 
Warning the jury not to be influenced by Mayo's and Winslow's recommendation of 
surveillance rather than incarceration, Karslake suggested that the `object of the petitioners, 
however it may be described, is to immure Mr. Windham in a madhouse for life'(p. 182) Seeking to 
establish a connection between the jury and his client, Karslake pleaded with them to `recollect that 
they were once young themselves'(p. 182) and might have conducted themselves in a way that they 
were now embarrassed to admit to. In enjoining their sympathy for a young man whose liberty, 
`which is dearer to him than life'(p. 183) had been threatened and who had been wrongfully subject 
to the gaze of a ̀ curious and gaping public'(p. 182), Karslake concluded his closing speech by 
confidently asserting that he should not appeal to the jury `in vain to draw the line between folly 
and insanity, between profligacy, however great and lamentable, and unsoundness of mind'(p. 183). 
In his closing speech on behalf of the petitioners, Chambers sought to counter what he 
viewed as the fallacious testimony of Cairns's expert medical witnesses. Acting more in the spirit 
of an attorney than a disinterested scientific witness, Chambers argued that Harrington Tuke's 
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testimony was undermined by his belief that had Windham given away all of his property he would 
be considered an imbecile. Likewise, Seymour, the `general consoler' was of the `opinion that all the 
lunatic asylums [... ] might be swept away [... ] with great advantage to the community'(p. 189). 
Because Sutherland did not recognise the intermediate state between idiocy and lunacy `his evidence 
cannot be regarded as of the least importance in the present case'(p. 189). Conolly was simply `too 
good-natured' and as one of the `kindest men living', it was unsurprising that he hesitated to place 
Windham in an asylum. In summing up their medical testimony, he argued that the 
doctors who have appeared for Mr. Windham are partisans of that strange theory that all 
the weakness, all the imbecility, all the extraordinary conduct of the alleged lunatic, is to 
be ascribed to a defective or neglected education [... ] There cannot be a greater fallacy than 
the one involved in this argument. (p. 189) 
In contrast, the medical testimony of Mayo and Winslow was ̀ complete and conclusive' in 
establishing `beyond a shadow of a doubt that he [Windham] is in a state and condition of mind 
which entitles him and his property to the protection of the Sovereign'(pp. 189-90). 
Chambers challenged Cairns's argument that the petitioners were acting from base and 
cruel motives. He argued that his clients had been compelled to institute the inquiry `by 
considerations of common humanity'(p. 190) in order to protect Windham from the destruction 
that his actions would cause. To Chambers, Windham `must be saved [... ] from ruin of health and 
character, from disease and wretchedness of life, from disgrace, from scorn, [and] from 
repulsion'(p. 197). With such evocative sentiments, he closed the case of the petitioners. In his 
summation of the inquiry, Samuel Warren commented that the `general body of the evidence which 
has been brought forward presents a marvellous conflict and contradiction'(p. 200). The jury had to 
decide 
between the theory of the petitioners that Mr. Windham's is a case of congenital 
deficiency of intellect, and that of the defence, that his mental condition is simply the 
result of neglected education. (p. 200) 
The most striking absence in the witness stand throughout the inquiry was Windham himself. On 
a number of occasions Cairns had requested that Windham testify in open court. However 
believing that this would not be in the interest of the public, and that it might lead to `hostile 
actions for slander'(p. 201), Warren requested that the jury interview Windham in private. On 28 
January, 1862, the thirty-fourth day of the inquiry, after having spoken with Windham the jury 
returned with the verdict that Windham was of sound mind and was capable of taking care of 
himself and his affairs. With Mill's essay On Liberty (1859) relatively fresh in the minds of 
interested observers, it was unsurprising that Mill's conception of eccentricity, publicity and 
public opinion were central in journalistic analysis of the perceived iniquities of the Windham 
inquiry. 
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iv. `Who is not mad? ' 
In 1861 John H. Brenten published The Tragedy of Life being Records of Remarkable phases of 
lunacy kept by a Physician. The first volume included a story narrated by a physician specialising in 
insanity which detailed the descent into madness of a young and wealthy man, Lawrence Tremlett. 
Well-born, good-looking, and possessed of the natural gift of pleasing, for years Tremlett 
presented ̀ no resemblance to the popular idea of a madman'. 
30 He met and married a young 
woman, Marion St. Maur, who gave birth to their son. However, it becomes clear that Tremlett 
has a ̀ perverted appetite'(p. 77). Examining Tremlett, the narrator concludes that his patient's 
`moral delusions were numerous, and his sentiments were very much perverted, his state 
resembling that which has been vaguely described as "moral insanity"' (p. 189). Two years later, the 
narrator reads in the paper that a commission de lunatico inquirendo had been instituted against 
Tremlett by his family. He notes that the inquiry into the state of Tremlett's mind aroused 
interest because there was ̀ considerable property at stake'(p. 204). 
The narrator is asked to testify on behalf of the prosecution and the passages detailing his 
preparation are important in reflecting the disquiet of physicians who are requested to give expert 
medical testimony. Foreshadowing the problems attendant on the definition and interpretation of 
moral insanity in the Windham inquiry, the narrator remains a reluctant witness: 
I need hardly say that the position of a medical witness is not in any case one to be envied 
in our profession; but when a physician is called upon to give evidence upon abstract 
questions where the best authorities differ considerably, it becomes still less so. Add to 
this there existed [... ] a strong prejudice in the minds of ordinary juries, and of the public 
generally, against those who are termed "experts" or "specialists, " and it will be conceded 
that my reluctance was not an unnatural sentiment. (p. 230) 
Though the passages t 
twhich the physician rehearses for the impending trial under the guidance of an 
Irish barrister are amusing they reveal the extent of the narrator's anxiety. He is taught how to 
respond to the defence counsel's arguments and how to ensure that his opinions have been properly 
understood. To this end he is instructed to use the phrase ̀ unsound mind' because the term "moral 
insanity" was a term'too vague'(p. 271). Despite explaining to the jury that Tremlett's `judgment 
was habitually warped, his emotions perverted, his impulses cruel, and his feelings callous and 
inaccessible to influences and motive which weighed with other men'(pp. 271-72), Tremlett's 
defence counsel achieved success. His client was found by the jury to be of sane mind and capable of 
managing his own affairs. The story concludes with the death of Tremlett and the marriage of 
Marion to Tremlett's barrister. 
30 John H. Brenten, The Tragedy of Life: Being Records of Remarkable Phases of Lunacy, kept by a 
Physician, 2 vols (London: Smith, Elder, 1861), 1, p. 197. Further page references are contained within 
the text. 
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Though one might infer from the absence of any mention of the story in any of the 
newspapers and journals covering the Windham case that A Tragedy was not widely acclaimed or 
even read, a reviewer in the Journal of Mental Science was quick to praise Brenten's work: 
Many authors have introduced madness into their works of fiction in moderated 
proportions, as the great musical composers make use of dischord; but Mr. Brenten's work 
is altogether on this subject - it is a whole opera in a minor key, or a whole gallery of 
Fuselli's paintings [... ] Few subjects, indeed, afford more scope for the skill of the 
accomplished word-painter than the lights and shades of mental infirmity-31 
While the reviewer thought that Balzac and Dumas both wrote `exquisite' delineations of 
monomania, the fictional rendering of moral insanity was encumbered by difficulties that few 
writers could overcome. Too few of the results were `wholesome to look upon' being derived from a 
`vitiated taste which induced the dandys of a former age to pay their twopences to see the poor 
lunatics in Bedlam, or which recently led lady visitors to Dr. Khan's museum of anatomical 
obscenities' (p. 145) . 
In contrast, the way in which Brenten examined moral perversion and explored the 
dilemmas for physicians requested to give expert testimony in medico-legal trials, was ̀ pure and 
good' and evidenced a ̀ profound' knowledge of the subject. It might therefore be read by the most 
`accomplished specialist' not only for amusement but for instruction (p. 148). Brenten's history of 
Tremlett's life-long hereditary insanity (his mother was sensationally discovered languishing in a 
lunatic asylum), represents a unique fictional addition to the factual medical accounts of moral 
insanity. It is important both for the way it strikingly foreshadowed the heightened anxieties 
surrounding the fine line upon which the expert witness had to tread in giving testimony in 
medico-legal court cases and illuminating the difficulties inherent in diagnosing moral insanity. 
As Mayo wrote of the term moral insanity, there was no `subject in which the inability of language 
to make good practical distinctions is more felt than in this [... ] It expresses the tendencies of the 
rules to be laid down, rather than the exact occasion for their application'. 
32 
To interested observers, the contradictory testimony of physicians during the Windham 
commission highlighted fundamental defects in the lunacy laws. Many newspaper columns were 
given over to discussing the value of the physicians' expert intervention, not least because of the 
vast expense incurred in employing them. 
33 Even within the courtroom the validity of medical 
31 JMS, 7 (1861-62), p. 145. Further page references are contained within the text. 
32 AJI, 18 (1861-62), p. 82. 
33 When deciding whether the case should be heard in Norfolk, Middlesex or London, the Lord 
Justices were eventually swayed by the expense in bringing physicians to court to provide expert 
medical testimony. As Cole explained, `not one of these gentlemen will go down [to Norfolk or 
Middlesex] under 150 or 200 guineas'. NNRO: WCK 4/29/4, p. 5. 
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testimony was disputed. Mr Bacon (co-counsel on behalf of the petitioners) felt that the `value of 
such evidence before a jury [... ] is nothing in such a case as this. There may be cases so doubtful 
[... ] as that it is worthwhile to resort to scientific evidence [... ] This is not a case of that sort - it 
is a case of fact'. 
34 The Daily Telegraph was one of many papers to ridicule medical testimony. `So 
various, so complicated, and so contradictory are the evidences of mental aberration, that many 
eminent psychologists have adopted as a starting point, not the question, "Who is mad? " but 
rather that of "Who is not mad? ,, 
35 
The Evening Standard was no less critical of the way in which the trial exposed the dangers 
of physicians' hazardous authority: 
It is the doctors, and not judges or juries, who decide whether a man has committed 
murder by poison. It is the doctors, and neither the Chancellor, nor the Masters in 
Lunacy, nor juries, who decide whether a man is insane or not. In both these cases the 
doctors almost usurp the functions of the jury. 
36 
Even more suspiciously, the paper thought, `doctors create a new species of insanity [amentia], 
unknown to the law, and then pronounce a man of unsound mind because he comes within their 
definition'. Underlying such criticism was the belief that in extending the terms of the 
`Inquisition' to include the little heard of amentia, physicians had injudiciously `extended the law 
immensely'. Equating partial idiocy with partial insanity, `they blend them altogether, and then 
they draw what is, in fact, a metaphysical rather than a medical conclusion'. The Evening Standard 
was most alarmed at the dangers of entrusting the law to physicians rather than to authorised and 
recognised law-makers. Complaining of the confusion that would inevitably arise in the minds of 
the jury, the result `of such a mode of giving medical evidence, if absolute authority is given to it, 
is to take the matter literally out of the hands of the jury, and to land them hand and foot in the 
grasp of the medical witnesses'. The paper was not alone in highlighting the spectre of `scientific 
dictatorship in medical men in matters of mixed law and science'. 
37 
Amidst declarations of support, warning notes were sounded. There were distinct 
divisions of opinion regarding what lessons, if any, could be learnt from the Windham inquiry. 
One article in The Times had argued that the administration and expense that had attended the 
Windham commission was ridiculous and unnecessary; Windham should have been incarcerated in 
an asylum or should never have been subjected to the commission. To a writer in the Cornhill 
34 NNRO: WCK 4/29/4, p. 7. 
35 Daily Telegraph, 27 December, 1861, p. 4. 
36 Evening Standard, 3 January, 1862, p. 4. 
37 Evening Standard, 3 January, 1862, p. 4. 
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Magazine, The Times article represented a ̀ cavalier and presumptuous way of treating really 
difficult and interesting questions'. 
38 While he agreed that the expense of the inquiry was 
`monstrous' and felt that the case was ̀ disgusting' in its revelation of salacious details, he felt that 
it nevertheless was important in raising a number of questions including how accurately and 
adequately to define madness, how to determine what evidence should be admissible in 
commissions, and what to do with men and women who were eccentric but clearly not mad? The 
writer believed that the case exposed the disadvantages engendered by the present incomplete state 
of science, medical knowledge and moral philosophy, especially as it related to the problematic 
diagnosis of moral insanity. 
As the Windham trial sensationally demonstrated, it was both impossible distinctly to 
draw a line between sanity and madness and to allow for the clinical existence of a middle ground 
because the `elementary principles of prudence and morals' remained ̀ ill-defined'. The writer clearly 
supported the jury's decision to exonerate Windham from the taint of insanity. The conduct of 
`the miserable creature whose infirmities so long disgusted all the newspaper readers in the 
kingdom was like the conduct of a madman, but it did not in itself prove madness'. 
39 Though the 
spectre of people squandering their money and pestering their friends and society would be ever 
present, this was not too high a price to pay for individual liberty and `the benefits [... ] which 
eccentricity confers on mankind'. 
40 Though commissions were necessary, ̀for lunatics cannot be 
left at large', 
no one who knows anything of the administration of justice, and of the crochets and bias 
[sic] of skilled witnesses, would ever listen for an instant to the proposal to put the 
liberty and property of suspected lunatics at the mercy of a set of mad doctors. Either they 
would shut up everyone who was extravagant and vicious, or else they would fall into 
radical dissension, each man standing up for his own theory. In either case, the security to 
the public would be utterly destroyed. 
41 
The issue of Windham's insanity or sanity featured in coverage of the trial. Many writers 
concurred with the Cornhill writer in criticising the doctrine of moral insanity. The Morning Post 
was sure that though Windham was foolish, he was not mad: 
In the name of common sense we protest against the doctrine that infatuation for, or even 
marriage with, a worthless woman, and extravagance lavished on a bride, purchased at such 
38 ̀ Commissions of Lunacy', Cornhill Magazine, 5 (February 1862), pp. 220-232 (p. 220). 
39 ̀ Commissions of Lunacy', p. 228. 
40 ̀ Commissions of Lunacy', p. 221. 
41 ̀ Commissions of Lunacy, p. 229. 
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a fearful sacrifice, is to be deemed insanity. If so, Bedlam and St. Luke's, Hanwell and 
Colney hatch [sic] may set about building additional wings with all convenient speed. 42 
The Daily Telegraph recognised the inherent difficulties in drawing a line between eccentricity and 
madness. Attempting to situate the Windham case in a wider frame of reference, the paper drew a 
comparison between Windham and the eccentric character of Daniel Quilp in Charles Dickens's 
The Old Curiosity Shop (1840-41). 43 The paper's position regarding the Windham case was made 
stark by such a comparison. Despite his marrying a ̀ strumpet' and being an allegedly ̀ egregious 
liar', it remained difficult `to arrive at the conclusion that Windham is either a sheer madman or a 
hopeless idiot [... ] If all the liars, the mendacious braggarts and boasters in this metropolis were 
placed under lock and key, would not Bedlam, and St. Lukes, Hanwell and Colney Hatch, require 
enormous additional space? '44 `The most that we can do', the paper concluded at the end of the 
trial, is `to check gross and manifest violations of the law, [and] to place restraint upon those who 
can palpably and indubitably be pronounced lunatics. 
45 
Twenty-four days into the inquiry, The Times described the Windham case as ̀ one of 
those loose collateral proceedings which have no root in our old law, and which vegetated in the 
rankness of a system having no part of the nature of our Constitution, and no sympathy with our 
law's jealousy of the liberty of the subject'. 
46 As the article indicated, the inquiry was seen to 
symbolically threaten anyone's individual liberty: `This man cannot by law be merely shut up as a 
prodigal, and he could not be shut up as a madman without endangering the liberty and the 
property of every man in the country'. `ý7 In the face of an incessant onslaught of `wearisome 
details of filth and folly' the Daily News similarly reminded its readers not to forget the `vital 
importance of the issue, when on the verdict of the jury depends not only the personal liberty of 
42 Morning Post, 6 December, 1861, p. 4. Recalling Mill's comments in On Liberty, the paper felt that 
publicity was the `very soul of justice; it steadies the balance; and judge, counsel, and jury are all the 
more cautious for it'. 
43 Like Windham, Quilp exhibited many peculiarities of conduct, including eating egg shells. The 
comparison also turned on Quilp's unscrupulous legal advisor's desire for his client to be subject to `a 
pretty little Commission de lunatico'. See Charles Dickens, The Old Curiosity Shop (London: 
Everyman, 1997), p. 285. 
44 Daily Telegraph, 27 December, 1861, p. 5. 
45 Daily Telegraph, 1 March, 1862, p. 4. For a satirical summation of the Law Lord's proposals see 
Punch, 8 March, 1862, p. 92. 
46 The Times, 21 January, 1862, p. 6. 
47 The Times, 21 January, 1862, p. 6. 
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one of the QUEEN'S subjects, but of the establishment of a leading precedent'. 
48 Believing that 
the crucial test of insanity lay in an interview with Windham himself, the paper objected to what 
the Lancet described as the ̀ totally irrelevant'49 evidence given by witnesses, many of whom were 
according to the Telegraph ̀curious, contemptible, base, intriguing, and guilty'. 
50 
The announcement of Windham's sanity was met in the courtroom by `loud 
cheers'(p. 202). It was widely believed that a ̀ sacred principle of English law-' had been upheld in the 
face of physicians and `hunting lawyers [... ] forgetting the dignity of their profession'. 
51 Several 
papers were quick to caution Windham against misinterpreting the overwhelming public support 
for the verdict. To the Telegraph, it was wholly accidental that the inquiry had ̀ linked his name by 
accident with an important principle of justice'. His triumph was merely the `defeat of a dangerous 
coalition'. 
52 The Daily News, too, hoped Windham `would receive the verdict of the jury, not as 
conferring a new license to a life of vanity, but rather as the indulgent voice of the law, and in a 
certain sense also of the public [... ] inviting him to reflect at this crisis of his existence, and make 
a vigorous effort to render himself worthy of the opportunities which his birth and possessions 
confer'. 
53 
One overarching problem exposed by the papers centred on the inadequacies of the English 
lunacy statutes. On the continent a medico-legal law existed which recognised an intermediate 
condition between sanity and insanity. In such cases the `prodigal' was not relieved of his property 
or liberty but was assigned to an advisor. In England, one was either insane or sane. Many 
believed that under the circumstances surrounding the Windham case, ̀the inquiry was one utterly 
unsuited to the tribunal to which it was subjected': 
every one felt wounded in his sense of right by the lavish waste, even to confiscation, of 
the property of a man who had committed no public crime; and that human nature itself 
shrank from the spectacle of fee'd advocates, with their clutch upon a human subject [... ] 
48 Daily News, 16 January, 1862, p. 4. 
49 Lancet, (1862) i, p. 125. 
50 Daily Telegraph, 31 January, 1862, p. 4. 
51 Daily Telegraph, 31 January, 1862, p. 4. 
52 Daily Telegraph, 31 January, 1862, p. 4. 
53 Daily News, 31 January, 1862, p. 4. 
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This is not like the car of justice. It is more like the car of JUGGERNAUT, crushing its 
victims as it rolls. 
54 
Though the paper argued that the public should be indebted to the Windham inquiry for destroying 
`one of the few remaining strongholds of injustice which exist in the wild and tangled territory of 
the law', 
55 it reserved more general criticism for the commission de lunatico inquirendo. It was a 
drawn-out and expensive process which was ̀ more ingeniously contrived for insuring an 
untrustworthy decision at an immense cost than could be devised by the cleverest lawyer of the 
day'. 56 The one consolation, noted the Norfolk News, was that if Windham's estate was to be 
inevitably squandered, ̀ its proceeds would do no less harm to morality, and quite as much service 
to society, by circulating through the channels of lawyers, doctors, and witnesses of all sorts, as 
57 
they would have done through the heroines of the Haymarket'. 
v. Overview 
The newspaper editorials and journal articles discussed above indicate that the Windham inquiry 
became a site through which to examine and discuss a multitude of issues: the value of medical 
testimony and the commissions themselves, the dangers implicit in physicians usurping the role of 
lawyers, the ill-defined and problematic relationships between lunacy, eccentricity and moral 
depravity, the poor state of medical knowledge as it was revealed through the doctrine of moral 
insanity, and the contradictory lessons which could be learnt from the case for Windham, the 
public, the legal profession and for the profession of mental science. Most dramatically, the inquiry 
itself and the attention it received in the press exposed the fragile ground upon which the authority 
of the profession of mental science was constructed. Offering up to the angry gaze of the public 
those physicians whose profitable sideline it was to act as medical witnesses, All the Year Round 
saw in the commission an opportunity to upbraid and ridicule Winslow. To accept moral insanity 
as a legal entity was in effect to relieve the jury of judicial responsibility and to lay it on 
54 The Times, 21 January, 1862, p. 6. Unsurprisingly, Punch did not lose sight of the benefits to 
lawyers to be gained by such Inquiries. See Figure 3 (on p. 152), `Law and Lunacy', Punch (January - 
June 1862), p. 35. 
55 The Times, 28 February, 1862, p. 6. 
56 The Times, 28 February, 1862, p. 6. 
57 Norfolk News, 1 February, 1862, p. 4. 
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psychiatrists. Yet to the journal, the greater problem lay in the ability of the physician to 
`insensibly adapt his theories'58 to either the benefit of the defence or the prosecution: 
There is no clear dividing line between sickness and health of mind; unsoundness of mind 
is, no doubt, as various and common as unsoundness of body; and perfect health of body or 
mind is the gift of one man in a million in civilized society. Every natural defect of 
temper is unsoundness. All crime is unsound [... ] We walk even upon one leg, breathe by 
help of a single lung, do our duty in the world as far as our infirmity permits. So it is with 
the mind. Every man has his weak place; his twist, his hobby. One man may rise to 
honour, and do noble service to his country, by help of an unhealthy restlessness that Dr. 
Winslow's fingers would itch to put under lock and key. 
59 
Medical journals similarly debated the testimony of Winslow and Mayo. Though the 
Lancet did not share their opinions, it felt that in comparison to the witnesses testifying for 
Windham, nothing was ̀ more fair or more temperate than the exposition of his case given by Drs. 
Mayo and Forbes Winslow'. 
60 In contrast, the British Medical Journal thought that their evidence 
was ̀ artificial' and the doctrine of moral insanity `[v] ery slippery'. 
61 The `marvellous, and indeed, 
most scandalous' proceeding that depended on proving such a clinical diagnosis was `beyond the 
pale of ordinary consideration'62 and the positions assumed by Winslow and Mayo were entirely 
`opposed to the liberty of the British person' . 
63 
Though the journal was embarrassed to welcome Windham as a ̀ denizen of the land of 
Healthy Mind' rather than unjustly `banish him to those dreary realms which he beyond the limits 
of rational and free humanity', 
64 it was pleased that the doctrine of moral insanity had been 
defeated in the court of medical and public opinion. Both journals agreed that the doctrine of moral 
insanity employed in the `expensive farce' that was the Windham inquiry had exposed the 
profession to public condemnation, and sought to distance themselves from the criticism that had 
nevertheless acted to undermine the entire profession's medical authority: 
58 ̀ A Commission of Lunacy: M. D. and M. A. D', All the Year Round, 6 (September 1861-March 
1862), pp. 510-513 (p. 513). 
59'A Commission of Lunacy: M. D and M. A. D', p. 511. 
60 Lancet, (1862) i, p. 126. 
61 BMJ, (1862), i, p. 39. 
62 BMJ, (1862), i, p. 146. 
63 BMJ, (1862), i, p. 147. 
64 BMJ, (1862), i, p. 125. 
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A great amount of very silly abuse has been thrown by some of the journals at our 
profession in reference to this trial; but most unjustly so. The other professional 
witnesses were decidedly opposed to the theory of moral insanity; and the fact that this 
theory was supported [... ] solely by Drs. Winslow and Mayo is pretty good proof that 
other men of celebrity could not be had to endorse their sentiments. 
65 
However, both journals remained convinced of the necessity of medical testimony. The 
British Medical Journal was cautionary about the alternatives to the provision of expert medical 
testimony in commissions and questioned whether `an examination, by a jury of non-professional 
persons, [was] really a satisfactory test of a man's soundness or unsoundness of mind? '66 As a 
result of the Windham inquiry and the difficulties presented by the wealth of contradictory medical 
testimony, the Lord Chancellor brought a bill for revisions to be made to what were perceived as 
defective lunacy laws. In debates on proposals for reformed lunacy legislation in the House of 
Lords, much discussion was given over to the question of how to determine legal incompetence. 
Lord Westbury, for example, argued that the physiological proof of organic or functional disease 
(for which physicians were necessary) should not be the test of lunacy. Rather, lunacy should be 
proven by incompetence in the management of affairs for which lawyers were best qualified. To 
Westbury, the case of Windham thus exemplified an error of judgment. 
Though The Times believed that proposals for legislative intervention would prevent the 
further perpetration of great injustices, the Daily Telegraph believed that Lord Westbury's 
comments on `common sense' were inherently dangerous. The paper argued that it was impossible 
to `proclaim any principle more dangerous, politically as well as socially. It violates not less the 
ordinary and popular, than the technical and physiological idea of madness'. 
67 Furthermore, such a 
proposal was tantamount to `paternal government [... ] a notion [... ] alien to English feeling and 
conviction'. 
68 The medical profession was equally circumspect about legislative intervention 
because of the questionable authority accorded by the Bench to medical evidence. 
69 The Lancet 
argued too that the `greatest danger to society, the utmost insecurity to property, would arise were 
lunacy to cease to be determined by medical evidence'. 
70 
65 BMJ, (1862), i, p. 147. 
66 BMJ, (1862), i, p. 147. 
67 Daily Telegraph, 1 March, 1862, p. 4. 
68 Daily Telegraph, 1 March, 1862, p. 4. 
69 BMJ, (1862), i, p. 258. 
70 Lancet, (1862) i, p. 151. 
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Another key proposal was that a writ to one of the judges of Westminister Hall directing 
the case to be tried in the same manner as any other case (according to the ordinary rules of 
evidence) would be substituted for the present commission. It was suggested that with this measure 
the abuses in the Windham case highlighted by the press would be remedied. Other proposals 
included limiting the length of the inquiry itself, limiting the number of antecedent years to which 
evidence could be provided in court regarding the alleged lunatic's actions, and demanding that the 
alleged lunatic should be interviewed by the judge and jury prior to the reception of evidence. This 
last proposal was met by The Times with relief. The Lord Chancellor, 
to check the vagaries of "mad doctors, " proposes to introduce into the judicial inquiry 
affecting lunatics the same rule which prevails elsewhere, - that scientific evidence shall 
only be admitted when "the subject is removed from the ordinary sphere and knowledge of 
common sense" [... ] Thus [... ] [a physician] would not be suffered to give an opinion 
whether driving a railway train or imitating a cat was to be taken as proof of unsound 
mind. 
71 
In 1862 the Lunacy Regulation Act introduced simpler procedures whereby the appointment of a 
receiver for a mentally incapacitated person would circumvent the need for expensive and drawn 
out inquisitions. The criticism that had been directed at Master Warren led also to a new procedure 
by which petitions of this kind would be tried by a judge of the Queen's Bench Division rather 
than a Master in Lunacy. To the relief of the press, no longer were `crazy medical theorists' to be 
enabled to abuse judicial procedures and no longer was a proceeding which potentially could deprive 
a man of `his liberty, friends, home - everything' to be superintended by a man [Samuel Warren] 
72 
who owes his appointment `to anything but his knowledge of the law'. 
The Windham inquiry had forced the profession of mental science to scrutinise its 
relationships with the public and the law and to reformulate its position in regard to contested 
forms of insanity, such as moral insanity, in a way that was entirely new. To secure renewed faith 
and respect in the minds of the confused and indignant public, it was commonly accepted that the 
solution lay in the prevention of medical experts as advocates in courts of law. Though defending 
the value of medical testimony, physicians agreed that impartiality was vital to rebuild some degree 
of authority: `The truth is that medical men will never obtain for their evidence the respect it 
deserves, until they cease to appear as advocates in a court of law. So long as they do, we must 
expect medical evidence to be treated as the Lord Chancellor has treated it'. 
73 Though at least four 
71 The Times, 28 February, 1862, p. 6. 
72 The Times, 28 February, 1862, p. 6. A scathing letter of attack directed at Warren had also been 
published in the Daily Telegraph on 30 January, 1862, p. 5. 
73 BMJ, (1862), i, p. 258. 
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trials were consequently structured on the new Act, never again was the medical profession 
scrutinised and condemned in such an hysterical manner as it had been as a result of the Windham 
trial. Lessons had evidently been learnt. 
74 
As indicated by `Dry Nurse's' references to both Edward Oxford and Daniel McNaughten 
it was via the drama of the courtroom that moral insanity was often introduced to the lay-public. 
As the Windham inquiry demonstrates, the sensational coverage such cases attracted served to 
heighten suspicion of medical intervention. Such was the concern felt by physicians regarding the 
detrimental popular image produced by their contribution to medico-legal trials that a conscious 
effort was made, within the ranks, to assist them. 
An article published by Ray in the American Journal of Insanity in 1851-52 explored the 
potential pitfalls inherent in the provision of expert medical testimony in courts of law. Acting in 
the role of the Irish barrister in Brenten's Tragedy, Ray hoped that his `Hints' would act to 
prevent the medical witness from `breaking down on the witness stand'. 
75 In order to profit in the 
performance of his duty the medical witness must be conscious of the derogatory effects on the 
bench and the jury of making rash comments. Too much confidence, Ray gently reminded his 
colleagues, might be the ruin of a fellow human-being. Rather, the physician should strenuously 
attempt to maintain his self-respect through responding to the often critical examination and 
interrogation of his medical expertise with a calm and collected disposition. 
He should keep in mind, most importantly, that there did not exist one definition of 
madness and if the lawyer was disposed to demand a definition rather than an explanation or a 
description, he was doing so not to shed light on the issue but to perplex and embarrass the 
medical expert. `Above all things', the medical witness should be cool and quiet, and `never be 
provoked into a sharp reply or a cutting retort. Let him be careful how he descends from the high 
position which he holds in virtue of his function, in which he will be always respected as long as he 
respects himself'(AJI, 8, p. 62). Reflecting the delicate relationship between the psychiatric 
profession and the bench, Ray's concluding remarks in Hints to Medical Witnesses set forth all that 
his colleagues could expect when requested to take the stand in medico-legal trials: 
He must make up his mind to have his sentiments travestied and sneered at, his motives 
impugned, and pit-falls dug in his path, with the same kind of indifference with which he 
would hear the maledictions of an excited patient. (AJI, 8, p. 62) 
74 After being denied assistance to pay the legal bill (of around £20,00), immense debt led to the sale 
of Felbrigg Hall by its creditors. William Frederick Windham died suddenly in 1866 at the age of 
twenty five. See the Norwich Argus, 17 February, 1866, p. 4. See Figure 4 (on p. 1 S 3) for photograph of 
Windham, c. 1862. Reprinted in Felbrigg Hall, Norfolk (The National Trust, 1983), p. 56. 
75 Isaac Ray, `Hints to Medical Witnesses in Questions of Insanity', AJI, 8 (1851-52), pp-50-62 
(p. 51). Further page references are contained within the text. 
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In respect to moral insanity, which had arrived in court with `something peculiarly repulsive to the 
judicial conscience'(AJI, 8, p. 60), the prospects were no better. There existed, he thought, an 
inability in the legal world to `conceive of any insanity that does not involve the intellectual 
powers ... [and consequently] the accumulation of proof only strengthens the difficulty' (AJ1,8, 
p. 60). Such was the depth of legal prejudice against the doctrine that Ray believed it to have been 
folly to have ever allowed nosological distinctions to enter the courtroom. 
In both the Select Committee hearings of 1859-60 and the commission de lunatico 
inquirendo of 1861-62, there was a noticeable absence of evidence from individuals who had 
themselves been subject to wrongful incarceration or who were threatened with surveillance. The 
focus in the following chapter will shift from an examination of medico-legal debates about partial 
insanity and an exploration of the way that lay-reformers and newspapers expressed consternation 
with the law, to a consideration of the way that novelists and alleged lunatics themselves conceived 
of wrongful confinement. It will become clear that the anxiety expressed by Mill at the secrecy of 
certification procedures and the collusion of families and friends was a formative component in the 
numerous tracts detailing wrongful confinement in lunatic asylums published during the 
nineteenth century. Seeking to expose the pernicious `trade in lunacy' and reveal the terrors of 
illegal detention, such narratives offer the reader a ̀ version' of the asylum and its proponents 
radically at odds with those written by physicians, asylum proprietors and philanthropists; one in 
which power and abuse were allied and one in which the psychological physician was far from being 
an agent of humane treatment and enlightened knowledge. 
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Figure 3. 
`Law and Lunacy', Punrh (1862) 





Figure 4. . 
William Frederick Windham, from a photograph c. 1862 
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Chapter Six 
The Prison and the Asylum 
In recent years the way that the insane represented themselves and those responsible for their 
incarceration has been the subject of critical attention. 
' In A Social History of Madness: Stories of 
the Insane (1987) Roy Porter examines the literature of the mad in order to shed light not only on 
what the insane themselves ̀ had to say' but also on the important and overlooked manner in which 
such texts echoed ̀ albeit if often in unconventional or distorted idiom, the ideas, values, 
aspirations, hopes and fears of their contemporaries'. 
2 In his attempt to situate the narratives in 
their `historico-cultural' context, Porter comments both on the stories written by the insane 
themselves and on the stories underlying their production and reception. Though the `dialectic of 
consciousness' which he seeks to draw out between the beliefs of mad people and ̀ their situations 
and times' informs the following discussion of narratives written by alleged lunatics, the chapter 
will focus on the representational and rhetorical strategies used by those individuals wrongfully 
incarcerated to convey their fear, anger and discontent. 
The site of `bedlam' had by the nineteenth century become cemented in the popular 
imagination as a byword for both uncontrollable frenzy and the horrors of the lunatic asylum. It 
was an association which Victorian physicians consciously sought to dismantle because it 
powerfully recalled a bygone world of insanity in which lunatics were wild beasts and physicians' 
no more than brutal and devious mad-doctors. It was a world against which they were defining 
their profession. Yet acknowledging the power of the word `bedlam' to evoke particular 
associations, it was appropriated by physicians themselves. Recall, for example, John Conolly's use 
of the phrase ̀ let Bedlam loose' in 1849 to convey the dangers of releasing the feeble-minded from 
asylums. As Conolly's comments indicate, `bedlam' perpetuated fear and apprehension. However, 
it also supported medical directives which saw in the site of the asylum a means to protect society 
from insanity and the insane from themselves. 
Like Bedlam, the Bastille and associated prison images resonated powerfully in the 
nineteenth-century imagination. Prisons, like lunatic asylums, similarly generated fears about 
1 See, for example, Women of the Asylum: Voices from Behind the Walls, 1840-1945, ed. by Jeffrey L. 
Geller and Maxine Harris (New York: Doubleday, 1994) and Mary Elene Wood, The Writing on the 
Wall: Women's Autobiography and the Asylum (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1994). On eighteenth-century autobiographical accounts of confinement see Voices of Madness: Four 
Pamphlets, 1683-1796, ed. by Allan Ingram (Stroud, Gloucs.: Sutton Publishing, 1997). 
2 Roy Porter, A Social History of Madness, pp. 1,2. Porter acknowledges Dale Alfred Peterson's work 
on life writing and insanity. See ̀The Literature of Madness: Autobiographical Writings by Mad 
People and Mental Patients in England and America From 1436-1975' (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Stanford University, 1977), and also A Mad People's History of Madness, ed. by D. A. 
Peterson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982). 
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confinement and the obstruction of personal liberty, sensationally captured by Charles Dickens in 
his portrayal of Doctor Manette and Charles Darnay in A Tale of Two Cities (1859). However, 
the Bastille and Bedlam carried different associations. While Bedlam was generally invoked in the 
context of the emotions surrounding lunacy and incarceration, the Bastille was used as a symbol by 
lunacy reformers, novelists and alleged lunatics to signal the dangers of wrongful confinement. In 
drawing attention to `secret' practices and the arbitrary power of physicians to incarcerate anyone 
against their will, the Bastille became an important trope which was utilised to expose social 
injustices and condemn abuses committed under the auspices of psychiatric authority. Narratives 
written by alleged lunatics which used the Bastille as a symbol highlighted opaque yet powerful 
connections between authenticity, control and empowerment. These accounts were significant 
because while illuminating the idealistic aims and intentions expressed in medical accounts of the 
asylum, they also revealed from a new perspective the significance accorded to individual liberty as 
it related to medical authority and the `self'. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Though the Bastille was constructed in the 
thirteenth century, it wasn't until the mid to late-eighteenth century that with the sensational 
popularity of prison narratives written by its inmates, the Bastille turned into a graphic form of 
cultural currency. The first short section examines the English response to the destruction of the 
Parisian prison in 1789 and considers the Memoir of one of its more sensational prisoners, Henry 
de Latude. His account of his captivity served to excite a fascination with and fear of the Bastille 
and, importantly, Charenton Hospital for lunatics, which was used to great effect by those 
wrongfully incarcerated in Victorian lunatic asylums. In a consideration of the processes of cultural 
dissemination by which the Bastille became embedded in the English cultural imagination, the 
following section will consider Thomas Carlyle's (1795-1881) epic history of the French 
Revolution. Its publication in 1837 was `something of a literary event' and `to the minds of many 
British readers, made the Revolution itself'. 
3 
In the present context, Carlyle's History is important as a text which by heightening an 
interest in the relationship between madness and detention and tyranny and liberty, served to 
further entrench a Victorian fascination with the Bastille. Much has been written about Carlyle's 
allegorical use of the elemental forces of nature to convey the barbarities and brutalities that 
attended the French Revolution. Much less has been written about his use of Bedlam and madness 
metaphorically to convey the frenzied, uncontrollable Parisian mob. Like Dickens, Carlyle was 
ambivalent about the Revolution. Both writers were particularly ambivalent about the Bastille. 
While uniquely symbolising emancipation from tyranny, it simultaneously signalled the horrors of 
arbitrary rule meted out by the ancien regime. 
3 Mark Cumming, '"Such a Figure Drew Priams Curtains! ": Carlyle's Epic History of the 
Revolution', in Representing the French Revolution: Literature, Historiography, and Art, ed. by James 
A. W. Heffernan (Hanover, N. H.: University Press of New England, 1992), pp. 63-77 (p. 64). 
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In order to illuminate the extent to which the Bastille held symbolic significance for the 
Victorians, the next section will consider the Bastille's dual-legacy as its symbolisms were 
constructed and deployed by a wide range of individuals and groups in the nineteenth and early- 
twentieth centuries; poor-law reformers, soldiers during the American Civil War, and political 
prisoners. The second half of the chapter will return to the world of nineteenth-century 
psychological medicine. Long after it had also come to represent a key site of emancipation from 
tyranny, novelists, journalists and alleged lunatics returned repeatedly to ideas, images and 
metaphors associated with the Bastille as an icon of oppression, and employed the prison to 
condemn the arbitrary nature of the lunacy laws and denounce the despotic authority of physicians. 
i. Theatrical Possibilities - 14th July, 1789 
On August 18th 1789, the front page of The Times was adorned with a large advertisement for 
Astley's Amphitheatre, Westminister Bridge. Entitled `The Assault of the Bastile'[sic], the theatre 
was offering an evening of entertainment which included a new dance called `La Coquette', an 
unrivaled display of horsemanship by `Young' Astley and his pupils, rope dancing by a Signor 
Spinacuta, and a comic burletta called `The Boot Makers'. The grand finale, paraded as an `entire 
new and splendid spectacle', was a performance of `PARIS IN AN UPROAR!, Or, The 
Destruction of the BASTILE', a drama which promised to be `one of the grandest and most 
extraordinary Entertainments that ever appeared, grounded on authentic Facts'. 
4 Though there 
would be scenes set in the Palais Royale and the Tuileries Gardens, the central scenes were located 
in the Bastille. The external `perspective view' of the Drawbridge and the Fosse would show the 
manner of storming and taking the fortress by the Military and the Citizens, and the internal 
`Picturesque View' would include not only the Governor's house but the inside of the Strong 
Tower, `Caves', a `Dark Dungeon' and `Remote Cells'. 
To aid those who had not visited Paris, the spectacle included a model of Paris on `an 
extraordinary Large Scale', so large (50 feet by 85 feet) that it was proudly described in the 
advertisement as covering the whole theatre. Three days later an almost identical advertisement 
was published again in The Times by a Mr Palmer of the Drury Lane Theatre. Entitled `The 
Triumph of Liberty, Or, The DESTRUCTION of the BASTILE' it also invited the public to 
attend `one of the grandest and most interesting spectacles that ever engaged the feelings of 
mankind'. 
5 A month earlier one would have read in their place advertisements for `The Mandarin, 
Or, Harlequin Widower' or `The Hop-Pickers, Or, The Double Elopement'. The sudden alteration 
of the performances in London between July and August of 1789 reflected one small but revealing 
English response to the storming of the Bastille and its portent for the future. 
4 The Times, 18 August, 1789, p. 1. 
5 The Times, 21 August, 1789, p. 2. 
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As The Times suggested, ̀the time was auspicious to those of an inventive genius'6 and 
the speed with which theatrical promoters like Astley and Palmer produced spectacles for the stage 
suggested a public fascination that should and could easily be accommodated. The storming of the 
Bastille was to the English an event at once horrific and sensational. The supposed instructional 
models supporting the melodrama were overshadowed in the advertisement by the morbid spectacle 
of the Bastille's caves and remote cells. Though The Times did not publish reviews of such 
performances, the regularity with which such popular dramas continued to be advertised indicates 
that they gripped the public's imagination. The theatrical and fictional possibilities linked to the 
Bastille were unquestionably gathering momentum. 
7 In contrast, the reaction in France to the 
Bastille and its capture was markedly different. With the capital's theatres mostly closed, the 
Revolution itself became the surrogate stage. Its actors were the vainquers de la Bastille, as they 
came to be known, and its audience were the commentators or those caught up in the turmoil. 
8 
The spectacles that had been found almost daily in the theatre, as in England, had dramatically 
moved onto the streets of Paris and such a transformation demanded the immediate imposition of 
`serious drama on the world of mere divertissement (entertainment)'. 
9 
Reports of events in Fauborg Saint-Antoine reaching England were often conflicting, 
sometimes already out of date, and often shrouded in mystery. In response to information that the 
prison had been demolished, employing Latude's Memoir as one authority, The Times confirmed 
that (because of the thickness of its walls) the Bastille remained standing `as firm as ever'. 
10 
Despite such decisive reports on the physical site, one Times commentator suggested that much `of 
the private intrigue of that dark abode will now probably be enveloped from the mystery which has 
always marked the proceedings of the Bastile'. 
11 Over a hundred years later the historian Franz 
Funck-Brentano doubted that the legends which gave the Bastille `so cruel a name are going to 
vanish into thin air, like the phantoms of an ancient chateau when light is let in'. 
12 It was 
precisely this esoteric veil, shrouding the Bastille in mystery, that was to fascinate the public not 
only abroad, but in Paris itself. 
6 The Times, 20 July, 1789, p. 2. 
7 Prison literature such as that of Latude and Linguet had, long before the storming of the Bastille, 
been popular and widely circulated. 
8 George Rude, The Crowd in the French Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 56. 
9 Simon Schama, Citizens -A Chronicle of the French Revolution (London: Viking, 1989), p. 382. 
10 The Times, 22 July, 1789, p. 3. 
11 The Times, 21 July, 1789, p. 2. 
12 Franz Funck-Brentano, Legends of the Bastille (London: Downey, 1899), p. 32. 
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While in England the best one could hope for was either coverage in newspapers or the 
almost immediate proliferation of dramatic performances, in France the Bastille itself became a 
spectacle not to be missed. 
13 The wealth of contradictory reports on the fortress enabled it to 
become ̀ the most extraordinary place ever seen; the crowds from all parts of the country' coming 
to view it, `even at the distance of 20 leagues'. 
14 Despite the fact that it was ̀ so lately shunned as 
the terror of France' it was now `the resort of numbers and what is extraordinary [... ] [is] that 
they are not satisfied unless they get at the inside'. 
15 Amidst such morbid fascination came a 
timely and prophetic reminder which foreshadowed Mill's comments on the iniquity of the lunacy 
laws: 
You talk of the Bastile as a dreadful engine of tyranny, and in doing so you give it its true 
name; but you seem to forget that tyranny is not more lessened when exercised by the 
people, than when exercised by a King. The Bastile was a tyranny, not because people were 
confined there, but because they were confined against law, and were treated with a 
barbarity which, being exercised in private, could not answer the end of example, but must 
be the effect of private vengeance. 
16 
This was certainly true of the lengthy imprisonment of jean Danry, or as he was widely 
known, Henry de Latude. 17 Because of the extraordinarily powerful way in which the Bastille `gave 
a shape and an image to all the vices against which the Revolution defined itself', 
18 Latude's 
13 Besides the many commemorative engravings and paintings of the fall of the Bastille, a cottage 
industry evolved based on the production of pewter mugs, jugs, coffee cups, and additional artifacts; 
there were even models of the fortress carved out of masonry saved from the dismantling of the 
fortress in the weeks following its `fall'. See Schama, Citizens, pp. 417,524. 
14 The Times, 29 July, 1789, p. 2. 
15 The Times, 30 July, 1789, p. 2. 
16 The Times, 31 July, 1789, p. 4. 
17 Latude was a soldier who in desiring to advance himself devised a plan in which he would send both 
a letter bomb and a warning of it to Madame de Pompadour. His plot was uncovered and in 1750 he 
was incarcerated first in the Bastille and then in Vincennes. He escaped but was recaptured and 
returned to the Bastille. Using a rope ladder he once more escaped, but upon reaching Amsterdam, he 
was caught and again returned to the Bastille and then Vincennes. Learning of his plight, in 1775 a 
friend assisted in his removal to what Latude initially considered an institution far less brutal than 
Vincennes or the Bastille, Charenton Hospital for Lunatics. Though released in 1777, the publication 
of Memoirs of Vengeance insured an additional period of detention in the Bicetre. In 1784, after 
twenty-eight years of imprisonment, Latude was finally set free. On the history of Latude, see Claude 
Quetel, Escape from the Bastille - The Life and Legend of Latude, trans. by Christopher Sharp 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1990), and Schama, Citizens, pp. 394-399. 
18 Schama, Citizens, p. 408. 
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sensational and horrific account of his exploits and multiple escape attempts positioned his 
narrative as one of the most popular and enduring accounts of late-eighteenth century despotism. 
To his contemporaries, Latude was a perfect representative of the virtues demanded of a citizen. 
Considering the symbolic weight and successful metaphorical adaptation of the Bastille, it is 
unsurprising that Latude's account of his detention in Charenton has attracted less attention. Yet 
it is important in the context of this study because to Latude Charenton represented an even 
greater form of tyranny than the Bastille. 
Latude likened Charenton to the `new Tartarus'19 or to the infernal regions of ancient 
Greek and Roman mythology. In contrast to the Bastille, where he had been unable to converse for 
years (except by his ingenious `postal system') here he was able to converse with fellow inmates. In 
`the first moments of my joy', he relates, ̀ I fancied myself free, because I was no longer in a 
subterranean cell where my groans were unheard, and an occasional glimmering of light only served 
to render distinct the horrors of my situation'(p. 239). Yet it was not long before he 
ascertained too plainly that I had only changed my punishment and my executioners, and 
that I was still in a prison. But why was I confined with lunatics? Was this another 
species of torture, invented by my cruel enemies to insult my miseries by degrading me in 
my own estimation - to deprive me of the only advantage I retained, the title and 
attributes of a man, by assimilating me to these unhappy wretches, who had lost the 
precious faculties of feeling and thinking? (pp. 216-7) 
To Latude's surprise, it became obvious that many of his fellow inmates were not raving lunatics. 
As he recounts in his Memoir, Charenton was also a place where `there were others confined [... ] 
by orders from the different Ministers, by Lettres de Cachet, and sometimes by the intercession of 
their own relatives' (p. 223) . 
20 
Being declared insane was to Latude a fate worse than being branded a criminal. Though 
he could escape from Vincennes and the Bastille, extricating himself from the taint of madness 
proved to be much harder. His comments deserve to be quoted at length: 
The establishment at Charenton, useful and necessary in some respects, was also, as my 
case will prove, one of the secret asylums where arbitrary power consigned its victims and 
consummated its detestable mysteries. Despotism was less cruel there than in the other 
state prisons, but its practice was more criminal. Elsewhere, the laws were disavowed, and 
never alluded to. The Ministers were known to be absolute, and hypocrisy was 
unnecessary. At Charenton it was different; every year, the forms at least of justice were 
carefully attended to. In the month of September, a committee from the Parliament of 
19 Memoirs of Henry Masers De Latude, ed. by Monsieur Thierry, trans. by John William Calcraft 
(Dublin: W. F. Wakeman, 1834), p. 215. Further page references are contained within the text. 
20 On the use of Charenton under the Old Regime as a prison for individuals seized under the lettre 
de cachet, see Goldstein, Console, pp. 113,197. 
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Paris visited the establishment, to hear the complaints of the prisoners. They listened to 
their remonstrances, dried their tears, and revived their hopes. But this imposing practice 
afforded little consolation to the innocent [... ] this visit was a mere outward form, to 
sanction, in the eyes of the monarch and the people, the iniquities of the Ministers, and 
[... ] it seldom produced any beneficial results. There was no instance of a person, confined 
on a lettre de cachet, obtaining redress from the laws through the medium of this mock 
tribunal [... ] still I remained a prisoner. (pp. 243-44) 
Though Latude wrote in a sensational style, no doubt with the reading public in mind, his 
reasoned comments indicate that he was genuinely concerned by the lack of sufficient mechanisms 
in place by which to define insanity. Further, the particular iniquity of his own case was that he 
had committed no crime, had never actually been accused of one, and was in full possession of his 
mental faculties. It was the fact that he was sane and had been sent to the asylum on a lettre de 
cachet which neutralised the supposed effectiveness of the `imposing practice' and prevented his 
early release from Charenton, the `secret asylum'. It has often been suggested that the contents of 
`prison literature' like those written by Latude and Linguet sacrificed realism to sensationalism. 
21 
To one, Latude's Memoir was merely `the creature of his own unaided brain'. 
22 Yet such criticisms 
did not lessen the popularity of such narratives. Rather, they served often to maintain as well as to 
further excite, in the popular imagination, a deepening fascination with the Bastille, and more 
generally, with tyrannical incarceration like that suffered by Latude while at Charenton. 
23 
ii. Panic madness - Carlyle and the storming of the Bastille 
In 1834, at the Theatre de la Gaffte in Paris, a melodrama entitled `Latude, or, Thirty Five Years of 
Captivity', was performed (as a commemoration of the proclamation of the July Monarchy) to 
favourable reviews, especially from liberal critics. 
24 Such a dedicatory performance and its literal 
and metaphorical appropriation of the Bastille contrasted to England's interpretation of and 
reaction to the infamous fortress. In 1837, Thomas Carlyle published his three-volume work, The 
French Revolution. Coloured to a great degree by his narrative, the English came to view the events 
of the 14th of July as an initiation into the violence that was to overwhelm the aspirations of the 
National Assembly. Though many rejoiced in the ascendancy of liberty over tyranny, they could 
not forget the indiscriminate bloodletting of `sans-cullotism' as presented by Carlyle in his 
21 See, for example, Thomas Evans, A Refutation of the Memoirs of the Bastille (London: Printed for 
the Author, 1793). 
22 Funck-Brentano, Legends, p. 168. 
23 The story of Latude's sensational exploits featured in All the Year Round's series, ̀ Old Stories 
Retold'. See ̀La Tude's Escape from the Bastille', All the Year Round, 6 (1871), pp. 373-381C. 
24 Quetel, Escape, p. 191. 
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account of the storming of the Bastille. Nor could they ignore the narrative's implicit warning to 
the English aristocracy to heed the providential retribution witnessed on the other side of the 
English Channel. 
Carlyle was clear on the origin of the French Revolution. There had been a massive 
dereliction of duty by the governing classes and their negation of responsibility led inevitably to 
an overhaul in the political and institutional framework of France. In reviewing Carlyle's History 
in the London and Westminster Review in July 1837, J. S. Mill explained Carlyle's theory. Those 
who had set out to regenerate France had `failed in what it was impossible that anyone should 
succeed in: namely in attempting to found a government, to create a new order of society, a new 
set of institutions and habits, among a people having no convictions to base such order of things 
upon'. 
25 As Thackeray put it in his review, published in The Times in August, the `screaming 
hungry French mob' had merely battered down bastilles to erect guillotines. 
26 
Carlyle's intention was to force his contemporaries to take a more profound view of their 
own condition - not by crude warnings of a revolution but by a deepening of their own historical 
imagination. 27 Though they differ in many respects, Carlyle's French Revolution was similar to 
Michelet's in that they both sought to throw light upon the role of the individual in the 
revolution, as opposed to an emphasis on larger and more impersonal social, political and economic 
institutions and structures. In this sense, Carlyle was following, albeit more independently, in the 
footsteps of Scott. 
28 In Thackeray's words, Carlyle's history of the Revolution produced `among 
the critics and the reading public a strange storm of applause and discontent'. 
29 
Both Mill and Thackeray admired Carlyle's History. J. S. Mill was lavish with his praise: 
`on the whole no work of greater genius, either historical or poetical, has been produced in this 
country for many years'. 
30 Though pleased by Mill's comments, Carlyle was delighted by 
25 J. S. Mill's unsigned review of Carlyle's History appeared in the London and Westminister Review, 
July, 1837, pp. 17-53. Cited in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 20, pp. 133-166 (p. 159). 
26 William Makepeace Thackeray's unsigned review of Carlyle's History was published in The Times, 
3 August 1837, p. 6. Cited in Thomas Carlyle - The Critical Heritage, ed. by Jules Paul Seigel 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971) p. 74. 
27 Avrom Fleishman, The English Historical Novel: Walter Scott to Virginia Woolf (London: John 
Hopkins, 1971) , p. 116. 
28 Andrew Sanders, `"The French are always at it" - the Impact of the French Revolution on 
Nineteenth Century Literature, 1815-1870', in The Impact of the French Revolution on European 
Consciousness, ed. by H. T. Mason and W. Doyle (Gloucs.: Alan Sutton, 1989), pp. 104-116 (p. 110) . 
29 Thackeray cited in Seigel, p. 69. 
30 Mill cited in Seigel, p. 52. 
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Thackeray's belief that his History `possesses genius, if any book ever did'. 
31 Yet both reviewers 
were conscious of the difficulty in assessing such an original work and the problems posed by its 
dramatic use of the present tense and its cacophony of voices, strategies which indicated Carlyle's 
doubt about the effectiveness of history itself to faithfully explain and convey the brutality of the 
Revolution. Thackeray saw in Carlyle's `prose run mad' and in his `wild vagaries of language' a 
prescient warning to proponents of English radicalism who might `learn by it that there is 
something more necessary for him even than his mad liberty - the authority, namely, by which he 
retains his head on his shoulders'. 
32 Yet he remained aware that others might view him as a ̀ dull 
madman' who had dispensed with `common sense and reason'. 
33 To Lady Sydney Morgan, writing 
in the Athenaeum in May 1837, his three volumes constituted `misplaced persiflage and flippant 
pseudo-philosophy'. 
34 Another contemporary reviewer, Herman Merivale, deplored Carlyle's 
`bastard English' and declared that he had `no title [as a historian] whatever'. 
35 His work was 
nothing less than `a set of lectures, very loosely collected, on striking personages'. 
36 
Both historians and Carlyle's contemporaries have commented in particular on the 
metaphorical employment of elemental forces to convey the violence that attended the storming of 
the Bastille. The image of a raging tempest crashing against and destroying the menacing and 
tyrannical fortress was a common one. 
37 Though clearly acknowledged by Thackeray, less 
attention has been paid to Carlyle's employment of madness in describing the events that took 
place on 14 July, 1789. While the `Tophet-black aspect'(ii, p. 353) of the Terror would be an 
arguably more appropriate site to employ the metaphor of madness, Carlyle perceived the 
destruction of the Bastille as representing more of the insane aspect of the people than the cold and 
calculated September Massacres in 1792. The last resort of the angry crowds in their search for 
31 Thackeray cited in Seigel, p. 73. 
32 Thackeray cited in Seigel, pp. 71,74. 
33 Thackeray cited in Seigel, p. 69. 
34 Lady Sidney Morgan's unsigned review appeared in the Athenaeum, 20 May, 1837, pp. 353-7. Cited 
in Seigel, p. 47. 
35 Herman Merivale's unsigned review appeared in the Edinburgh Review, July 1840, pp. 411-45. 
Cited in Seigel, p. 77,80. 
36 Merivale cited in Seigel, p. 83. 
37 On the use of this metaphor see Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution, ed. by K. J. Fielding and 
David Sorenson, 2 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), i, pp. 192,200,201,204; Further 
page references to Carlyle's History are contained within the text. See also Jules Michelet, History of 
the French Revolution, ed. by K. J. Fielding and David Sorensen, trans. by Charles Cocks (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 78. 
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arms in mid July was the Bastille. It was believed, correctly, that the stores of gunpowder had been 
moved there. As they surged towards the fortress, as Carlyle would describe, the people's frenzied 
call for arms was ̀ like one great voice, as of a Demon yelling from the air: for all faces wax fire- 
eyed, all hearts burn up into madness'(i, p. 184). 
Carlyle's figurative use of madness reflects his characteristic desire for order and 
responsibility and his condemnation of a radicalism so chaotic and frenzied as to be itself 
destructive. On the one hand Carlyle was able to explain such a reaction from `ye maddened sons 
of France'(i, p. 193) by suggesting that it was inevitable; the crowds were merely desiring to free 
themselves and their fellow men from the `chains and squalid stagnancy'(i, p. 192) of monarchical 
order. Yet a more compelling suggestion was that the mad crowds could not but degenerate into 
chaos: ̀ This was the 13th day of July 1789; a worse day, many said, than the last 13th was, when 
only hail fell out of Heaven, not madness rose out of Tophet, ruining worse than crops'. On the 
14th of July, `Paris has wholly got to the acme of its frenzy; whirled, all ways, by panic madness 
[... ] Blood flows; the ailment of new madness'(i, pp. 200-201). 
`Mad Paris' had ̀ abandoned altogether to itself' and `madness ruled the world'(i, p. 187) 
were typical phrases used by Carlyle in his account of the taking of the Bastille. Extending the 
necessarily devastating effects of such a retaliation, Carlyle set forth a relationship between the 
events taking place at the Bastille and Bedlam: `For four hours now has the World-Bedlam roared: 
call it the World-Chimera, blowing fire! '(i, p. 204) For Carlyle, the `blaze of triumph' that 
followed the surrender of the Bastille by de Launay rested on `a dark ground of terror: all outward, 
all inward things fallen into one general wreck of madness'(i, p. 206). The death of the governor 
indicated to him that if `Revenge is a "kind of justice", it is a "wild" kind! 0 mad sansculottism, 
hast thou risen, in thy mad darkness, in thy soot and rags'(i, p. 216). A witness (though hardly 
impartial) to the events of that afternoon, Grace Dalrymple Elliot, concurred. She recorded in her 
journal that `every sort of brutal excess was committed, and scenes of horror were occurring every 
hour [... ] all those who were at the taking of the Bastille, were mad drunk, dragging dead bodies 
and heads and limbs about the streets by torch-light'. 
38 The `royalty of the mob'39 was to replace 
the old monarchy and for Carlyle the flourishing of arbitrary rule was as dangerous as the Lettre de 
cachet that confined one in the Bastille. Though in the months following its capture the physical 
body of the Bastille was dismantled, its soul remained alive, `living, perhaps still longer, in the 
memories of men'(i, p. 219). 
38 Grace Dalrymple Elliot, Journal of My Life during the French Revolution (London: Richard 
Bentley, 1859), p. 33. 
39 Michelet, History, p. 215. 
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iii. `Shut out from the world' - The Bastille abroad 
In The French Revolution Carlyle had been ambivalent about the Bastille. On the one hand it had 
long been a symbol of the despotic and corrupt French monarchy. The punishment meted out in 
the Bastille was to Michelet `torture even for the spectator'. It `wounded the souls of men, made 
them furious, mad, confounded every idea of justice, and subverted justice itself'. 40 On the other 
hand, the storming of the Bastille on the 14th of July positioned the Fortress as a symbol of liberty 
and as one of the most historically-important sites of emancipation from tyranny. Eighteenth- 
century accounts of incarceration and the histories written by Michelet and Carlyle, all served to 
construct and perpetuate a mythic and arguably more powerful version of the Bastille than that 
based on `the General Principles of Law, Probability, and Truth' as offered by the solicitor Thomas 
Evans. 41 They passionately highlighted the injustice that was a necessary adjunct to imprisonment 
in the state prison and were to serve, in the nineteenth century, primarily as a means to 
symbolically and reverentially frame impassioned pleas for truth and justice. 
Revolutionaries and political prisoners throughout this period drew heavily on this 
complex dual legacy. As an icon of ancien regime oppression the Bastille was employed to 
communicate to readers of their polemics the nature of such dreadful prisons as the Schlüsselburg in 
St. Petersburg, described by Vera Figner as the `Russian bastile'. To Alexander Berkman, the 
anarchist who tried to assassinate Henry Clay Frick at the height of the Homestead Strike, the 
Western Penitentiary of Pennsylvania was a `modern Bastille' where prisoners were condemned to 
a living death. More recently, political prisoners in India have used the Bastille to describe such 
prisons as Andamans. 
42 By employing the Bastille to describe the terrible nature of unjust 
incarceration and while expressing their belief in the continued power of revolution to overthrow 
tyranny, the writings of political prisoners reflected vividly the duality of the Bastille metaphor. 
Their continued allegiance to triumphant, insurrectionary rebellion buttressed their appropriation 
of the Bastille both as a site of tyranny and emancipation. 
In the United States during the Civil War, northern sympathisers with the South (called 
`copper-heads' by their enemies) described the guardhouses where they were held as Bastilles'. 
Lincoln's opponents, led by copperhead Democrats, published a number of tracts which drew a 
direct analogy between the site of their incarceration and the Parisian prison. Such tracts were 
entitled, for example, The Bastille in America, or Democratic Absolutism (1861), Secrets of the 
40 Michelet, History, p. 204. My italics. 
41 Evans, A Refutation, p. 1. 
42 See Bejoy Kumar Sinha, In Andamans - The Indian Bastille (New Delhi: People's Publishing 
House, 1988); Vera Figner, Memoirs of a Revolutionist, abridged trans. by Camilla C. Daniels 
(London: Martin Lawrence, 1929), p. 193; Alexander Berkman, Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist 
(London: C. W. Daniel, 1926), p. 121. 
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American Bastille (1863), and Fourteen Months in American Bastilles (1863). In 1792 Simon- 
Nicholas-Henri Linguet wrote that in the `entire universe there has never been anything 
resembling the system of the Bastille. We can find no nation blighted by the shame and 
inhumanity of a permanent Bastille'. To Linguet, the prison was a ̀ purgatory, where the most 
trivial faults, and often innocence itself, maybe subjected arbitrarily to the torments of hell'. 
43 
One `Eye Witness' to the horrors of the American guardhouses expressed similar sentiments, 
believing that those who had been incarcerated had been denied ̀ every process of law and shut out 
from the world in this Bastille. Verily "in the midst of life we are in death. "'44 
Though in The French Revolution Carlyle's fear of anarchic revolt suggests an ambivalent 
attitude towards the Bastille, in Past and Present (1842) he wholeheartedly situates the Bastille as a 
symbol of despotism. The riots and strikes that had taken place in England in the early 1840s, 
initially in the Midlands but soon extending North, were immediately interpreted as a resurgence 
of the Jacobin spirit of the late-eighteenth century. The Corn Law Amendment Act of 1834 had 
the effect of increasing disaffection amongst the unemployed and drew attention to the brutal 
treatment meted out in the newly established workhouses. Unsurprisingly, Carlyle was not slow 
to employ the phrases ̀Poor Law Bastilles' or `the workhouse Bastille'. 
45 Though the rhetoric of 
opposition to the poor laws was both varied and complex, the Bastille, invoked to convey its 
horrors and more generally the despotic and unjust treatment meted out to England's pauper 
population under the guise of the Victorian poor-laws, was a constitutive element. 
46 
In contrast to political prisoners, neither the copperhead soldiers nor agitators for the 
reform of the poor laws saw in the site of the Bastille a symbolic vision of insurrection and 
revolutionary liberation. Though critics of the iniquitous lunacy legislation wrote treatises 
deploring the lunacy laws, espousing reformist ideals, within such tracts they similarly 
appropriated the Bastille solely as a symbol of cruelty and oppression of a type characteristic of the 
43 Memoirs of the Bastille by Latude and Linguet, trans. by J. and S. F. Mills (London: George 
Routledge & Sons, 1927), p. 180. 
44 The Bastille in America, Or, Democratic Absolutism by an Eye Witness (London: Robert 
Hardwicke, 1861), p. 11. The publication of such a pamphlet in London was an attempt to influence 
British opinion in favour of the secessionist Confederacy. 
45 Thomas Carlyle, Past and Present, ed. by Richard D. Altick (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 
1965), p. 7. 
46 In its tending of the sick, its dietary regimes and physical environment, the Union Workhouse 
was to the narrator in Dickens's Our Mutual Friend (1865) more of a penal establishment than the 
County jail, its horror dramatically evoked in the character of Betty Higden. See Charles Dickens, 
Our Mutual Friend (London: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 496-501. See also ̀ Peter Simple', The 
Horrible Cruelty of the New Poor Law, or, A Scene in the Bath Union Bastille (Bath: Sold by Miss 
Williams, 1837), and G. R. Wythen Baxter, The Book of the Bastile (London: [n. pub. ], 1841). 
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ancien regime. Importantly, they too remained attached to only part of the powerful legacy of the 
Bastille. 
iv. The Bastilles of England - Nineteenth-century lunacy laws 
Immured in a wretched and comfortless prison-house, and left to linger out a lifetime of 
misery, without any rational attempt at treatment, without employment, without a 
glimpse of happiness, or a hope of liberation, [the lunatic] was terrified or starved into 
submission. Lashed, laughed at, despised, forgotten. The great objects were - confine, 
conceal. 
47 
This scene, described by the Victorian physician W. A. F. Browne (1805-1885) in his 1837 tract 
What Asylums Were, Are, and Ought to Be, sought to capture all that was wrong with the 
treatment of lunatics during the decades preceding Pinel's liberation of the insane from their 
chains and manacles. It was a period that Browne describes as the `reign of terror'. Pinel's act of 
emancipating the insane from the `savage ferocity' of the past was quite simply a ̀ jubilee initiative 
of the reign of mercy', an act which was to Browne no less important than the `exhumation [... ] of 
the prisoners from the Bastille'(p. 137). 
Writing over thirty years later and on the other side of the Atlantic, the American 
physician Isaac Ray agreed with Browne on the significance of the revolution that had taken place 
in the care and treatment of the insane. The humane work undertaken by physicians and reformers 
(in this case Dorothea Dix) represented nothing less than `the best fruits of that noble 
philanthropy, of that peculiarly Christian spirit and principle, which distinguish the social 
condition of our times'. 
48 He believed, furthermore, that in an era when the law of kindness' was 
`paramount to every other influence', the possibility of the sane being confined in lunatic asylums 
was a dangerous fallacy: 
Of all the bugbears conjured up [... ] to frighten grown people from the course pointed out 
by true science and true humanity, it would be hard to find one more destitute of real 
substance than the alleged practice of confining sane persons in hospitals for the insane. 
49 
Browne also consigned wrongful incarceration to the past. The scenario of the sane being 
`entrapped, imprisoned, and confined, in defiance of the most active interference made in their 
47 Browne, What Asylums Were, Are, and Ought to Be, p. 101. Further page references are contained 
within the text. 
48 Isaac Ray, "`A Modern Lettre de Cachet" Reviewed', Atlantic Monthly, 22 (August 1868), pp. 227- 
243 (p. 242). 
49 Ray, '"A Modern Lettre de Cachet"', p. 240. 
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favour'(p. 113) described a system which, `at variance with common sense and justice'(p. 131), had 
been eradicated in the face of the `reign of humanity' initiated by Pinel and characterised by 
`Christian benevolence'(p. 139). 
As the two physicians' comments make clear, it was a commonly held belief within medical 
circles that since the days when `atrocities' were perpetrated in what Browne describes as ̀ Bastiles, 
deridingly called asylums', a revolution had taken place. As Browne's tract illustrates, the merest 
mention of the Bastille was enough to imprint on the imagination a vivid picture of the horrors of 
the past. However, his use of the Bastille metaphor was made more powerful due to its history as a 
site of emancipation. In contrast, victims of the lunacy laws in the nineteenth century challenged 
Browne's sanguine description of lunacy reform by presenting a very different picture of the 
humane and enlightened liberation of the insane. Investing the prison with symbolic meaning 
drawn directly from the associations and metaphors popularised by its eighteenth-century prisoners 
like Latude and Linguet, they employed the Bastille as a. powerful symbol of brutality and arbitrary 
psychological cruelty. In their accounts of wrongful incarceration they return repeatedly to the 
lettre de cachet, the fear (captured by Linguet) of being buried alive, and the mysterious legends 
attached to the prison. Most importantly, it was the secrecy and illegality of their detention that 
united the Bastille with abuses represented as inherent in the legal system underpinning private 
asylum care. 
Convicted or hardened prisoners wrote accounts of their lives and their experiences for a 
number of reasons, including financial gain, to warn would-be criminals of the potential outcome 
of their crimes, or to demonstrate the power of Christian redemption in confessional narratives. 
In contrast, those who were released after experiencing wrongful confinement or who escaped from 
lunatic asylums portrayed themselves as political prisoners, seeking to draw attention to the 
arbitrary and despotic nature of their unjust detention. The authors of such tracts condemned 
the system and the individuals which had led to their detention. Yet ever conscious of the taint of 
insanity, their tracts are marked by a notable absence of sentimentality and, like Latude's account 
of his incarceration in Charenton, offer constructive criticism of the lunacy laws and suggestions 
for their reform. 
One of the more famous Victorian accounts of wrongful confinement in a lunatic asylum, 
The Bastilles of England, or, the Lunacy Laws at Work, was written in 1883 by Louisa Lowe. The 
daughter of a well-to-do landowner in Devon in 1842 she married the local Vicar, George Lowe. 
Though she appeared contented with married life, an apparently idyllic domestic existence was 
undermined by both personal and marital problems which had led to a period of hysterical mania 
and an unsuccessful suicide attempt. From the late 1860s, Lowe became increasingly interested in 
Modern Spiritualism and, especially, passive writing. In September 1870 Lowe made the formative 
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decision to leave her husband and their Anglican faith to pursue a life of independence. 50 
Throughout their marriage her husband had continually accused her of being insane, but it was her 
interest in spiritualism and her subsequent departure from the marital home which enabled him to 
commit Lowe to an asylum. 
When she left in 1870 she stayed with a friend in Exeter. Followed by her husband and 
daughter, who begged her to return home, she remained adamant and called on the only friend she 
had in the area, a Dr Shapter. When later the same day she was called upon by Mr Arthur Kempe, a 
surgeon, who explained to her that he was visiting an old friend in the same lodging house, she 
became suspicious and left immediately, moving to a local hotel. Three days later she was accosted 
in the lobby and escorted against her will to Brislington Lodge, a private asylum run by a Dr Fox 
and his son Charles. The attending physician noted that she ̀ betrayed an indelicacy in her 
conversation, and a total absence of that womanly reserve and reticence upon her private affairs and 
sexual relations with her husband, which are usually observed'. 
51 With all the physicians convinced 
that she had shown signs of sub-acute mania and a ̀ perversion of the moral sentiments' Lowe 
resigned herself to the realities of asylum care. On Valentine's day in 1871, after five months at 
Brislington Lodge, she was transferred to Lawn House, Henry Maudsley's private asylum in 
Hanwell. 
Maudsley diagnosed Lowe as suffering from unsoundness of mind as a result of her 
monomaniacal belief in the authority of passive writing. As we have seen, by the 1870s the belief 
that spiritualism indicated insanity was firmly established within the psychiatric profession. To L. 
Forbes Winslow, it was ̀ one of the principle causes of the increase in insanity'. 
52 Maudsley's 
diagnosis of religious monomania confirmed Winslow's belief that the religious groups contained `a 
large number of weak-minded hysterical women, in whom the seeds of mental disorder, though for 
a time latent, are only waiting for new excitement to ripen into maturity'. 
53 
Meanwhile, secure in the knowledge that Lowe was permanently established as a lunatic in 
an asylum, her husband began the legal process in the Chancery Court to gain access to her 
substantial income. An ill-judged move, it was to ultimately lead, after nine months in Lawn 
House, to her release. As soon as she was released she revived the defunct Alleged Lunatics' Friend 
Society and, after she had been officially declared sane in April 1872, she also became the Honorary 
50 Owen, The Darkened Room, p. 171. 
51 Quoted in Owen, The Darkened Room, p. 180. 
52 Lyttleton Stewart Forbes Winslow, Spiritualistic Madness (London: Balliere, Tindall, and Cox, 
1877), p. 19. 
53 Winslow, Spiritualistic Madness, p. 19. 
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Secretary of the Lunacy Law Reform Association. 
54 Desiring even greater publicity for the cause 
she was now firmly supporting, she proceeded to give testimony in a legal action, initiated by 
herself, against the Commissioners in Lunacy. Her accusation was that they had failed adequately 
to prevent her wrongful confinement both in Brislington Lodge and in Lawn House. She 
questioned the legality of the procedures by which she had been committed. She was convinced that 
the certificate signed by Dr Shapter was misleading because it emphasised to an unacceptable degree 
her earlier bouts of hysterical mania. 
55 She also argued that the committal procedures were 
incorrect and that her private correspondence had been illegally confiscated by the doctors. 
In the first report heard before the Queen's Bench in late November 1872, a report 
charging the Commissioners with concurring in the improper detention of a ̀ False-Alleged 
Lunatic', her affidavit vividly recalled the abuses that she had suffered: 
It is now many years since, in "Hard Cash, " attention was called to the frightful facilities 
for abuse and corruption offered by our Lunacy Laws, and yet the evil continues unabated. 
Again does a warning voice sound; again it is a tale of the cruellest wrong laid before the 
country - this time told solely from the most bitter experience. God grant that it be told 
not in vain, but may arouse the English nation at least to demand efficient supervision 
56 
and control of its lunatic asylums. 
Her action failed and it was not until 1877 that a second Select Committee was appointed to 
inquire into the lunacy laws `so far as it regards the security afforded by it against violations of 
personal liberty'. 
57 Six years later, Lowe published The Bastilles of England. Setting out to 
delineate the shortcomings of the lunacy laws and expose the abuses which it allowed, she began her 
tract with a vivid comparison: `Few analogies can be more striking than those between our English 
houses licensed for lunatics, and the Bastilles of pre-revolutionized France, between the English 
medical certificates of lunacy with their concomitant order of incarceration, and the French lettre 
58 de cachet'. 
54 Owen, The Darkened Room, p. 154. 
55 Louisa Lowe, "Quin Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: No. 1, Report of a Case Heard in Queen's Bench, 
November 22,1872 (London: J. Burns, 1872-3), p. 8. 
56 Lowe, "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? " No. 1, p. 2. 
57 Louisa Lowe, The Bastilles of England, or, The Lunacy Laws at Work (London: Crookenden, 
1883), p. 2. 
58 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 1. 
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v. Lettres de Cachet 
The order on which Latude was confined in the Bastille was identical to the medical certificates that 
consigned Lowe to asylum care. In either scenario, she argued, `the individual is "deported and 
incarcerated" at the will of another private individual, by means of documents, of which he is 
allowed no cognizance, and which, as experience shows, are procurable by all who can pay for 
them'. 
59 In both cases - the eighteenth-century lettre de cachet and the nineteenth-century legal 
procedure by which one was confined to an asylum on the grounds of lunacy - Lowe believed that 
`the individual is equally secluded from the world, deprived of all civil rights, and left absolutely, in 
all respects, at the mercy of his incarcerators, without other check than occasional official 
supervision '. 
60 
As early as 1840 the issue of wrongful confinement in lunatic asylums had become 
sensational enough to be treated as a central theme by popular novelists. In 1840 Henry Cockton, 
for example, published The Life and Adventures of Valentine Vox, the Ventriloquist. Like Charles 
Reade's Hard Cash, the novel sought to reveal the iniquitous operation of the lunacy laws, or, the 
`pernicious, the dreadful operation of which has been, if not vividly, truthfully portrayed, a system 
teeming with secret cruelties and horrors'. 
61 In Cockton's novel, the infamous lettres de cachet 
were transformed into `jolly mad-doctors, the majority of whom are to be bought for half a 
sovereign [... ] [who] are called in to certify, [... ] are paid to certify [... ] [and] therefore do certify, 
and pocket the coin'. 
62 If the public had doubted the novel's truth, they could read newspaper 
coverage of trials which turned upon the contradictory evidence of medical experts. 
Though the problem was that there existed no clear cut boundaries between the insane and 
the sane, this would have not been such an issue had not the young psychiatric profession 
. positioned 
itself as an arbiter of mental health, declaring that only they were qualified to assess 
one's mental state. As it appeared to the public, while one specialist confirmed the presence of 
insanity another would confidently, in the same case, deny the existence of any mental disorder 
whatsoever. In commenting on such a courtroom scenario, Lowe argued that one half of them could 
63 be no more than rogues, `men who, for the sake of their fees, deliberately commit perjury'. Set 
59 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 1. 
60 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 1. 
61 Cockton, Valentine Vox, p. v. 
62 Cockton, Valentine Vox, p. 144. 
63 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 7. 
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against scandals involving the abuse of the lunacy laws by doctors themselves, Cockton's `jolly 
mad-doctors' were perhaps not so overtly fictional as we might suppose. 
64 
In 1838 Richard Paternoster had been committed to an asylum against his will. Ironically 
enough, his father was William Finch, the mad-house proprietor. Paternoster had become estranged 
from his family after a dispute over an inheritance. After his release on the grounds of sanity, like 
Lowe, he employed the lettre de cachet to capture the tyranny under which he had been 
incarcerated. 65 Like Pasternoster, the anonymous author ('a sane patient') of My Experiences in a 
Lunatic Asylum (1879) explained that he had read many `tales and many histories which turn on 
the abuse of lettres de cachet in the famous ante-Revolutionary days'. The author challenged the 
reader to distinguish between then and the present day: Will any-body tell me the difference? It 
seems to me that all that could be done by their means can be done "under certificates" here and 
now, and legally justified afterwards over and over again'. 
66 He described his narrative as a ̀ true 
story of the Bastilles of merrie England'. 
It was the secrecy of the proceedings that linked the lettre de cachet with the lunacy laws. 
Lowe believed that many victims had been ̀ subject to the most abject personal slavery on false 
allegations of lunacy; in fact, condemned, [... ] perhaps for life, to a doom often worse than a 
felon's without trial, or even knowing whereof they are accused'. 
67 As one Times commentator 
noted in 1858, ̀ It is only to a madhouse, not to a prison, that an Englishman can be sent, and no 
one be the wiser'. 
68 While secrecy naturally attended the committal of patients to private lunatic 
asylums, it was believed with classic Victorian propriety that on release or escape, one should 
maintain a dignified silence. As the `sane patient' noted, his friends thought that in writing about 
his experiences in a lunatic asylum he ̀ should in some way be breaking a confidence which should be 
devoutly kept [... ] that the secrets of the prison-house of lunacy should be as sacred as the 
mysteries of the Ceres of old'. 
69 Many, apparently, were `prevented from divulging "the secrets of 
the prisonhouse" by the irreparable social injury he would thereby inflict upon himself and his 
family'. 70 Like Rosina Bulwer-Lytton, Lowe believed that public awareness was the key to reform. 
64 One recalls the damaging publicity received by John Conolly when he was forced to testify in the 
Lawrence Ruck case. See The Times, 24 August, 1858. 
65 Peter McCandless, `Liberty and Lunacy' in Scull, Madhouses, p. 346. 
66 `A Sane Patient', My Experiences in a Lunatic Asylum (London: Chatto and Windus, 1879), p. 66. 
67 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 3. 
68 The Times, 24 August, 1858, p. 6. 
69 My Experiences, p. 19. 
70 The Times, 21 August, 1858, p. 12. 
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In light of the ever-present possibility that the issue might, like so many other causes, be 
consigned to `the limbo of oblivion', Lowe saw it as her duty to publicise the outrages and assist all 
71 
those who had similarly been confined. 
The ̀ sane patient' whose liberty `and very existence as an individual being, had been 
signed away behind my back' wanted his work to be perceived not as an `onslaught on the medical 
men engaged in lunacy practice' but as ̀ an onslaught on a crying national sin, and all who favour 
it'. 72 In contrast, Lowe believed that a direct relationship existed between the innocent patient's 
liberty and the incarcerator in the guise of the physician or asylum superintendent. For many 
people it `is the fashion to put their doctor on a pedestal and do him honour, as an African does to 
his medicine-man', but of the three learned professions, medicine produced the most criminals. 
Citing William Palmer she could without difficulty declare that to `each of those murderers while 
they lived, the law confided absolute power to certify lunacy - to each now living, ejusdem generis, 
73 is the same power entrusted'. These ̀ medical professionals', she argued, were 
wholly unfit to be trusted with the meting out to their fellow men so awful a doom as 
deprivation of liberty on the ground of lunacy. For that such deprivation is an awful 
doom, one that society is only justified in inflicting for its own security, and then only so 
far as that security requires, no thoughtful person will deny. 
74 
The capability, independence, and moral worth of asylum proprietors had been questioned for as 
long as the'trade in lunacy' existed. These `gaolers of the mind' as William Pargeter had called 
asylum proprietors as early as 1792, should be watched so as to prevent, or at least keep in check, 
the `oppressive tyranny' of their `receptacles of misery'. 
75 
71 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 3. Lowe assisted Georgina Weldon, another spiritualist who had 
been accused of insanity in the late 1870s. See Judith R. Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight - 
Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
p. 178. See also Brian Thompson, A Monkey Among Crocodiles: The Disastrous Life of Mrs Georgina 
Weldon (London: Harper Collins, 2000). 
72 My Experiences, pp. 40,113. 
73 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 6. William Palmer was a respected physician who was executed in 
1856, convicted of one murder by poisoning (but widely believed to have poisoned up to fourteen 
individual. See Dudley Barker, Palmer - The Rugeley Poisoner (London: Duckworth, 1935), and 
Boyle, Black Swine, pp. 60-76. 
74 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 7. 
75 William Pargeter, Observations on maniacal disorders (Reading: for the Author, 1792), quoted in 
Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry 1535-1860, ed. by Richard A. Hunter and Ida Macalpine (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 542. 
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An early nineteenth-century physician, Robert Hull, declared that such men as those 
involved in the commercial element of private lunacy care were `devoid of every requisite for this 
peculiar undertaking - without psychological tastes, without philanthropy, without erudition'. 
76 
`A Lady', writing in the Lancet in 1840 similarly reflected that such `men of education', would, for 
`filthy lucre [... ] prostrate their moral respectability [... ] that they may wallow in luxurious 
comfort'. 
77 Summing up such sentiments the `sane patient' argued that when such physicians 
`condescend to think a little less of their own feelings, and a little more of theirs whom they shut 
up, we shall be well on the road to amendment'. 
78 After Mabel Etchell's lover's father had made 
advances upon her, he had her committed to Hygeria Lodge, a private asylum. In recounting her 
experience of wrongful confinement in Ten Years in a Lunatic Asylum (1868) to draw attention to 
the `defective' machinery of the lunacy laws, she agreed that reform must begin with the asylum 
superintendant. Until `moral excellence and intellectual perceptions are made indispensable 
qualifications for those who desire those onerous and responsible posts, no great reformation can 
be expected'. 
79 
Under the influence of Richelieu, the `Red Cardinal', the increasing arbitrariness of 
detention helped in no small degree to cement the perception that the French monarchy was one of 
the most despotic institutions in the world, and the lettre de cachet the most feared of its tools. In 
the nineteenth century, oppression and injustice, as it was perceived to be allied with the French 
monarchy, was appropriated by campaigners denigrating private asylum proprietors, physicians and 
conniving family members. In 1868 L. Clarke Davis published `A Modern Lettre de Cachet' in the 
Atlantic Monthly. Like the accounts discussed above, Davis sought to expose the horrors of the 
lunatic asylum and condemn the `monstrous' lunacy laws by drawing a direct analogy with the 
lettre de cachet. With the signature of the physician, the lunacy certificate `springs into vitality 
with all the strength of that old lettre of France which, with like silence and secrecy, consigned its 
victim to the Bastile'. 
80 
Like the lettre de cachet, the lunacy certificate removed the alleged lunatic from the 
`wholesome air of the outer world, from the refined intercourse of society, from our dreams of art, 
76 Robert Hull, `Essays on determination of blood to the head' (London: Churchill, 1842) quoted in 
Hunter and Macalpine, Psychiatry, p. 905. 
77 A Lady, `Facts Connected with the Treatment of Insanity in St. Luke's Hospital', Lancet, (1840- 
41) ii, p. 759. 
78 My E. peiien ce5, p. 112. 
79 Mabel Etchell, Ten Years in a Lunatic Asylum (London: Simpkin, Marshall, 1868), p. 86. 
80 L. Clarke Davis, `A Modern Lettre de Cachet', Atlantic Monthly, 22 (May 1868), pp. 588-602 
(p. 590). 
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from our scheme of benevolence, or from our professional pursuits, to the lonely cell [... ] of an 
asylum densely peopled with the insane-. 
81 As institutions in which the `walls are as high and 
strong, the keepers as vigilant and morose, the codes of law as absolute, the windows and doors as 
difficult to escape from, as those of any prison in the land', lunatic asylums were to Davis 
82 
nothing less than `torture-houses', `palace-like Bastiles' and `charnel-houses for the mind'. It is 
clear that the lettre de cachet was considered analogous to the official process by which lunacy 
certificates committed the sane to lunatic asylums. The only difference, argued Lowe, was that `the 
fearful power there [eighteenth century France] centred but in a very few hands, and those the 
highest in the State, is here confided to a numerous profession, entirely regardless of the moral or 
intellectual worth in the individuals that compose it'. 
83 
vi. Buried Alive 
In 1878 the London Figaro published an article on wrongful incarceration entitled `Worse than 
Bastilles'. To the writer, the incarceration in lunatic asylums of the `sane victims of lust, greed, 
fraud, or revenge' was ̀ worse than penal servitude. Worse than the Bastille. Worse than an 
agonising death! '84 To anyone who had an enemy `rich enough to pay for the wicked deed', the 
most `infamous and accursed iniquity' of confinement to the `awful living tomb' that was the 
private lunatic asylum was a distinct possibility. Just as the lettre de cachet was appropriated to 
symbolise the secrecy which attended illegal detention in lunatic asylums, so too was one of the 
most powerful legacies left by Linguet used to give meaning to the desperation or mental `agony' 
that was felt by the wrongfully confined: the perception of being buried alive. It was even adopted 
by suffragettes, revolutionaries and political prisoners. 
85 
In July 1858, the efforts of Rosina Bulwer-Lytton and her network of supporters was 
successful in securing newspaper interest in her case. In an article published after a compromise had 
81 Davis, `Lettre', p. 589. 
82 Davis, `Lettre', p. 589. 
83 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 52. 
84 `Worse than Bastilles', London Figaro, 26 October, 1878, p. 9. 
85 In describing her incarceration in Holloway prison, Lady Constance Lytton explained that the 
sense of `being buried alive was all but insufferable and might quickly drive one to the verge of 
insanity. See Constance Lytton and Jane Warton, Prisons & Prisoners - Some Personal Experiences 
(London: William Heinemann, 1914), p. 67. Imprisoned in the Western Penitentiary in 
Pennsylvania, Alexander Berkman likened his incarceration to an `agony of living death'. Berkman, 
p. 123. Figner, too, thought that the interior of Schülessburg was like a ̀ tomb': `The closed doors 
behind which prisoners were pining in loneliness, looked like a row of coffins standing upright'. 
Figner, pp. 188-89. 
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been reached between Rosina and her husband, the Daily Telegraph reflected that Rosina had been 
excommunicated from her home, cut off from her family, and `buried in a social tomb'. 
86 Mabel 
Etchell believed that she had been confined to `a living death' and laments in her narrative how she 
had been cruelly deposited in `the sepulchre of a private mad-house'. 
87 In one of many letters to 
the Commissioners in Lunacy, Louisa Lowe wrote that her life while incarcerated in Lawn House 
was a ̀ hideous doom'. It was a ̀ lingering death in life' which was a ̀ moral torture of 
incarceration'. 88 Clarissa Caldwell Lathrop vividly recounts in A Secret Institution (1890) the 
terrors of life, as a sane patient, in an American asylum. Her account of life within a ̀ living tomb' 
or that `horrible prison', recalled the experiences of both Etchell and Lowe. As `completely shut 
away from the world as if I had never existed', she was forced to endure ̀ the horrors of a living 
grave, and the possible fate of a hopeless lunatic'. 
89 
Such sentiments were echoed in popular fiction: `If you were to dig a grave for her in the 
nearest churchyard and bury her alive in it', Doctor Mosgrave informs Robert Audley in Lady 
Audley's Secret (1862), `you could not more safely shut her from the world and all worldly 
associations'. 
90 In response to being told the destination of her trip, a Belgian asylum, Lady 
Audley declared to her arch enemy, `You have brought me to my grave, Mr. Audley [... ] you have 
used your power basely and cruelly, and have brought me to a living grave'. 
91 Upon Robert 
Audley's departure from Villebrumeuse, Lady Audley icily noted that `law could pronounce no 
worse sentence than this, a life-long imprisonment in a mad-house'. 
92 In Valentine Vox, Goodman 
and his friend are at a loss to explain why `a young creature like that - not yet arrived at 
womanhood, scarcely eighteen, should be buried within four walls, and not suffered to see a single 
soul save the wretch who casts her food into her den during the day, and chains her down to her 
86 Daily Telegraph, 15 July, 1858, p. 4. 
87 Etchell, pp. 76-77. 
88 Quoted in Owen, The Darkened Room, p. 190. 
89 Clarissa Caldwell Lathrop, A Secret Institution (New York: Bryant, 1890), pp. 92,121,225,169. 
90 Mary Elizabeth Braddon, Lady Audley's Secret (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 381. 
91 Braddon, Lady Audley's Secret, p. 391. 
92 Braddon, Lady Audley's Secret, p. 394. 
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pallet at night'. 
93 In Charles Reade's Hard Cash, Alfred Hardie could do nothing but he as ̀mute 
as death in his gloomy cell, a tomb within a living tomb'. 
94 
`[W] e may state it as the conviction of those who stand above all prejudice', the Daily 
Telegraph continued, `that the lunatic asylums of this country are frequently applied to the same 
uses as the Bastille, where the Man in the Iron Mask was immured for life and buried in secrecy 
because his pretensions were considered dangerous by claimants to estates and titles, or 
perpetrators of unrevealed crimes'. 
95 The Bastille, the `sane patient' suggested, 
could scarcely hold its prisoners more closely than the "establishment" wherein I lived; and 
scarcely harder could it have been for any echo of complaint or suffering to reach the outer 
world. Buried and forgotten we lay there like dead men out of mind. 
96 
To Jean Jaques Calet, a French Protestant who had been imprisoned in the Bastille for nearly 
twenty years, and who witnessed its storming in 1789, the Bastille was ̀ the Grave of liberty, the 
97 
scandal of France' and `the disgrace of Europe'. 
In My Experiences in a Lunatic Asylum, the narrator considers what might have been done 
to aid those, like himself, who were wrongfully confined in lunatic asylums. 
it is not too much to say [... ] that there are at this present moment languishing in these 
places many men who might well have been rescued, may even now (and a mob attack, 
Bastille fashion, upon the whole body of private asylums would, to my mind, do as much 
good as harm), - men who might well have been spared and saved to do good work in the 
world, but who now he as helpless as the enchanter at the feet of Vivien in the hollow oak 
Lost to life and use, and name and fame. 
98 
Our `sane patient' did not believe that a ̀ mob attack, Bastille fashion' on private asylums would 
accomplish reform. Louisa Lowe agreed: 'were every licensed house in England closed to-morrow, 
and the system of inspection left untouched, abuses would soon be almost as ripe as they are 
93 Cockton, Valentine Vox, p. 174. 
94 Charles Reade, Hard Cash (London: Chatto and Windus, 1863), p. 266. Further page references are 
contained within the text. 
95 Daily Telegraph, 15 July, 1858, p. 4. 
96 My Experiences, pp. 66-67. 
97 Jean Jacques Calet, A True and Minute Account of the Destruction of the Bastille (Medford, MA: 
William Hunt, 1800), p. 34. First published in 1789. 
98 My Experiences, pp. 17-18. 
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now'. 
99 For it to be effective, reform could only take place at the level of the law. Only judges 
could compel asylum proprietors to accept patients that were a danger to themselves or others. `It 
is not for me to suggest reform', the `sane patient' continued, `but for those who are paid to do 
that work rightly and earnestly, or who choose to undertake to legislate for us'. 
100 While Lowe's 
warning was in earnest, his was tinged with irony. It was precisely because of the failure of the 
lunacy laws that men and women, like Merlin, were left to languish, buried alive in private asylums 
in nineteenth-century England. `Significant proof', Lowe concludes, ̀ has now been adduced to 
justify the assertion that the English lunacy system is strictly analogous to that of the ancient 
Bastilles of France'. 
101 Though like other nineteenth-century lunacy campaigners, in The Bastilles 
of England Lowe had appropriated only a part of the symbolic and metaphorical legacy of the 
Bastille. 
In 1868 Isaac Ray penned a response to Davis's article entitled `A Modern Lettre de Cachet 
Reviewed'. Echoing the anxiety of physicians giving evidence at the 1859-60 Select Committee 
hearings and commenting on the Windham commission, Ray criticised Davis for exciting `popular 
prejudices' against the medical profession and exacerbating suspicion of lunatic asylums. Ray 
wished to assuage public fear of the asylum and rejuvenate public opinion in favour of the physician. 
His strategy was to condemn outright the `vocabulary of oppression and tyranny' which framed the 
`spiteful effusions' of Davis. Ray believed that this vocabulary had been 
ransacked for titles and epithets wherewith to render them [lunatic asylums] odious and 
unworthy of confidence. They are called "prisons, " "Bastiles, " "torture-houses, " "breeders 
of insanity": their physicians are styled "jailers, " [... ] their inmates are called "prisoners, " 
and their seclusion "imprisonment, " "being buried alive". 
102 
Beyond exciting a ̀ temporary sensation in the minds of over-credulous people, and all of those who 
are ever ready to believe that the fairest outside is a cloak for concealing some hideous evil beneath 
it', 103 Ray firmly believed that the institution and profession which he was defending would not 
be harmed by such language. 
However the fact that renowned physicians like Ray, Bucknill and others responded so 
directly to the metaphors, images and associations contained in memoirs and newspaper accounts 
99 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 118. 
100 My Experiences, p. 6. 
101 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, p. 52. 
102 Ray, `"A Modern Lettre de Cachet" Reviewed', p. 242. 
103 Ray, "`A Modern Lettre de Cachet" Reviewed', p. 242. 
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suggests a deepening awareness that such language was damaging not only the aspirations and 
stature of psychological physicians but also the social and medical authority of the profession of 
mental science. 
104 By reasserting the symbolic relationship between the prison and the asylum, by 
turning to the legacy of the Bastille as a site of cruelty and secrecy, men and women like Lowe, 
Etchell and the `sane patient' threatened the very principles underpinning the Victorian `reign of 
humanity' and the ̀ reign of mercy' in the care and treatment of the insane. Countering official 
declarations of progress, reform, kindness and humanity, Victorians were left in no doubt that 
despite the best efforts of lunacy reformers, one of the `great objects' of lunatic asylums remained 
to `confine and conceal'. The anxiety this belief generated was reinforced by Charles Reade's Hard 
Cash. As the following chapter demonstrates, it was a novel which on its publication in 1863 
became the object of deep consternation and criticism from the medical establishment. 
104 The way that the Bastille operated in debates about wrongful confinement in Victorian lunatic 
asylums is strikingly absent from what is otherwise a comprehensive account of the history of the 
symbol of the Parisian prison. See Hans Jürgen Lüsebrink and Rolf Reichardt, The Bastille: A History 
of a Symbol of Despotism and Freedom, 
University Press, 1997). 
trans. by Norbert Schürer (Durham and London: Duke 
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Chapter Seven 
Charles Reade and Mary Elizabeth Braddon 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, individuals who felt they had been wrongly incarcerated in 
lunatic asylums like Mabel Etchell wrote about their confinement experiences in order to enlighten 
their readers to the reality that lay behind the `costly building, the enchanted pleasure-grounds [... ] 
and the well-dressed inmates' of the private lunatic asylum. Far from perceiving the asylum as a 
site of care underpinned by humanity, and its physicians as personifications of enlightened 
benevolence, they sought to convey instead `the agony, the misery [... ] and the mute despair' that 
in truth characterised ̀ those splendid homes of wretchedness'. 
' 
Such narratives were condemned by their critics as dishonest and untrustworthy; 
unrealistic, they were considered to contain nothing more than `flippant errors' whose sole purpose 
was to hoax a lay public and exacerbate unfounded anxiety. Compounded by the fact that the sanity 
of their authors was itself in question, individuals who sought to challenge the accomplishments 
espoused by proponents of the asylum were confronted with the problem of credibility. Discussion 
ensued centring on the most appropriate vehicle through which to convince the public of the 
veracity of their experiences. Whether `a plain statement of facts' contained in a ̀ didactic 
narrative'2 was more effective than the employment of fiction to enlighten the reading public was 
disputed. 
Responding to the question of why she did not use ̀ the amenities of fiction on the facts of 
the asylum life' Louisa Lowe concluded in The Bastilles of England, that if `my tale shares with the 
proverbial dulness [sic] of statistics, it will I trust also share their recognised value'. Lowe 
envisaged her tract as simply `a plain unvarnished account of facts, facts as I have seen them or 
known them to be. '3 In contrast to authority accorded automatically to statistics (recall the 
Lancet's reliance on `plain facts' to dispute the apparent despotic power of physicians during the 
Nottidge trial), Lowe believed that there existed in the pages of a novel the capacity for 
imaginative disbelief. While Lowe viewed the novel as an inadequate site within which to 
communicate her didactic message (which was to abolish private asylums), Charles Reade felt 
conversely that fiction, especially sensation fiction, was an ideal vehicle through which to expose 
the horrors of wrongful confinement, the devious machinations of physicians and asylum 
superintendants and the ineffectual operation of the lunacy laws. 
1 Etchell, Ten Years in a Lunatic Asylum, p. 3. 
2A Fastened Fellow, A Man's Adventure (London: E. W. Allen, 1878), p. 1. 
3 Lowe, The Bastilles of England, pp. 119-20. 
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Despite the difficulties it entailed, the employment of a ̀ highly ornamented' fictional 
narrative to address a didactic moral question was to Reade as beneficial as it was problematic. In 
his Preface to Hard Cash he attempted to offset criticism by defending his decision to employ the 
genre of sensation fiction to examine the lunacy laws and illegal confinement. Though he felt that 
the `slang term' of `sensation novelist' was `not quite accurate' as it was applied to his novels, he 
maintained that `without sensation there can be no interest'(p. i) and it was precisely public 
`interest' in the subject which he sought to secure. From its publication in serial form in Charles 
Dickens's All the Year Round, Reade's story was mired in controversy. 
The anger expressed by the critics of Hard Cash centred on Reade's claim that his expose 
of the horrors of wrongful confinement in lunatic asylums was founded on `fact'. Unlike Lowe, 
who felt fiction would encourage imaginative disbelief in the reader, both Reade and his critics 
recognised the affective power of fiction to manipulate the opinions and beliefs of the reading 
public. More powerful than factual tracts and treatises in its ability to excite fear, Reade conceived 
of his novel as a productive alliance between fact and fiction. To his critics, Hard Cash was as 
inaccurate and untrue as it was ̀ illegitimate'. Unsurprisingly, the most vocal critics of Reade's 
novel were physicians and asylum superintendants. Hard Cash was to them nothing more than a 
`libellous attack' and a ̀ terrible slander' on the medical profession. There were numerous grounds 
on which medical men could object to the novel: Reade had transparently parodied eminent 
physicians, overtly criticised the Commissioners in Lunacy, and laid bare the psychological and 
physical abuses still committed in lunatic asylums. 
As this chapter will demonstrate, the responses to Reade's novel foreground a series of 
specific anxieties about the ability of textual forms to influence the public mind, the illegitimacy or 
legitimacy of the use of fiction in addressing social issues, and the proper responsibility of authors 
to their art and the reading public. The reception of the novel thus enables us to examine both 
Reade's treatment of wrongful incarceration in lunatic asylums and to consider wider concerns 
about the contested nature of the authority fiction possessed to influence a naive public. However, 
of most interest for this study is the way that physicians objected to the novel on the grounds that 
it represented a blatant contravention of established codes and conventions of both `realism' and 
sensationalism. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines contemporary 
responses to sensation literature, exploring the construction of anxieties about the genre's 
dangerous influence on the reading public. While the sensation novel's treatment of class and 
gender was an acute source of concern, the novels' conflation of romance and realism was, as this 
section will demonstrate, equally perturbing to critics. Against this backdrop of cultural alarm at 
the effects of indulging in and being influenced by sensation fiction, the second section will 
consider Reade's Hard Cash. After examining the issues, apprehensions and debates which led to 
Reade's initial interest in l. inacy law reform and his decision to write the novel, this section will 
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focus on the positive and negative reception of the novel, examining in particular a newspaper 
debate between Reade and a private asylum superintendant, J. S. Bushnan. 
To demonstrate the literal dangers that Hard Cash posed to the health of society, Bushnan 
compared it to Mary Elizabeth Braddon's Lady Audley's Secret (1862), a novel whose influence he 
believed was far less dangerous than Reade's Hard Cash. Bearing in mind Dickens's criticisms of 
Wilkie Collins's `Mad Monkton', the final section of this chapter will address Bushnan's 
comparison by considering the varying ways that Braddon and Reade, in their treatment of 
insanity and the asylum, conceive of their responsibility to their reader and their reader's 
responsibility to those afflicted with insanity. 
i. Prurient Prudes and the Strawberry Ices of Literature 
In his Autobiography (1883), Anthony Trollope remarked that a `vast proportion of the teaching 
of the day, - greater probably than many of us acknowledge to ourselves, - comes from [novels]'. 
` 
There were many, like Trollope, who took a keen interest in observing and commenting upon the 
way in which novel-reading had been `brought into society' during the nineteenth century. 
5 Due 
to the flourishing of circulating libraries like Mudie's from the 1840s and the rise of railway stalls 
and their proffering of `Yellow-backs' from the 1850s, the novel was read `right and left, above 
stairs and below, in town houses and in country parsonages, by young countesses and by farmer's 
daughters, by old lawyers and by young students'. 
6 Whether instructing young men in the charms 
of love or in educating young girls on what to expect from their friends and families, the novel had 
become according to Trollope the `amusement of the time'. Margaret Oliphant (1828-97), on the 
other hand, believed that the sensation novel (what Lady Laura Ridding described as ̀ strawberry 
ices of literature'7) provided evidence that fiction had deteriorated from the sane, wholesome and 
clean family entertainment that it had been in the days of Walter Scott. 
8 The novel had become, 
she felt, culturally deleterious to the heath of the nation. 
4 Anthony Trollope, An Autobiography, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1883), II, p. 32. 
5 [Margaret Oliphant], `Novels', Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 102 (September 1867), pp. 257-80 
(p. 258). On the history of the novel industry see Altick, The English Common Reader. 
6 Trollope, Autobiography, II, p. 31. In 1842, Charles Edward Mudie began to rent boxes of novels 
from his Bloomsbury residence. As Altick points out, it was not until he opened his New Oxford 
street headquarters that he came ̀ to full eminence'. See Altick, The English Common Reader, p. 295. 
7 Lady Laura Ridding, `What Women Should Read? ', Woman at Home, 5 (October 1896-September 
1897), pp-29-32 (p. 29). 
8 [Oliphant], `Novels', pp. 257-58. 
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As a novel which to one critic sacrificed `everything to intensity of excitement', 
9 
the 
serial publication in 1859 of Wilkie Collins's The Woman in White in All the Year Round signalled 
the introduction to the literary marketplace of a distinctly new kind of novel. Unlike their gothic 
predecessors, the revelations of villainy and mystery in sensation novels like Mrs Henry Wood's 
East Lynne (1861) and Mary Elizabeth Braddon's Lady Audley's Secret (1862) 10 were no longer 
located in musty dungeons, leaden coffins and ancient abbeys, but in country mansions, beautifully 
landscaped gardens and lawyer's offices. Similarly, evil and dangerous protagonists took the form of 
beautiful young women, respected physicians and noble heirs to country estates. The immediate 
popularity of sensation novels lay partly in their topicality and their proximity to the real lives of 
their readers. As Henry James put it, in a thrilling manner sensation novels dramatically 
penetrated and exposed in their harshest light `those mysterious of mysteries, the mysteries which 
are at our front doors'. 
11 
Not `slow to perceive that the columns of the daily papers were becoming formidable rivals 
to quiet novels' (in part because of the lurid attention newspapers gave to crime12), the writers 
and publishers of sensation novelists responded by appropriating the commercial premises 
underpinning the flourishing newspaper industry and marketed their novels to take advantage of 
the recent changes in literary production and distribution. To the consternation of Oliphant, the 
sensation phenomenon undermined the hope that the abolition of `taxes on knowledge' (newspaper 
9 Unsigned review, Critic, 25 August, 1860. Quoted in Wilkie Collins: The Critical Heritage, ed. by 
Norman Page (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 82. 
10 East Lynne was initially serialized in the New Monthly Magazine (edited then by William Harrison 
Ainsworth) from January 1861. That autumn it was published in three volumes by Bentley. The first 
installment of Lady Audley's Secret was published in 1861 in Robin Goodfellow. When the magazine 
folded after only 13 issues, the story was reissued in 1862 in 12 installments in Ward & Lock's 
Sixpenny Magazine. In October 1862 it was published in three volumes by the new firm of Tinsley 
Brothers. An immediate success, the profits enabled the elder of the two Tinsley brothers to purchase 
a new home which he named Audley Lodge. See Robert Lee Wolff, Sensational Victorian: The Life and 
Fiction of Mary Elizabeth Braddon (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979), p. 5. 
11 A writer in the Daily News wryly commented in 1862 that both the length and expense of the 
Windham trial were `tempting subjects to those who pander to that "sensation" mania which is 
scarcely less rife in London than in New York'. Daily News, 16 January, 1862, p. 4. 
12 ̀ Sensation Novels', Medical Critic and Psychological journal, 3 (July 1863), pp. 513-19 (p. 514). 
The reporting of the widespread political agitation of the 1830s in newspapers both horrified and 
fascinated the reading public. Altick suggests that the decline of Chartism in the following decades 
posed a problem for newspaper editors: what would retain interest and so maintain readers? The 
solution, Altick argues, lay in their cashing in on the public's interest in deviance and criminal 
activity following the establishment of police forces and new methods of criminal detection such as 
photography. See Richard D. Altick, Victorian Studies in Scarlet (London: J. M. Dent, 1972), p. 44. 
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stamp tax and advertisement and paper duties) would give rise to improved reading tastes. 
13 
Founded on immoral and vice-ridden `noxious topics', the widespread popularity of sensation 
novels (any novelist, James argued, who was able to interpret an `illegitimate world to the 
legitimate world, commands from the nature of this position a certain popularity'14) seemed to 
their critics to substantiate fears that the very bastions of middle-class life were in the process of 
succumbing to an insidious corruption. 
' 5 
It was this dire spectre, the fear that the taste for novel-reading might corrupt public 
virtue, which encouraged moralists into paroxysms of vigilance and strengthened their 
determination to `supervise [public taste] with the most anxious and unceasing care'. 
16 To critics 
like Henry Longueville Mansel (1820-71) and Oliphant, the increasing popularity of sensation 
literature was alarming. In comparison to gothic fiction's `machinery of miracle [... ] [which was] 
troublesome and expensive', 
17 
and in contrast to their Newgate, oriental and sentimental 
predecessors, bigamy, murder, deceit, arson, deviant sexuality and anti-social behaviour were 
presented in sensation novels as fundamental cornerstones of middle-class society and culture. 
Drawing attention to the dangers inherent in the sensation novel's fictitious manipulation of 
reality - their irreverent domestication of subversive and criminal acts and illicit behaviors - it was 
believed by critics that by fostering intense and uncontrollable emotional urges and affective 
impulses, they threatened the health not only the individual reader but of society itself: 
Regarding these works merely as an efflorescence, as an eruption indicative of the health of 
the body in which they appear, the existence of an impure [... ] crop of novels, and the fact 
they are easily read, are by no means favourable symptoms of the conditions of the body of 
society. 
18 
In sensationalising the lurid underbelly of Victorian propriety, such novels made blatant 
`appeal[s] to the imagination, through the active agency of the nerves', a phenomenon that was as 
startling as ̀ exceptional outrages of morality and custom'. They appealed ̀to the nerves rather than 
13 Altick, The English Common Reader, p. 356. 
14 James, ̀Mary Elizabeth Braddon', p. 742. 
15 Ann Cvetkovich, Mixed Feelings - Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian Sensationalism (New 
Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 15. 
16 W. R. Greg, `False Morality of Lady Novelists', National Review, 8 (January - April 1859), 
pp. 144-67 (p. 145). 
17 `Sensation Novels', Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine, 91 (May 1862), pp. 564-584 (p. 566). 
18 H. L. Mansel, `Sensation Novels', Quarterly Review, 113 (April 1863), pp. 481-514 (p. 512). 
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to the heart' and promoted an ̀ intense appreciation of flesh and blood'. 
19 Their affective influence 
was central to critics' exploration of the process by which such novels legitimised sensation. 
Seeking to make sense of the process by which such narratives constructed `many thrills of 
feeling', 20 a metaphor of physical and intellectual consumption predominated. The sober-minded 
Oliphant believed that the readers of sensation fiction did `not gulp down the evil in them for the 
sake of the abominable skill [... ] or the splendor of the scenery [... ] On the contrary, [they] 
swallow the poorest of literary drivel'. 
21 An explanatory discourse evolved in which sensation 
novels were interpreted in terms of their addictive qualities; they were depicted as edible 
commodities, too delectable to be ignored yet disease-ridden and contagious. 
Unlike `[h] istories, philosophies, political treatises [... ] [which] are solid and often tough 
food, which requires laborious and slow mastication', novels were like `soup or jelly; they may be 
drunk off at a draught or swallowed whole, certain of being easily and rapidly absorbed into the 
system'. 
22 Critics of sensation novels were aghast at the consequences that would result from the 
infectious manner in which such ̀ mental food'23 `permeat [ed] and penetrat [ed]'24 the body and 
the mind. In a review of Wilkie Collins's Armadale (1866), the Athenaeum's music critic Henry 
Fothergill Chorley (1808-72) ominously wrote that We are in a period of diseased invention, and 
the coming phase of it may be palsy'. 
25 The metaphorically-diseased properties of the novels could 
not but hasten societal disaster: `from an epidemic however, it has lately changed into an endemic. 
Its virus is spreading in all directions'. 
26 In conflating the metaphor of physical and intellectual 
consumption with a medical language of mania, contagion and disease, the tenor of the criticism 
darkened considerably. 
19 [Oliphant], `Novels', p. 259. 
20 [Oliphant], `Novels', p. 259. 
21 [Oliphant], `Novels', p. 261. 
22 Greg, `False Morality of Lady-Novelists', p. 146. 
23 [Oliphant], `Novels', p. 259. 
24 Greg, `False Morality of Lady-Novelists', p. 144. 
25 H. F. Chorley, unsigned review, Athenaeum, 2 June 1866. Quoted in Wilkie Collins: The Critical 
Heritage, p. 147. On Chorley's `morbid dread of new opinions' and ̀ unscrupulous hostility to new 
knowledge' see Harriet Martineau, Autobiography, 2 voll (London: Virago Press, 1983), 1, pp. 421-22. 
26 Westminister Review, 25 (July 1866), pp. 269-70. Quoted in P. D. Edwards, Some Mid-Victorian 
Thrillers: The Sensation Novel, Its Friends and Foes (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 
[1971]), pp. 5-6. 
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The fact that sensation novels were read by inhabitants of the kitchen as well as the 
parlour and drawing room (where once, critics fondly recalled, the staples of reading had been 
didactic treatises, sermons and dignified histories) was alarming. This contagion destabilised 
traditional class distinctions. `Thrills of feeling' were experienced by the inhabitants of kitchens 
and servant quarters, who had traditionally been fed on a diet of crude broadsides and penny- 
dreadfuls. Impressionable older women `whose feelings are more easily aroused and whose estimates 
are more easily influenced than ours', and men `of leisure' and `business' were also enticed. 
27 In 
her characteristically unrestrained manner, Oliphant thought that such ̀ feverish productions' had 
initiated a ̀ revolution in [... ] domestic arrangements by making the parlour no longer a suitable 
environment for children'. 
28 It was the effect of reading such fiction upon impressionable young 
women, though, that most concerned the moralists. Their lack of experience of the world afforded 
young women `no criterion whereby to separate the true from the false in the delineations of 
life'. 29 In permeating and penetrating the entire Victorian household, in transcending class, 
gender and generational divisions, there was no question that the `craving for sensation'30 was a 
threatening spectre. W. Fraser Rae wrote in 1865 that 
by a purely literary standard, these works must be designated as the least valuable among 
works of fiction. They glitter on the surface, but the substance is base metal. Hence it is 
that the impartial critic is compelled, as it were, to unite with the moralist in regarding 
them as mischievous in their tendency, and as one of the abominations of the age. 
31 
The argument that sensation fiction provided a necessary recreational outlet from the 
demanding pressures of modern society was often appropriated by its defenders. What was a ̀ man 
to do' when the `stimulus' provided by such novels was ̀ precisely what he wants? ' a journalist 
asked. ̀ What is to be done when a book is sought as a distraction from anxious thoughts, and a 
[sic] something which will prevent the mind from feeding on itself? '32 Wilkie Collins wrote in 
1863 that `there are few higher, better, or more profitable enjoyments in this world than reading a 
27 Greg, `False Morality of Lady-Novelists', p. 146. 
28 [Oliphant], `Novels', pp. 275,258. 
29 Greg, `False Morality of Lady-Novelists', p. 146. 
30 Mansel, `Sensation Novels', p. 505. 
31 W. Fraser Rae, ̀ Sensation Novelists: Miss Braddon', North British Review, 43 n. s. 4 (September 
1865), pp. 180-205 (p. 203). 
32 The Times, 4 November, 1864, p. 6. 
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good novel'. 
33 Like George Augustus Sala, Collins took both moralists and literary critics to 
account for their condemnation of sensation literature. He pointed out that their desire to censure 
sensation novels ironically had the effect of heightening their appeal. In attempting to affix `to our 
novels the stigma of being a species of contraband goods' the `dull people' had helped the sensation 
novel to become a ̀ prohibited luxury'. 
34 In a similar vein, Sala believed that the distinguishing 
characteristic of modern cant and criticism was ̀ prurient prudery', 
35 
a phrase appropriated from a 
pamphlet written by Reade in 1866 entitled The Prurient Prude. 
36 The `dolts and dullards and 
envious backbiters' had, Sala felt, blindly regarded as sensational anything that was ̀ vivid, and 
nervous, and forcible, and graphic, and true'. 
37 The spectre of life without the invigorating 
qualities of sensation was a society populated by only the `calmly dull, tranquilly inane, timorously 
decorous, [and] sweetly stupid'. 
38 
Since the publication of Winifred Hughes's The Maniac in the Cellar: Sensation Novels of 
the 1860s in 1980, the narrative structures and devices, and the authors, readers and critics of 
sensation literature have been the focus of renewed critical inquiry. From their seemingly 
innocuous obsession with secret identities (which has been understood in relation to the 
production and manifestation of anxieties about the collapsing of class distinctions), to their 
physiological referents (interpreted in light of concerns about cultural degeneration and the onset 
of modernity), the genre of sensation fiction has in many respects been liberated from the virulent, 
moralistic condemnation of Victorian critics. 
39 
Of particular interest to recent critics is the way that sensation novelists situated female 
protagonists as the arbiters of immorality and deviancy. The rhetorical discourses which encoded 
and created contemporary anxieties were often directed at the dominant role played by women in 
both the creation and consumption of sensation fiction. To their critics, the transgression of social 
33 Wilkie Collins, `A Petition to the Novel-Writers', My Miscellanies, 2 vols (London: Sampson, 
Low, 1863), I, p. 89. 
34 Collins, `A Petition', I, pp. 73,72. 
35 George Augustus Sala, `The Cant of Modern Criticism', Belgravia, 4 (November 1867), pp. 45-55 
(p. 53). 
36 Reprinted in Charles Reade, Readiana: Comments on Current Events (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1884), pp. 314-319. 
37 George Augustus Sala, ̀On the "Sensational" in Literature and Art', Belgravia, 4 (February 1868), 
pp. 449-458 (p. 457). 
38 Sala, '"Sensational" in Literature', p. 458. 
39 See Jonathan Loesburg, `The Ideology of Narrative Form in Sensation Fiction', Representations, 13 
(1986), pp. 115-138. 
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conventions and codes of behavior, and the explicit focus upon dangerous sexuality, fixed sensation 
novels in the province of the female and became a means to disavow them as inferior works of 
literature. Such claims have been undercut by recent critics who have drawn attention to the way in 
which sensation novelists challenged mid-Victorian domestic ideologies and subverted 
conventional stereotypes of masculine and feminine behavior and responsibility. Lyn Pykett, for 
example, has argued that the novels' `unfixing' of the feminine and the consequent spectre of 
destabilisation to the established order that they manifested was a process that the writers of 
sensation fiction actively participated in and consciously responded to. 
40 In Disease, Desire and 
the Body: Victorian Women's Popular Novels (1997) Pamela Gilbert has argued that the widespread 
concern over sensation fiction centred around its `promiscuous exchange of intellectual and 
cultural materials' and was grounded in its conscious construction of gendered readers, authors, 
and texts. 
41 
For this study, however, the most interesting of recent critical re-evaluations of the 
sensation genre are those that focus upon the novels' collapsing of the generically distinct 
categories of romance and realism. To Hughes, the sensation novelists' transgression of standards 
of realism and idealism was the distinguishing feature of the genre. 
42 The disavowal of traditional 
representational strategies was as concerning to contemporary critics and observers as the 
treatment of class and gender. As Gilbert puts it, the importation of `extraordinary events of 
romance into the ordinary reality of quotidian existence' was `generic miscegenation of the worst 
kind'. 43 The way in which the novels violated the codes and literary conventions of both realism 
and romance generated considerable discussion about both the purpose of fiction and the effects it 
would produce upon the reading public. To Oliphant, the sensation novel's ability to influence 
behaviour and produce unhealthy and excitable tendencies, was problematic not least because it was 
`attained by violent and illegitimate means as fantastic in themselves as they are contradictory to 
44 
actual life'. 
40 Lyn Pykett, The `Improper' Feminine: The Women's Sensation Novel and the New Woman Writing 
(London: Routledge, 1992), p. 10. 
41 Gilbert, Disease, Desire, and the Body, p. 3. 
42 Winifred Hughes, The Maniac in the Cellar. Sensation Novels of the 1860s (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), p. 16. 
43 Gilbert, Disease, Desire, and the Body, p. 70. On the anxiety generated by the conflation of 
romance and realism see also Kate Flint, The Woman Reader, 1837-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), p. 276. 
44 ̀ Sensation Novels', Blackwood's, p. 565. 
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In an 1862 article on female sensation novelists in Littell's Living Age, the critic expresses 
similar anxieties about the illegitimacy of sensation fiction through its conflation of romance and 
realism: 
we have thought it well to enter our protest against the form of fiction most popular in 
the present day, because we conceive it to fail both positively and negatively in the 
legitimate uses of fiction. Negatively, because it asks least from the sense, feeling and 
thought of the reader; and positively, because instead of quickening the imagination it 
stimulates a vulgar curiosity, weakens the established rules of right and wrong, touches, to 
say the least, upon things illicit, raises false and vain expectations, and draws a wholly 
45 false picture of life. 
Though staunchly critical of the majority of sensation novels, Oliphant reserved praise for Wilkie 
Collins's The Woman in White, arguing that there were no grounds on which she could `object to 
the means by which he startles us and thrills his readers; everything is legitimate, natural, and 
possible'. 
46 The legitimacy of the novel, Oliphant felt, lay in Collins's avoidance of murder, 
seduction and `fantastic monsters' and `startling eccentrics' in favour of constructing `more 
delicate and subtle' (and so more powerful) thrills drawn from `the simplest expedients of life'. 
Oliphant's praise of The Woman in White was thus underpinned by what she perceived as the 
distinction the novel maintained between inauthentic idealism and topical realism. David Masson, 
the Victorian biographer of Milton, similarly felt that, separately, both `kinds of art were 
legitimate'. Yet not all critics maintained that the `legitimacy' of fiction relied upon the separation 
of these categories. Trollope, for example, believed that such an opposition was mistaken, arguing 
rather that a ̀ good novel should be both, and both in the highest degree'. 
47 
In her recent study of Victorian sensation and domestic violence, Marlene Tromp 
addresses the relationship between realism and sensation by examining Margaret Oliphant's Salem 
Chapel (1863). Oliphant's novel uses two intertwined plots (one a sensational story of attempted 
murder and the other a more sober and `decorous' account of the novel's leading family, the 
Vincents) to depict the religious intolerance of a dissenting community. Focusing on Oliphant's 
use of language, madness and the woman's body, Tromp argues that the narrative's slippage 
between realism and sensation represents a form of disruptive `interference' which resists the 
attempts of contemporary critics `to maintain the safe dualities established in earlier fictional 
45 ̀ Our Female Sensation Novelists', Littell's Living Age, p. 369. 
46 `Sensation Novels', Blackwood's, p. 566. 
47 David Masson, British Novelists and Their Styles: being a critical sketch of the history of British 
Prose Fiction (1859), pp. 248-51. Quoted in The Early and Mid-Victorian Novel, ed. by David Skilton 
(London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 1 12,138; Troilope, An Autobiography, II, p. 42. 
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modes'. 
48 In exploring the `tenuous negotiation of the real and not real' Tromp argues that the 
construct of sensation contaminated both realism and the middle classes. While Tromp's scrutiny 
of the anxiety caused by the conflation of idealism and realism sheds important light on the way 
that marital violence was presented to Victorian readers, more significant is the way that she 
directly addresses the `critical relationship between sensation and what was understood as 
reality'. 
49 
As chapter four has demonstrated, Collins threatened the maintenance of shared 
interpretive systems. In deliberately upsetting the boundaries which he believed were defined by the 
spurious demands of sentimentality, Collins felt that he was providing an invaluable service to his 
readers: to represent the truths, however uncomfortable, about the human condition. Conversely, 
Dickens felt that by exacerbating anxiety and undercutting his philosophy of elevating the social 
condition, such a goal was repugnant. It was for this reason that he refused to publish the short 
story in Household Words. In his engagement with contemporary psychiatric discourse and frames 
of reference, Reade was considered, like Collins, irresponsible and his novel dangerous. The danger 
similarly lay in Reade's `illegitimate' conflation of romance and realism and his use of the genre of 
sensation fiction to expose `truths', in this case of the lunatic asylum and the lunacy laws. The 
writing, publication and reception of Charles Reade's Hard Cash thus acts as an important 
counterpoint to the challenges and problems posed by the writing and reception of `Mad 
Monkton', specifically with regard to perceived responsibilities to both art and the reading public. 
In the eyes of his critics, Reade's ̀ truths' about the existence of wrongful confinement 
were highly debatable if not downright false, and these critics disputed his claims to realism. 
50 By 
describing the state's humane and enlightened practitioners of psychological medicine and its 
advanced institutional machinery for the care of the insane as merely facades which obscured the 
realities of illegal incarceration in lunatic asylums, Reade's novel caused outrage in medical circles. 
Through its encouragement of readers' suspicion (of physicians and treatments) and its 
exploitation of public anxiety and fear (of the asylum and its attendants), Hard Cash was perceived 
to hold the potential literally to hasten both individual and societal disaster by replacing the 
asylum with the Victorian household (and necessarily inexperienced and unskilled lay-attendants) 
48 Marlene Tromp, The Private Rod: Marital Violence, Sensation, and the Law in Victorian Britain 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), p. 18. 
49 Tromp, The Private Rod, p. 71. 
50 J. S. Bushnan angrily declared that `any one (not a sensation writer) imagining that these checks 
and securities [surrounding the alleged lunatic] could be evaded [... ] would himself be a fit subject for 
a commission "de lunatico inquirendo. "' See ̀Correspondance', Reade, Hard Cash, p. iv. A writer in 
the Lancet similarly felt that Reade's novel was simply a ̀ tissue of falsehoods'. Lancet, (1863) ii, 
p. 604. 
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as the safest of sites in which to care for mentally ill relatives and friends. Even more than ̀ Mad 
Monkton', Reade's very conscious choice of genre and subject matter disrupted shared interpretive 
systems and threatened stable boundaries of emotional reception. 
ii. `Imaginative powers' and `patient, laborious industry': Charles Reade and Hard Cash 
The origins of Hard Cash lay partially in the case of a young man, Arthur Fletcher, who was 
committed to a private lunatic asylum by his late father's business partners after attempting to 
claim a £35,000 share of their business. He escaped. Charles Reade saw in such a sensational story 
an opportunity to expand his reformist predilections and lost no time in interviewing Fletcher, 
compiling what became known as his `asyla' notebooks. Based on the transcripts of his interviews 
with Fletcher, between August and December 1858 Reade sent a series of letters to the press 
entitled `Our Dark Places'. 
51 The publicity Reade's letters received led to Fletcher's case being 
tried in court and in July 1859 Fletcher was declared sane and granted substantial damages. 
52 
Notwithstanding the barrage of criticism that had recently been directed at private 
asylums and the widespread expressions of public discontent with the lunacy laws, in noting 
Reade's proposal to write a novel which would expose the gross abuses committed in private lunatic 
asylums, a writer in the Lancet was confident that Reade's ̀clear good sense and powerful pen will 
insure full investigation,. 53 Reade's ̀powerful pen' produced `Very Hard Cash' which was serialised 
between March and December 1862 in Dickens's journal All The Year Round. 
54 Despite its 
confident expectations, the Lancet was the first of many to passionately condemn Reade's 
`illegitimate' and `irresponsible' novel. 
Hard Cash commences in dramatic fashion. After resisting storms, pirates, shipwrecks 
and an ambush by highway men, the sailor David Dodd returns to his family in England with his 
$14,000 in `hard cash' secure. He puts his savings in the bank owned by Richard Hardie. After 
discovering that this devious banker has stolen his savings, Dodd becomes insane and is committed 
to a public lunatic asylum. Meanwhile, Hardie's son, Alfred, has fallen in love with (and has 
proposed marriage to) Dodd's daughter, Julia. Alfred becomes suspicious of the events surrounding 
51 Reprinted in Reade, Readiana, pp. 113-125. See also Altick, The Presence of the Present, pp. 545-6, 
and Wayne Burns, Charles Reade -A Study in Victorian Authorship (New 
York: Bookman Associates, 
1961), pp. 203-4. 
52 Burns, Charles Reade, p. 203. 
53 Lancet, (1858) ü, p. 209. 
54 Reade was first introduced to Dickens in 1859 through Edward Bulwer-Lytton. Coleman 
believes 
that their developing friendship led to Dickens commissioning Reade to write Hard Cash, offering 
him £800 for the serial rights to the novel. John Coleman, Charles Reade as I knew Him (London: 
Treherne & Company, 1903), pp. 233-234. 
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Dodd's committal and threatens to expose his father's dishonesty. Whereupon his father secretly 
arranges to have him incarcerated in a private lunatic asylum (he is later transferred to two other 
asylums). Alfred's sudden disappearance shocks everyone. All except Julia believe that he has 
deserted her for another woman. While Alfred desperately but unsuccessfully attempts to prove his 
sanity and escape from the asylums, Julia's brother, Edward Dodd, addresses the family's dire 
financial straits by becoming a fireman. In sensational fashion, when the private lunatic asylum 
burns down Edward is on hand to assist in the rescue and escape of both David Dodd (who had 
been transferred there) and Alfred. Still mad, David Dodd departs from England, returning to his 
livelihood as a sailor. 
After an heroic attempt to save another member of the crew from drowning, he is 
presumed dead. However, a distant cousin, a sailor on the same ship, recognises his tattoos and 
requests that Dodd be embalmed rather than buried at sea. In a dramatic twist of events, a fly bites 
Dodd and it is discovered that he is not dead but in a state of suspended animation. He recovers 
his sanity and returns to England to reclaim his stolen savings. In the meantime, Alfred has 
secured the love of Julia, received a first-class degree at Oxford, and with the help of an eccentric 
psychological physician, Dr Sampson, brings a suit for wrongful incarceration against his father 
and, by implication, the asylum proprietors. The novel concludes with the civil trial, the death of a 
ruined and ultimately repentant Richard Hardie, the safe return of David Dodd, the marriage of 
Julia and Alfred (three thousand pounds richer from the successful outcome of the suit), and the 
birth of numerous off-spring. 
The phenomenon of the sensation novel drew the attention of literary critics (and 
sensation novelists themselves) to the complex relationship between realism and idealism as it was 
presented in fiction, foregrounding a debate about the legitimate and illegitimate use of fiction in 
drawing a ̀ picture of life'. Whether sensation novelists were faithful in their fictional 
representation of contemporary society or whether their novels were irresponsible in raising `false 
and vain expectations' which posed dangers to `the established rules of right and wrong' was a 
question which Dickens was forced to confront upon reading Collins's `Mad Monkton'. It was a 
question which lay also at the heart of the controversial reception of Hard Cash. As Reade 
envisaged it, the novel was a platform to expose the abuses committed in private lunatic asylums, 
forcing readers to acknowledge the dangers of accepting at face value the humanitarian advances and 
enlightened treatments and practices lauded by Victorian psychological physicians. Reade lost no 
opportunity (both in Hard Cash and in the correspondance that the novel elicited) to insist that 
the novel be interpreted as a warning to readers to be on their guard: 
Chained sane amongst the mad; on his [Alfred Hardie's] wedding day; expecting with tied 
hands the sinister acts of the soul-murderers who had the power to make a he a truth! We 
can paint the body writhing vainly against its unjust bonds; but who can paint the 
loathing, agonized, soul in a mental situation so ghastly? [... ] Pray think of it for 
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yourselves, men and women, if you have not sworn never to think over a novel. Think of 
it for your own sakes; Alfred's turn today, it may be yours tomorrow. (p. 267) 
Reade imbued the novel with myriad contemporary references. Pinel, Esquirol, the English 
statutes of lunacy, Commissions de Lunatico Inquirendo, the Commissioners in Lunacy, the 
method of non-restraint popularised by Conolly, monomania, the use of drugs such as opium and 
the processes of certification and treatment practices are all represented in great detail. There are 
striking parallels in Hard Cash to Henry Cockton's The Life and Adventures of Valentine Vox, the 
Ventriloquist (1840); not only in the subject matter of wrongful confinement but also in the way 
that both writers sought to warn readers about the Victorian lunatic asylum. Foreshadowing the 
anxieties that were central to critics' condemnation of sensation fiction in the 1860s, the character 
of Mr Goodman in Valentine Vox explains that before he himself had experienced illegal 
incarceration he had believed that the `villainies' and `monstrous proceedings' practiced in private 
lunatic asylums were `mere fictions' created by `diseased imaginations'. 
55 Yet as Cockton explains 
in the Preface to the novel, the `terrible subject' that he was treating fictitiously was grounded in 
reality: `I have neither departed from facts nor exaggerated those facts in the smallest degree'. 
56 
Reade, too, argued that like The Cloister and the Hearth (1861) Hard Cash was a 
matter of fact Romance; that is, a fiction built on truths; and these truths have been 
gathered by long, severe, systematic, labour, from a multitude of volumes, pamphlets, 
journals, reports, blue-books, manuscript narratives, letters, and living people, whom I 
have sought out, examined, and cross-examined, to get at the truth on each main topic I 
have striven to handle. (pp. i-ii) 
As with Cockton and Valentine Vox, Reade's lengthy testament to the authenticity of his novel 
indicates that was no `diseased invention' created by a ̀ diseased imagination'. 
The `smoldering passion'(p. 284) and violent jealousy of Edith Archbold the asylum 
proprietor, and her predatory sexual advances on Alfred Hardie were obvious grounds on which to 
criticise the novel for legitimising morally unacceptable behaviors and emotions. Yet Reade's 
treatment of female sexuality was nowhere remarked upon in the reviews. 
57 Instead, it was his 
expose of the iniquities practised in the lunatic asylum that drew the most virulent condemnation 
from literary critics and physicians. Scholars of Victorian culture may not fully realise how readily 
psychological physicians reviewed contemporary literature. To John Charles Bucknill writing in 
the Asylum Journal of Mental Science, Tennyson's Maud (1855) was quite simply the `history of a 
55 Cockton, Valentine Vox, p. 108. 
56 Cockton, Valentine Vox, p. vii. 
57 See, for example, review of Hard Cash in Athenaeum, 1863 (July-December), pp. 875-6. 
193 
madman depicted by the hands of a master'. 
58 Yet when it came to commenting upon the fictitious 
treatment of physicians and their institutions, as in Hard Cash, gracious praise was replaced with 
impassioned and defensive anger. Reade's ̀wholesale attack of a profession which includes within its 
ranks many of the most distinguished philanthropists of the age' was no more than `the Quixotic 
imaginings of his own brain-'. 
59 All the British Medical Journal could say was ̀ that if he believes 
what he writes about mad-doctors, he shows that he is utterly ignorant of the subject he is dealing 
with [... ] [he] has not hesitated, for the sake of a trade-trick, and in the way of business, to asperse 
most shamefully the conduct of highly honourable men'. 
60 
Reade's scarcely disguised use of John Conolly as a model for the character of Dr 
Wycherley was among the first topics to be criticised. Internationally renowned for introducing a 
regime based on non-restraint while an attendant physician at Hanwell Lunatic Asylum in 
Middlesex, Conolly had played a prominent role in completing the reforms set in motion by the 
Tukes in York and by Pinel in Paris. After leaving Hanwell, Conolly accepted numerous requests 
to testify in famous lunacy commissions and in medico-legal trials. 
61 His position as an eminent 
Victorian alienist suffered as a result of his notorious involvement in several cases of wrongful 
incarceration in the late 1850s including, as we have seen, that of Lawrence Ruck and Rosina 
Bulwer-Lytton. Conolly was an easy target for Reade. 
As John Sutherland notes, in the character of Wycherley, Reade makes numerous references 
to Conolly, especially regarding his involvement in the case of Ruck. 
62 Reade's allusions to the 
theories of insanity and the ameliorative treatment methods espoused in Conolly's well-known 
treatises, An Inquiry concerning the Indications of Insanity (1830), and The Treatment of the Insane 
without Mechanical Restraint (1856), were not lost on Thomas Harrington Tuke, Conolly's son- 
in-law and himself a physician (who had testified at the Windham inquiry). He believed that the 
character of Wycherley was an intentionally hostile portrait of Conolly. Discovering letters from 
Dickens to Harrington Tuke, Richard Hunter and Ida Macalpine have demonstrated that though 
Dickens and Conolly never appear to have met, they were on close terms. 
63 In the face of 
58 JMS, 2 (October 1855), p. 96. See also Bucknill's `Macbeth: A Psychological Study', JMS, 4 (1857- 
58), pp. 477-507. 
59 Lancet, (1863) ii, p. 604. 
60 BMJ, (1863), ii, p. 583. 
61 Smith, Trial by Medicine, p. 70. 
62 Sutherland, Victorian Fiction, p. 84. 
63 See Richard A. Hunter and Ida Macalpine, `Dickens and Conolly - An Embarrassed Editor's 
Disclaimer', The Times Literary Supplement, 11 August, 1961, pp. 534-535 (p. 534). 
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Harrington Tuke's plea to Dickens to remonstrate with the author of Hard Cash, Dickens' 
loyalties were divided. As his article on lunatic asylums in Household Words in 1852 indicates, 
Dickens admired Conolly for the effort he had made to improve asylum conditions. 64 Dickens 
equally respected Reade and had even written to Wills on 30 September 1862 asking him to 
congratulate him on the `admirable art' and `surprising grace and vigour' of his novel. 
65 
In the first of three letters to Harrington Tuke, written on October 12 1863 (three weeks 
after Dickens wrote to Wills), Dickens wrote that he was unsure whether Harrington Tuke's 
apparent request that he set up a meeting with Reade to discuss his ill-disguised portrait of 
Conolly was a good idea. Mindful of Harrington Tuke's concern, when Reade's attentions turned 
to the `timidity of champions'(p. 334), the Commissioners in Lunacy, Dickens attempted to 
exonerate himself from criticism by inserting a note to an issue in which Reade parodied the 
eminent physician and commissioner in lunacy, Samuel Gaskell: `The conductor of this journal 
desires to take this opportunity of expressing his personal belief that no public servants do their 
66 duty with greater ability, humanity, and intelligence than the Commissioners in Lunacy'. 
Despite his public criticism of Reade's portrayal of the commissioners in lunacy, in private he 
continued to defend Reade. 
In the second letter to Harrington Tuke, written on 15 November 1863, Dickens 
returned to Reade's portrait of Conolly: `I cannot imagine Mr Reade had the least knowledge of 
what you tell me concerning Conolly. I am strongly impressed with the belief that it must be a 
wonderful coincidence [... ] I cannot believe that he would wilfully be personal and cruel'. 
67 
Increasingly exasperated by his own conspicuous role in the embarrassing debacle, Dickens wrote 
for a third time to Harrington Tuke (on 2 December 1863) explaining that he intended to separate 
himself `from these statements and opinions, and distinctly to assure the public (as an act of plain 
justice) that they are not mine'. On December 26,1863, a forthright disclaimer came attached to 
68 
the concluding number of the serial: 
64 See [Henry Morley], `The Treatment of the Insane', Household Words, 5 (March-September 1862), 
pp. 270-273. 
65 Hunter and Macalpine, `Dickens and Conolly', p. 535. 
66 ̀ Very Hard Cash', All the Year Round, 10 (August 1863 - February, 1864), p. 265. To Walter 
Phillips, the explanation for Dickens's note (which made ̀ no secret of his disapproval of views that 
Reade expressed') lay in the fact that his good friend, John Forster, was a member of the Lunacy 
Commission. See Walter C. Phillips, Dickens, Reade and Collins. Sensation Novelists. A Study in the 
Conditions and Theories of Novel-Writing in Victorian England (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1919), p. 114. 
67 Hunter and Macalpine, `Dickens and Conolly', p. 534. 
68 Hunter and Macalpine, `Dickens and Conolly', p. 534. 
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NOTE: THE STATEMENTS AND OPINIONS OF THIS JOURNAL 
GENERALLY, ARE, OF COURSE, TO BE RECEIVED AS THE STATEMENTS 
AND OPINIONS OF ITS CONDUCTOR. BUT THIS IS NOT SO, IN THE CASE 
OF A WORK OF FICTION FIRST PUBLISHED IN THESE PAGES AS A SERIAL 
STORY, WITH THE NAME OF AN EMINENT WRITER ATTACHED TO IT. 
WHEN ONE OF MY LITERARY BROTHERS DOES ME THE HONOUR TO 
UNDERTAKE SUCH A TASK, I HOLD THAT HE EXECUTES IT ON HIS OWN 
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND FOR THE SUSTAINMENT OF HIS OWN 
REPUTATION: AND I DO NOT CONSIDER MYSELF AT LIBERTY TO 
EXERCISE THAT CONTROL OVER HIS TEXT WHICH I CLAIM AS TO 
OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS. 69 
Notwithstanding Dickens's efforts to deflect criticism onto Reade, the Lancet felt that 
Reade was ̀ not a fair subject for criticism'. 
70 The British Medical journal similarly asked ̀ for no 
apology from Mr. Reade', because he was `manifestly a sensation-novel writer'. 
71 It was impossible 
to directly condemn Reade's treatment of physicians. Had the journals' done so, they would be 
open to the suggestion that the illegal incarceration of the sane represented a degree of fact and this 
was something they vehemently denied. Instead, they focused on Dickens, a larger and more 
important target. The Lancet, for example, was forthright in objecting to 
the appearance of such calumnies in a journal which Chas. Dickens conducts [... ] It is 
absurd to suppose that such grave abuses as those Mr. Reade details would have escaped the " 
criticism of Mr. Charles Dickens or of others if they had any real existence; and we are 
pained to see a tissue of falsehoods in any degree endorsed by his name appearing at the 
head of the sheet. 
72 
In a particularly bitter and personal attack, the British Medical Journal also directed criticism at 
the role of Dickens: 
With regard to Mr. Charles Dickens, however, we must say, that there is for him no 
excuse [... ] with all his wit, [he] has ever shown a want of wisdom or ballast - signs of a 
defective education, perhaps [... ] Mr. Dickens' journal has done a good deal more than 
slander Lunacy Commissioners; it has cast diabolical charges upon the character of all 
73 
medical men. 
69 ̀ Very Hard Cash', All the Year Round, 10 (August 1863- February 1864), p. 419. 
70 Lancet, (1863) ii, p. 604. 
71 BMJ, (1863), ii, p. 583. 
72 Lancet, (1863) ü, p. 604. 
73 BMJ, (1863), ii, p. 583. 
196 
Reade had his supporters. Wilkie Collins's sole comments were ̀ Bravo, Bravo, Bravo! '74 
Swinburne also praised the `literary tact and skill' with which Reade had highlighted the `villainous 
lunacy of the law regarding lunatics [... ] In the power of realizing and vivifying what he could only 
have known by research or report, Reade is second only to Defoe'. 
75 Reade's assertion of the 
novel's realism and `truth' provoked criticism in equal measure. Once again, Dickens was partly 
responsible. As the British Medical Journal acknowledged, Dickens was renowned for `occasionallz- 
telling truths through his fictions, and of reforming evils by publishing them in the form of 
romance'. 
76 In the eyes of his critics, the monthly serialisation of his friend's novel had been 
irresponsible. He should have known that there were `plenty of persons ready enough to believe 
that his [Reade's] statements are true and real expressions of actual facts known to him'. 
77 Reade, 
too, should have known that `the slightest whisper, founded in truth, of any of the abominations 
recorded as facts [... ] would be indignantly echoed from one end of the kingdom to the other, and 
78 
the gravest investigation demanded'. This was, in fact, exactly what he wished for. 
An argument between J. S. Bushnan (the proprietor of Laverstock House Lunatic Asylum 
in Salisbury) and Reade in the letter columns of the Daily News in late October 1863 centred on 
the words, images and associations which Reade used to expose the continued existence of wrongful 
incarceration. Bushnan expressed his outrage at the potential effects of Hard Cash on the public 
mind by contrasting Reade's novel with Elizabeth Braddon's Lady Audley's Secret. When it was 
published in 1862 Braddon's novel had been criticised for its `strong' tendency to confuse vice and 
74 Letter from Collins to Reade, 31 March, 1863. Pierpont Morgan manuscript collection, MA 80 
RV-Autographs, Misc. - English. 
75 Algernon Charles Swinburne, Miscellanies (New York: Worthington Company, 1886), pp. 774- 
775. A reviewer of Reade's fiction in Blackwood's felt that the faults of Hard Cash ('moving his 
readers outside the lawful limits of art; casting probability to the winds and riding wildly over all the 
laws of circumstance') were `lost in the brilliancy of his power'. He was nothing less than a `genius'. 
`Charles Reade's Novels', Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine, 106 (July-December, 1869), pp. 488-514 
(pp. 489-90). 
76 BMJ, (1863), ii, p. 584. 
77 BMJ, (1863), ii, p. 585. Dickens was increasingly hesitant to publish stories that would be 
condemned on moral grounds. After the unfortunate attention he received on publishing Hard Cash, 
he later refused to publish Reade's Griffith Gaunt because of its open portrayal of bigamy. It was 
subsequently published in the Argosy from January to November, 1866. See Andrew Blake, Reading 
Victorian Fiction: The Cultural Context and Ideological Context of the Nineteenth-Century Novel 
(London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 77. 
78 BMJ, (1863), ii, p. 584. 
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virtue and to `unsettle the fundamental notions of morality'. 
79 As one reviewer put it, the 
`artistic faults of this novel are as grave as the ethical ones. Combined, they render it one of the 
most noxious books of modern times'. 
80 Yet Bushnan believed that the `thrills of terror' that 
penetrated the `public mind' upon reading Hard Cash were far more dangerous in their literal 
effects than the thrills of terror produced by reading a novel in which a house is set on fire and a 
`superfluous' husband is pushed into a well by a deviant heroine. 
Bushnan argued that Braddon's `highly seasoned dish' would amusingly warn readers 
against sitting on the edges of wells and having `any but fireproof libraries'. He did not believe 
that Lady Audley's Secret could be read in any literal way as a ̀ warning to the reader' against the 
temptations of confusing virtue and vice. In contrast, the `thrills of terror' produced by Reade's 
novel were far more dangerous because they were underpinned by the spectre that 
any man may, at any moment, be consigned to a fate which to a sane man may be worse 
than death, and that not by the act of any of our Lady Audley's, or other interesting 
criminals, but as part of a regular and organized system, in all compliance with the laws of 
the land. 
81 
Reade's fictional presentation of the illegal incarceration of sane individuals in lunatic asylums was 
condemned by Bushnan as a ̀ terrible slander' and portrayed events which were simply `not 
possible'. Reade made a forceful public defence of his claims about asylums. In a letter to the same 
paper in October 1863 he expressed his irritation at Bushnan's attempt to `lull the public back into 
the false sense of security from which [Hard Cash was] calculated to rouse them'. 
82 After the serial 
publication of Hard Cash, Reade explained that he had received numerous letters and petitions 
from families and friends asking him to assist in the release of individuals wrongfully or illegally 
incarcerated in lunatic asylums. 
83 This response, and his private researches, vindicated the 
application of his `imaginative powers' and `patient, laborious industry'. `[U]nder existing 
79 ̀ Baits for Suicide - "Lady Audley's Secret" and "Aurora Floyd"', Medical Critic and Psychological 
journal, 4 (October 1863), pp. 585-604 (p. 594). 
80 Rae, `Sensation Novelists', p. 187. 
81 `Correspondance', Reade, Hard Cash, p. iii. 
82 ̀ Correspondance', Reade, Hard Cash, p. v. 
83 See, for example, the description of one letter sent by a lunatic to Reade in Digby, Madness, 
Morality and Medicine, p. 196. 
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arrangements any English man or woman may without much difficulty be incarcerated in a private 
84 lunatic asylum when not deprived of reason'. 
Bushnan's anxiety was matched by that of a reviewer in The Times, who feared that the 
`incautious' reader would `imagine mad doctors to be scientific scoundrels, lunatic asylums to be a 
refined sort of Tophet, and the commissioners in lunacy and visiting justices to be a flock of sheep. 
This is the untruthful exaggeration of fact jumbled with fiction'. The fundamental problem with 
the novel was Reade's ̀ too sure a reliance on the artistic value of fact'. 
85 Warning him that `he 
ought to use fact with moderation' the reviewer continued: 
Eccentric fact makes improbable fiction, and improbable fiction is not impressive [... ] that 
he will lead people to inquire into the truth of his views is also likely enough; but he would 
probably produce a still more powerful effect if he treated fiction as fiction, and reserved 
his facts for a more sober and direct appeal to the public. 
86 
The Times-reviewer believed that Reade had committed an ̀ artistic error' in choosing the genre of 
sensation fiction to `expose quack medicine'87 and to hold up `to the execration of mankind [the] 
invented brutalities of mad-doctors and abominations committed in mad-houses '88 . 
Reade knew exactly what he was doing by employing the genre of sensation fiction to 
expose the horror of wrongful confinement. Through the vehicle of fiction his message would reach 
a wider audience than if it had been stated in a more `sober and direct appeal' to the public. He also 
knew that he might ironically benefit from the frenzied criticism, a valid form of publicity, that 
sensation novels regularly received. In one sense, Reade appeared to any himself with sensation 
novelists like Braddon and Collins; in another sense the reception of the novel makes clear that he 
also sought to subvert the efforts of sensation novelists to present the extraordinary as typical. 
Extending the genre's range of representation he consciously tried to present as truthful what to 
many seemed improbable. The defence of sensation to explore truths had always been an explicit 
strategy for Reade. As the narrator of The Autobiography of a Thief (1858) explains: 
84 ̀ Correspondance', Reade, Hard Cash, pp. x-xi. 
85 The Times, 2 January, 1864, p. 6. The reviewer in Black-wood's was in the minority in defending 
Reade by arguing that fiction held as much right as fact to treat `every spot on which men struggle 
and suffer'. 
86 The Times, 2 January, 1864, p. 6. 
87 The Times, 2 January, 1864, p. 6. 
88 BMJ, (1863), ii, p. 584. 
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I feign probabilities; I record improbabilities: the former are conjectures, the latter truths: 
mixed they make a thing not so true as Gospel nor so false as History: viz., Fiction. 
When I startle you most, think twice before you disbelieve me. 
89 
While Reade conceived of his exposure of the `monstrous enactments' and `mad statutes' (`Facility, 
Obscurity, and Impurity') which insured the `frequent detention of sane but moneyed men'(p. 330) 
as fact important for Victorians to know about, his critics considered his depiction of wrongful 
confinement as both illegitimate, untruthful and harmful to both the health of the reader and the 
health of society itself. 
90 
iii. Responsibility 
When J. S. Bushnan denied the truth of Hard Cash and condemned Reade's irresponsibility to his 
readers he did so through a comparison with Mary Elizabeth Braddon's Lady Audley's Secret. 
Considering his criticism of Reade's portrayal of the world of lunacy, Bushnan's disregard of 
Braddon's treatment of the world of the asylum and lunacy in Lady Audley's Secret is surprising. 
This last section will examine Braddon's novelistic treatment of madness in three texts: a novel, 
The Trail of the Serpent (1861), a short story, `The Mystery at Fernwood', published in Temple 
Bar also in 1861, and an article published in Belgravia in 1867 entitled `An Adventurous 
Investigation'. Collectively, they demonstrate a sophisticated engagement with nineteenth- 
century law, psychiatric practice and lunatic asylums, and position Braddon, like Reade, as a sharp 
delineator not only of mid-nineteenth century society and its contradictory cultural values but 
also of the complex relationship between reason and unreason as it was both understood and 
misunderstood by the Victorians. 
In an article entitled `Mad Folk' in Belgravia in 1869, the writer offers a powerful 
incentive for instruction on the subject of insanity: 
No one can be indifferent to it who considers his own liability to become insane in this 
crowded and jostling age, where men tread so closely upon each other's heels, and where 
89 Charles Reade, Autobiography of a Thief, and, Jack of All Trades, a matter-of-fact-Romance 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1903), p. 1. 
90 Apparently it was also harmful to All the Year Round, reducing circulation by 3000 copies. See 
Charles L. Reade and the Rev. Compton Reade, Charles Reade: A Memoir, 2 vols (London: Chapman 
and Hall, 1887), I, p. 151. John Coleman also felt in `assailing the infamies, the cruelties, and the 
horrors of the madhouse system' Reade's novel proved a ̀ sad disappointment' resulting in its 
premature conclusion. See Coleman, p. 234. 
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every nerve-fibre is at its highest tension, and the social wheels are made to revolve at the 
most terrific speed. 
91 
Yet how the reading public should be enlightened on the subject of insanity was contested by 
writers of fiction like Braddon and Reade. Unlike Reade, Braddon felt that the sensation novel was 
an inappropriate site within which to educate the public about what she described as ̀ the night-side 
of things'. More appropriate, she felt, were short stories and articles, both of which were better 
suited to didactic instruction. Maintaining that the codes, conventions and purposes of prose 
fiction were unsuited to the communication of an explicitly moral message, Braddon understood 
her responsibility to her readers, and to her art, in a very different way than Reade. 
As he recounted in one of his notebooks, Reade thought that Braddon was ̀[Industrious, 
self-denying, gentle, affectionate, talented, and utterly unassuming, a devoted daughter, loving 
mother, and kindly stepmother'. When he published The Wandering Heir in late 1872, he dedicated 
it to Braddon as a ̀ slight mark of respect for her private virtues and public talents'. 
92 Despite 
being `intimate friends', the two writers felt differently about the relationship between their 
artistic endeavours and `real' life. Never adverse to discussing his own novels, Reade explained that 
he wrote for a public who were gripped with `the great tragi-comedy of humanity that is around and 
about them'. 
93 Far from pious, Reade assumed that his readers were interested in an ̀ aristocratic 
divorce suit, the last great social scandal, a sensational suicide [... ] a woman murdered in Seven 
Dials, or a baby found strangled in a bonnet-box at Piccadilly Circus'. 
94 
After Braddon's death in 1915, a tribute to the novelist was published in The Times by a 
`Lady who knew Miss Braddon well'. The anonymous author mused on Braddon's aversion to the 
imaginative possibilities contained in newspaper stories and concluded that she never took `a "real 
life" plot as her theme. To do so, according to her old-fashioned notions of rectitude, would have 
been dishonourable, as well as unfaithful to the creative spirit'. 
95 Braddon's son held a rather 
different opinion of his mother's industrious output. `Instead of lingering in the past she moved 
forward with her times and was always well abreast of the age. Her novels, except her six historical 
novels, might all be taken as faithful pictures of contemporary life'. 
96 Such was the ambiguity 
91 ̀ Mad Folk', Belgravia, 10 (December 1869), pp. 206-212 (p. 206). 
92 Quoted in Malcolm Elwin, Charles Reade -A Biography (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1931), p. 266. 
93 Coleman, p. 263. 
94 Coleman, p. 263. 
95 `An Appreciation', The Times, 5 February, 1915, p. 11. 
96 W. B. Maxwell, Time Gathered (London: Hutchinson, 1937), p. 269. 
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surrounding the origin of the `creative sprit' that made Braddon so famous and her novels so 
popular. 
Braddon undertook her first paid literary endeavour as a young woman. For X10 she was 
asked by a local Yorkshire squire and self-confessed admirer, John Gilby to write a short novel that 
combined `the human interest and genial humour of Dickens with the plot weaving of G. W. M. 
97 Reynolds'. Published as Three Times Dead, or the Secret of the Heath, it was not an immediate 
success. On her return to London she met and fell in love with an Irish publisher, John Maxwell, 
who republished Three Times Dead in 1861 under the new title, The Trail of the Serpent. As 
Braddon wrote many years later, `Death stalked in ghastliest form, across my pages; and villainy 
reigned triumphant till Nemesis of the last chapter. I wrote with all the freedom of one who feared 
not the face of a critic [... ] People buy it, and read it, and its faults and follies are forgiven'. 
98 It 
became an immediate bestseller. As Maxwell mentioned in one of only three surviving letters to 
Braddon: `One thousand copies of "The Trail of the Serpent" sold in seven days. Pleasant news! '99 
After wrongfully accused of murdering his wealthy uncle, Montague Harding, Richard 
Marwood's only option (for he appears by all evidence to be guilty) is to employ the insanity 
defence. As a result he is committed to a lunatic asylum. After languishing there for eight years, 
his friends (led by an amateur detective) trace the true murderer, Jabez North. Marwood is thus 
exonerated both from the taint of madness and from the accusation of murdering his uncle. Like 
the murder itself, the novel was ̀ something out of the common'. 
' 00 
Following the dramatic courtroom scenes, Braddon introduces the reader 
the lunatic 
ti 
asylum in which Marwood is confined. Braddon's employment of the insanity defence and her 
manipulation of concerns about illegal incarceration represent an intricate engagement with 
contemporary psychiatric practice. 
101 However, though Marwood's gloomy despondency, `the 
blackness of a despair far more terrible than the most terrible death'(p. 151) is reinforced through 
contrast with his fellow inmates, horror of the asylum and of ill-treatment is not evoked in the 
way that it is in Reade's Hard Cash. Helen Small has suggestively argued that the employment of 
97 Braddon quoted in Wolff, p. 81. 
98 Quoted in Wolff, pp. 113-14. 
99 Quoted in Wolff, p. 99. 
100 Mary Elizabeth Braddon, The Trail of the Serpent (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, 
1866), p. 35. Further page references are contained within the text. 
101 Though Elaine Showalter argues that Lady Audley's `real secret is that she is sane, and moreover, 
representative', I believe that Showalter's interpretation of Lady Audley's `latent insanity' overlooks 
Braddon's intricate engagement with nineteenth-century theories of partial insanity. See Elaine 
Showalter, A Literature of Their Own: British Women Novelists from Bronte to Lessing (London: 
Virago, 1991), p. 167. 
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`literary' images and words in psychiatric literature presents us with a means to locate the 
boundaries of their self-proclaimed authority and provides us with an insight into the limited 
nature of their claim to scientific autonomy. 
102 In contrast to her sensation novels, Braddon's 
negotiation of popular conceptions of insanity and its treatment in her short stories and articles 
extends her authority as a serious social commentator, as reformist in her aspirations as Reade 
considered himself to be. 
In 1861 the editor of Temple Bar, George Augustus Sala, published a short story by 
Braddon entitled `The Mystery at Fernwood'. The narrator is a young woman, Bella, who had 
recently become the fiancee of Laurence Wendale, the sole heir of an estate in Yorkshire, Fernwood. 
The `great mystery'103 she exposes centres on the discovery that the invalid Mr Thomas, who had 
resided in utter seclusion at Fernwood throughout his life, was Wendale's twin brother, a raving 
lunatic who, at the conclusion of the story, murders Lawrence Wendale. Playing upon popular 
conceptions of insanity as she had in The Trail of the Serpent, more striking are the affinities with 
Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre (1847). Though there are no direct references to Bertha Mason, the 
similarities are significant both in terms of plot and style: the reader is given hints and clues that 
slowly strip away the mystery and reveal the truth. Like Mason, Thomas is concealed in the upper 
wing of a stately home. Both lunatics, sources of shame to their families, remain concealed but 
carefully looked after in the family home. Just as Jane Eyre encounters Bertha Mason for the first 
time late at night and alone, so does Bella meet Thomas, the `horrible shadow, the dreadful being 
[... ] with a harsh dissonant laugh'(III, p. 563). 
When she awakes after fainting at the sight of Thomas, the `horrible double' of Lawrence, 
Bella is not convinced by Lucy's explanation that she had simply experienced a delusion common to 
`people of an extremely sensitive temperament'(IV, p. 64). A doctor is called in to cure Bella's 
`mental ills, and regulate [... ] [her] feverish pulse'(IV, p. 64). He declares that Bella is suffering 
from a case of `hysteria, optical delusions, false impressions of outward objects [... ] and other semi- 
mental, semi-physical infirmities'(IV, p. 65). Braddon was exploring a displacement tactic that she 
had used with even greater skill in Lady Audley's Secret. 
In the inquest that followed the murder `every effort was made to hush up the terrible 
story'(IV, p. 73) and confine the `irremediable affliction' to the knowledge of family members. 
Thomas was transferred to the county lunatic asylum. Braddon's moral was clear: lunacy must be 
treated in the proper environment, the lunatic asylum. In both stories and articles on the subject 
of insanity published in Belgravia throughout the 1860s and early 1870s the treatment of lunacy 
remained a concern of Braddon's. In 1867, a short story entitled `An Adventurous Investigation' 
102 Small, `In the guise of science', p. 47. 
103 Mary Elizabeth Braddon, ̀ The Mystery at Fernwood', Temple Bar, 3 (September 1861), p. 552- 
563, and 4 (March 1862), pp. 63-74.3, p. 552. Further page references are contained within the text. 
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appeared in her journal which again centred madness and its treatment. The story relates the 
observations of two friends as they travel through the fictional Tripedal Island (amusingly 
identified as the home of the maniac whose screams scare Allan Armadale in Wilkie Collins's 
Armadale) investigating `the entire aspect and condition of lunacy'. 
They represent different attitudes towards lunacy. The narrator's friend, Smith, was fearful 
for his personal safety. He believed that `exploring the ins and outs of this island, and hunting up 
the lunatics by night and by day'(p. 57) was itself a ̀ mad thing'(p. 57). Recommending that his 
friend arm himself with revolvers and double his life insurance policy, Smith suddenly departs. In 
contrast, the narrator wanted to investigate the treatment of lunacy and to 
stir up the public interest to provide remedies for it; to alleviate the misery and neglect of 
such poor unfortunates; to, if possible, ultimately create for them a proper and 
commodious asylum, instead of leaving them as now, to the tender mercies of avaricious 
relatives, or the brutal treatment of untaught and ignorant "friends. "104 
The narrator immediately realises that the problem in assessing the state of lunacy on the island 
was twofold. Firstly, there was a lack of reliable statistical information on insanity. Secondly, 
`many otherwise intelligent islanders could not distinguish between a lunatic and an eccentric 
person'(p. 62). He believes this was ̀ attributable almost wholly to ignorance'(p. 62). Through 
`apathy or forgetfulness [... ] poor demented creatures lay fastened up in cow-houses, stables, or 
private rooms, as unthought of by the outside world as if they had no existence'(pp. 62-63). Even 
more concerning to the narrator was the possibility that `sane' people might be ̀ confined (for 
selfish purposes), and the case either remained unknown or escaped active investigation'(p. 63). 
In one scene the narrator learns of a proposal to construct a lunatic asylum on the island. 
He concludes that the majority of the islanders considered such a project unnecessary. ̀I do not 
think the feeling was one of apathy or disregard to human suffering; but the FACTS were 
imperfectly known to them, owing to a system (or total absence of system) which had so long 
prevailed'(p. 66). The narrator continually returns to the problem of complacency, reminding the 
reader that lunacy was an affliction which demanded to be taken seriously. He uses the case of one 
young woman called Kate who had been betrayed and deserted by her lover to illustrate the 
importance of his investigation. The `deadhead', as Kate was known, was confined by her relatives 
in a padlocked stable. She is found by the narrator curled up under a blanket in semi-darkness and 
wearing only a chemise. ̀ She lay like an animal on the unclean straw, utterly deserted save by her 
feeders, and the evidences of repulsiveness - not further to be described - were plainly 
visible'(p. 72). When her aunt is asked who lifted her out of bed, she replies, ̀there's a man that 
104 ̀ An Adventurous Investigation', Belgravia, 1 (February 1867), pp. 55-72 (pp. 57-58). Further 
page references are contained within the text. 
? ̂ 4 
comes in and looks after her! '(p. 72). The implication is not lost on the reader. The narrator 
concludes his account with an appeal, imploring readers to take his description of the situation on 
Tripedal Island seriously. He reminds them of their close proximity not only to the island itself 
but to the affliction of insanity: 
Reader, you have the particulars of poor Kate's lunacy and treatment, - the very recent 
condition of an afflicted defenseless woman [... ] is not half-a-day's travel and sail from 
Belgravia! [... ] To alleviate the sad condition of these unfortunates, the hand of private 
charity might be extended. (p. 72)105 
Such an article was sensational only in that it described in shocking detail the 
circumstances in which lunatics were found to be living on the fictional Tripedal Island. It 
purpose, in a journal like Belgravia, was to rouse readers into action, to encourage them to open 
not just their purses but their minds. Braddon sought to educate the readers of Belgravia by vividly 
illustrating the dangers inherent in ignoring or concealing the spectre of insanity. Concerned that 
the effective treatment and understanding of insanity was undercut by public misconceptions 
(based on fear or ignorance), the article, like `The Mystery at Fernwood', suggests that Braddon's 
instructive aims were similar to Reade's. It was important, she felt, that her readers be enlightened 
to the existence of the `night-side' of things. 
106 By this she meant to lay `bare our social scourges 
both of the moral and the material kind, in order that we may with one heart and mind unite in 
striving to rectify those evils which madden people and hurry nations to premature decay'. 
107 
Of particular concern to defenders of asylum care wasA"way in which rhetoric operated to 
excite in the `public mind' particular sentiments, emotions and associations and images. For 
example, physicians expressed anger at the way that Erskine's `masterly rhetoric' had insured 
Hadfield's acquittal. Similarly, though Isaac Ray believed that the `vocabulary of oppression and 
tyranny' would in no way threaten the profession of mental science, the attention he paid to the 
use of such a vocabulary betrayed a real concern at the ease with which newspapers influenced the 
public. When novelists chose to examine psychological issues they too were open to criticism from 
the medical establishment. This chapter has demonstrated the varied ways in which Reade and 
Braddon sought to educate their readers about madness and its treatment. While Reade's protest 
against wrongful confinement was deliberately grounded in the conflation of the genres of romance 
105 While the description of Kate and her environment is reminiscent of the young girl (also forsaken 
by her lover) found by Goodman and Whitely in the asylum stables in Cockton's Valentine Vox, the 
appeal recalls Dickens's plea to the readers of Household Words after his visit to Saint Luke's Asylum 
in 1851. 
106 `Insanity and its Treatment', Belgravia, 10 (February 1870), pp. 467-478 (p. 478). 
107 ̀ Insanity and its Treatment', Belgravia, 10, p. 478. 
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and realism, Braddon maintained a distinction between her educative and ̀ serious' articles and her 
sensational novels and stories. 
Though her short stories and articles consciously sought to arouse sympathy and elicit 
compassion for the plight of the insane, her ̀ highly ornamented' novels reinforced popular 
misconceptions about insanity and its treatment. Unlike Reade's Hard Cash, Braddon's literary 
treatment of insanity was not challenged by physicians and asylum superintendants. In examining 
the problems that underpinned the literary mediation of a set of specific anxieties about the dangers 
of ignorance on the subject of insanity, it becomes clear that unlike Braddon, Reade doubly 
challenged contemporary critical doctrines about realism and the legitimacy of fiction, using art to 
make truth-claims and using truth to underpin his art. 
In 1860 the physician Thomas Mayo argued that there were `certain great psychological 
truths which it is incumbent upon the public to possess as a part of education, if they would avoid 
being victimized [... ] by the more sprightly and flippant errors of the present day [... ] How much 
good may be done, how much evil may be averted [... ] by an enlightened application of the public 
mind in these directions'. 
108 He was alarmed that `psychological truths' were being undermined 
by the representation of insanity and its treatment in novels, newspapers and popular journals (all 
of which reinforced `prevalent errors in the public mind'109) As this chapter has argued, 
physicians were not alone in expressing a desire to educate a naive public. 
Though the key to a heightened understanding of the complexities of madness and its 
treatment, enlightenment as Reade envisaged it contributed to rather than quelled public suspicion 
of the self-proclaimed expertise of `mad-doctors'. In their conscious effort to control both 
representation and reception of their works, and in deliberately provoking powerful responses in 
their readers, ranging from sympathy, benevolence and pity, to horror and fear, both novelists 
simultaneously assisted and hindered the nineteenth-century psychiatric profession's desire to 
resituate insanity in the public mind not as something to be feared and so contained, but as a 
disease which necessitated careful and kindly moral treatment. As the following chapter will 
demonstrate, this `psychological truth' continued to be contested throughout the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. 
108 Thomas Mayo, `On the Relations of the Public to the Science and Practice of Medicine', Fraser's 
Magazine, 62 (August 1860), pp. 179,180. 
109 James F. Duncan, Popular Errors on the Subject of Insanity, Examined and Exposed (Dublin: 
James McGlashan, 1853), p. 160. 
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Chapter Eight 
Wrongful confinement: 1877-1878 
It was the medical profession's development of sophisticated nomenclatures of insanity which, in 
the end, weakened public confidence in medical authority and heightened fear of wrongful 
confinement. This last chapter develops this argument by examining the parliamentary 
investigation into the operation of the lunacy laws `so far as regards the security afforded by it 
against violations of personal liberty'. 
' Lewis L. Dillwyn, M. P. for Swansea, called for the 
appointment of a Select Committee Inquiry in February 1877. Though instituted with the specific 
intention of examining whether or not the lunacy laws secured adequate safeguards to prevent 
wrongful detention in lunatic asylums, the final Report published in March 1878 was 
`voluminous'. 2 
The Select Committee Inquiry of 1877-1878 has been variously referred to in medical and 
social histories of insanity, used to investigate the role played by the Commissioners in Lunacy in 
the history of Victorian lunacy reform, as well as serving to illuminate the histories of individual 
physicians and alleged lunatics like Louisa Lowe. 
3 It was employed to illustrate the fear and hatred 
both of lunatics and those in charge of lunacy, as well as documenting the perceived increase in 
insanity in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
4 Yet though the Inquiry has been 
appropriated to a range of diverse uses, it has usually been a source for inquiries into other, though 
related, topics. No comprehensive interpretation or analysis of the Inquiry in relation to wrongful 
confinement has been undertaken. Little attention has been paid, for example, to the striking 
discrepancy between the narrow specificity of the Inquiry's initial objective and its eventual 
`kaleidoscopic' and `chaotic' breadth. One explanation for such an absence of interrogation may he 
in the fact that the Inquiry was, in the history of lunacy law reform, far from ground-breaking. Its 
conclusion, that `allegations of mala fides or of serious abuses were not substantiated', 
5 
engendered 
no alteration in the lunacy laws; the Inquiry ultimately vindicated the profession of mental science 
1 JMS, 23 (1877-78), p. 457. 
2 Presenting the testimony given by 63 witnesses over the course of two parliamentary sessions, the 
Report consisted of `583 pages, quarto size, of closely printed matter' and weighed nearly 31b. 8oz. 
JPMMP, 31 (1878), p. 44. 
3 See Owen, The Darkened Room, pp. 168-201. See also chapters on Samuel Gaskell, John Charles 
Bucknill, and Henry Maudsley in Masters of Bedlam. pp. 161-186,187-225,226-267. 
4 Kathleen Jones, Mental Heath and Social Policy, 1845-1959 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1960), p. 22; Scull, Museums of Madness, pp. 243,245. 
5 Report from the Select Committee on Lunacy Law; with the Proceedings of the Committee; PP 1878 
XVI, 43, p. iii. 
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and its asylum proprietors from accusations of obloquy and charges of abusing legal safeguards for 
financial gain. 
An equally compelling if obvious reason why the Inquiry has only been culled for specific 
detail lies in the fact that unlike the 1845 and 1859-1860 Select Committee Hearings (which both 
led to dramatic reformulations of the lunacy laws), in 1877 there were no `lunacy cause celebre[s]'6 
to heighten the interest of newspapers and which in turn would have elicited a wider awareness of, 
and interest in, the hearings. While the Lancet observed that there was ̀ no skeleton to be exhumed, 
and no dark disclosure to be effected', 
7 
the journal of Mental Science described the hearings ̀ chiefly 
as a sop thrown to satisfy a few noisy importunate lunatics who were at large'. L. Forbes 
8 
Winslow argued with his usual flair that the hearings had simply 
originated in imaginary grievances, morbid fancies, actual delusions, and in the hostility 
and antipathies of those who had been subjected to asylum restraint. These miasmata 
invaded a sensitive and susceptible nature, were manifested in an annual paroxysm of 
plaints and petitions in Parliament, and, ultimately, through the long-recognised efficacy 
of importunity, through the incessant drop, dropping on the marble heart of authority, 
secured, in a soft and yielding moment, a public recognition from the Secretary of State. 
9 
In spite of the fact that the law remained unchanged, and though there was neither `public 
excitement on the subject of lunacy or any public demand for an inquiry', 
10 
the select committee 
investigation of 1877-78 is significant. It explored anxieties about wrongful confinement as they 
had developed and altered over the course of the nineteenth century, particularly in response to the 
expansion of classificatory systems of insanity, and it examined the interface between the reality of 
insanity and the `idea' of insanity as it was manifested in Britain in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. 
As Winslow's language and tone suggest, though the tenor of the debate over wrongful 
incarceration had not abated, the frames of reference - as evidenced in the breadth of issues covered 
in the hearings - had extended in what we might consider to be a far from `desultory fashion'. The 
6 JMS, 23 (1877-78), p. 457. 
7 Lancet, (1877) i, p. 691. The language the journal employed suggests a conscious attempt to break 
down the popular association between wrongful incarceration and the horrors of sensation fiction. Yet 
ironically, it serves to reinforce the way in which distinct medical and literary discourses and their 
terms of reference operated on one another during this period. 
8 JMS, 23 (1877-78), p. 457. 
9 JPMMP, 30 (1877), p. 311. 
10 JMS, 23 (1877-78), p. 457. 
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lay-public's increased role, and often undesired involvement in matters psychiatric, had become 
extraordinarily influential in medical and legal conceptions of responsibility and authority. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first explores two accounts, both published 
in 1877, of the nineteenth-century reforms in lunacy legislation. J. Mortimer Granville and John 
Sibbald, both prominent figures in the medical community, offered dramatically different 
interpretations of the success of reforms. Central to both accounts was the role played by the lay- 
public. The select committee witnesses, whose testimony is discussed in both the second and third 
sections, were informed by these two positions. Accompanying the heated debates about 
accountability was a concern about the effects of the extension of medical nomenclatures to include 
moral insanity and monomania. The complex relationship between the professions of law and 
medicine were subject to intense scrutiny. The third section focuses on the testimony given by one 
of the pre-eminent authorities on lunacy and its treatment, Lord Shaftesbury. His contradictory 
comments on the responsibilities of the lay-public (and the role of publicity) in medical matters 
ironically acted to undercut the credibility of the profession which he was seeking to defend. This 
section contrasts his opinions with those of James Billington, the secretary of the new Lunacy Law 
Amendment Society, a body formed to agitate on behalf of alleged lunatics and whose testimony 
was discussed in great detail, and with derision, by medical journals covering the investigation. 
i. ̀ Imperfect fellows' in a finikin civilization': lunacy reform in 1877-1878 
Under the title, The Care and Cure of the Insane, in 1877 J. Mortimer Granville published the 
results of an extensive survey of lunatic asylums. Sponsored by the Lancet, over the course of the 
three previous years Granville had visited and observed the operations of a range of asylums 
(including county asylums, licensed houses and workhouses) in the city of London, Middlesex and 
Surrey. The purpose of Granville's inquiry was three-fold. He was employed by the editor of the 
Lancet to ascertain the general character and efficiency of the institution's provisions (and the 
condition of the patients' daily lives), to observe treatment systems for both remedial and chronic 
cases, and to collect and collate statistics of cases for the past ten years. Granville acknowledged 
that the recognition of insanity as a disease and the formerly cruel and abusive treatment of the 
insane had both led to substantive reforms. Yet though the key initiative of reform - the 
replacement of punitive methods of treatment with a humane system of moral therapy - was a 
laudable advancement, Granville believed that it had not led to any improvement in the care and 
cure of the insane. 
Granville believed that the recognition of insanity as a disease had been taken too far. He 
was critical of the sentiment expressed in medical circles that judges and juries were increasingly 
extraneous figures in determining, for example, between crime and insanity. A reviewer in The 
Times summed up this view. `many persons [psychological physicians] regard lunatics as worthy of 




11 Though the abolition of the ̀ old system' of physical restraint and its replacement 
with manual and chemical restraints was applauded as a humane and enlightened initiative, the 
compassionate ̀ treatment' administered under the `new system' seemed to Granville equally 
deleterious to the care and cure of the insane. Due to the absence of any national or even regional 
system of training and certification for asylum attendants, the use of manual restraint was 
unregulated. Their capacity for brutality often resulted in broken limbs and, occasionally, the 
deaths of lunatics. 
12 The use of drugs such as chloral also produced `disastrous effects [... ] [and 
had] a tendency to enable patients, who might otherwise recover, to glide over the crisis of their 
complaint, and pass into a state of permanent dementia'. 
13 
Granville felt that too much reliance had been placed in the humane trappings of moral 
therapy - provisions, amusements, surroundings - to the detriment of the psychological physician's 
practice of remedial or curative treatment. Despite the auspicious commencement of moral 
management, to Granville the `new' system's replacement of physical restraint with the patient's 
assertion of self-control and individual will-power had been undermined by the use of drugs and 
manual restraints, thus denying real incentive to recovery. Instead, not only had there been no 
substantial improvement in the results obtained since the abolition of restraints, but rather `a 
positive diminution of the proportion of cures'. 
14 The failure of the `new system' of moral therapy 
was in part due to a dangerous complacency on the part of the public: `Philanthropists, animated 
only by feelings of humanity, were not unnaturally satisfied with the reform effected; and the 
insane being liberated from their chains and kindly treated, public opinion rested from its 
enterprise of mercy'. 
15 
Though Granville did not seek to trace the cultural, political and institutional influences 
which had led to an unbalanced and ineffectual `repentant compensation', 
16 he refers to the 
productive power of public opinion. Had the public not been satisfied with the state of asylums and 
11 The Times, 29 December, 1877, p. 3. 
12 For typical accounts of the abusive treatment of lunatics by their attendants see, BMJ, (1862), ii, 
p. 658, and the Lancet, (1862) ii, p. 663. 
13 Report from the Select Committee on Lunacy Law; Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, 
Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix; PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 400. For a more favourable opinion of the 
effects that drugs could have on lunatics see George H. Savage, ̀On the Treatment of Insanity, More 
Especially by Drugs', Guy's Hospital Gazette, 3rd series, 23 (1878), pp. 134-164. 
14 J. Mortimer Granville, The Care and Cure of the Insane: Being the Reports of the Lancet 
Commission on Lunatic Asylums, 1875-6-7. For Middlesex, the City of London, and Surrey, 2 vols 
(London: Hardwicke and Bogue, 1877), ii, p. 222. 
15 Granville, The Care and Cure of the Insane, ii, p. 221. 
16 The Times, 29 December, 1877, p. 3. 
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treatment, agitation would have initiated debate which would in turn have led, if not to reform, 
then at least to closer scrutiny. Instead, the public had apparently been lulled into believing that 
lunacy reform had been successfully effected when to Granville it had been taken too far and in the 
wrong direction. 
17 He felt that the present-day care of the insane reflected merely a reactionary 
protest against the past. Pointing to the decreasing rates of cure and the increasing number of 
chronic cases silting up in the asylums, he argued that the lauded reforms were simultaneously 
excessive and incapable of curing lunacy. He concluded that `on nearly all the leading lines of 
advance and improvement there has been more stagnation than progress, since the emancipation of 
the insane from a state of bondage and imprisonment with the professed purpose of bringing them 
under the benign influence of a curative regime'. 
1 g 
In the same year that Granville published The Care and Cure of the Insane, a very different 
interpretation of reform was being expounded by John Sibbald, the Deputy Commissioner in 
Lunacy for Scotland. In the third and final Morison lecture on insanity for 1877, entitled 
`Insanity in Modern Times' and delivered before the Royal College of Physicians in Edinburgh, he 
sought to explore the interlocking developments which had led to what he considered a triumph of 
`compassionate consideration' in the treatment and understanding of the insane. 
19 Sibbald 
believed that there were two pivotal explanations for reform in the care and treatment of lunatics. 
Firstly, the improvement of the political circumstances of states and the increasing `social 
organisation' of communities, and secondly, the evolution of the `the humane sentiment of 
society'(p. 539), which had begun to exhibit strength sufficient to exercise a powerful influence on 
every department of civil organisation. Such a `revolution in public sentiment'(p. 543) produced, 
Sibbald argued, an extension of the limits of the popular understanding of insanity. It was this 
`broader conception of the nature of insanity which advancing civilisation had generated in the 
public mind' that he felt `acted most powerfully in creating the irresistible demand for the 
improvement of asylums'(p. 542). 
Sibbald believed that without the expansion of the `idea' of insanity and the `increased 
comprehensiveness of signification'(p. 543) it generated in the public mind, the struggle between 
`barbarism and civilisation' and between `darkness and light' in the treatment and understanding 
of the insane might not have been quite so triumphant. Though The Times reviewer agreed with 
Granville that reformist measures remained inadequate, he also agreed with Sibbald in suggesting 
that reform could not have been accomplished without `the improvement in the moral sense of the 
17 Granville, The Care and Cure of the Insane, ii, p. 223. 
18 Granville, The Care and Cure of the Insane, ii, p. 221. 
19 John Sibbald, `Insanity in Modern Times', JMS, 23 (1877-78), p. 539. Further page references are 
contained within the text. 
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majority of our countrymen'20 and the development of the `belief that the duties of society were 
not at an end in the case of those who had become incapable of remembering their correlative duties 
to society, but that it was an obligation which society owed to its moral nature'. 
21 
Paying tribute to the triumph of `compassionate consideration' and expertise over 
brutality and ignorance, Sibbald presented an optimistic vision of the development of lunacy 
reform since the late eighteenth century. In marked contrast, Granville drew opposite conclusions 
about the implementation of reformist measures. Though both writers disagreed on the 
achievements of reform, they both acknowledged the substantial effect that pubic opinion, popular 
sentiment, and the moral sense of the people had had on nineteenth-century lunacy reform. 
Characterised by an increased `comprehensiveness' in the `idea' of insanity, the `revolution in 
public sentiment' played an important but overlooked role both in refining popular responses to 
the lunatic and his or her treatment and in complicating medical and legal notions of social 
normalcy and deviancy. Paying attention to these specific developments, this chapter will consider 
Granville and Sibbald's antithetical interpretations of reform in the context of the testimony of 
witnesses during the select committee investigation of 1877-78. 
One of the central goals of the Committee was to clarify the excessively complicated 
administration of the lunacy laws as they related to civil liberties. Under the direction of the 
Chairman of the inquiry, Stephen Cave, the Committee members interrogated witnesses on a wide 
range of issues. Much attention was given to the responsibilities and duties of the legal and medical 
departments involved. 22 Though the employment of drugs in lunatic asylums, the size of asylums 
and their classificatory systems of treatment were all discussed, particular attention was paid to 
recognised defects of the laws. These included the imperfect wording of the lunacy certificates 
(names, dates and important details of diagnosis were too often omitted, weakening the specific 
role of the certificate as a protection of personal liberty) and the inadequate care of single 
patients. 
23 
In order to ascertain how the lunacy laws might better serve the lunatic and safeguard his 
or her liberties, numerous suggestions were made by all of the witnesses. These included the 
20 The Times, 29 December, 1877, p. 3. 
21 The Times, 29 December, 1877, p. 3. 
22 These included Chancery Visitors, asylum superintendents and medical men, Commissioners in 
Lunacy, lawyers and the medical officers of workhouses. 
23 Single patients were lunatics who were not under commission and who were boarded out to 
families, friends, and boarding houses. If the single patient owned property, the confinement was 
overseen by the Chancery Visitors in Lunacy. For all others, it was entirely unregulated. On the 
furore surrounding the horrific treatment of the unregistered `single patients' see ̀Lunatics Out of 
Asylums', Lancet, (1877) i, p. 944. 
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appointment of an independent medical man (nominated by the Commissioners in Lunacy) to each 
private asylum, making private asylums free to visits from inspectors and family members at all 
times, increasing the number and extending the powers of the Commissioners and the Chancery 
Visitors, making certificates terminable (as in Scotland), and replacing licensed houses with public 
hospitals (again, as in Scotland). Perhaps most contentiously, several witnesses suggested that an 
overhaul of the lunacy laws could only be achieved by shifting the right to diagnose lunacy from 
medical to legal authorities. Charles Lockhart Robertson also caused alarm when he suggested that 
asylums themselves were antagonistic to cure. 
24 
Though the Lancet did not want to `condemn the evidence en masse or to stigmatise the 
opinions of competent witnesses as worthless', the way in which testimony had been received 
`without discrimination as to the competency of the witnesses or the nature and purpose of their 
expressed opinions' could only lead to immature and confused judgments. 
25 To the journal, the 
`integrity and usefulness' of the inquiry's conclusions and recommendations depended on 
distinguishing between fact and opinion or `separating the wheat from the chaff'. 
26 Yet because the 
`wildest assertions have been made, [and] the most sweeping and contradictory views propounded', 
the Lancet felt that there was little hope that anyone could gain a clear perception of the problem, 
or aid the Committee in solving it. 
27 Even the witnesses themselves felt that far from amounting 
to a comprehensive examination of the relationship between the lunacy laws and civil liberties, the 
specific goal of the Inquiry had become mired in extraneous issues. Sir James Foxe, the Chief 
Commissioner in Lunacy for Scotland, felt that the Inquiry was marked by `a lack of coherence' 
and ̀ an apparent want of any definate object' concluding that `a perusal of the evidence leaves the 
reader in a somewhat chaotic state of mind'. 
28 Lyttleton Stewart Forbes Winslow, a leading 
physician specialising in mental science, felt that the questions were no more than `dreary 
24 Reported in JMS, 23 (1877-78), p. 469. Charles Lockhart Robertson (1825-97) was from 1870 until 
the year before his death one of the Lord Chancellor's Visitors in Lunacy. Prior to gaining this 
position he was the medical superintendent of Sussex County Lunatic Asylum. With the perception of 
lunatic asylums as custodial warehouses on the increase in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
this opinion gained increasing support. See Scull's analysis of this development in The Most Solitary 
of Afflictions, pp. 267-374. 
25 ̀ The Lunacy Law Inquiry, Lancet, (1877) ii, p. 285. 
26 `The Lunacy Inquiry', Lancet, (1877) i, p. 690 
27 Lancet, (18 77) i, p. 690. 
28 Sir James Coxe, Lunacy in its Relation to the State. A Commentary on the Evidence taken by the 
committee of the House of Commons on Lunacy Law in the session of 1877 (London: Sampson Low, 
Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1878), p. 3. 
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lucubrations'. 29 From Dillwyn's motion to the publication of the Committee's Report in March 
1878, the scope and thus the significance of the Inquiry had extended `in a desultory fashion 30 
beyond the expectations and desires of interested observers. As one contemporary observer wrote, 
the bearings ultimately represented no more than `a kaleidoscopic view of the conflicting and ever- 
31 
shifting aspects of opinions on the subject of lunacy'. 
ii. `Is Insanity a disease? '
The 1877-78 Inquiry reveals an important extension of the parameters of `responsibility'. During 
the McNaughten case of 1843 issues of responsibility were interpreted primarily in regard to the 
criminal culpability of the defendant. By 1877, the conception of responsibility had expanded to 
include not only the defendant in medico-legal cases, inquiries and commission, but also the legal 
profession, the psychiatric community, the relations and friends and relatives of the alleged lunatic, 
and importantly, the newspaper press. It becomes clear that each group were considered in some 
way responsible for the questionable success of the lunacy laws as they were applied to tenuous, 
partial, or indefinate cases of insanity. Representing two significant moments in the history of 
lunacy reform, the 1843 McNaughten case and the 1877 Select Committee Inquiry demonstrate 
that a formative shift both in popular, legal and medical notions of insanity had taken place in 
regard to conceptions of legal, social and medical accountability. 
As Bucknill explained in his discussion of the Nottidge case in The Care of the Insane, the 
sole purpose of the law was to provide for the safety of the public and the individual. Where there 
was no danger, there existed no legal justification for confinement. To the medical profession, 
early confinement was necessary to treat disorder, even if the lunatic posed no direct danger to the 
public at large. Their responsibility to treat the lunatic authorised and justified confinement. The 
disparity between the legal and medical conceptions of the terms of treatment was further 
complicated by the expansion of the medical nomenclature of insanity to include moral insanity, a 
disease which more often risked moral injury rather than physical danger. 
Under the improved administration of asylums, Sibbald felt that as well as the broadening 
of the `idea of insanity', medical classification had also expanded to include `many persons who had 
not previously been considered fit inmates for such establishments'(pp. 542-543). Whereas 
abnormalities and eccentricities of conduct might have been tolerated in a time and place when the 
population was `sparse and pastoral', Sibbald believed that in the late nineteenth-century 
29 JPMMP, 30 (1877), p. 311. The author was Lyttleton Stewart Forbes Winslow, himself one of the 
witnesses called to testify at the hearings. 
30 Coxe, Lunacy in its Relation to the State, p. 3. 
31 Lancet, (1877) ii, p. 285. 
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environment of the city, `full of the complex operations of a highly developed commerce'(p. 544), 
such behavior was intolerable: `In the former period they would have continued members of the 
household in which they were born; at present they would be regarded as insane and sent to an 
asylum-'(p. 544). Sir James Coxe, a Medical Commissioner for the Scottish Board of Lunacy, felt 
similarly that there was `reason to think that the meaning of the statutory terms of lunacy has of 
recent years been considerably extended, and that a belief is pretty widely held that forms of 
thought and feeling that were formerly regarded as mere eccentricities or absurdities of character, 
are now frequently dealt with as insanity. 
32 
Bucknill wrote in 1880 that the lunacy law had 
extended in its application to large classes of persons who would never have been considered 
lunatics when this legislation was entered upon [... ] Since 1845, medical science has 
discovered whole realms of lunacy, and the nicer touch of a finikin civilization has shrunk 
from the contact of imperfect-fellows [... ] The old brutalities have become rare [... ] and 
instead thereof another evil has been evolved, and the asylum system in its whole vast 
extent has encompassed an ever-increasing multitude, numbers of whom might well be 
33 
enjoying moderate freedom and comparative happiness in their own homes. 
Physicians specialising in the field of mental disease argued that classificatory systems of insanity 
had evolved naturally in response to the increasingly diverse forms of insanity caused by the 
accelerating pace of change in western civilization. 
34 Though the refinement of classificatory 
systems allowed greater effectiveness of treatment, it posed problems. 
The centrality of `moral freedom' to the Inquiry, particularly in relation to the perceived 
threats posed to the liberty of the subject by the `the marble heart of authority' in its various 
guises, ensured that the distinction between sanity and insanity was a preoccupation of the 
committee members. In order to ascertain whether or not the law was sufficient to protect the 
liberty of the subject, every witness was asked whether or not they knew of any cases in which a 
patient had been willfully and wrongfully sent to an asylum, and whether or not they had 
experienced cases in which a patient had either been detained for mercenary motives or for longer 
than was necessary. Some witnesses rejected outright this blatant contravention of the lunacy laws 
while others admitted that they had witnessed such abuses, but almost all agreed that what 
Granville describes as the `increasing subtlety of the mental condition' compounded the difficulty 
of determining accurately whether an individual suffering from `indefinate insanity' should 
be 
32 Coxe, Lunacy in its Relation to the State, p. 11. 
33 Bucknill, The Care of the Insane, pp. 4-5. 
34 See, for example, D. H. Tuke, `Does Civilization favour the Generation of Mental 
Disease', JMS, 4 
(1857-58), pp. 94-110; and J. S. Jewell, `Influence of our Present Civilisation in the 
Production of 
Nervous and Mental Diseases', Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, 8 (1881), pp. 14-17. 
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confined in an asylum or be permitted to reside outside the asylum, perhaps ̀ to subvert domestic 
quietude'. 
35 Bucknill illustrated an inconsistency between the lawyer's view of the insane (founded 
when society was young and simple) and the doctor's view of what must be done to `prevent 
mischief among the tender and complex interests of modern life'. 
36 It was unsurprising, perhaps, 
that the evidence of witnesses turned almost immediately to the doctrine of moral insanity. 
Dr John Nugent, Inspector and Commissioner of Control on the Board of Lunacy in 
Ireland, stated that if the law was properly exercised and fairly carried out, undue confinement 
should not exist. Yet in his practical experience the `most difficult question of all to deal with' was 
not only to determine the existence of moral insanity but `how far the detention is justifiable, of a 
person labouring under that morbid state where there is a perverted mind, unaccountable conduct, 
and an abandonment of those feelings that ought to exist in a well-regulated society, marked by 
acts of folly, extravagance, and dissipation'. 
37 Though he felt that dipsomaniacs, for 
example, should not be subjected to confinement in an asylum, Nugent concurred with many 
physicians in believing that the lunatic always posed dangers to those around him and should as a 
matter of course be confined to an institution. Yet he could not state with any degree of clarity 
whether or not the injurious acts committed by the morally insane should automatically require 
asylum-based treatment. To draw the line between moral insanity and `moral obliquity' the key 
determinant to Nugent was the degree to which the patient entertained sentiments and feelings in 
regard to others which were not `justifiable'. To Richard Adams, the superintendent of the 
Cornwall asylum in Bodmin, moral insanity was evidenced by a want of `moral restraint' in which 
the individual held no delusions but was nevertheless guilty of `purposeless acts'. 
38 Though the 
morally insane acted ̀ wickedly in every way' such acts were not criminal because they `arise from 
nothing, and lead to nowhere, so to speak'(p. 362). 
Adams agreed with Nugent that the legal safeguards currently in force were theoretically 
sufficient to protect the liberty of the subject. Yet in admitting to Cave that he had discharged 
several patients as not insane, he defended what appeared to be instances of wrongful incarceration 
by blaming the law. The individuals in question, he explained, had behaved in an extraordinary 
manner, or had done `very odd and peculiar things for a series of years'39 for which the law was 
forced to intervene. The `law' had judged that they were insane rather than wicked and they had 
35 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 131. 
36 Bucknill, The Care of the Insane, pp. 53-54. 
37 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 131. 
38 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 362. 
39 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 355. 
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therefore been sent to his institution rather than a prison. In contrast to morally insane acts, 
Adams felt that `atrocious crimes' had a cause. Though he agreed with Nugent that to distinguish 
between insanity and sanity in such cases was ̀ extremely difficult', to clarify the distinction one 
need look to the patient's `family' history, which would inevitably show signs of an `insane taint', 
and to the information to be gained from close observation and individual attention. The 
detention of the morally insane in asylums was only justifiable if the patient had become dangerous 
to himself or to others, or if the physician believed that the removal to an asylum would cure the 
afflicted patient; not if the patient's `moral evil' merely became annoying to friends and family. 
William Balfour, like Nugent and Adams, was experienced in the field of lunacy, having 
held the position of medical officer at Colney Hatch and the position of superintendent at the 
Hampstead asylum for imbeciles. Unlike Adams and Nugent, he stated in his testimony that the 
lunacy laws were insufficient to protect individual liberty. Moral insanity in its legal framework 
took centre stage in Balfour's evidence. Whether or not to confine the morally insane depended, he 
suggested, on whether or not moral insanity was considered a disease. Because the law did not 
recognise moral insanity, any criminal acts committed by what physicians considered morally 
insane individuals were punished accordingly. In contrast, to physicians it represented mental 
imbalance and was properly classified as a disease. Yet in either case and whether in prison or in the 
asylum, Balfour believed that `treatment' was offered and for this reason he felt that the law - both 
lunacy and criminal - was consistent. It was however, threatened by what he saw as a two-fold 
`abuse of [... ] power'. 
40 
The lunacy law inevitably relied on the `honesty of the medical profession' but Balfour felt 
it to be an unfortunate fact that the `generality of medical men' were not `conversant with 
lunacy'. 41 Furthermore, the alleged lunatic's friends and family compounded the inexperience and 
ignorance of medical men by abusing the trust of such physicians in order to relieve themselves of 
individuals who had become troublesome. Balfour agreed with the sentiments of a writer for the 
Lancet who wrote that in 1877 it was still possible `for any unprincipled "friends" of a weakly, 
excitable, or distressed person, to procure certificates upon which his introduction to an asylum 
may be effected'. 
42 Though it was suggested that cases in which reluctance to discharge patients 
from private asylums were limited in number (and defended by fears that to release the patient too 
early into the `vortex of the worrying world-43 would lead to unforeseen consequences), the 
40 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 151. 
41 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 151. 
42 ̀ Lunacy Law Reform', Lancet, (1877) i, p. 429. 
43 Lancet, (18 77) i, p. 429. 
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anxiety expressed by Balfour centred again the question of who should exercise the responsibility to 
detain an individual, for how long, and on what grounds: medical or legal. 
44 
The opinions of Nugent, Adams and Balfour on moral insanity highlight the way in which 
it remained problematic, both to the consolidation of the physician's control over the lunatic and 
to the public perception of him as a competent judge of insanity (and conversely as a responsible 
and trustworthy guardian of the community at large). Importantly, their comments also 
demonstrate the way in which the function and effectiveness of the law in its medical relations was 
rendered most fragile when applied to what one of the Committee member described as cases of 
`indefinite insanity'. 45 This was aptly demonstrated in early 1878 with the case of a Reverend 
Henry John Dodwell. The clergyman was obsessed with the idea that due to his dismissal as 
Chaplain to the Industrial Schools at Brighton, the `whole official world was in league against 
him'. Unable to gain redress through the Court of Chancery for what he perceived as a grievous 
wrong, he devised the idea of firing a pistol at the Master of the Rolls, Sir George Jessel, in order 
to draw public attention to his `own fancied wrongs'. 
46 Committing the act on 22 February, he 
was immediately arraigned at the Old Bailey. In the trial which followed, Dodwell rejected legal 
assistance and chose to conduct his own defence. He argued that because the pistol was unloaded, 
the action was harmless and thus could not be construed as an attempted assassination. On 15 
March a jury found Dodwell guilty of common assault, but on the charge of feloniously shooting 
with intent to murder he was acquitted on the grounds of insanity. He was sent to Newgate and 
then Broadmoor. 
Because Dodwell had been incarcerated in a lunatic asylum without any medical testimony 
being given to substantiate the accusation, it was viewed as a sensational instance of wrongful 
incarceration. Dodwell himself complained that he had been declared non compos mentis without 
any medical witnesses having been called. He considered anything preferable to being `stamped as a 
criminal lunatic and incarcerated as such for life in a living tomb'. 
47 While in Newgate Dodwell 
was examined by L. S. Forbes Winslow and a Dr. Winn. Both physicians concluded in their report 
to the Home Office that Dodwell was sane. 
48 However, all attempts to release him from 
44 Balfour's reaction to the unlawful detention of individuals who held `delusions, queer crochets, 
queer ideas about things' but who were neither dangerous nor suicidal, was to reinforce inspection 
procedures by `nationalizing' the problem by making the private establishments the property of the 
district or state. 
45 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 363. 
46 The Times, 16 March, 1878, p. 9. 
47 The Times, 29 March, 1878, p. 5. 
48 L. Forbes Winslow, Recollections of Forty Years. Being an Account at First Hand of some Famous 
Criminal Lunacy Cases (London: John Ouseley, 1910), pp. 116-126. 
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Broadmoor were unsuccessful According to Winslow, he had in fact been ̀driven mad by the 
environment of the place' and as a result died there. 
49 In cases of alleged insanity where there was 
no indication of a perversion of intellect, as in moral insanity, medical evidence was not required 
by law to determine the fact or degree of responsibility. Determined as it was without the benefit 
of expert medical testimony, the ruling in the Dodwell case drew fierce condemnation from the 
Lancet. The verdict afforded a ̀ striking illustration of the extraordinary position in which the law 
still places the question of responsibility'. 
50 
To the journal the case exemplified the way in which the law could paradoxically determine 
insanity, a recognisable `disease', without basing the judgment on medical testimony. It was `one 
of the conspicuous anomalies of our judicial system, the removal of which has been unaccountably 
delayed'. The whole question of the relationship between insanity and responsibility when 
considered without the benefit of a judgment `trained in the investigation, and practiced in the 
diagnosis, of mind disorder and disease' was liable to be misconstrued and misapplied. It was a 
serious and alarming consideration to the profession of mental science that a jury `may at any 
moment err fatally in, the recognition of insanity, sending a victim of disease to the gallows, or 
incarcerating a sane, though misguided and vain, man to a madhouse for life, in place of visiting his 
offence with an appropriate legal penalty'. 
51 Winslow believed that 
in cases where guilt or innocence is simply to be decided they [the lay-jury] are quite as 
competent to deal with the matter as most cultured people in the land [... ] but where an 
abstruse subject, involving scientific and psychological investigations, occurs, and where 
the objective and subjective state of the mind has to be dealt with, and where the question 
of madness or rationality is the one under consideration, then [... ] the tribunal to decide 
this should not be a number of ignorant gabies. 
52 
To Henry Maudsley, the acquittal or conviction of a prisoner where insanity was alleged was a 
merely a matter of chance. Were `the issue to be decided by tossing up a shilling, instead of by the 
grave procedure of a trial in a court, it could hardly be more uncertain'. 
53 The greatest irony was 
that though the physicians involved in the Dodwell case had declared him sane, the case nonetheless 
aroused hostility towards the profession. 
49 Winslow, Recollections of Forty Years, p. 126. 
50 ̀ Lay Judgments on Insanity', Lancet, (1878) i, p. 429. 
51 Lancet, (18 78) i, p-429. 
52 Winslow, Recollections of Forty Years, pp. 101-102. 
53 Henry Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease (London: Henry S. King, 1874), p. 101. 
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While The Times agreed with Maudsley and Winslow that lunacy was a proper question for 
medical experts, the paper wished that `experts [... ] would be less apparently anxious to draw all 
criminals under the shelter of their protecting sentence. It will be a dangerous time for the sane 
part of our population if ever these extreme views are suffered to prevail'. 
54 The Dodwell case 
pitted the legal profession against the medical profession. Just as lawyers took issue with the 
`fanciful theories of medical men who never fail to find insanity where they earnestly look for it', 
55 
so too did physicians condemn `the unjust and absurd criterion of responsibility which is 
sanctioned by the law'. 
56 That such a defect in the law should be rectified immediately was 
important, so argued the Lancet, because ̀these too frequently occurring disputes about the sanity 
or insanity of persons who commit acts injurious to the public peace tend to weaken the general 
respect for what claims to be full and impartial justice'. 
57 
To Bucknill, the statute and lunacy laws were in `such a hopeless state of entanglement, 
that it would seem that nothing short of codification can possibly succeed in loosening and 
smoothing out their knotted intricacies and confusions'. 
58 The debate over the criterion of 
responsibility was both underpinned by and illustrative of the difficulty of achieving an accurate 
definition of insanity within increasingly sophisticated and complicated nosologies of mental 
affliction. With the recognition of moral insanity, a disease in which the individual may know 
what he is doing is wrong, yet who remains unable to resist the impulse to commit criminal acts, 
the journal felt that the `attempt to measure responsibility by the knowledge of right and wrong to 
which jurists cling is no longer possible'. 
59 No one, it seemed, doubted that the McNaughten 
rules - based as they were solely on the criterion of physical impairment and on the presumed 
common sense of a jury - had become inadequate to cope with `indefinate' forms of lunacy such as 
moral insanity. 
In the previous decade S. Henry Dickson, Professor of Medicine at the Jefferson Medical 
College in Philadelphia, had addressed this issue in an article for the Quarterly Journal of 
Psychological Medicine and Medical Jurisprudence. While he admitted that members of the bar 
complained frequently that they were unable to obtain a satisfactory definition of insanity, 
Dickson remained cautious of offering a ̀ positive and sufficient definition as they [members of the 
54 The Times, 16 March, 1878, p. 9. 
55 Maudsley, Responsibility, p. 101. 
56 Maudsley, Responsibility, pp. 101-102. 
57 `The Case of Dodwell', Lancet, (1878) i, p. 691. 
58 Bucknill, The Care of the Insane, p. 54. 
59 Lancet, (18 78) i, p. 429. 
22 
bar] have a right to ask'60 because though it was possible to `know or recognize [and to] describe 
lunacy', defining it remained problematic 
partly because of the imperfection of biological and psychological science at the present 
day, and partly on account of the inherent defects of language. Words, though not given 
us, as a cynical satirist affirmed, "to conceal our thoughts, " must be felt too often to be a 
very inadequate means of communicating them. 
61 
The medical and legal professions were brought into confrontation primarily because of 
`difficulty in mutually understanding each other from the difference in the nomenclature which 
they respectively employ'. 
62 The `great difference of opinion' that set lawyers and physicians in 
opposition was not so much a disagreement arising from the `facts or practical inferences to be 
drawn from them', but rather `the signification of words'63 used to describe and indicate insanity. 
Lawyers used the terms insanity, lunacy, and unsoundness of mind interchangeably; physicians 
used the term, `insanity' more often in relation to crime, and `lunacy' in relation to civil rights 
(though he admitted that such distinctions were artificial and continually varying). Medicine had 
established a terminology corresponding to a more generally recognised classification of insanity, 
divided primarily by dementia (determined by an absolute or partial want of reason) and mania 
(understood by the fact of delusion). As with Nugent and Adams, the greatest difficulty for Pope 
was presented by the diagnoses of moral insanity and monomania. Though monomania had, ̀ by the 
ingenuity of medical schools, been subdivided into many species' they were in a ̀ medico-legal sense 
valueless'. 
64 To Pope, the legal terminology of insanity was as confused as the medical terminology 
was valueless, with no single distinction being adopted or conformed to, distinctions becoming 
invariably obsolete, and the most important varieties of insanity (those creating civil or 
testamentary incapacity or criminal irresponsibility) holding no distinct names. As Coxe put it, 
In the first place, there may not everywhere be a coincidence of opinion as to what 
constitutes insanity; and in the second place, when the existence of insanity is fully 
recognized, a diversity of opinion may yet be held [... ] Insanity is explained by 
lexicographers to be unsoundness of mind, disorder of the intellect, or madness; but these 
60 S. Henry Dickson, `The Legal Consequences of Insanity', Quarterly Journal of Psychological 
Medicine and Medical Jurisprudence, 11 (1868), pp. 467-506 (p. 467). 
61 Dickson, `The Legal Consequences of Insanity', p. 471. 
62 H. M. R. Pope, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Lunacy (London: H. Sweet, 1877), p. 6. 
63 Alfred S. Taylor, Medical Jurisprudence (Philadelphia: Blanchard and Lea, 1856), p. 654. 
64 Pope, A Treatise on the Law, p. 9. 
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terms are really nothing more than synonymous expressions [... ] It thus appears that it is 
not to dictionaries or Acts of Parliament that we must look for a definition of insanitv. 6' 
The dilemma caused by the insufficiency of the lunacy and criminal laws was aggravated by the 
absence of an agreed medico-legal nomenclature of insanity. The explanation for the ascendance of 
debatable ̀ opinion' over legal and medical fact was due precisely to both the expansion of the 
statutory terms of lunacy to include partial forms of lunacy - to the broader conception of insanity 
and recognition of sub-species and forms (like moral insanity and monomania) that had occurred 
since the late-eighteenth century - and to the striking disparity between medical and legal 
conceptions of both insanity and responsibility. 
iii. Public opinion and white slaves 
In 1876 one of the Journal of Mental Science's `noisy importunate' agitators anonymously 
published a pamphlet entitled Slavery in England., An Account of the manner in which persons 
without trial are condemned to imprisonment for life. Employing cases of `solitary survivors' who 
had emerged from lunatic asylums `with reason unimpaired to tell the horrible tale of those who 
have disappeared within the walls of a madhouse, engulfed like those beneath the waves, never to be 
seen by those they love again', 
66 
the pamphlet insisted that in a culture circumscribed by moral 
cowardice and in a society which legally violated personal liberty, `the natural birthright of all 
mankind'(p. 4), wrongful confinement in lunatic asylums would continue to thrive. Wrongful 
confinement was not only symbolically represented by the Bastille, but was also imagined as a form 
of slavery: 
If slavery consists in deprivation of liberty, in being absolutely under the power of 
another, in being deprived of civil rights, of wife, of children, and property, the reader, no 
doubt to his unbounded astonishment, will find well-authenticated cases of such slavery 
existing in England, the renowned land of liberty, at the present day. (p. 4) 
The pamphlet recounted the stories of the `white slaves'(p. 89), victims of the `evil' system who had 
been detained in `prison-houses [... ] without trial by jury, or any opportunity of vindicating their 
rights'(p. 5). Their stories were brought before the public to raise publicity, money and influence 
for the `righteous cause'(p. 93) of lunacy law reform. Though accepting that it lay with the 
appointment of a Parliamentary Select Committee to effect `an entire reconstruction of those laws, 
65 Coxe, Lunacy in its Relation to the State, pp. 3-4. 
66 `Eye Witness', Slavery in England. An account of the manner in which persons without trial are 
condemned to imprisonment for life, with illustrative cases (London: W. H. Guest, 1876), p. 81. Further 
page references are contained within the text. 
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under cover of which the liberties of Englishmen are violated, notwithstanding the existence of 
Magna Charta and all those safeguards which in this country we might imagine effectually protect 
our rights'(p. 5), a direct appeal was made to the lay-public: `They [the public] have proved by their 
protest against the Fugitive Slave Bill that the same hatred of oppression and cruelty dwell in their 
hearts as animated their forefathers [... ] Will they also come forward on the part of the white 
slaves? ' (p. 90) 
The psychiatric profession was horrified by the tract's strategic invocation of slavery. 
Parliament had abolished the slave trade in 1807. By 1838 the project of emancipating nearly a 
million slaves in the British West Indies had been completed. As Linda Colley argues, the success 
of anti-slavery campaigns had become an `emblem of national virtue, a means by which the British 
could impress foreigners with their innate love of liberty-'. 
67 Both the author of Slavery in England 
and the profession of mental science were sensitive to the rhetorical power of a discourse which 
invoked liberty and slavery in discussions of incarceration in lunatic asylums. The physicians 
perceived in the tract's analogy between wrongful confinement and slavery a challenge to their 
humanitarian credentials and professional credibility. They mounted a rigorous defence of their role 
in the care and cure of the lunatic. 
68 Though the Journal of Mental Science agreed that the lunacy 
laws were capable of reform, the arguments of Slavery in England were rejected as ̀ feeble, one-sided 
[and] incoherent' and had probably been written by a woman. 
69 
The journal's attack on the pamphlet indicates that the psychiatric profession was 
unprepared for such a rhetorically powerful attack on their propriety and authority. Physicians came 
to fear the power of lay-public opinion in medico-legal discourses and debates and attacked 
interventions like Slavery in England with whatever means were at their disposal. This included 
the imputation that `Eye Witness' was a woman, and had therefore been making emotional 
arguments which serious men need not consider. 
The pamphlet invited support for the newly-formed Lunacy Law Amendment Society 
(LLAS), whose secretary, James Billington, was asked to give testimony at the hearings on cases of 
wrongful confinement. 
70 Billington demanded that all persons alleged to be insane should either 
67 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 
p. 354. 
68 The author of Slavery in England was presumably aware that Lord Shaftesbury, chairman of the 
Lunacy Commission, was a vocal proponent of the abolition movement. See Battiscombe, Shaftesbury, 
pp. 238,254. 
69JMS, 22 (1876-77), p. 613. 
70 Billington explained to the committee members that he and others, including gentlemen of 
position in the City (which he refused to name), had decided to establish their society seven months 
previously because they had felt the need to separate themselves from the Lunacy 
Law Reform 
Association (LLRA). The spiritualist views of the LLRA's Secretary, Louisa Lowe, were to 
Billington 
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be brought first before a magistrate or have the power to demand a jury trial where they might 
bring witnesses forward to prove their sanity. Once in the asylum, the LLAS insisted that 
committal papers be made available. Notices should be displayed in the day rooms informing the 
alleged lunatic of their rights to see a solicitor and post letters without interference. The LLAS 
demanded that the patient have the option of removal to a public asylum. Lastly, the Society 
wanted improper detention to be considered a ̀ public wrong'. False or erroneous allegations of 
lunacy should be punishable as a misdemeanor when shown to be wilful and malicious. 
Being declared insane was a source of shame and embarrassment to patients and their 
relatives and many were unwilling to offer their cases up to public scrutiny. For this reason, 
Billington relied heavily on the cases detailed in Slavery in England. This strategy exasperated the 
committee members who demanded that Billington back up his charges with facts and figures and 
named individuals. In the face of the committee's insistence, which verged on hostility, he insisted 
that the key to the prevention of wrongful confinement lay in generating publicity and in opening 
up the diagnosis of insanity from the joint province of medicine and law. The lay-jury was at the 
heart of the reformers' strategy: `Our opinion is, that men who have a knowledge of mankind, that 
in living about the world, not necessarily within a prescribed limit, which medical men or lawyers 
move in, would have a better opportunity of determining whether a man was insane or not'. 
71 
Both the `Eye-Witness' and Billington's criticisms illustrate that the 1877-78 Inquiry forced an 
interrogation of the rights claimed by the legal and medical professions. Reformers challenged 
their right to determine the line between sanity and lunacy. 
The last witness invited to testify at the 1877-78 select committee inquiry (on 12 July, 
1877) was a man widely acknowledged as a defender of the rights of lunatics, the Earl of 
Shaftesbury, Chairman of the Lunacy Commission since its establishment in 1845. Tracing the 
course of legislation since the 1840s, he argued that since at least 1859 ̀we have been in a state of 
continued progress and a very great improvement'. 
72 Testifying before Walpole's Select 
Committee of 1859, Shaftesbury suggested that lunatics might have been detained longer than was 
necessary. Agitators for lunacy reform including Billington and the `Eye-Witness'had repeatedly 
referred to Shaftesbury's view. Yet while Shaftesbury was now prepared to admit that perfection had 
not yet been attained, he continued to argue that legislative reform had been at the heart of humane 
advances in the treatment of the insane. No longer, he felt, were the safeguards implemented by 
the lunacy laws inadequate to prevent undue detention. Conspiracies were simply next to 
debilitating to the action and aims of the LLAS, despite the common belief that the present 
laws were 
inadequate to secure the personal liberty of individuals. 
71 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 315. 
72 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 532. 
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impossible in what had become a ̀ great liberation society'. 
73 When pressed on this point by the 
Chairman of the Committee in 1877, he emphasised another factor: the power of public opinion. It 
had been `so very active, so much attention is paid, visitation is so much improved in a variety of 
ways [... ] that I should say that in the licensed houses, and certainly in the county asylums, the 
tendency was rather to turn patients out too soon'. 
74 Publicity, he felt, had acted powerfully on 
the `minds of the superintendants'. The change was especially noticeable since 1859, when `people 
were not easily moved to consider these matters'. 
75 
Lunacy, Shaftesbury believed, presented a great danger to society and for this reason early 
detention in an asylum was of utmost necessity. In this first step on the road to cure, 
responsibility lay with the lunatic's family and friends to pay vigilant attention to the early stages 
of disease. Shaftesbury wanted to instill in the public a precautionary obligation. They were 
responsible for scrutinising their friends and relatives for `peculiar' behavior and for `something 
out of the common way'. Yet the fact that in a ̀ very large number of cases, the insanity is not 
detected until the overt act has been committed' suggested to Shaftesbury the influence of the `evil 
way in which a large proportion of the public judge of sanity and insanity'. 
76 In truth, Shaftesbury 
was ambivalent about public opinion and its role in the treatment of lunatics. He believed that 
public concern had initiated valuable reforms. However, he felt equally that the public remained 
largely ignorant of the complexities of the issues, especially those raised by partial forms of 
insanity: 
the large mass of society, even educated persons, are wholly unable to form an opinion 
unless they see something that is very decided; that they consider aberration; something 
very peculiar; something out of the common way [... ] they do not see that it very often is 
an indication of his approaching insanity; they put it down [instead] to a sudden change 
of temper. 
77 
Though Shaftesbury accorded the lay-public with duties and responsibilities equaling that 
of the lunacy commissioners, other notions regarding lunacy and its treatment needed to be 
excised from the popular imagination, notably the connection between private licensed houses 
for 
the insane and the principle of profit which tarnished the reputation of private lunatic asylums. In 
1859 Shaftesbury had deplored the principle of profit as the epitome of a ̀ vicious' system. In his 
73 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 535. 
74 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 533. 
75 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 549. 
76 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 534. 
77 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 534. 
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1877 testimony, he argued conversely that private licensed houses for the insane provided a valuable 
service for wealthy individuals and offered treatment unmatched by pudic institutions limited in 
funding. Shaftesbury was questioned on his change of opinion and he responded by praising the 
`public jealousy upon the subject' of private lunatic asylums. 
78 Should either the vigilance of the 
commissioners or the public be relaxed, the result would inevitably be a return to the past era of 
abuses, conspiracies and collusions between asylum superintendants, mad-doctors and devious 
relatives. 
Nevertheless, he desired to `comfort the public mind'79 by offering reassurance that 
experts in mental disease were best placed to treat the malady in the site of the asylum, and that 
they themselves were active agents in this process to cure the lunatic and to protect society. 
Shaftesbury praised the public for their protection of the liberty of the subject, exhorted them to 
increase their vigilance for the benefit of a safe society (free from the dangers of roaming lunatics), 
and deplored their ignorant beliefs (whether grounded in fear or embarrassment); The `increased 
comprehensiveness of signification' had led to a broadening not only of the public's awareness of 
the spectre of lunacy itself, but of the role they might play and the responsibilities they should 
discharge. ̀ [E]verybody', lawyers, physicians, and the lay-public, should `be alive to the matter'80 
of insanity. The revolution in public sentiment itself necessitated a revolution in accountability. 
As Billington's comments indicate, though publicity was in many respects the key to 
preventing wrongful incarceration by ensuring early detention, educating the public and 
heightening society's awareness of the dangers of lunacy, publicity itself posed its own dangers and 
embarrassments. The pervasive `social stain'81 which insanity engendered affected both the lunatic 
(even after release from an asylum) and his or her family and friends. The `great fear in England of 
so many people', Shaftesbury admitted, `is publicity and anything that tends to bring the patient 
before the public, and to make the case of the patient notorious, would induce people to keep back 
that patient [... ] before they admitted him to the treatment of an asylum'. 
82 In his testimony, 
Crichton Browne suggested that the reason why well-to-do families preferred the privacy of 
licensed houses was because there existed a `wide amount of disgrace' attached to insanity. 
83 
78 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 558. 
79 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 561. 
80 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 558. 
81 Lancet, (18 77) i, p. 429. 
82 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 564. 
83 PP 1877 XIII, 1, p. 65. Recall the centrality of the issue of privacy in the 1859-60 Select 
Committee hearings. 
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Lord Shaftesbury's evidence, especially his conception of the complex and shifting 
relationship between those with a specialist knowledge of insanity and the lay-public, seems 
initially to reinforce Sibbald's suggestion that a revolution had taken place in the sentiment of 
society towards lunacy. Both Sibbald and Shaftesbury appear to agree also that heightened public 
scrutiny of psychological doctors acted to prevent abuse and stem neglect of their professional 
responsibilities. Yet whereas Sibbald felt that the broader conception of insanity which had been 
generated in the public mind had underpinned and influenced the direction of reform, Shaftesbury's 
comments suggest that the productive relationship between the public's widening knowledge and 
the result of the `broader conception of the nature of insanity [... ] [which had been] generated in 
the public mind' was more tenuous, and for two reasons. First, the difficulty, even for physicians, 
of accurately determining the existence of insanity, despite ever greater discrimination between 
kinds and types, and divisions and subdivisions of insanity; and second, the fear of publicity and 
the subsequent inaction on the part of the public. 
84 
iv. Overview 
Because the medical profession had argued that there had been no satisfactory reason for the 
institution of the Inquiry in the first place, and that the basis for the Inquiry was grounded merely 
in the hostility and antipathies of `noisy importunate lunatics' who had been subjected to the 
machinations of the complicated lunacy laws, their comments following the publication of the 
Report in early 1878 betray a certain satisfaction: 
Altogether, the mountain which had travailed has brought forth a mouse. The cases of 
grievance put before the Commissioners at great length turned out to be moonshine, and 
under such circumstances no really valuable result could be expected. A great deal of time 
has been wasted, for which the only compensation we can see is, that the public mind may 
possibly be reassured from the scare which first assumed important dimensions under the 
85 
skilful manipulation of Mr. Charles Reade, in his well-known `Hard Cash'. 
84 When John Charles Bucknill travelled to the States to investigate their systems of asylum care, he 
attributed in Notes on Asylums for the Insane in America (London: J. & A. Churchill, 1876) the 
faults 
he witnessed not only to defective legislation but to, as one reviewer described it, `the absence of a 
healthy public opinion as to the requirements of the insane'. See the British and Foreign Medico- 
Chirurgical Review, 6 (July-October 1877), p. 173. This point, I suggest, reinforces the important 
role that public opinion played in the attitude towards and the organisation within the 
lunatic 
asylum. 
85 ̀ Report of the Lunacy Commission', BMJ, (1878), i, p. 540. 
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The Lancet agreed: ̀ The tone of half-heartedness which runs through the [select committee's] 
Report is in itself a convincing proof that nothing of great moment had been detected which could 
be held to call for vigorous action, or has even provoked a strong opinion'. 
86 
John Charles Bucknill drew opposite conclusions. He believed that the invasion of the 
liberty of the subject, sanctioned by the powers of caption conferred upon the owners of asylums by 
the 1845 Act, had for `a generation made private war upon the liberties of the innocent and the 
helpless, who are no more dangerous than children, no more in need of imprisonment than the deaf 
and the blind'. 
87 Far from disentangling the roles and responsibilities of the judicial and medical 
authorities, the `origin, action and conclusions of this [1877] Select Committee [... ] are singularly 
loose and illogical, as if everyone who touched the subject was bound to become a little 
incoherent'. 88 Because no-one, it seemed, was content with the report's conclusions (except the 
asylum superintendants) Bucknill felt that the paradoxical result of the Inquiry was to produce 
greater public unease and distrust about the operation of the lunacy laws. 
89 
What the 1877 Inquiry made clear is that the terms of the debate over wrongful 
confinement had shifted since the early days of lunacy reform. Most significantly, the parameters of 
responsibility had extended; more attention centred on the beneficial and detrimental roles that 
friends and families played in the confinement of alleged lunatics. Considering the fact that 
throughout the nineteenth century the lay-public had played an increasingly significant role in the 
revolution in the care and treatment of the insane, it remains ironic that this occurred during a 
period in which, as Bucknill puts it, the `nicer touch of a finikin civilization' was shrinking from 
`the contact of imperfect-fellows'. The debates set in motion by the select committee hearings of 
1877-78, especially those centring on the relationship between `responsibility' and the role of the 
public, tapped into many of the anxieties and issues that the coverage of the McNaughten case 
engendered over thirty years earlier. The 1877-78 Inquiry provides a fascinating juncture through 
which also to examine the way in which popular conceptions of rightful confinement had evolved 
since the McNaughten case of 1843. 
The importance of the McNaughten case was two-fold. Within the courtroom, the trial 
and subsequent rulings set a legal precedent by which to determine the responsibility attached to 
lunatics diagnosed with partial forms of insanity. Outside the confines of the court, an equally 
important debate was taking place. This newspaper and journal controversy, over whether 
McNaughten was a lunatic or an assassin and should therefore be the object of sympathy or 
86 `Report on the Committee on Lunacy Law', Lancet, (1878) i, p. 504. 
87 Bucknill, The Care of the Insane, p. 38. 
88 Bucknill, The Care of the Insane, p. ix. 
89 Bucknill, The Care of the Insane, p. ix. 
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condemnation, was constructed on rival conceptions of humanity and inhumanity. It was not 
McNaughten himself who was the primary subject of discussion, but the public's `proper' response 
to the murder of Drummond. In Sibbald's terms, we might consider the McNaughten case as it was 
debated in the press as one which indicates the `increased comprehensiveness of signification' which 
was initiated by the `revolution in public sentiment' towards the insane. The 1877 Inquiry, too, 
provides an opportunity for exploring the understanding of and significance attributed to the 
`public mind'. Though the Inquiry itself was not radical in its conclusions, it remains significant 
for our understanding of the full implications that the `increased comprehensiveness of 
signification' had on lunacy reform. In becoming entangled in debates over responsibility and 
accountability, issues which had previously been jealously guarded by both medicine and law, the 
lay-public had emerged as a powerful force in medico-legal discourse, beginning to contest and 
shape the terms of the debate in a manner previously unimaginable, both to themselves and others. 
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Conclusion 
The year after J. Stevenson Bushnan was embroiled in a controversy with Charles Reade over the 
novelist's treatment of wrongful confinement in Hard Cash, the physician published Hints on 
Certifying in Cases of Insanity (1862). He included at the end of the tract an advertisement for his 
own private lunatic asylum near Salisbury, Laverstock House. It was an advertisement which 
advocated the unique benefits of private asylum care. In addition to possessing a ̀ large and efficient 
staff of experienced male and female attendants', the institution provided an `approved' treatment 
regime which incorporated `every means of remedial treatment suggested by modern science and 
experience'. It was a site replete with every possible `comfort and convenience' to aid patients the 
`greatest prospect of success' in the treatment of their maladies. As the reader was forcefully 
reminded, Laverstock House was not solely `a place of detention and security'. 
' 
Bushnan's reassuring emphasis on medical expertise founded on `experience' and `modern 
science' represents a conscious attempt to allay concerns generated by the disparaging depiction of 
the private asylum contained in tracts, novels and pamphlets sensationally exposing instances of 
wrongful confinement (such as Collins's The Woman in White (1860) or Reade's Hard Cash). Like 
those accounts, an `Extraordinary Narrative of an Outrageous Violation of Liberty and Law' (a 
penny pamphlet describing the illegal incarceration of Lady Rosina Lytton), represented the kind 
of hostile publicity to which Bushnan and others were forced to reply. The frontispiece illustration 
of the `Extraordinary Narrative' provocatively challenged Bushnan's confident portrayal of the 
private lunatic asylum as an enlightened and humane site of care and treatment. In the illustration 
Lady Lytton is depicted, draped in white robes, as an innocent woman who is trapped in a dungeon 
littered with sculls. The room in which she languishes is both oppressive and ominous. The dim 
light cast by candles does not conceal a skeleton in the corner of the room. Nor does it disguise the 
shock of her solicitor. The dramatic pictorial image of wrongful confinement is reinforced by the 
language: `gloomy cell' and `dismal dungeon of Bedlam'. The analogy between the asylum and the 
prison is explicit. 
2 
These two representations of the private lunatic asylum - as the epitome of modern 
psychological medicine and as a Gothic den of horrors - were in explicit dialogue with one another 
throughout the nineteenth century. These images exemplify a series of contentious debates about 
wrongful confinement in private lunatic asylums in Victorian England. I have been concerned in 
1 See Figure 5 (on p. 234), from J. Stevenson Bushnan, Hints on Certifying in Cases of Insanity 
(Salisbury: Frederick A. Blake, [1862]), no page number. 
2 See Figure 6 (on p. 235), `Extraordinary Narrative of an Outrageous Violation of Liberty and Law' 
[1858], reprinted in David Lytton Cobbold, A Blighted Marriage: The Life of Rosina Bulwer Lytton 
(Knebworth: Knebworth House Education and Preservation Trust, 1999). 
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this study to trace the ways that this powerful cultural anxiety was articulated and negotiated from 
the 1840s through to the 1870s. 
This was a period in which the understanding of psychological maladies, and so the care 
and treatment of the lunatic, was transformed. The rise of the lunatic asylum as the officially- 
sanctioned site of care, the introduction of new treatment regimes and the expansion of 
nomenclatures of insanity were all measures which psychological physicians triumphantly hailed as 
a sign of the successful consolidation of their professional authority over the lunatic. However, as 
this dissertation has argued, it was also a period marked by increasing public concern over the 
excessive authority of psychological physicians and deepening anxiety about the organisations 
whose responsibility it was to supervise the efficient operation of the lunatic asylum. 
Despite confident medical declarations of skill and expertise, and notwithstanding the 
safeguards enshrined in legislation to prevent wrongful confinement, physicians, asylum 
superintendants and commissioners in lunacy were unable to successfully allay the concerns 
engendered by cultural representations of wrongful confinement. Two specific and interrelated 
developments ensured the medical community's inability to communicate to the lay-public what 
they perceived as their remarkable accomplishments: the expansion of medical classifications of 
insanity to include partial forms of lunacy (such as moral insanity and monomania), and the 
`increased comprehensiveness of signification' attached to the `idea' of insanity as it was 
reformulated in response to a ̀ revolution in popular sentiment'. 
Far from reassuring the public that the expansion of classifications of insanity would give 
rise to the improved care and treatment of lunatics, many Victorians felt that `new' diagnoses of 
moral insanity and monomania posed a direct and dangerous threat to the civil liberties of English 
men and women. Formulated in medico-legal trials, novels, newspaper editorials and personal 
accounts, this opinion was widespread. One of the most powerful tropes through which this 
anxiety was constructed was the Bastille of ancien regime France. Judging from their vociferous 
responses in psychological tracts and journals, physicians were attuned to the threat that the 
words, images and associations associated with the Parisian prison posed to their medical 
credibility and, ultimately, their professional aspirations. 
Demonstrating the multiple levels on which the Bastille operated in debates over wrongful 
confinement, W. A. F. Browne was one of a number of physicians to liken the `reign of humanity' 
in the care and treatment of the insane to the triumphant storming of the Bastille in 1789. Yet the 
words, images and associations used to describe the `triumphs of the application of 
humanity' and 
the `conquests over ignorance, superstition, and cruelty'3 achieved by the Victorian profession of 
mental science were themselves subject, like the Bastille, to manipulation. As this study 
has 
3 Daniel Hack Tuke, Chapters in the History of the Insane in the British Isles (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench & Co., 1882), p. 501. 
2 ý1 
shown, the discourse of humanitarianism played an equally complicated role in the debates over 
wrongful confinement. 
In 1852 Charles Dickens published an article in Household Words describing a visit to St 
Luke's Hospital for the insane. Though concerned at the absence of activities for its inmates, he 
applauded physicians for their `substitution of humanity for brutality' and `kindness for 
maltreatment'. While such language was used by Dickens and physicians themselves to signify the 
improvements in the care and treatment of the insane, it was also deployed in debates about 
wrongful confinement to deride the profession of mental science. In particular, the rhetoric of 
humanitarianism was employed to denounce their new theories of partial insanity. Perceived by 
many as assisting criminals to escape due retribution, moral insanity and monomania positioned 
physicians as excessively humane. These diagnoses exacerbated an anxiety in the 'public mind' 
about the aims of the `system of mercy' and entrenched a mistrust of its `good effects'. 
Both psychological physicians and their critics in the lunacy law reform movement used a 
language of `humanity' to defend their own activities and undermine their opponents. There was a 
crisis of `excessive' humanity in the debates about moral insanity and monomania and in related 
debates about wrongful confinement. Physicians defended their theories and actions by attacking 
their critics as ̀ humanity-mongers' whose `wild, irregulated, hysterical clamour'4 constituted a 
`morbid excess' of `humane feeling' on the subject of insanity. In turn, the lunacy law reformers, 
recognising the rhetorical value of the language of `humanity'- its power to influence the public - 
attacked the physicians as being too `soft-hearted' (to criminals) and inhumane to those falsely 
diagnosed with insanity. 
As this dissertation has demonstrated, the debates about wrongful confinement exposed 
the fragility of the authority of physicians. During the decades covered here, the profession's claims 
of medical authority were challenged; not only in courts of law, but in the formidable court of 
public opinion. If it were not for what Sibbald described as the `revolution' in the popular 
understanding of insanity, debates about wrongful confinement would not have been so powerfully 
informed and complicated by sentimentalised language and concerns with representation. Like the 
introduction of moral insanity and monomania to established classificatory systems, the benefits 
to be gained from and the problems posed by the evolution of `popular sentiment' on the subject of 
wrongful confinement were hotly contested, acting to alter cultural attitudes towards not only the 
insane but also towards the medical profession. `[H] umanity-mongers' had become an influential 
factor in medico-legal discourse, challenging the authority of mental science and undermining the 
perception of its triumphant `reign of humanity'. 
Space restraints have prevented discussion of a number of allied issues and debates. 
William Parry-Jones's The Trade in Lunacy, remains an important point of reference for scholars 
4 Hack Tuke, Chapters, p. 500. 
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interested in the origins of wrongful confinement in the eighteenth century. Though this area is 
only of peripheral interest here, the dissertation demonstrates more generally the necessity for a 
critical re-evaluation of the origins of the `trade in lunacy'. Similarly, there has not been space to 
consider the significant role debates about wrongful confinement played in passing of the Lunacy 
Acts Amendment Act of 1889.5 I have been concerned here to explore cases of wrongful 
confinement which turned on the contested diagnoses of moral insanity and monomania, and to 
examine the debates and anxieties they engendered. For this reason, I have deliberately not 
attempted to assess quantitatively whether these two forms of partial insanity contributed to an 
actual increase in the numbers wrongfully confined in English lunatic asylums. Though posing its 
own difficulties, this is an avenue which remains important to pursue. 
The `hue and cry' surrounding cultural representations of wrongful confinement offer an 
invaluable site through which to understand how Victorians perceived both madness and the 
practice and practitioners of psychological medicine. The debates also present a vehicle through 
which to consider medical conceptions of alleged lunatics and their families, a frame of reference too 
often overlooked. In refocusing attention on cultural values, perceptions and attitudes, and 
exploring the complex utilisation and manipulation of the `rhetoric of intentions', this study 
challenges scholars to reconceptualise the value of debates about wrongful incarceration in 
Victorian society and culture. This is especially the case because so many of the debates here 
discussed were influenced by and contributed to debates taking place in oth 
r. lthe 
significance we 
should thus accord to the wider ramifications of these debates (about liberty, tyranny, autonomy 
and the individual and the state) cannot be underestimated. 
The dangers of and benefits to be gained from the diagnosis of moral insanity were debated 
until the early twentieth century. Subject to the powerful influence of degenerationist theory, and 
the rise of a biologically-determinist interpretive model of mental disorder, the term `moral 
insanity' was replaced initially by the terms `moral imbecility' and `moral idiocy', and later with 
the term `psychopathic' or `sociopathic' personality'. 
6 The doctrine of monomania suffered a 
similar fate. In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, French psychiatrists initiated the 
removal of the term from medical vocabularies. Considering the problems that both terms posed 
to the legal and medical professions, it was inevitable that they would be replaced with less 
contentious terms. What remains remarkable, and necessary for this study, is the fact that moral 
5 This was an act which addressed one of the key anxieties of lay lunacy law reformers 
by demanding 
the signature of a magistrate prior to committal to private lunatic asylums. On the ramifications of 
this Act, see Peter McCandless, `Dangerous to themselves and Others: the Victorian Debate over the 
Prevention of Wrongful Confinement', Journal of British Studies, 23 (Fall 1983), pp. 84-10 4. 
6 Carlson and Dain, `The Meaning of Moral Insanity', p. 139. 
7 Goldstein, Console, pp. 189-196. 
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insanity and monomania survived in medical discourse for almost a century, in spite of the 
hostility they generated towards the profession of mental science. 
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Figure 5. 
Advertisement for Laverstock House Asylum, Wiltshire [1862] 
and carriage exercise, one of -the privileges of the higher class 
of patients, is allowed to others whose state of health will not 
permit them to join in country walks and excursions. A cler- 
gyman resides in the village ; Divine Service is regularly 
performed in the private chapel of the Institution; and the 
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